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"On behalf of the Government and the People of Malta I have the honour 
to invoke for my Country the right to be an independent state. I request you 
therefore to fix as a matter of urgency a date for the Maltese Islands' 
independence within the Commonwealth." 
With this letter, dated 20 th August 1962 addressed to Duncan 
Sandys, then Colonial Secretary, Prime Minister Gorg Borg Olivier 
started the formal process which led in two years' time to Malta 
becoming independent. 
It was a process which had long started as an ideal; it was the 
nationhood concept of Malta, existing since when we were a Roman 
municipium, realising itself in the uprising against Monroy under 
Spanish domination, asserting itself as a sovereign entity with the 
Order of St John, realising itself in the revolt and victory over the 
French occupation between 1798 and 1800; the Maltese then aimed 
at national independence under the protection of Great Britain, 
only to be dispossessed by the imposition of colonial rule by the 
"protecting power" putting an end to "Melitensium amor" and 
substituting thereto military occupation by cession. 
The Maltese people sought their independence mainly through 
political action and except for the Sette Giugno events ending in 
bloodshed and death and which expressed the exasperation of 
people long-suffering and long-used; the way to self-government 
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and eventual sovereignty was led through the decades by historical 
figures such as Mitrovich and Camillo Sceberras, Fortunato Mizzi, 
founder of the Nationalist Party, Manuel Dimech with his Bandiera 
tal-Maltin, Sir U go Mifsud and Enrico Mizzi. 
In 1932 the Nationalist government demanded, for Malta, 
Dominion status on the basis of the Statute of Westminster. In 1955 
the then rising star of Maltese politics, Dom Mintoff, swung the 
pendulum in favour of integration with Britain, re-swinging later for 
independence. The so-called "Break ·with Britain Resolution" 
proposed by Mintoff, was immediately seconded by Borg Olivier in 
the Legislative Assembly in December 1957 and thus ensured the 
definite burial of the integration proposal. 
Malta owes a lot to some of its politicians. In this book Prof. Frendo 
has rendered a service not only to history but also to the realisation 
that Malta has been served well by many who sought in politics to 
serve their country. We have reached a standard of living and a 
quality of life among the highest in the Mediterranean region. We 
have exploited our geographic position, we have taken important 
initiatives both at Helsinki I and Helsinki II, we have given to the 
Mediterranean dimension full significance in our foreign policy. At 
the United Nations we have contributed seminal ideas on the 
Common Heritage of Mankind concept as well as on reforms to the 
United Nations. We hope to seek convergence on our road to 
Europe. We have made full use of our independence. 
We can understand today's achievement through this exceptional 
book, recalling the pains and agony of the rundown of the Services, 
the mass migration to Australia and Canada, the meagre financial 
assistance offered to Malta by Britain which Borg Olivier disdained 
in a phrase which became famous: "I have not come here to make 
a silver collection." 
Prof. Frendo reveals the dramatis personae of the sixties in Malta's 
political scene: Toni Pellegrini, turbulent and precipitous, Herbert 
Ganado a nationalist and a firm believer in Christian social doctrine 
but fearing an Independent Malta with Mintoff in Government. 
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Mabel Strickland always a believer in Malta's dependence on Britain 
but accepting Independence once achieved. Mintoff is certainly in 
a class of his own. His dynamism and creativity are only matched by 
his style, difficult, abrasive and populist, one of the best negotiators 
in the international scene, yet neglecting himself any diplomatic 
touch; he sought difficult positions and far from waiting for the 
maturity of time, provoking the time factor in advancing causes in 
which he firmly believed. In a way he contrasted and complemented 
Borg Olivier. Borg Olivier was cautious in his approaches, 
diplomatic in his statements, yet determined and solid as a rock once 
he reached a decision. He was careful not to make enemies but never 
at the expense of the dignity of his country. He had an almost 
physical love for Malta. Borg Olivier was never given to clericalism, 
maintaining a distance yet never neglecting any support from the 
Church; he was not a doctrinaire but in his pragmatism had an 
instinctive understanding for the common man. Indeed, he felt a 
very common man himself. He used to tell me that he never 
regarded himself to be particularly intelligent but made it a habit to 
listen to others and after listening to others he built his own 
conclusions. 
I knew personally and to a certain extent worked with all the dramatis 
personae involved. I had a personal liking for Herbert Ganado and 
his humanitas. Anyone reading "Rajt Malta Tinbidel", a classic for all 
times on Malta's social history, can understand the humanitas of 
Herbert. I followed him in his commitment to a welfare society built 
on social legislation inspired by Christian social doctrine. But he 
disappointed me tremendously by not believing in Independence. 
On resigning from the splinter Democratic Nationalist Party I 
informed him that his negative stand on Independence was neither 
democratic still less nationalist. I then took an active part in the 
independence referendum campaign organised by the Nationalist 
Party addressing public meetings and conferences in different parts 
of the island. 
I never felt any kindred spirit with Toni Pellegrini. I disagreed with 
him on what I considered his superficial approach on fundamental 
issues and the rough style in expressing himself. 
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At the time referred to in Prof. Frendo's book, I knew Mabel 
Strickland mainly form afar. She was dedicated to the cause of the 
Empire and for Malta as a self-governing colony within the 
Commonwealth. My own politics were completely alien to hers. In 
the course of time I got to know her very well indeed, primarily as 
her legal adviser. She was a formidable woman, very pragmatic; 
despite her political beliefs, once Independence was achieved she 
made it a point to ensure that her papers would uphold Malta's 
Independence as a democracy within a European and 
Commonwealth context. 
Another key factor was Archbishop Gonzi. He was certainly 
moulded in the "Prince - Bishop" cast. He was an ecclesiastic 
reflecting a pre-Aggiornamento Church. He also knew how to fight 
for a cause and how to mobilise the forces of the "Militant" Church .. 
Even in those times I considered the infliction of the interdict as 
unwise and excessive. In Archbishop Gonzi, Mintoff found his 
match. Both were born leaders. Both discarded the art of 
compromise. Both generated followers who firmly believed in them, 
but on reflection and with the advantage of time I believe that the 
extremes of the 1960's and indeed of the early 1970's could have 
been avoided had the transition to Independence been made on a 
consensual and national basis without a "religious" conflict added 
thereto. In this context one cannot but admire the style and 
substance of Borg Olivier's politics and policies. He exploited to his 
party's advantage the Mintoff - Gonzi conflict, made the British 
Government understand that it was only his Government that could 
ensure an Independent Malta within a Western European context. 
Duncan Sandys realised that with Borg Olivier one could reach a 
gentleman's agreement. The Maltese people, even those reluctant 
for Independence, sensed that Malta's future was in an 
Independent Malta and found in Borg Olivier's proposal for an 
Independent Malta with a Monarchical system and Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth as Queen of Malta together with a defence 
agreement and a financial treaty with Great Britain for a ten-year 
term, as providing that political stability and security that Malta 
needed for its first decade of independence. 
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I think that Borg Olivier's foresight rested mainly on his correct 
reading of Malta's aspirations within a context of continuity. 
I t has to be said to the credit of Mr Mintoff and of the Malta Labour 
Party that their support for Independence was a determining factor 
in Borg Olivier's manoeuvring with the British government. 
We owe a debt of gratitude to the author of this book for making 
many of us re-live yesterday; for teaching the present generation, 
especially those born since Independence how difficult and 
humiliating it was to live as a colony. To coming generations 
Prof. Frendo has shown the contribution made by many Maltese 
politicians to the constitutional development and welfare of 
the Maltese Islands. In particular this book brings out the 
diplomatic skills, the perseverance and the strong belief in the 
Maltese people which Borg Olivier displayed in the difficult years 
leading to Independence, making him indeed Missier Malta 
Indipendenti. 
Some may want to know yesterday to understand tomorrow; 
because history is not a chronology of events, history is the making 
of a people in its political, economic and social evolution. 
Sometimes in going through the history of our people through the 
centuries, we realise that we are living today as an Independent 
State, sovereign as a people, free to join regional and other entities, 
mainly thanks to the contribution of those who dedicated themselves 
to serve their fellow countrymen through politics. One may disagree 
with several or indeed most of these politicians, yet they all 
contributed to a dialogue as a result of which the Maltese people 
built their future. 
Generations of Maltese were denied the right to be masters in 
their country, to decide who is to govern their land; for many it 
was a distant distant dream that Malta would one day be 
independent. We are depositories of such a dream. For the dream 
has come true. 
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Prof. Frendo has, through his research, helped us understand the 
circumstances under which the Maltese politicians had to work 
themselves through, to make a reality of a dream. It is up to us and 
to future generations to live the reality of this dream. 
GUIDO DE MARCO 





This work seeks to paint and to frame a picture of how Maltese 
statehood originated in the early nineteen sixties, what was going on 
behind the scenes. It does this mainly, and for the first time, through 
the voluminous original correspondence recently released in the 
expertly organized and managed British archives in London. By far 
the most important series for our purpose is C0926, which has now 
become accessible after more than thirty years. Containing scores of 
volumes, this deals mainly with Colonial and Commonwealth 
Relations Office affairs. Several documents were misplaced, taken 
out or simply destroyed under statute or otherwise and are today 
unavailable, but originals or copies of the more important exchanges 
between the various officials from different departments and 
ministries almost invariably found their way into the Colonial and 
Commonwealth Relations Office archival circuit. 1 C0926 constitutes 
1 The Dominions Office became the C.R.O. in 1947; this was merged with the 
Foreign Office in 1969. The C.O. was abolished in 1967. 
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thus a comprehensive and revealing corpus of documentary 
evidence. From it, these sinews of thread have been largely woven in 
a modest attempt to throw some further light on what, for Malta and 
her people, was undoubtedly a significant parting of the ways, a 
stepping out into the world. What was going on behind the scenes 
and on the sidelines, why things happened or not, why these 
happened in one way and not in another, is brought into focus. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies and Commonwealth 
Relations, who was most directly concerned with Maltese affairs at 
this time, was Mr Duncan Sandys. He replaced Mr Reginald 
Maudling in mid-July 1962, Maudling having in turn substituted the 
longer-lasting lain Macleod. Four months earlier in 1962, Lord 
Lansdowne had replaced Lord Perth as the Minister of State 
responsible for much the same domain, after Perth had served in that 
capacity for six years, ever since Malta's 'Integration' phase. Mr 
Harold Macmillan, who had headed this Conservative administration 
since 1957, resigned and in October 1963 he was succeeded as Prime 
Minister by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. In that leadership contest, 
Douglas-Home unexpectedly and narrowly beat the Deputy Prime 
Minister Mr R. A. Butler, who however replaced him as the Foreign 
Secretary. The Minister of Defence (redesignated Secretary of State 
for Defence from April 1964) was Major Peter Thorneycroft. When 
Mr Hugh Gaitskell passed away in 1963 he was succeeded as leader 
of the British Labour Party and as Leader of the Opposition by Mr 
Harold Wilson (who then became Prime Minister in October 1964). 
Other figures who played a significant role in the decision-making 
processes regarding Malta, as they emerge from this documentation, 
were the Defence Chiefs of Staff, that is the British Army, the Royal 
Navy and the Royal Air Force, including the Heads of these Services 
stationed in Malta. The Defence Chiefs of Staff reported to Earl 
Mountbatten of Burma, who was Chief of the Defence Staff between 
1959 and 1965. A war hero linked to the royal family, Mountbatten 
knew Malta and the Mediterranean like the back of his hand, having 
served there for six years first as Commander of the First Squadron, 
Mediterranean, then as Admiral and Commander in Chief, 
Mediterranean, as well as NATO's Allied Commander in Chief in the 
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Mediterranean, before becoming First Sea Lord and Chief of the 
Naval Staff in 1955.2 
Other protagonists on the British side were the Governor of the 
Colony, Sir Maurice Dorman who (not unlike Mountbatten in India 
in 1947) would become her first Governor-General in 1964; and Sir 
Edward Wakefield, who occupied the newly-created Office of UK 
Commissioner in Malta under the 1961 Constitution, which had 
been introduced on lines recommended by Sir Hilary Blood. 
On the Maltese side, the main dramatis personae were Dr Giorgio 
Borg Olivier, Prime Minister and, since 1950, Leader of the 
Nationalist Party; Mr Dominic Mintoff, Leader of the Opposition 
apd, since 1949, of the Malta Labour Party; and Archbishop Sir 
Michael Gonzi, who had served in the early 1920s as a Labour Party 
Senator and as private secretary to Archbishop Maurus Caruana 
whom he succeeded in 1943, after having been Bishop of Gozo for 
19 years. In addition to these three, there were the smaller 'Church' 
or 'Centre' parties represented in parliament. These were the 
Christian Workers, Democratic Nationalists and Progressive 
Constitutionals, led respectively by Mr Anthony Pellegrini, Dr 
Herbert Ganado and Miss Mabel Strickland. There were also 
Cabinet Ministers, especially Borg Olivier's number two man in the 
administration Dr Giovanni Felice; and Malta Government officials 
acting in different capacities, some more committed than others, 
who gave valuable service to the Maltese administration and to Malta 
at this determining juncture in her history. 
2 Meddling in Maltese politics was not unknown to Mountbatten either. He is 
reputed to have had a disagreement with Borg Olivier's administration in the mid-
1950s when Borg Olivier insisted that Service goods including polo horses were 
obliged to pay customs duty. Mountbatten prided himself on having called Mr John 
Cole, one of Borg Olivier's Coalition Ministers who later emigrated to Australia, and 
encouraged him to cross the floor, thus toppling the administration, and leading to 
Mintoff's first premiership in 1955, when 'Integration' was very much on the cards. 
Mountbatten confessed this in person over dinner while aboard ship to Mr JohnA. 
Mizzi, then a serving journalist with the Strickland press and a stringer for The Daily 
Telegraph. Mizzi/Frendo interview, July 1999. 
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Left: Sir Edward Wakefield, who became the UK Commissioner in Malta 
under the 1961 'Blood' Constitution, and later the first UK High 
Commissioner accredited to Malta, coordinated the top secret monthly 
intelligence reports by a "Local Committee" between 1962 and 1964. Right: 
Sir Maurice Dorman, Malta's last Governor and later her first Governor-
General, chaired various bodies including, under the 1961 Constitution, the 
Malta Joint Consultative Council, on which the Prime Minister also sat. 
Trade unions, especially the General Workers Union led by Mr Joe 
Attard Kingswell, were directly concerned because of the Services 
run-down. The Malta Police Force, led by Commissioner Vivian de 
Gray, was instrumental in more ways than met the eye. There were 
experts and advisers from overseas, such as Dr Wolfgang Stolper 
from the United Nations, an economist, and his team; and the 
Attorney-General's Office headed by a constitutional lawyer, 
Professor J. J. Cremona. The resident Italian and American consular 
representatives, Signor Onofrio Messina and Mr Harrison Lewis, 
kept a close watch on things. Last but certainly not least, there were 
the parliaments and the publics of the two countries, and the ways 
in which these expressed themselves especially at given moments. 
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materials without losing the reader - in such a way that, so far as 
possible, the events and the topics may be seen to speak for 
themselves - the interpretation has sought to be as faithful as possible 
to the actual happenings and to the main themes identified. There 
were the long, tortuous and sometimes tricky negotiations for 
Independence, which lasted more than two years, and which seemed 
like an eternity. These revolved mainly around constitutional issues, 
defence matters and financial aid. There were other underlying 
options and prospects which loomed ahead, at least potentially, 
involving other powers and concerns. Finally the strings were tied 
up. In spite of the odds, Independence for Malta was made to 
happen. 
By its very nature a pioneering and hopefully seminal work, this 
history thus looks at the emergence of a new state from colonial 
tutelage; at the transformation of a onetime strategic fortress and 
outpost of empire into a democratic and basically sovereign nation; 
at the challenge of viability, integrity and survival for a small island 
in the central Mediterranean, on the southern shores of Europe, 
caught for many years in the hold of one domination after another. 
It is almost as much a history of Britain, in some respects, as it is a 
history of Malta over the time covered - with disengagement, 
Britain's lingering role in the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle 
East, decolonization, and the unfolding Commonwealth, as a 
general background to it. The period focussed on - about four years 
from 1961 to 1964 - may seem like a very short time, but in terms 
of historical 'duration' it is as long and varied as it is complex and 
formative, a veritable X-Ray of Malta past, present and future. 
To change, to adapt, to survive and to better one's life, have been 
and are primary human concerns, for which political decisions of 
every kind and form are necessary all the time. To study these 
frontally in evolving national, institutional or ideological contexts is 
essential for self-understanding in any context. Whether "from 
above" or "from below" - to use a somewhat fashionable and, for the 
diplomatic and political historian, possibly off-putting phraseology 
- there are myriad elements to be investigated in the human 
condition and experience, whether individual or collective, national, 
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regional or global, all of which can rightfully be studied and 
highlighted in time, not necessarily historically. Any suggestion that 
good history is "history without the politics in it" must be taken as 
simply a badly-worded call to impartiality. The emptying of politics 
from history would deprive the historical discipline of what has been 
and is perhaps the overriding drive in mankind: the power to do and 
change things according to new needs, perceptions and aspirations 
as these arise. Depending on the nature of the subject treated, and 
the sources available for its study, a history will be prompted to draw 
its own conclusions on the basis of the evidence available for it at the 
time of writing. The Origins of Maltese Statehood does not pretend to 
do anything more than this. Documents alone do not make history, 
certainly; but there can hardly be a lasting history without 
documents. Documents of one category or another impose their own 
constraints. In the sixties, Robinson and Gallagher spoke of "the 
official mind" in their readings of how British imperialism stumbled 
across Africa from one country to another, marking boundaries for 
purposes of politics and strategy. In a more recent complementary 
work by Cain and Hopkins using another bundle of documents and 
another set oflenses, it turns out that financial and business interests 
in the City were driving that movement forward through other 
pressures. In our case here, in the early 1960s we have a general 
stock-taking of what Malta meant and how it could survive. 
Personalities and individuals also matter. The motor is essentially a 
political and prescriptive one - what to do, and how best to do it -
but in the process, just about everything gets thrown on the table: 
from emigration to tourism, from the dockyard to the Royal Malta 
Artillery, and from the opera house to the university. 
The ensuing revelations, implications and deductions are meant to 
be dynamic not static, and inquisitive: illuminating the lived present 
as much as the recent past. As generations move on, and the child 
fathers the man, new approaches are bound to arise, if only because 
new evidence becomes available. Likewise trapped in time - which 
remains the ultimate arbiter - arrivistes will take issue with 
predecessors. History as it really happened may be a great ideal to 
aspire to, but one which can never be fully attained, and ifbased on 
dehydrated facts it would be a boring and rather useless exercise 
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anyway, because not to interpet is to die. However "wholistic" an 
historian may wish to be, the best one could do in any study of the 
particular is remain open to the inter-related, the multi-faceted, if 
possible positing alternative scenarios and contexts, perhaps 
indicating comparisons in time and space, trying to make sense of 
the materials by ordering coherent lines of sustained empirical 
argument - not, of course, narrating blandly as in a chronicle or in 
a vacuum. By its self-imposed constraints, this exercise sets one wide 
angle and zooms in to focus on a series of related aspects through 
the viewfinder, some of them beneath the surface. To venture 
further beyond place and time or delve deeper for an elusive 
"totality" would be reminiscent of a Latin quip once cited in the 
Council of Government in a debate on language and education by 
the founding-father of the Maltese nationalist movement Dr 
Fortunato Mizzi (d. 1905): "something of everything, nothing of 
anything." There are copious references here to Cyprus, Egypt and 
Gibraltar; to Cuba, British Guiana and Zanzibar; to Italy and the 
Holy See, NATO and the USA. Of course there can be a measure of 
otherness and of universality accompanying immediacy or 
specificity, that is implicit in human behavior anywhere; but not to 
miss the wood for the trees is as important as not missing the trees 
for the wood. As Frantz Fanon put it in 1952: "I am wholly what I 
am. I do not have to look for the universal." NegTitude was its own 
follower: "My Negro consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. 
It is."3 
The Maltese consciousness was emphatically Catholic by religion, 
largely Semitic by language, European by history in a continuum 
since the twelfth century, survivalist and economically dependent 
with strokes and touches of the British Empire set against 
Mediterranean hues, insular and cosmopolitan; but it was above all 
Maltese, hence its uniqueness. So too was Malta's path to 
de colonization and statehood a particular case, however comparable 
it may be to similar paths elsewhere around the globe. Admittedly, 
3 F. Fanon, Peau noire, masques blanes; but see ch. 5, "Independence", Elleke Boehmer, 
Colonial and Posteolonial Literature (Oxford, 1995), pp. 180-222. 
20 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
history writing in Malta, where history was not fully taught as a 
discipline at university before the 1950s, and specialization in it was 
later interrupted for a decade, remained quite subjected to the 
particularistic and antiquarian, the eulogistic and sentimental, with 
doses of paternalism and finality heaped upon it (mingled now with 
tourist colour brochures and coffee table extravaganzas). That was 
partly why Storja was started as an annual digest by the University 
of Malta's History Society in 1978, with an emphasis on "extracting 
meaning". 4 In the words of Malta's Head of State, who has 
graciously contributed the Foreword to this work: 
Sometimes it is tragic to find Maltese students who know 
more about the Wars of the Roses than about events which 
led to their Island's independence; or more about what 
happened in the Italian Risorgimento than how Malta truly 
lived through that period of the Risorgimento, with the roots 
of nationalism and of an independent Malta during the 
same period ... the notion ofliberalism in the true sense of 
the word 'liberal', the notion of democracy evolving, of a 
changing world in which Malta is a participant of change ... 5 
Let us therefore begin to find, to elevate and to examine the 
documents and the memories, tracing the fingerprints and the 
footsteps, to fork out some discernible pathways which, in the case 
before us, lead demonstrably to the present, not to discard what may 
be "contemporary" in the best senses originally intended by great 
thinkers like Vico, Michelet, Croce and others. Let us try to re-evoke 
a lived and a shared past in nation building (as well as in the 
shedding of empire), to come to grips with what it has meant and 
means, inducing the reader to re-live or at least to see those times, 
4 See the mission statement on the inside front cover of the first number: "Storja: A 
Commitment to Historical Learning", Storja 78. 
5 See this writer's interview with President de Marco, The Sunday Times, Valletta, Part 
2, 13 June 1999, under "History, identity and our future", p. 47. 
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such as they were - if possible without tinted spectacles. That still 
remains a very formidable task, not easily realisable, and never 
permanently or ultimately so. Much has already been buried or 
simplistically pigeon-holed in sheer politico-religious and party 
political controversy in recent decades - taking an EU-aspiring Malta 
to the brink of now having five national feasts but no National Day 
as such. 6 Slowly, that may be changing, and about time too; 
mentalities and party leaderships change over time, visions of past 
and future evolve. As new evidence and interpretations become 
available, a national post-colonial historical consciousness, 
reconciliation and pragmatism may indeed mature. 
Wherever possible, documentary evidence here has been 
supplemented and moderated by oral history. This writer has been 
interviewing Maltese people (as well as many non-Maltese ones) 
from all walks of life, not only politicians, since his undergraduate 
days in 1967-1968; many of these have sadly passed away but their 
memories and impressions have been somehow preserved. 
Interviewees have also included Mr Mintoff, Archbishop Gonzi 
(d.1984) and Dr Borg Olivier (d.1980), as well as, among others, the 
late police commissioner Vivian de Gray, the late minister Dr 
Carmelo Caruana, Dr Victor Ragonesi, Professor J. J. Cremona, J oe 
Attard Kingswell, and several others, who were actively involved in 
Maltese public life in the early 1960s. Some of them are 
acknowledged in the bibliography. I heartily thank all those named 
and un-named who have informed, instructed and inspired me; 
there are many to be grateful to - activists, thinkers, writers, fellow 
travellers, critics - for their help and inspiration in the course of 
multifold pursuits in life when facts, experiences and views have 
been aired and shared, not always with any specific aim in view. 
6 In a gesture of reconciliation after what seemed like Mintoff's attempts to wipe 
Independence Day off the Maltese calendar after 1971, when a Nationalist 
administration was returned in 1987 parliament agreed to have five national feasts 
recording different historical events of varying importance: 8th September, 21 st 
September, 7th June, 13th December and 31st March. 
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Unfortunately very few of those who were then involved, somehow 
or other, have sat down to record their memories. Autobiographies 
and biographies in Malta have been somewhat scarce so far, or else 
their authors too reluctant to penetrate the substance, perhaps out 
of deference to their subjects or the fear of ruffling feathers. Moreover 
the times spoken of are still quite recent, almost too recent. They are 
well within the living memory of many older people in Malta as in 
Britain and elsewhere; some of these may well have pockets of 
information and a residual wisdom still awaiting utterance. That 
indeed would be most helpful in the event of a second edition. Sir 
Arturo Mercieca (d.1969), the jurist-deportee who continued to be 
prolific, and whose Le Mie Vicende remains a useful autobiography, 
managed to slot in an emotional reference to independence on the 
last page, in the last paragraph of its English translation. In the early 
1960s, engaged Maltese intellectuals were conspicuous by their 
absence; practically all the space was monopolized by politicians and 
ecclesiastics, their assistants and followers. Of such pertinent 
published recollections as exist, volume four of Rajt Malta Tinbidel by 
Dr Herbert Ganado (d.1979), and the first two chapters ofDr Edgar 
Mizzi's more recent memoirs, have been helpful; references to them 
are duly acknowledged in the usual way. There is also a three volume 
biography of Archbishop Gonzi, the second volume of which is of 
some relevance, and some other generic biographical material mostly 
in Maltese. 
M Y thanks go in the first place to the then Chairman of APS Bank, 
Chev. Alfred P. Farrugia, whose idea it was six years ago that I write 
a book about how Malta became independent. I wish sincerely to 
express my gratitude to him and to the Directors of APS Bank for 
their entire trust and ready encouragement by way of a research 
sponsorship. That was supplemented by whatever else was available 
for research purposes from university funding schemes, and 
otherwise. 7 I would also like to thank the staffs of archives and 
7 My earlier book Malta's Quest for IndejJendence; Reflections on the Course of Maltese 
History, written at the invitation of the publisher Anton Dougall with a brief to 
produce a general, popular, 'non-academic' account from prehistory to the present, 
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libraries where I have mostly worked, especially the Public Record 
Office in London; the Cambridge University Library particularly 
while I was a Visiting Fellow in Clare Hall, Cambridge, in 1996; the 
Bodleian in Oxford, especially Rhodes House; the La Trobe and 
Augsburg university libraries in Australia and Germany from where 
I had obtained relevant secondary data while I taught there; the 
University of Malta Library especially the staff in the reference and 
Melitensia sections; and the staffs at the Santo Spirito archives and 
the Bibliotecha, where the archivist Ms Hella-Jean Bartolo kindly 
and obligingly volunteered to assist with the retrieval, photocopying 
and discussion of some of the documentation once a complete draft 
of the text began nearing completion. The staff at the Department 
of Information's photo library in Valletta were most helpful and kind, 
as were those at the Union Press, Dar Centrali and GWU libraries. 
I sincerely thank them for their assistance and, in the case of the 
DOl and the Union Press, for several photographs they lent me, or 
developed or reproduced for me. Sadly Malta's best photolibrary has 
been lost forever to posterity as a result of the gutting of the Progress 
is now ten years old; it spans a much longer gamut, and it could not of course draw 
upon the primary sources relating to the early 1960s which were then inaccessible. 
Maltese Political Development, 1798-1964, written for the Ministry of Education and 
Human Resources in 1993, is very much a documentary history; it has the advantage 
of complementing this present work through various annotated textual documents 
such as parliamentary speeches covering the 1950s and 1960s until Malta's 
membership of the Council of Europe. An earlier work, Party Politics in a Fortress 
Colony; The Maltese EXjJerience, first published by Midsea in 1979, with a second 
edition by the same publisher in 1991 and a third envisaged soon, is complementary 
as a background and stimulus to The Origins of Maltese Statehood, especially on the 
formation of Maltese political parties from the 1870s, but as a detailed account it 
stops in the early 1920s. The 1920s and 1930s have been fairly thoroughly 
researched from Italian, British and American primary sources, mainly through 
research funding from La Trobe University, Melbourne; but unfortunately due to 
other commitments, and deprived of any research assistance, I have so far not had 
the time and the opportunity to conclude an intended, much-needed two volume 
history of Malta between the Wars. There is a gap in Maltese scholarship here - the 
inter-war period, still under-researched and rather misunderstood, is rich socially 
and culturally in its dialectical texture of fascism, colonialism and democracy, and a 
time when Malta first requested Dominion Status (1932). 
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Press building in Valletta during a 'political demonstration' on 
Monday, 15th October 1979. 
My thanks go to my wife Margaret for her patience and 
encouragement over the years, as well as our children Juliana, 
Benjamin and Oliver, for moral support and not least for their help 
with the computer whenever I got stuck. In this respect, I also want 
to thank the support staff at the University of Malta's Computer 
Services Centre, the Work Resources Programme, and Ms Annabelle 
Borg at the office. The Italian Ambassador, the British High 
Commissioner as well as the directors of the American Centre and 
of the Italian Cultural Institute, Mr John A. Mizzi, a veteran 
journalist, and Dr Alberto Bin from NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 
provided some useful contact addresses, suggestions and, in the 
latter case, copies of materials which are just now being declassified, 
while the Office of the Prime Minister had given me access to some 
archival materials at Castille for an earlier related work, some of 
which I have drawn upon here. Mr Mizzi, Professor Cremona, Major 
E.J. Axisa, Dr Ragonesi and others have kindly supplied me with 
copies of original manuscripts or original photographs from their 
private archives. Their cooperation and support are heartily 
acknowledged. Mr Lino Spiteri, Mr John Mizzi, Professor J oe 
Friggieri, Ms Hella-Jean Bartolo and, at my insistence, Chev. Alfred 
Farrugia, have read and most helpfully commented upon my draft 
MS or parts thereof: to them all I owe a debt of gratitude. Naturally 
I am solely reponsible for any errors of commission or omission. 
HENRYFRENDO 
15th August 1999 
3 
Towards the 1960s 
A LAND AND A PEOPLE 
IN HISTORY 
Throughout their long and chequered history, Maltese had sought 
degrees of manageable freedom. They sometimes dreamt of 
independence but hardly of a complete one - if that were possible. 
Since ancient times, the islanders had developed a sense of 
belonging to their territory: their fields, shores and families. 
Gradually, this affinity evolved into one ofland and people. Already 
in the Middle Ages, we find marked traces of a sense of in-group 
feeling, which could roughly be translated into that of an ethnie, if 
not a patrie. Succeeding generations of islanders held together by 
bonds of blood - kith and kin in a defined space - were obliged to 
seek nourishment and shelter, sometimes to unite in self-defence. 
For countless years, these inhabitants often lived in fear, striving to 
protect their lives and possessions against marauding intruders: the 
hated Saracens searching for spoils, for slave oarsmen responsive to 
the lash of the whip, docile servant-bearers to be shipped off to a 
harem or a market place. Subjected to the law of the powerful, they 
faced avaricious exploiters: feudal lords and their fiscal mercenaries 
drawing blood out of the stone with unilateral abandon. 
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Small, dependent and defenceless, protected by the sea to which 
they were exposed, by the winding alleys of settlement clusters in the 
interior stretching to the tops of hills, they sought to secure a limited 
freedom, the right to live with some amour propre. This was generally 
their best 'bargain chip', not unlike the dream of a freed slave whose 
onetime master gave him food and shelter. On the one hand, they 
needed to belong to a larger whole, to be somehow 'a part of 
something', of one empire or another: Rome, Palermo, Barcelona, 
Madrid, Paris... At the same time, they seemed to want nothing 
better than to enjoy as much autonomy as they could muster in the 
regulation of their internal affairs, without foreign interference. Put 
differently, they needed a protector, but then they would much 
rather be allowed to do as they pleased - having put down anchor, 
they would man their boat. They wanted to be a municipium, with 
or without a Roman governor in situ. They wanted the right directly 
to petition the sovereign beyond the seas, and a promise never again 
to be leased out as a fief to whichever lord. They needed solace and 
assurance at home, in their groping for survival. The food - material 
and spiritual - came from the terra ferma closest to them. It came in 
the form of grain and victuals; it also came in the guise of cassock 
and cloth. As the Roman Catholic Church established itself amongst 
them since the earliest times, especially from the Later Middle Ages 
onwards, they generally clung to it, as a child does to a mother. The 
Muslim Moor, whose language - sometimes linking the northern and 
southern shores of the Mediterranean - they largely spoke, became 
'the other'. 
With the coming of the Order ofStJohn, Malta was once again a fief, 
contrary to the emperor's earlier assurance in 1428; but so 
circumstance obliged. As these Maltese were to find out time and 
again, imperium-insula undertakings tended to be one-sided pacts, or 
perhaps just wishful thinking on the islanders' part. For so long as 
strength came to be measured by superior stealth, such has been the 
fate of the weak in relation to the strong. As chanted in many a 
ballad, they might have recourse to brawn and muscle in hand-to-
hand skirmishes - sword or dagger, fire or flight to the rescue. But 
there was nothing much beyond that, except in extremis, as in 1428; 
and in 1775; and in 1798. 
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Having been assuaged, and 'legally' empowered to take up arms -
manu forti - in defence of their rights by no other than the Spanish 
Emperor himself in the Late Middle Ages, what could they now do 
in practice? They could at best raise their arms to heaven in prayer 
or despair, for other arms they hardly had, and might not have 
known much how to use them if they did. There was no battlefield 
over which to fight. It was under the Order's rule from the 16th to 
the 18th century that the Maltese perfected corsairing, in the fight 
against the infidel - and for booty - at sea. 
Times changed, of course. Revolution having visited the New World, 
it ventured into the Old. Apple carts were upset. Challenging ideas 
were expressed, mostly by means of the written word ... and the 
warring troops on land and sea. Thus divulged, the ideas spread. 
The timid made bold. The poor were no longer ashamed. The patrie, 
after all, was theirs. They could become "citizens". Their rights were 
"inalienable" - not in anyone's gift, like bracelets in a dowry. There 
should no longer be imprisonment without trial, nor a special tax 
on salt; or on tea. 
For the Maltese, history was a little more complex. Their new lords 
became themselves their main providers, to some extent even their 
captive clients. The urge for freedom therefore could not be quite 
identified with that for bread. Maltese may not always have been 
allowed to hunt for rabbit, but generally speaking they were free to 
keep body and soul together. There was generally no starvation: 
what was more, the new 'feudal' lord invested in hospitals and 
orphanages. Nor was that simple charity: it was Holy Religion. In 
the name of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, Malta became 'a fief 
of the Lord'. There were occasional periods when tyranny and 
hardship joined hands; and it was on such occasions, as in 1775, that 
stirrings of freedom came briefly and bloodily to the fore. We even 
find reference to 'a Maltese banner' planted by the good rebels on 
StJames Cavalier at the entrance to Valletta in that attempted rising. 
Still, it didn't work. Freedom was desired from oppression, perhaps 
from want; but freedom by whom, to what end, and how? 
Malta was jolted into a genre of 'theoretical' freedom with the advent 
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of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. The French had some Maltese 
partisans, mostly intellectuals of sorts who were fed up with the 
Order's archaic hegemony. The Order of St John represented 
everything which the French Revolution had battled against: the 
aristocracy, the church, the inquisition, despotism, wealth and 
privilege. Liberators spoke with a silver tongue. As elsewhere, they 
implanted the vocabulary of freedom, but without actually 
delivering it. In so doing, they provoked a popular armed 
insurrection. This was not ajacquerie, nor a sporadic outburst: it went 
on for two years, thousands died. Malta had seen neither so much 
misery nor so much fervour since the Great Siege of 1565, when in 
a classic Cross against Crescent encounter the Ottoman Empire had 
valiantly tried to conquer her. 
Deliverance was at hand, or so it seemed, when the British Navy 
blockaded the French and starved them out. Sadly for the Maltese 
insurgents, that blockade was inefficient on the day when it probably 
mattered most to them. On the night of 11 th January 1799, the 
taking ofValletta was swept into disarray by French celebrations to 
welcome the safe arrival of a succouring Genoese ship. The French 
eventually left with full military honours, having surrendered to the 
British. Licking their wounds, the Maltese were still at the gates in 
1800. When it came finally to deciding their own fate, at the most 
auspicious moment of all where it really mattered, after a bloody 
long drawn out struggle which had drained them of just about 
everything they had possessed, there they were, out on the doorstep, 
waiting for the next decree from on high. As their 'chief, they had 
selected an Englishman (Captain Ball), who at this point was also 
swept aside and possibly double crossed by another Englishman 
(Major-General Pigot). 
All this, by way of background and introduction, is to give inkling 
as to what independence would have meant to a people such as this. 
Not only had independence been elusive, it seemed almos,t 
impossible. Domination was resented, independence perhaps 
feared, and freedom probably confused with tradition. There was 
a conceptual and juridical swash at emancipation in that courageous, 
eloquent and seminal Dichiarazione dei diritti degli abitanti di Malta 
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e Gozo of 15th June 1802, particularly in one turn of phrase where 
the very word 'indipendenza' was used, to argue that if the British 
decided to leave they had no right to cede Malta to any other power. 
(Except, possibly, Naples, to which Malta supposedly belonged de 
jure; but by 1802 even that was not so clear any more.) 
The British vocabulary of freedom was less extravagant than the 
French, but in the course of time some doses of it saw an application 
on the ground. It was not handed down liberally, like manna falling 
from heaven. In fits and starts, an increasingly liberal constitutional 
framework was gradually set in place. Essential components of a 
viable democratic freedom, such as an uncensored press and a 
secret ballot, came about by the mid-nineteenth century, and 
these more or less survived the test of time. The economy was 
further transformed, increasingly new jobs took the place of 
traditional occupations, people changed habitat, and tastes, even 
languages. 
From the propagation of 'nation-inspired' events such as the Gtto 
Settembre to the withdrawal in 1903 of Representative Government; 
from the Sette Giugno unrest to the demand for Dominion Status in 
1932, followed by the revocation a year later of the Responsible 
Government obtained in 1921; from the internment and 
deportations of the early 1940s to the repatriations and then the 
restitution of Self-Government in 1947 - with a Maltese Labour Party 
at the helm, for the first time - the rocking Maltese boat gathered 
ballast and steadied in its onward destination towards 'self-
determination' . 
As the British disengaged, the Maltese recharged. Yet the paradoxes 
of the Maltese condition resurfaced again and again. We had Nerik 
Mizzi before the First World War with his daring suggestion for an 
autonomous Malta in a federation with Italy; then we had Dom 
Mintoff after the Second World War with his much more elaborate 
and popular plan for Malta's integration with Britain. For various 
reasons, 'integration' fell through: Mintoff may have been too 
demanding; the Nationalists were dead set against it, as was the local 
Catholic Church; and the Suez crisis coupled with the fate of Malta's 
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~ 
In this PN cartoon, Mr Mintoffpushes a reluctant donkey towards a carrot 
held out for it by the British prime minister, Sir Anthony Eden, at the edge 
of a canyon - meaning Malta's Integration with Britain. Below, Mr Mintoff 
addresses a GWU conference in 1956 surrounded by Union Jacks. 
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An article in Dr Borg Olivier's hand opposing the MLP's Integration plan. 
(Manuscript by courtesy ofDr V. Ragonesi.) 
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Royal Dockyard complicated matters still further. The net result in 
national political development was a convergence of the Nationalist 
and Labour stand on independence. The 'Break with Britain' 
resolution in December 1957 was proposed in parliament by the 
then Prime Minister, Mr Mintoff, and seconded by the then Leader 
of the Opposition, Dr Borg Olivier. In a show of unanimity rare to 
Maltese politics even in matters of national concern, the Maltese 
Legislative Assembly took up the cudgels with both hands and now 
was aiming in the same direction: Malta's independence from 
Britain. 
The dockyard's future remained an overriding stumbling block: it 
was partly on issues related to this problem that Mintoff resigned in 
April 1958 and pledged to "govern from the squares", with the 
slogan "British get out". There was rioting. Malta's 'Responsible 
Government' constitution came to grief once more. It was under a 
colonial regime that Malta's first five-year Development Plan was 
finally launched ... 
Over the years certain identifiable features remained; in some 
respects these crystallized and consolidated. One of them was 
undeniably the march towards nationhood and statehood. 'March' 
is to use the wrong word: this was no drill, nor even a parade or a 
festa. Malta's path to statehood was a halting and a searching one, 
with potholes, pitfalls and deviations. There were painful moments, 
grave uncertainties, and many obstacles - survival, strategy and 
security foremost among them. Many were the worries and fears of 
Maltese, as well as of Britain and some other countries. Until the last 
minute, there were doubts, queries and alternatives. There were 
differences of perception and interest in the balance; there was 
machismo, and there was pique. But there was also a vision and a self-
confident perseverance, tenacity and a dynamic creativity, which 
soon put paid to the worst scenarios of mass destitution, of civil 
unrest, or indeed of Communist domination. The time had come, 
finally: here at hand, in the early 1960s, was a truly historic moment 








Silver Collection and Silver Lining 
THE DEMAND FOR 
INDEPENDENCE 
Independence came in 1964, which was a year of great challenge 
and a new beginning; but the year of decision was really 1962. 
In the general elections held in February 1962, 'independence' 
featured as a general aspiration in the electoral programmes of the 
main political parties, Nationalist and Labour. No sooner had the 
Nationalists been returned than Dr Borg Olivier went up to 
London for talks, first about some amendments to the 1961 
constitution, but soon afterwards about economic assistance. He was 
successful in his first mission, but not in his second. Seeing that no 
progress was being made in extracting financial aid, he opted for 
independence from Britain there and then. It is possible that he 
may have had the demand for independence up his sleeve all 
along, as a fall-back position or perhaps as a trump card. What 
seems to have finally provoked it was the British Government's 
intransigence: they could not offer anything beyond an additional 
one hundred thousand pounds in aid. That stance provoked Borg 
Olivier's famous and widely-reported retort that he had not gone 
to London "to make a silver collection". From his hotel suite at the 
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Savoy Hotel in London, he had two historic letters sent to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, demanding independence as a 
matter of urgency. Shortly afterwards he called a press conference 
to announce Malta's demand to the world. 
The Maltese scenario in 1962 was very much coloured by four main 
events that had occurred since 1958. First, there was the collapse of 
the Integration plan and the consequent anti-British riots and 
clashes in April of that year, for which Mintoff and his party were 
blamed. On 28th April Governor Laycock prohibited the holding of 
demonstrations for three months, and two days later declared that 
"a public emergency" existed in Malta. 1 Responsible Government 
was suspended and as a result Malta was relegated to a constitutional 
limbo. This state of affairs was deplored equally by the PN and the 
MLP, both of which probably believed that they enjoyed majority 
support among the electorate in 1958/59. 
Thirdly, there was the 'politico-religious' dispute, as it was called, 
with Mr Mintoff and Archbishop Gonzi as its chief protagonists in 
a mass (and rather hysterical) mobilization of popular forces. 
Depicted by Mintoff and others in MLP publications (such as The 
Struggle and Il-Helsien) as pro-British and anti-worker, the 
Archbishop was hurt in more ways than one, admonishing the 
irreverent critics. He was further hurt when during the huge 
celebrations to commemorate St Paul's shipwreck in 1960 he called 
at the dockyard with the Papal delegate, Cardinal Muench, and 
when he started speaking he was booed by workers who then burst 
out singing the MLP anthem. The reparations Gonzi expected were 
not forthcoming: following the MLP's participation in an AAPSO 
executive meeting in Cairo in January 1961, the Lenten Pastoral 
read in all churches in February denounced Communism and 
AAPSO with it. In March the MLP held a party conference 
I Both decrees were published in the Government Gazette of the respective dates, 28th 
and 30th April 1958. The former was done under section 21 of the Public Meetings 
Ordinance, the latter under the Malta (Emergency Powers) Order in Council, 1953. 
THE DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE 
! 
HENNESSYI TIUES' 
m, BRANDY mAT I 1ft 
MADE~~~~.~~_U~II He. 7,011 
M4LT4 I ::~:I 
I t( I'olIru:~ 
W'J!.DNESDAY, APRIL:!:, lSSS. Prltt3d.·· -----------------
COMMONS CRITICIZE 'SEVERANCE' MOTION 
Britain's Interest in Malta .oo,~. 
80TH SIDES OF HOUSE SHOW 
GENUINE CONCERN OVER POSITION 
37 
Times of Malta reports of a major debate in the House of Commons where 
the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, harked back to the 'Break with 
Britain' resolution passed unanimously by the Malta Legislative Assembly 
on 30th December 1957; and (below) an MLP demonstration in Valletta, 
with the Malta Police and British commandos preparing to contol it. 
38 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
defending its position and on 8th April 1961 the Bishops gave "a 
personal interdict" to all those who had attended it. It was in the 
course of this, with fire and brimstone promised to MLP leaders and 
activists, that the MLP elaborated and insisted on its so-called "six 
points" (sitt punti) for a more secular and ideologically open state. 
In May 1962 there was a fourth crucial development when it 
became known that the long-planned reductions in British defence 
spending had suddenly become a harsh reality and they would hit 
Malta with immediate effect. 
Meanwhile Mintoff courted the friendship ofTito and Nasser, and 
participated in other AAPSO meetings, thereby lending credence to 
the analogy popularly drawn of him with Fidel Castro. A Cairo-
based anti-colonialist Third World grouping imbued with anti-
capitalist Marxist rhetoric typical of the time, the Afro-Asian Peoples 
Solidarity Organization was a pro-Peking 'Communist' front; it was 
not a mainstream European-inspired democratic socialist body like 
the Socialist International, which the MLP also joined.2 The Maltese 
Church opposed that too: no Socialists of whatever hue were 
welcome in Malta. There was a real fear in the minds of many 
people, lay as much as religious, that under Mintoff's unremitting 
leadership, democracy would risk going down the drain and that, 
if left to his own devices in an independent state, Malta was likely 
to become another Cuba: "a Cuba in the Mediterranean". Such 
fears, which may have been or seemed exaggerated, may not have 
been exactly religious nor were they limited to ecclesiastics. Mintoff 
and his party were not assisted by the aura of upheaval associated 
2 The MLP denied this mentioning, for example, that President Julius Nyerere, 
who was hosting the AAPSO conference in Dar-es-Salaam in January 1963, 
was a Catholic. See "Is-Socjalizmu u I-AAPSO" and "President Kattoliku jistieden 
lill-AAPSO", Il-lfelsien, 14 Dec. 1962, p.l. See also "Dr Buttigieg jaghti I-fatti 
ezatti tal-Kwitsjoni Pulitico-Religjuza", ibid., 12 Sept. 1964, p. 1: " .. .lilna pingewna 
bhala komunisti. Glial dan ahna ma stajniex ma nwigbux. U gliax lirigna stqarrija 
pulitika biex niddefendu rwielina, ahna I-membri ta' I-eiekuttiv iddubajna 1-
interedett." Founded by the Bandung Conference in 1955, AAPSO became pro-
Soviet after 1965 under Nasser's influence. See F. HaUiday, Revolution and World 
Politics (Lond., 1999), p. 111. 
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with them following their administration and the still vividly-
recalled rioting of April 1958, however justified such outbursts 
might have been regarded, from a populist political viewpoint in a 
colonial situation, by those who had directly or indirectly instigated 
them. Several MLP demonstrators including MPs had landed in 
prison.3 
As a result of all that, Malta came to be regarded in London as a 
likely crisis situation, one in which it was not advisable to hold fresh 
elections before a state of normality (sic) had been restored and 
better control ascertained. It was Mintoff rather than Borg Olivier 
who mobilized and galvanized a mass following for Independence 
from Britain after 1958. His well-oiled political machine was 
organized with drum-beating and bugle-sounding children's 
brigades in 'national' uniform marching down the streets, and large 
pictures of Mintoff with his pipe reguarly on the front pages of the 
party press organs in the style of a leadership cult; the party had its 
3 Briefly the 'six points' were these: (1) the separation of church and state; (2) the 
introduction of civil marriage; (3) a liberal state censorship on European lines; (4) 
freedom of conscience without any religious preference; (5) no special privileges for 
the Roman Catholic Church; and (6) the belief that violence need not always be 
shunned. The MLP's stance during the round table negotiations for independence 
and later, particularly certain objections to the independence constitution draft, 
would reverberate with the 'sitt punti' and closely related topics. To get a 'feel' of 
the times, as that continued to filter down the years, see e.g. the heated exchanges 
between Mr Mintoff, G. H. Ferro, Page Thirteen and other correspondents about 
1958 in The Sunday Times (of Malta) as recently as July-Aug. 1989. Ferro accused 
Mintoff of having betrayed Eden's confidence to Nasser on preparations for the Suez 
operation in 1956, a charge denied by Mintoff, while Ferro denied Mintoff's claim 
that British commandos had been used to quell rioting in April 1958. Mintoff quoted 
from "a scholarly analysis" published by his "parliamentary colleague" Dr Alfred 
Sant. See D. Mintoff, "Friend to Eden and Nasser", The Sunday Times, 30 July 1989, 
p.33; and G.H. Ferro, "History his way", ibid., 6 Aug. 1989, p.17. For contrasting 
historical outlines of the ongoing Church-MLP diatribes especially from 1959 
onwards, see A. Azzopardi, Il-Qawmien tal-Haddiem Malti (Malta, 1986), vo!. 2, 1955-
1971, esp. pp. 44-88; E.S. Tonna and M. Galea, L-Arcisqof Gonzi (Malta, 1982), vo!. 
2,1943-1964, esp. pp. 108-126,139-172; E. Dobie, Malta's Road to Independence 
(Norman, U.S.A. 1967), pp. 211-233. 
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!' ips have been restored between the Government and ti).e Church. In e evening the Prime Minister broadcast a statement that he was ten-ting his resignation and the resignation of his Cabinet colleagnes to e Governor. ·Later in the night the Lientenant Governor broadcast to e people nrging them to keep calm and assnring them that the admin-tration wOllld carry 011 and that public order would be preserved. I His Honour Mr. l'mfford Smith l>Toadcast the f(lllow-
~:- . 
~As\ you have heard: this ment. We cannot sec beyond enlng the Prime Mli.ister that at present. mltted his resignation to "But I can reassure you 
[
Excellency the Governor, that no matter what haI>-
l the other MInisters have pens, the Governor will en-
"en In theIr resIgna.tions at sure that the .ndmln1strat,lOl'l. 
sanlC time. contInues. There will be no 
~-rhe Prime Minister and breakdown. Law up.d _.<?rdcr 
Reports of the Mintoff administra-
tion's resignation from office on 21 st 
April 1958 and (inset), on the previous 
day, cavalry policemen preventing 
Labour hecklers from disrupting 
Nationalist meeting in Qormi. 
Princess Margaret 
Opening New 
P~liame~t Today , 
, ' 
'(R(.W. SCTviH)' I 
PORT OF SPAIN, AprIl 21. i 
Princess Margaret went to 
rift ~~g~~r~ft~: t1~~o.J~s{~r~~ I 
Of her West< Indles tour. I 
The Princess arrived bv alr 
yesterday in the "Calypso 
Island". SIle is to open the 
first parliament 01 the Fede-
:ratIon of the West IndIan 
Islands tomorrow. 
May Day and Battle of Flowers, even its carnivals, song contests and 
beauty queens. After 1961 the MLP had to combat the church 
sanctions and an antagonistic hierarchy as much as - if not more than 
- the onetime pro-Italian Nationalists themselves. Mintoffimpressed 
with his forceful delivery and greater secular-mindedness, not to 
mention his Oxford pedigree, such as it was; but his posture was 
increasingly seen as demagogic and unreliable, ideologically erratic 
and even dangerous. 
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Scenes of 'Mintoffian' rioting on 28th April 1958 in what The Times of Malta 
headlined as "The Battle for Malta". Four days earlier Governor Laycock 
had taken over the administration of the Islands after accepting the 
government's resignation, and Police Commissioner de Gray professed his 
duty to serve the Crown. In a Rediffusion broadcast on 29 th April 
Archbishop Gonzi condemned violence and urged calm. A state of 
emergency was declared on the following day. 
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In fact, Mintoff's attitudes and tactics were probably far 
more harmful than some of his proclaimed ideas, which 
were secular and even salutary by twentieth century standards -
a time in the Catholic Church of aggiornamento and ecumenism 
during the second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965 ... but also 
a time when the Communist advance seemed menacing. Ideas 
could change; the style of governance and the disposition to power 
was less likely to do so. One of the stalwarts of Mintoff's party 
who served as editor of The Voice of Malta from 1959 and then as 
the party's president, was Dr Anton Buttigeg, MLP Deputy 
Leader between 1962 and 1976. In his memoires Buttigieg, who 
was also one of Malta's leading poets, commented negatively about 
certain traits in Mintoff's character which aroused instincts of 
hostility unnecessarily causing divisiveness. Buttigieg (d. 1983) 
wrote: 
Mintoff is too hasty and what he wants he wants quickly. Apart 
from being much too hasty, he likes being obstinate and he 
enjoys displeasing others; instead of trying to court sympathy 
he tries to impose. That is why then there is fighting and 
trouble and above all division among the people.,,4 
With the advantage of hindsight, it may have to be generally 
admitted that the opposition's reading of at least some of Mintoff's 
propensities in the early 1960s was not so far-fetched, however 
reactionary and xenophobic it may have appeared to an 
4 Literally from the original MS: " ... Mintoff ihobb ighaggel wisq u dak li jrid iridu 
malajr. Barra milli huwa ghaggieli z-zejjed, huwajhobb iwebbes rasu,jiehu gostjurta 
lil haddiehor u flokjipprovajigbed is-simpatijajipprovajimponi. Ghalhekk imbghad 
ikun hemm il-glied u I-ghilt u fuq kollox il-firda fost il-poplu ... " Buttigieg was 
prompted to make this general assessment of Mintoff's typical manner of dealing 
when referring to certain measures he had taken during the 1956 referendom on 
Integration when, he added, "a lot of worry and adversity arose needlessly as this 
could have been avoided with a little patience and tactics ... " ("hafna nkwiet u glied 
inqala' ghal xejn u b'daqxejn sabar u tattika seta' jigi evitat...") This text is being 
reproduced here tale quale. 
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(Courtesy of Mr J. A, Mizzi) 
'enlightened' observer then. 5 In varying degrees the indomitable 
Archbishop Gonzi, born in 1885, and the astute Dr Borg Olivier 
jockeying for a return to office, may be said to have been resisting 
Mintoff the man - as a visionary, vitriolic rebel driven to affirm his 
own world-view on state and society. The 'politico-religious' struggle 
was not simply or solely - or perhaps even primarily - one fought 
on grounds of faith and religion - 'sitt punti' or not. It was to some 
extent less about religious belief as such than it was about power 
and personalities. Camouflaged under consuetudo and a litany of 
often fervently-held traditions, the religiously conservative would 
not let Mintoff defile or break their grip on what they assumed to 
be Malta's manifest destiny as a gregariously and uniformly Roman 
Catholic society, morally led and guided, unhindered, by the 
church hierarchy. Gonzi, like Mintoff from the Cottonera district 
on the dockyard side of the Grand Harbour, was not one who took 
kindly to an affront; he was in that respect not unlike Mintoff, or 
indeed unlike his episcopal prececessors Caruana and more so 
Pietro Pace. Imposing and dogmatic, Gonzi could be no less fiery 
5 For a critique of the more negative aspects of the post-colonial Mintoff years see 
e.g. H. Frendo, 'Messages from Mintoff's Malta', Quadrant, Sydney, vo1.30, n.12, Dec. 
1986, 18-33; for positive appreciations see e.g. B.York, 'Malta: From War Base to 
Peace Centre', Arena, n.73, Melbourne, 1985,37-40, and S. Cooper, 'Positive 
Neutrality:The Case of Malta', ibid., n. 74,1986,142-144. 
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In the wake of a bitter 'politico-
religious' dispute between the 
Gonzi-Ied Roman Catholic Church 
and the Mintoff-Ied Malta Labour 
Party, which mainly started in 1960 
and escalated in 1961, rival slogans 
proclaim commitments such as 
(above, on the facade of the Naxxar 
parish church): "Always with the 
Church, never against the Bishops"; 
and (below, plastering the Gnaxaq 
Labour Party club): "With the 
Church always, against Mintoff 
never". 
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or temperemental, except that, unlike Mintoff, he spoke as the 
Vicar of Christ, sceptre in hand. This confrontation, particularly the 
ostracising sanctions and mortal sin associated with it, may have 
kept the turbulent 'demonized' Mintoff at bay for longer than 
might otherwise have been the case, but it tore into the flesh of 
Maltese social relations and invaded national politics. 
As a person Borg Olivier was quite different to these two. Slow but 
calculating, rarely losing his cool, reading character, delegating 
implementation, stubborn and tenacious, leisurely and even 
exasperating, a bon viveur respected for his gentlemanly social 
graces, adept at using time as a healer when he could do so, his 
character may be gauged from this esprit during a press conference 
at Luqa airport. A Nationalist supporter in the crowd threw a 
penny at a Labour journalist, Paul Carachi, missing him and almost 
hitting the Prime Minister instead. Borg Olivier turned to Carachi 
and made a joke of it: "Let's split it", he said, "a halfpenny each."6 
While taking full political advantage of ecclesiastical interdicts 
against his adversaries if and as it suited him and his own party, 
Borg Olivier did not allow these to interfere with social intercourse. 
Thus for example he was at the wedding reception in Casal Paola 
of a young "interdicted" Labour MP who in August 1964 had just 
been married "in the sacristy". 7 
Sir Hilary Blood's appointment in 1960 to inquire into the 
constitutional position was a typical British problem-solving 
response: on one hand it played for time and thus might have had, 
to some extent, a calming-down effect; on the other hand, it offered 
scope for on-the-spot analyses and recommendations by a detached 
6 "Il-Partiti regghu waslu Iura", Il-tlelsien, 2 Mar. 1964, p. 1: "ejja naqsmuh sitta kuII 
wiehed". 
7 "Lino SpiteriJizzewweg", Il-tlelsien, 21 Aug. 1964, p. 1. The marriage took place 
in the same sacrasty in Rabat where another Labour journalist MP, Dr Joseph 
MicaIIef Stafrace, had been married three years earlier. 
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rapporteur. 8 The expectation of Maltese politicians generally was that 
fresh elections should be held immediately in 1958, and that the 
demonstrations following Mintoff's resignation be not used as a 
pretext for reverting to direct rule. Blood, who started his work in 
Malta in November 1960 and had his report published by March of 
the following year, was largely boycotted by the parties when he 
came to Malta, so he sized up the situation as best he could through 
whatever contacts he could make with others in the know. 
That Blood recommended a restoration of responsible government 
came as no surprise, because the House of Commons had been 
informed of the British Government's intention to do that by the 
Secretary of State as early as July 1960. However, some of the 
changes which his Constitutional Commission put forward, and 
which were accepted, may be judged to have been a tentative mise-
en-scene for what, it now seems, was rather expected to follow in their 
tracks. They certainly provided the operational parameters within 
which subsequent developments unfolded until September 1964, 
although there were always ifs and buts. 
The Malta (Constitution) Order in Council of 19619 laid down the 
operative constitutional status of the Island for the years before it 
took - we now know - the plunge to independence. It almost foresaw 
it, and laid down the carpet. The dyarchical principle - of a 'Maltese' 
and a co-existing 'Imperial' government - no longer featured here, 
as had been the case in the 1921 and 1947 constitutions. There was 
to be only one recognised form of government: the Maltese 
government. For the first time, specific constitutional provisions 
8 The other members of the Blood commission were Edward St John, Q.C., an 
Australian, Fred Hayday, and Sir Alfred Roberts, who fell ill. 
9 The text 'Malta - The Malta (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961', was a Cmd. 
paper reprinted by the Dept. of Information, Valletta, 1961, pp. 52; the Maltese 
version is entitled 'I1-Kostituzzjoni ta' Malta - 1961'. For summaries of these Orders 
in Council see Malta Review, Special Issue, Malta Independence 21st September 
1964, Dept. ofInformation, Valletta, pp. 17-19. 
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were made for human rights. The expedient of 'reserved matters', 
on which the British side had relied to safeguard its external 
interests, was replaced by a system of 'concurrent powers', which 
similarly implied a more integrated or consultative approach. Most 
tellingly of all, we had the Governor substituted by a 'United 
Kingdom High Commissioner' as London's 'agent' in Malta, almost 
as if he would be an ambassador extraordinary or plenipotentiary 
accredited to an independent state. 
The Governor remained there, but his role would be rather more 
perfunctory. He would be the Queen's representative and like a 
'Head of State' , in which function he would normally act on the advice 
of the Cabinet. His discretionary powers however comprised matters 
pertaining to the operational and disciplinary control of the police 
force, and the appointments and disciplinary procedures in the civil 
service and the judiciary, once again subject to certain provisions 
respecting institutional norms (such as the Public Service 
Commission). The Governor could sometimes consult with the Prime 
Minister. He could still reserve bills affecting internal security or 
impinging on defence and external relations objected to by the UK 
Commissioner, or bills repugnant to the Constitution or affecting 
certain ordinances, such as the Broadcasting Ordinance. He could 
also 'reserve' any bills to raise government loans. Clearly, therefore, 
he still had a role to play which was not altogether ceremonial. The 
UK Commissioner clipped the Governor's wings, but not his feathers. 
The Cabinet led by the Prime Minister reporting to a legislature of 
50 members elected by universal suffrage, would in principle be able 
to some degree to handle defence and foreign affairs, subject to 
certain restraints. Malta was, again for the first time, designated as 
the 'State of Malta'. Henceforth its Legislative Assembly could also 
legislate on issues relating to defence and foreign affairs, subject to 
the advice and generally the consent of the British Government 
through its newly-created representative, its so-called Commissioner. 
In trade relations with other countries, however, the Malta 
Government had full authority under this Constitution to do much 
as it pleased. A Consultative Council, to be chaired by the Governor, 
was set up. This was intended to facilitate the smooth working of 
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The Blood Commission in 
1961 was boycotted by 
Nationalists and Labourites 
who mobilized their forces, 
especially the latter. Inset (top 
right): a mass meeting and 
(bottom) a Labour Brigade 
section marching down 
Kingsway, Valletta. 
~ 
" Y) ~ 
~ 
THE DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE 
Eminenza Reverendissima, 
Pare che coteata Segreterla di Stato 81a sotto Itimpressione 
che 1& questione, che de perecchi anni ormsi agita Is vita delle 
due raole Maltesi, non sia altro che una questione personale tra 
i Vescovi \e specialmente~L'Arcivescovo) da una parte e i1 Signor 
Mint'?!'!', gia' Primo.Ministro di Malta per tre in:felicissimi anni, 
L'intenzione del Sig. 1;into:fr, che abbandono' la pratica' della 
religione sin dalle. sua prima aioventu ' e perdette pienamente la 
Fede, et di sociallzzare J,'jal ta, staccare 11 popolo dalla Chiesa e 
relegare questa alIa sacrestia. Egl1 aiutato finanziariamente 
dall'Inghilterra, che si serviva di lui come di strumento per 
integ:,iJ.re ~:~~ ta (,?olla lnshi1 terra), r?i usei f ad at tirare al1a sua 
una eatena di insulti e di insinuazioni maligne contro d~ me, 
contro 11 Vescovo di Gozo, i Parroci e 11 clero in genel'ale delle 
due diocesi. Questo 10 fa per annientare l'influenza dells 
nostra parole: l'ha detto confidenzialmente i1 Segretario del 
Partito, ohe di questi giomi si et dimesso. Come si vede et 
una guerra aul tipo della guerra :fatta alla Uniesa nei paesi di 
oltre la cortina di :ferro. 
Domeniea seors§:, 
'<aletro inaletenza del buon popolo maltese ei tenne una 
adunanza di popolb - 100,000 persone - per protestare contro 
le o~feBe £atte a noi Vescovi, al clero e alle tradizioni 
cattoliche dl Malta, nonche' contro i :frequenti contatti col 
governi communisti e contra l'affiliazione ~el Partita del Lavoro, 
senza il COnsenSQ dello stea'so Parti to e contro la volonta' della 
maggiornnza dei lavoratbri, all' Afrc-Asiatica Commissione. }I'u 
una eosa straordinaria per Malta. 11 lIB.B.C." di Londra disse 
che non si vide mai una :folIa cosi' grande. 
Aecludo alcuni ritagli di gioma11 10ea11, ehe con£ermano 
quanto scrivo a no~e mic e a nome del Vescovo di Gozo. 
E chino 81 bacio della S. Porpora, con ossequio e venera-
zione mi confermo 
. It.. Bue Erfilnenza 'Heir.ma 
Il Sig. Card. DOMENICO TARDINI 
·Segretario di Stato di S.S. 
Citta' del Vaticano. 
dell'Eminenza Vostra Rev.me 




Excerpts from a letter of 7th March 1961 from Archbishop Gonzi, who was 
in touch with the former MLP secretary-general Pellegrini, to Cardinal 
Tardini, denying the Vatican's "impression" that the Malta church question 
was just a personality clash, and justifying his own position. 
(Document by courtesy of Dr Daniel Micallef.) 
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the 'concurrent powers' stratagem, mainly in matters relating to 
defence and external affairs. The UK Commissioner would be a 
member of it ex officio, together with up to three nominees each by 
the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister. He would not, 
however, be in the chair. 
When lain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, presented 
the Constitutional Commission's report to the Commons in March 
1961, he agreed with the Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell 
that this was" a considerable step forward", adding that the new Malta 
constitution had "considerable similarities" with the constitutional 
principles which had been established in the State of Singapore. 
Macleod agreed with Gaitskell too that this was "not in any way, of 
course, a final stage" of Malta's constitutional development. Their first 
concern had been "the immediate future". 10 
One of the supplementary questions on Malta asked later on in the 
month concerned broadcasting. This was already a sensitive subject 
because in 1961 a Broadcasting Authority was set up and by 1962, 
still more importantly, a Maltese television station, MTV, went on air, 
broadcasting in Maltese and English. This would quickly 
revolutionize the communications scene in Malta, which until now 
had depended on newspapers and radio. The television 
transmissions received in Malta until 1962 had been Italian ones, in 
black and white, which only a minority could fully understand, 
although many more would certainly have followed the Italian 
songs, festivals, shows and spectacles. As in the case of radio in the 
1930s, so with television in the 1960s, the English and Maltese 
medium only made it to a Maltese audience after the Italian one had 
already begun to penetrate Maltese listening and viewing 
audiences. I! Politicians, always keen on what publicity they can get, 
quickly took note of this new medium and fought for airtime. As 
10 Hansard, Commons, 8 Mar. 1961, cols. 471-477. 
11 See H. Frendo, 'The Fear Dynamic', Maltese Joumalism, 1838-1992 (Press Club, 
Malta, 1994), p. 25. 
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tends to happen, parties in power get rather more coverage simply 
because they run the government and do things more than an 
opposition party can. Given the question of religious sentiments in 
Malta at a time of confrontation between the established church and 
the main opposition party, apart from other reasons, the access to 
airtime started on the wrong foot. The Under Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Hugh Fraser, told Major Patrick Wall that a bill setting 
up an Authority responsible for broadcasting and television was 
being enacted: 
The Authority must satisfy itself that due impartiality is 
preserved on political matters and that, save under agreed 
procedures, no matter designed to serve the interest of any 
political party is included in the programmes. 
It would be the special objective oftheAuthority to see that all parties 
would have a fair allocation of time over wireless and television, Fraser 
added. He was also asked, however, if he appreciated the fact that 
there would be "a complete monopoly in both sound and television 
broadcasting for Malta Rediffusion". What possibility of independent 
expression would there be when sound and television broadcasting 
were under the control of one company? 12 
The former Chief Justice Sir Arturo Mercieca, writing under his nom-
de-plume "Cato", was among those who were critical of this new 
hybrid called "the United Kingdom Commissioner". Unlike an 
ambassador he was neither accredited nor subject to the Maltese 
Government; on the contrary he was "endowed with the exercise of 
a continuous inquisitorial control" over Maltese local affairs. He had 
to be provided with Cabinet agendae, Cabinet decisions and 
conclusions with all the papers laid before Cabinet, with regard to all 
matters affecting defence or internal affairs (clause 28 of the 1961 
Order-in-Council), as well as a copy of every Bill introduced in the 
Assembly. Moreover, following his advice, the British Government 
12 Hansard, Commons, 14 Mar. 1961, col. 1190. 
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Apart from newspapers and periodical publications, another means of mass 
communication among Maltese until 1962 when MTV went on air, was 
radio broadcasting, especially through the thousands of Rediffusion sets 
installed in homes. These provided a mix of information, entertainment, 
education and religious devotions, from the Angelus, the BBC World News 
and George Dougall's commentary "Din hija Londra" to cooking recipes, 
comic sketches, the recital of the rosary, and occasional broadcasts or 
discussion programmes of a political nature. One of the early 'Broadcasting 
Boards' was this, from left (back row): Mr Joe Fenech, Secretary to the 
Board; a British Government representative, Mr Peter Hayman, and his 
replacement Mr Michael Cullis; and Mr Paul Naudi from the Department 
of Information. In the front row (from left) are Professor Guze Aquilina, a 
prolific author and university don; the former Commissioner of Police J. 
E. Axisa as Chairman; and Mr Rogantin Cachia, a former Lyceum 
headmaster. The MBA members in 1962-64 were Mr E. G. Arrigo, C.B.E. 
(Chairman), Mr Edgar Staines, O.B.E. and Mr Em. C. Tabone. 
(Photograph courtesy of Major E. J. Axisa.) 
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could request Ministers to take any action, or discontinue to take 
action, within a specified time; and in default of compliance, he could, 
under his seal, issue an order giving effect to the request. Such an 
order would "have the force of law", it would be published and it 
would "prevail over any law enacted locally and any instrument made 
thereunder" (clause 82). The UK Commissioner could also reserve 
a Bill before the Assembly for the signification of Her Majesty's 
pleasure (clause 83). Mercieca clearly did not think much of Downing 
Street's "boasts" of a liberal constitutional improvement because now 
the Maltese Government would be consulted on matters of defence, 
external relations and Anglo-Maltese affairs. "How meagre and 
stinted proves to be this would-be concession", he wrote, "surrounded 
as it stands by such a high protective wall of distrust, controls and 
guarantees in favour of the still overpowering Nation."13 
The person selected for this admittedly "hybrid" position, which 
conformed neither to a similar one in Singapore whose occupant was 
also responsible for South East Asia, nor to that of a High 
Commissioner representing the Queen as in Pakistan, was Sir Edward 
Wakefield, who had served in India and Arabia as well as been an 
MP.14 In his first press conference after taking up his duties in Malta, 
Wakefield saw Malta ideally as a prosperous self-governing state 
"firmly embedded in the Commonwealth and the western alliance." 
Although his business was to look after British interests in matters of 
defence and foreign affairs on which "concurrent powers were now 
held by both Governments", he hoped to spread the understanding 
that "the interests of Malta and Britain were ultimately identical." Any 
13 Cato, "The United Kingdom Commissioner", The Bulletin, 22 Dec. 1961, enc. 926/ 
1320. 
14 Min., Eastwood/Poynton, 8 Feb. 1962,926/1320. The Commissioner was to be "the 
official channel of communication between the Government of Malta and the United 
Kingdom Government." He was also "the official channel for dealings between the 
Services in Malta and the Government of Malta" as well as charged with normal 
"consular" responsibility for looking after the interests of British subjects (other than 
Maltese) in the Islands. 'Functions of the British Commissioner, Malta - Note for the 
Secretary of State', enc. 926/1320. 
54 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
MEXJIN FUQ TRIQ WAHDA 
C If4DtPE~DENZA ) 
\ DOMINCON STATUS ~ 
I ... 
I ff , J~ 
"JIo~KK MA NAQ8LUX FUQ TRIQ WAHUA (L-INTEGRATION), IS-SOLt'ZZJONI LOGIK,-\. mM 
L-OUItA {L--INDIPENDENZA) ..... (J:\lINTOFF Fll",Pl\RLA31ENT FIl.o"21 T,\" :m":.JJU.1957,. 
"IL-PARTIT HEKK J'AJlSIBHA", WlEGBU DR. HORG OLIVIER DAK I:x-~nAR rI~E.tlIL-PAttTIT 
NAZZJONALlSTA. "FERUAN lL-LEJLA lffiN ILLl AL:\1E='lU JEKK m:\ IT_TIUQ rBLU.OKK.J..\T·\, 
NAQBI.U FUQ L-OHRA", WIEoEB DUl\fiNKU ;\IINTOFF FL-ISTESS LAQr.tf:\., 
-fFERRHIJXTIS-:5"Ot:TAIJSTI;JfATnTlIN.NAZZJONALlSTI GHALL·AHHAR! 
A caricature in the Strickland-owned anti-Independence daily Il-Berqa 
during the 1962 general election campaign showing Mintoff and Borg 
Olivier together leading a chained, blindfolded people into the jaws of 
hunger, unemployment and misery. It implores readers not to please the 
Socialists: "Vote for the Nationalists last!" 
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application by Malta to join the Common Market "would have to be 
sponsored by Britain" (which only joined it in 1973), but Britain 
"would explain to the Malta Government what Common Market 
membership would mean to the island."15 
In the general election held in February 1962, Borg Olivier's PN 
polled 63,262 votes and had 25 MPs elected, to which another 
(Coronato Attard» was added when he crossed the floor from 
Herbert Ganado's PDN. The MLP polled 50,974 votes electing 16 
MPs. Smaller parties elected nine MPs between them, soon reduced 
to eight because of Attard's defection. Before accepting to form a 
government, Borg Oliver sought and obtained reassurance from the 
Governor, Admiral Grantham, and from the then Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Reginald Maudling, that the "Blood Constitution" 
would be changed in accordance with his party's manifesto, 
returning the police and other key areas to Maltese control. 
Borg Olivier first consulted with the Governor and the Secretary of 
State through the Governor, then he went up to London further to 
negotiate and finalise the changes agreed to. It was only after he had 
obtained a clear understanding on the assurances sought that he 
took the oath of office and named his Cabinet. This included seven 
other Ministers, of whom the eldest and the youngest were medical 
doctors from the South of the Island: Dr Antonio Paris of Cospicua 
and Dr Alexander Cachia Zammit of Zejtun. The senior Minister 
after Borg Olivier was Dr Giovanni Felice, a Sliema lawyer with a 
grasp of financial matters. 16 
15 'Malta Vital To Western Security - New Commissioner Outlines Aims', The Times, 
Lond., 15 Mar. 1962, enc. 926/1320. 
16 Borg Olivier, 51, assumed responsibility for economic planning and finance. The 
other Cabinet members were Dr Giovanni Felice, 62, for industrial development and 
tourism; Dr Antonio Paris, 72, education; Dr Carmelo Caruana, 45, agriculture, 
power and communications; Dr Tommaso Caruana Demajo, 51, justice; Dr J oseph 
Spiteri, 41, works and housing; Dr Alexander Cachia Zammit, 37, employment and 
social services, including emigration; and the Prime Minister's brother, Dr Paolo 
Borg Olivier, 60, health. 
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Watching and waiting as the votes get counted at the KnightshaIl in VaIletta, 
Mintoff is seen with (above, from left) J oe Zerafa and Danny Cremona, the 
MLP's secretary general and president, to his right; Dr Anton Buttigieg, the 
deputy leader, behind him; Dr Patrick Holland and Dr Joe Micallef 
Stafrace. Below (from left): Dr Buttigieg and Miss Mabel Strickland. Bottom 
right: Lorry Sant, 24, at the start of a militant trade union and political life 
in the Dockyard and the MLP. 
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The organs of two of the smaller 
"centre" or "church" parties, which 
returned 4 seats each in the 
February 1962 general election: 
Malta Taghna of Dr Herbert 
Ganado's Democratic Nationalist 
Party, and It-Tarka of Toni 
Pellegrini's Christian Workers 
Party. The former party had 
broken away from the PN, the 
latter from the MLP; both opposed 
Independence in the forseeable 
future. Right: A specimen electoral 
list under Malta's proportional 
representation electoral system 
showing the names of some of the 
1962 party candidates (on the 
Valletta district) set against the 
emblems of their respective parties. 
The candidates of all parties except 
the PN identified themselves on the 
ballot sheet with their respective 
party leader in person. 
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In fulfilment of his promise to proceed to London to re-assert a 
Maltese premier's responsibility for police affairs, the public service 
and the judiciary, Borg Olivier on taking office broadcast to the 
nation on yd March. The new prime minister briefed the public on 
his meetings with the Governor on 24th and 27th February and again 
on 2nd March, and the assurances obtained: 
After consultations with the Executive of the Party, I gave 
His Excellency a final answer yesterday evening. I told him 
that I could accept his invitation to form a Government. 
This morning I was sworn in as Prime Minister, and I 
promised the Governor that by next Monday morning I 
should form my Cabinet. 
Further to his press conference on 2yd February, Borg Olivier spelt 
out the constitutional changes, which had to be brought into effect 
immediately, 
so that the Maltese Government would regain control over 
the Police and the Civil Service. It was principally on these 
two points, and on the relations of the Cabinet with the 
Governor, that I discussed matters with His Excellency. I felt 
that I could not agree to form a Government unless I had 
been satisfied that I had opened the way to preliminary 
discussions with the Secretary of State in connection with 
these objections which should be removed without loss of 
time ... 
"This was quite apart", he added, "from other discussions, to be held 
later on, relating to the solution of the wider constitutional problems 
of Malta ... After all, the election results did not leave the slightest 
doubt as to what the people think regarding the solution which has 
to be found in connection with the constitutional question of Malta ... " 
I shall ... press for radical changes in the constitution with 
the aim of fulfilling the electoral programme of the 
Nationalist Party concerning the status which, we maintain, 
Malta should have as an independent member of the 
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Commonwealth. With the help of God and with your 
support and co-operation, I believe that the Government 
will secure this improvement for our country, in the 
common interest of us all. Long live MaltaY 
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On arriving in London from Rome on 23rd March,18 Borg Olivier 
explained the purpose of his visit to the B.B.C. at London Airport: 
I propose to endeavour to obtain the United Kingdom 
Government's assent to a few important amendments in the 
Constitution. In order that my Government may get a firm 
grip of the situation and carry on the administration of the 
Island it must have full responsibility for the Police and the 
Civil Service. At a later stage I shall tackle the whole 
constitutional question certainly not unmindful of my 
pledge to achieve independence within the Commonwealth. 
I make bold to hope that Britain will want to be generous 
with Malta. With a good start I will feel in a position to get 
down to business and negotiate. However I feel in duty 
bound to go ahead only if obstacles in the way are removed. 
I cannot be expected to make the unworkable work. 19 
In the course of discussions which Borg Olivier held in London 
during the last week of March, Maudling agreed to amend the 
Constitution on matters relating to the police, the public service and 
17 'Statement by the Prime Minister of Malta, the Hon. Dr Borg Olivier, to the People 
of Malta and Gozo, to be broadcast on the 'A: Network at 8.00 p.m. on Saturday, 3rd 
March, 1962', enc. 92611692. 
18 The British Legation's Minister Plenipotentiary to the Holy See was Sir Peter 
Scarlett. While in London, Borg Olivier and his delegation were entertained to lunch 
at the Dorchester Hotel by Mr Maudling. Also present were the Minister of State, Lord 
Perth; Sir George Dowty; Sir John Martin; Christopher Eastwood; John Kisch; and 
Mr Maudling's private secretary, Edward West. 
19 "The Prime Minister in London", The Times of Malta, 24 Mar. 1962, p. 2, enc. CO 926/ 
1692. 
60 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
some other aspects. Maltese Ministers, not the Governor, would 
henceforth be responsible for "the provision, maintenancee and 
administration and the use and operational control of the Police 
Force", Maudling explained to his colleagues in April. The 
recommendations of the Public Service Commission and of the 
Judicial Service Commission would not go to the Governor but to 
the Prime Minister. Judges and Magistrates would be appointed by 
the Governor "on the advice of the Prime Minister". The Governor 
would not be entitled to see or be provided with all the papers which 
were available to the Cabinet and any other information concerning 
the Government of Malta. The Prime Minister would keep the 
Governor fully informed about "the general conduct of the 
Government" and would furnish him with full information on any 
matter which he might require. 2o 
Parrying questions in a subsequent sitting, Maudling said that no 
amending Order in Council could be issued immediately because the 
alterations would have to be drafted and submitted to a meeting of the 
Privy Council. He also conceded that Dr Borg Olivier and himselfhad 
agreed to have further talks at a later date concerning constitutional 
development as well as financial aid and economic planning.21 
Agreement having been reached in line with Malta's requests, these 
were duly implemented with effect from 30th July 1962.22 
Within weeks of taking office, an electoral pledge had been fulfilled. 
Although Borg Olivier spent time in London discussing these changes, 
he had the nod even before Parliament was opened on 26th April. 
Times were a-changing. That was a sign that the British were prepared 
to entrust Borg Olivier's administration with powers which they had 
felt it necessary to withhold from Mintoff's after the troubles of 1958. 
20 'Extract from Official Report', 16 Apr. 1962, enc. 926/1337. 
21'Extract from Official Report', 19 Apr. 1962, enc. 92611338. A copy of this extract 
was sent to Malta on 24th April. 
22 See i.a. the Hansard report, 16 Apr. 1962, enc. CO 926/1337. 
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There was thus a taste of victory for the new administration, indicating 
a newly found prowess in dealings with Britain. It was a shot in the 
arm for Borg Olivier, reinforcing his leadership and raising his spirits. 
With his spirits, he also raised his stakes. 
If the Maltese were out 'to milk the British cow', well, the British got 
wind of it and locked and barred the farm gates. Borg Olivier's 
government asked for the renewal of - as they saw it - an already 
promised 1958 multi-million pound package offer. That comprised 
a grant of some £25,000,000, originally linked to Integration, 
compared to the £16,500,000 or £8,500,000 less which Malta was 
getting under the current Development Plan. The Maltese 
Government wanted aid to help defray a deficit of £1.5 million in 
recurrent expenditure, an increase of £1.8 million in funds being 
made available by Britain for capital development; and the 
conversion into a gift of an amount of £5 million offered as a loan. 
They wished to use grant money - which was not likely to be spent 
within the period on schemes provided for by the current 
Development Plan for 1959/64 - on new development projects. The 
budget deficit on recurrent expenditure was due to more investment 
in social services, the setting away of £500,000 for the Contingency 
Fund, making good for a loss of £280,000 incurred on securities by 
the Government Savings Bank, and a remission of taxation, 
described by Borg Olivier as "the ending of an enforced loan", 
totalling £300,000. 23 
Borg Olivier must have had some qualms about his prospects this 
time, although it should be underlined that in his earlier address to 
23 See especially the minutes of an important meeting held at the Colonial Office on 
17th August 1962, C0926/1183/48583. For the British side, together with the new 
Colonial Secretary, Mr Duncan Sandys, there were Sir John Martin, Mr Galsworthy 
and Mr Russell. For the Maltese side, together with Dr Borg Olivier, there were 
Professor J. J. Cremona, the Attorney-General; Mr Edgar Cuschieri, the 
Administrative Secretary; Dr Victor Ragonesi, the Public Relations Secretary; and 
Mr A. Salomone, the Financial Secretary. The UK Commissioner, Sir Edward 
Wakefield, was also present. 
62 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
the nation at the beginning of March he had already repeatedly spelt 
out his government's ultimate constitutional goal, in accordance with 
his party's electoral programme: Independence within the 
Commonwealth. On the eve of his departure for London in late 
June, he again broadcast to the country explaining that Malta's 
situation was a difficult one, sketching out his delegation's desires 
and plans for Malta. Briefly, Borg Olivier sought to make the 
argument that Maltese economic development had been long 
subjected to and hampered by British imperial needs. For that 
reason, for many years, Malta could not effectively seek other novel 
and pertinent forms for a more self-sustaining existence. For thus 
depriving Malta of her options, the British bore a special 
responsibility to help her now that they were leaving. 
In a broad policy sweep, Borg Olivier noted how much needed to 
be done in different spheres of industrial development, for the 
raising of the standard of education and other social services, to 
increase jobs by providing opportunities outside of employment with 
Service establishments, and to avoid unemployment generally: 
From the Colonial Government run by the British my 
Government has inherited an economic plan which, at least 
so far, has not yielded good results, and a constitution full 
of shackles and restrictions. The military barracks are empty, 
the harbours are empty. There has been considerable 
increased taxation amounting to over £1 1/4 million yearly, 
and a reserve fund of about £1 million has been completely 
exhausted. In the field of tourism, public money has been 
squandered without yielding any productive returns. Many 
other evils have been inherited, not the least of which is the 
threat oflarge-scale discharges ... 
Attacking the economic dependence caused by imperial interests in 
Malta, Borg Olivier stated that British defence interests had 
militated in particular against the development of a Maltese tourist 
industry "like other islands in the Mediterranean and beyond". This 
could have brought in "such vast sums of money as well as the setting 
up of related industries to the great benefit of our national wealth." 
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"Because of Defence interests", Borg Olivier insisted, "we could not 
build an economy based on industries ... " And again: "We could 
never find alternative sources of revenue owing to the interests and 
exigencies of Defence ... " Having made that point, he then asked his 
Maltese audience: 
In these circumstances would it be fair for the British 
Government to render the situation more hopeless for our 
Government by shirking its responsibilities towards its own 
workers and employees? Would it be fair today to throw out 
into the streets thousands of workers with consequent 
enormous hardship on their families, when the British 
Government is fully aware that adequate consideration has 
not as yet been given to the provision of suitable alternative 
employment essential to their livelihood? 
Once the British Government under their own administration, with 
all the experts and funds they had at their disposal, and with the 
reins of Malta's administration completely in their hands, had failed 
to provide alternative employment for their own employees, 
they cannot now expect me to achieve in four weeks what 
they failed to accomplish in four years. It was just four weeks 
ago that they expressed the intention of substantially 
reducing in time the number of jobs with the Defence 
Departments ... The British Government did not effect 
discharges when the Governor was administering Malta on 
behalf of the Colonial Office. It would now be a clear sign 
oflack of a sense of justice, goodwill and co-operation with 
the Maltese Government, were the British Government to 
insist now on effecting discharges ... 
In what was essentially a nationalist denouement of colonial 
exploitation and under-development, Borg Olivier was preparing 
the ground to launch his request for a hefty financial package in his 
forthcoming London talks. He wanted to impress upon the British 
that they were morally obliged to help Malta which was being 
adversely hit by their changed policies, with a dig at their allegedly 
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preferential treatment for violent regimes such as the Makarios one 
in Cyprus. Borg Olivier made no concession to the jobs which 
Defence needs had also created and the monies which the fleet and 
other works had generated over time in Malta. What he sought to 
attack was dependence on needs which were not home-grown and 
not nationally-oriented in the long-term: needs which could change 
at the outsider's whim. 
In his endeavours in the national interest, Borg Olivier felt that he 
had the support of all the Maltese political parties, of the Church, 
of the General Workers Union and the other trade unions: 
I urge the people to keep calm and to have faith for they 
may rest assured that their rights will be fully safeguarded. 
I should think that in the end reason will prevail and an 
equitable solution be also found to this problem ... The 
British Government should realise that the Maltese people 
are once and for all past the stage of begging for charity ... 
Any unilateral decision by the British Government which 
damages instead of improving Malta's situation cannot but 
provoke serious reactions and unilateral decisions by the 
Maltese Government. 
Borg Olivier was angry: just as his Economic Committee had - on 
the prevailing premises - completed a study about the economic 
plans and projections required, further discharges were suddenly 
announced by the British side. Now again, as in March before 
proceeding to London, Borg Olivier did not hold back from 
restating the Independence ideal for Malta, more couched and more 
seething as it now was in his discourse on economic survival. He said: 
There is a solution to every problem. The remedy for Malta 
in such a situation could be found were Britain not to 
remain hard and indifferent towards a tolerant and loyal 
people who has up to now lost great opportunities of 
economic aid, similar to those being extended to Makarios 
and others who in their own country, instead of shedding 
their blood as we did to further the interests of the British 
I 
5 
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defence plan, shed the blood of those who treated them far 
better than they are treating us ... We cannot work out the 
solution by ourselves because up to now we are not free to 
look after our own interests ... Ifthere is goodwill, which on 
Malta's part will not be lacking, I am prepared to face one 
situation after another with a courage that one expects of 
anyone who wants to turn his country into a Nation capable 
of competing in a free world ... 24 
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Malta's economic condition and prospects for economic 
diversification had been a sore point throughout the post-war era, 
although they had never seemed as fragile as now. Among the expert 
reports drawn up to take stock of the prevailing economic situation, 
and to suggest ways ahead, there were those by Sir Wilfred Woods 
(Report on the Finances of the Government of Malta, 1946), Sir George 
Schuster (Interim Report on the Financial and Economic Structure of the 
Maltese Islands, 1950), Thomas Balogh and Dudley Seers (The 
Economic Problems of Malta, 1955), and most importantly for the next 
Five-Year Development Plan covering 1964/69, there would be that 
by the UN economic adviser Wolfgang Stolper and his team 
(Economic Adaptation and Development in Malta, 1964). 
Data and explanations about the exact amounts of financial 
assistance and resources do not always tally and may be a trifle 
confusing because of differences in emphasis and interpretation or 
changes due to revisons; moreover the multiplier effect from 
reduced expenditure due to a diminishing presence of Service 
personnel was also a factor which could not be so precisely 
determined due to fluctuations and other variables. In 1959 the 
colonial government had established a 5-year plan which provided 
for total resources of £32lj4 million, of which £29lj4 million in grants 
or loans provided by Britain, and £3 million raised by local loans. 
24 'Broadcast by the Prime Minister on the Eve of the Departure of the Malta 
Government Delegation to London', trans., enc., 926/1692. The original text was 
released by the Dept. of Information, Valletta, 25 June 1962. 
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In ] uly 1961 this plan was revised to provide for total resources of 
some £35Ij2 million, an extra £1 million being raised by local loan 
funds and an application being made to the World Bank for a loan 
of between £2 and £3 million towards the cost of a new power 
station and water distillation plant. By the end of 1962, 22 factories 
were reported to be in production and a number of further 
applications had been approved under the Aids to Industries 
Scheme, which gave start-up grants of up to 33Ij3 % and generous 
tax exemptions for up to ten years. Service expenditure reached its 
peak during 1960 with a total overall expenditure of £22.5 million; 
after that the position was largely dominated by the Services run-
down on the one hand and the development plan on the other.25 
But how could the damage to be inflicted onjobs and the economy 
by the British Services 'Run-Down' be restrained? How could the 
Maltese economy be diversified in time to rise to the new, abrupt 
challenges facing it? Could it be done at all, outside of a conjuror's 
realm? 
Borg Olivier did not want to use capital funds for recurrent 
expenditure: he needed more of both, and a reserve - all the more 
so if faced by a sudden bout of discharges on a big scale. Briefly and 
generally stated, what Malta was actually getting from Britain in 
1962 was considerably less than what she would have got under the 
proposed 1958 Integration package - when however she would have 
been part and parcel of Britain, generally subject to its laws and 
taxes and needs, defence or any other. The cutting down on defence 
expenditure was a ruthless exercise, as cuts in public expenditure 
usually are, only that Malta was at the receiving end, without as 
much as the courtesy of prior consultations. 
25 See the report prepared by Major Patrick Wall, M.P., for the Conservative 
Commonwealth Council Conference, 'Malta 1961-1963', and the comments on it by 
Mr A. Salomone, Financial Secretary in Valletta, 29 Apr. 1963, Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Finance, MEPF/Conf./l03/63, OPMArch., Castille. See also the "Note 
on Malta's Economic Performance since 1960" from Malta House (then at 24, 
Haymarket, London, S.W.l), n.d., c.1963), enc. CO 926/1857/48655. 
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The Defence White Paper of 1962 stated that the defence facilities 
in Malta were to be reduced to those required for a forward-
operating base, and that the necessary discharges would be spread 
over a period of five years. This statement led to a debate in the 
British Parliament strongly condemning the "unilateral and 
arbitrary intentions of the British Governmnent to discharge 
Admiralty employees without adequate negotiation with the Malta 
Government". It was demanded "that adequate means be found, 
together with the Malta Government, to prevent misery and 
hardship to thousands of families and to find alternative work and 
livelihood for them." Later Her Majesty's Government agreed not 
to start the rundown until pt January 1963 but refused to extend 
the rundown period beyond 1967, it being understood that the 
number of discharges would become a serious problem by the end 
of 1964, estimated at 10,000 lost jobs. However well the 
industrialisation of the Island proceeded, emigration expanded and 
tourism increased, it would be impossible to provide alternative 
work for the thousands of workers to be discharged so soon. In his 
Candlemas speech in February 1963 just as the rundown began, the 
Governor of Malta, Sir Maurice Dorman, said he was advised that 
by 1967 some 29,000 people would be out of work here in Malta. 
"In a nutshell", he explained despondently and gloomily, "one could 
say that by 1967 it is possible that nearly one-fourth of our people 
might be out of work, one-fifth of our national income would have 
vanished and one-sixth of the Government revenue would have 
fallen away. This is a dark sky, a stormy sea and a bleak outlook for 
Independence. "26 
It is in the light of such constraints and preoccupations that the 
Sandys-Borg Olivier meeting of 17th August 1962 at the Colonial 
Office has to be seen. Faced by a stalemate there, it is no wonder 
that tempers became frayed, with that meeting ending rather 
abruptly. All that Sandys was prepared to concede was an extra offer 
26 Quoted in 'Note on Malta's economic performance', ibid., f.S. 
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of £100,000. Borg Olivier rejected this saying the acceptance of it 
would have made him "a laughing stock." 
Sandys said that some at least of the increased expenditure proposed 
did not seem to him to be "either wise or necessary"; he felt that it 
should in fact be possible for the Malta Government to balance its 
recurrent budget. The Maltese national debt, one of Sandys' 
assistants held, was considerably smaller than that of most other 
countries. HMG had already committed £22 million to Malta, 
£16lj2 in gifts and £5 1/2 in loan. That was "a not unreasonable 
proportion of loan to grant assistance", said the Secretary of State. 
The UK, he added, "could not go on making increases." 
Borg Olivier on his part, vociferously assisted by Ragonesi, insisted 
that if the need in Malta was immediately less pressing than 
elsewhere "the prospect in Malta was worse." The whole idea of 
loans, Sandys emphasised, was "to develop, and that development 
produces the revenue from which the loans are paid back and 
further development financed." But, retorted Borg Olivier, not all 
projects could be self-supporting. He pointed out that to date only 
750 new jobs had been created, compared with 7,500 required by 
1964. 
Much ofthe discussion centred around the 1958 financial package, 
with Borg Olivier and Ragonesi insisting that Lennox-Boyd and 
Governor Laycock had retained it on offer. Sandys on the other 
hand held that that those earlier proposals had "lapsed", and that 
"it was futile for the Maltese Government to try to revive piece-
meal parts of the 1958 agreement", which had posed the choice 
at the end of the five years between "full integration or. .. some 
other agreed constitutional and economic basis for Malta's 
future." Lennox-Boyd's, Sandys said, had been only "a tentative 
suggestion" . 
Going back to Lennox-Boyd's statements at the time to the British 
Parliament, it is obvious that much as he was disappointed if not 
distraught by the grotesque twist which the whole Integration 
episode had taken, he nonetheless was keen to emphasise that Malta 
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would not be abandoned to its fate by Britain. Therefore, the 
promised financial aid could or would still be forthcoming under a 
different constitutional arrangement. Admittedly, that was in 
March 1958, before Mintoff's resignation and the ensuing 
hullabaloo; but it was also three months after the passing of the 
'Break with Britain' resolution by the Maltese Assembly. The rift had 
already taken place. In the discussions concluded in March 1958, 
Mintoff had "refused to recommend integration to the Maltese 
people on the imaginative terms proposed by Her Majesty's 
Government." 
Talking in the same breath of integration with Britain and 
independence from it - the only common denominator to the two 
conflicting proposals apparently being how much money would be 
on offer - Lennox-Boyd was taken amiss by the Maltese leader. 
Adopting the proverbial under-statement, he was politely conveying 
that message to the House of Commons only a few weeks before 
Mintoff's decision to resign from office in April 1958. Referring to 
Mr Mintoff, Lennox-Boyd had continued thus: 
He attempted to attach a political condition, namely, the 
right to independence on a unilateral basis, which strikes at 
the root of a union in mutual confidence which was the basis 
of the integration proposals. It is impossible for the United 
Kingdom Government to pledge Parliament to proceed 
with integration unless a very different state of mind is 
shown ... the Prime Minister of Malta proposed that Her 
Majesty's Government should immediately enter into 
further financial commitments of a most extensive character 
or be ready to grant independence to Malta. He suggested 
that in implementing the plan for integration the United 
Kingdom Parliament should undertake that until such time 
as full economic equivalence was achieved, they would be 
prepared to grant independence to Malta if a Maltese 
Government were at any time during that period returned 
to office with a mandate for that policy. At a later stage he 
offered to withdraw this proposal, provided that the United 
Kingdom Parliament were prepared to extend to the 
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Maltese people, at their next Election, a choice between 
integration and independence. 
In these circumstances, Lennox-Boyd had "revived the tentative 
suggestion" that rather than lose all the fruits of the long Anglo-
Maltese negotiations, Britain would be prepared, if the Maltese 
people so desired, to proceed with interim constitutional and 
economic arrangements for a period offive years. The essence of this 
five-year plan would be that Malta would be granted a constitution 
broadly on the lines of that proposed under the integration plan, 
save for the time being making Malta part of the United Kingdom 
and providing for representation at Westminster; the same economic 
and financial arrangements; and, at the end of the five years, both 
Governments would consult together to review the working of the 
constitutional and economic arrangements and to consider whether 
they could then proceed to the conclusion of arrangements on a 
permanent basis. In concluding his speech in the Commons, 
Lennox-Boyd had made it "abundantly clear" that Britain would not 
be abandoning Malta and her people, or of their being indifferent 
"to the economic consequences of the effect of defence cuts". He had 
repeated the assurance already given about the level of employment 
in the dockyard until 1960 and again confirmed that pending 
investigaton of the possibility of converting the dockyard to 
commercial use, no decision had been taken about its future 
thereafter. "I repeated", Lennox-Boyd had said, "that we stood by 
the economic and financial commitments under the integration 
plan."27 
When at the 17th August meeting four years later Sandys insisted 
that the 1958 offer was never taken up and had therefore lapsed, 
Borg Olivier said that after integration had been finally buried in the 
House of Commons, the offer of money was in fact repeated to him 
through the Governor. He was unable to accept it solely because he 
27 Extracts from Hansard, Commons, 25 Mar.1958, cols. 227, 230 and 243, enc., 
Annex A, 926/1183/48583. 
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did not have a majority in the Legislative Assembly. He said that he 
asked the Governor to hold immediate elections - which he felt sure 
he would win - and told him that "he would come back for the 
money after he had received his mandate." The constitution had 
already been suspended then but after the period of direct rule, 
elections had now been held, Borg Olivier had received his mandate, 
and here he was now, as he put it: "in the United Kingdom to 
negotiate for the money." 
To dodge this, Sandys linked the offer to the integration proposal, 
but the Maltese side denied that. There was no denying that it had 
been the prospect of integration that had led Britain to offer such a 
deal in the first place, under a whole set of different assumptions. 
Lennox-Boyd had first proposed the plan on 25th March 1958, and 
then repeated it on 3 pt July 1958, after integration had been 
rejected. Victor Ragonesi reminded Duncan Sandys that on 31 st July 
1958 Lennox-Boyd had promised "to assist in balancing the budget 
on recurrent account so as to maintain and raise the standard of 
education and other social services." Some assistance had in fact 
been given, but not to the extent originally envisaged under the 
Mintoff and Lennox-Boyd package. 
The Maltese delegation was after cash and infrastrfuctural 
investments, hence their determined stand for aid on recurrent as 
well as capital expenditure. When Ragonesi reminded Sandys that 
Mr Mac1eod and Lord Perth had repeated promises of assistance 
towards the recurrent budget to Dr Olivier in 1960, Sandys waved 
that aside saying it was impossible for undertakings to be made to 
people who were not in office. What the Governor had told Dr 
Olivier in 1958, he added, was in effect that although both parties 
were against integration Her Majesty's Government were prepared 
to hold the offer open against the possibility of a change in Maltese 
opinion. "In fact integration had been and had continued to be 
rejected and the offer therefore was dead." 
A harsh exchange then followed between Professor J. J. Cemona and 
Mr Sandys, when the former recalled Lennox-Boyd's general pledge 
of financial assistance to develop the economy and to maintain 
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standards of social welfare. Sandys pointed out that integration 
implied a higher standard of social services in Malta than Malta 
could otherwise expect, from which Cremona deduced that Malta 
was being "punished by losing the advantages integration might 
have brought." This annoyed Sandys who said Malta "could not 
expect to have it both ways". Having rejected integration after 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages involved, the Maltese 
Government 'could hardly talk about having been "punished".' 
In other words - Sandys seemed to be saying - stew in your own 
juice: since you did not want integration, you cannot expect now to 
benefit from advantages that would have accrued with Malta as an 
integral part of the UK, rather than as a separate state. There was 
almost an implication that the offer had been left on the table as a 
carrot, but only until such time as the Maltese decision to go their 
own way became irrevocable. With integration, Britain would not 
have needed to negotiate with a Maltese Government about defence 
facilities or anything else which it would have been in the power of 
the UK government to decide and to execute in as binding a fashion 
as it desired - on what would have been its own sovereign territory. 
That would have been worth a different price, certainly, a much 
higher one, but the original premise no longer applied. 
Borg Olivier observed that the 1962 elections had shown that the 
Maltese people were in favour of independence. Whilst he could not 
say that the money previously offered "was due to Malta", Her 
Majesty's Government were "morally bound to give it". When he 
said that the offer had not been withdrawn, Sandys promptly 
repeated that it had been rejected. 
The British side was ready to agree to a partial redeployment of 
funds granted for 1962-1964, but they wanted much more detailed 
submissions than they had so far received. When Ragonesi pleaded 
urgency, Sir John Martin's rejoinder was that "if the urgency was so 
great, five or six weeks had been allowed to slip away with no details 
forthcoming." In response to a special allocation for rebuilding the 
Opera House, Mr Galsworthy did not feel this was worthy of 
assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. That, 
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he added, had already been paid for under the £30 million given 
in War Damage. 
Although it may seem odd that the Nationalist Government would 
have brought up funding for an Opera House when the country 
was supposedly in dire straits, they must have reckoned that in all 
probability here was one last chance for having it rebuilt through 
overseas aid. It had after all been destroyed in the Second 
World War while Malta was devastated fighting on the side of the 
Allies; it had been the most outstanding piece of Victorian 
architecture from the British period in Malta; and the money 
dished out in War Damage was not nearly enough anyway. 
The Borg Olivier administration was also concerned about 
attracting tourists, and they would have regarded having the 
Opera House 'back' as an inducement to attract high-quality 
tourists to Malta and bolster up Valletta (Malta's capital city and 
Borg Olivier's constituency). The question about the Opera House 
at the 17 th August meeting was immediately followed by a 
charge, from Ragonesi, that "the Colonial Government did nothing 
to encourage tourists." This was largely true of course, because 
Malta's 'tourists' had been the soldiers and sailors; it was only now 
that the tourist industry was suddenly dawning on Malta as a 
potenital prime source of income. The Opera House issue limped 
on until the very end of the independence negotiations. 
Unfortunately for Malta and her people, no less than for her 
tourists, it was a classic, symbolic project which Borg Olivier's 
dogged persistence did not succeed in 'retrieving' as a visible and 
lasting parting gift to the George Cross Island from the Land of 
Hope and Glory. 
The final and far more decisive stumbling block in this all-important 
encounter concerned the rundown and the future of the dockyard. 
It was a familiar enough topic. Borg Olivier deplored not so much 
the rundown as the fact that the changes to British defensive strategy 
had been made "overnight". There would be a major redeployment 
of forces in the course of which less emphasis would be placed on 
Malta. The Maltese side wanted to see the rundown postponed, but 
the Admiralty had already been persuaded to hold back the 
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beginning of the rundown until January 1963 and to extend its 
operation into 1967. Sandys had proposed a "joint study" of its 
effects but this, he noted, "had not aroused much interest in Malta." 
As for the dockyard itself, while the British side held that the 
changeover to Baileys had long been known, the Maltese side denied 
that. They had known that the dockyard would be "civilianised", but 
they had not learned of the plan to close the Naval Base, which 
employed 6,000 men, until the White Paper in February 1962. 
Ragonesi described Britain's act as "a breach of promise" since the 
Commander-in-Chief had promised, he said, that the rundown 
would be discussed. From now on the discussion went something 
like this: 
Sandys: Discussion does not mean a Maltese right of veto. 
Ragonesi: It does not mean a unilateral British act either ... 
The Maltese are not prepared to be treated as guinea-pigs 
at the whim of British defence requirements. If no help 
could be forthcoming the Maltese and British had better call 
it a day. 
Borg Olivier: If we are going to make any real impact on the 
worsening employment situation we need an additional 
grant of £1.8 million as well as the loan money. 
Sandys: ... Let us not poison the atmosphere between the 
two countries. Let us join in a friendly spirit in the enquiry 
I have proposed. I would not have proposed it had I not felt 
there is some hope of a solution and UK assistance arising 
from it. 
Borg Olivier: I won't be quarrelsome. I shall confine myself 
to the facts. I shall try to raise the money wherever else I can 
find it, but the British Government are leaving me in the 
lurch so far as immediate needs are concerned ... 
When Sandys again alluded to the offer of £100,000, Borg Olivier 
said that accepting that would have made him a laughing stock. 
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There seemed to be nothing further to be said and the meeting was 
unceremoniously wound up.2S 
Other than the possibility of redeploying some grants, the only other 
marginally substantive outcome of this meeting was a delegation of 
power to Malta to raise funds from other countries (sic). Thatincluded 
"power to seek associate membership of the E.E.C. on the same lines 
as Greece". Arrangements had already been made for the Maltese 
Government to use the facilities offered by the British team of 
negotiators in Brussels. The Common Market was on the Maltese 
Government's agenda - but preferably without the need to have to 
seek delegation of powers before going ahead with whatever was 
required. 
The British Government agreed that Malta's negotiations for 
associate membership of the E.E.C. need not depend on Britain's 
own accession, but they were prepared to negotiate with the Six 
"special arrangements" regarding the treatment of Maltese exports, 
if there were an interval between Britain's accession and Malta's 
association agreement. Otherwise Britain would have "to begin 
applying the common external tariff to their exports on our entry 
into the Community." Following instructions, Wakefield some days 
later wrote to Borg Olivier to say that Sandys was glad to grant 
authority for Malta to negotiate and conclude agreements of any kind 
with the Community and the authorities constituted thereunder, 
subject only to their not impinging upon H.M.G.'s Defence 
and External Affairs commitments. This authority is not 
limited to circumstances in which Britain joins the 
Community. If, however, Malta became associated with the 
Community under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, whilst 
Britain did not join, a reconsideration of Anglo-Maltese 
trade relations would of course become necessary. I have 
been asked to add that ... the fact that H.M.G. have 
28 See the minutes of this meeting (fII-6) between Sandys, Borg Olivier and their 
respective delegations, held at the C.O., 17 Aug. 1962, 926/1183/48583. 
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delegated this authority to the Malta Governmenty is in no 
way a guarantee that the Six will themselves be prepared to 
negotiate with the Malta Government under Article 238 of 
the Treaty of Rome. 29 
There can be no doubt at all that the meeting of 17th August 
convinced Borg Olivier and his delegation that the time for a 
definite break had come. That time was now. For two or three days, 
no doubt over some whiskeys at the Savoy, the members of the 
unnerved Maltese delegation would have exchanged views, 
discussed options and drafts, as they waited for the reply in writing 
to the various points raised - and which Sandys had promised to let 
Dr Olivier have "over the week-end". In fact, that letter from Sandys 
went out on the very same day in which the meeting had taken place. 
No time was lost to respond - but nothing had changed either. The 
die was cast. Neither guinea-pigs nor laughing-stocks, the Maltese 
had had enough: henceforth they would go it alone and do it their 
way. Her Majesty's Government could keep its offer of £1 00,000 -
assuming that was not a red rag waved to the bull's face. 
On the 20th August Dr Borg Olivier addressed two letters from his 
hotel to the Secretary of State, a long one and a short one. 
In the lengthy one, one of the lengthiest he ever signed, Borg Olivier 
returned to the charge taking the points of the meeting one by one 
and giving his version or rebuttal of each. Few new points emerge 
from this letter, one being his claim that Governor Laycock had at 
first promised fresh elections to him in 1958. He reiterated that 
Lennox-Boyd as late as 31 st July 1958 had confirmed the 
'integration' offer, which could not but have been essentially based 
on what the British Government considered was needed by Malta 
"to undertake a development programme in order to start 
diversifying her economy and to raise the educational and social 
level of her people to what is reasonable by European standards." 
29 Min., J. M. Martin, 23 Aug. 1962,926/1183/48583. 
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Malta's needs at present were "much greater", argued Borg Olivier, 
because a severe decline in Service spending in Malta was altogether 
unexpected in 1958. He corrected and elaborated on what he 
called a misconception of the grant/loan relativity in the total 
finances of the development plan, going back to the mid-fifties. The 
British contribution of £16.5 million by way of grant had to be 
viewed in relation to the total resources of £35.5 million, which 
included a loan from purely local sources of £4 million. Borg Olivier 
described the British way of dealing as "most unfair": 
In March 1958 Her Majesty's Government considered that 
Malta needed a grant of £25 million for capital development 
alone over the next five years. It is with the latter amount 
that the £16.5 million grant referred to in your letter should 
really be compared. As regards the unspent balance of £12 
million referred to in your letter, I think it was made clear 
during my talks with you that, in the light of the very small 
success achieved, if at all, in the performance of the 
development plan and having regard especially to the 
envisaged drastic run-down in defence expenditure in 
Malta, resort to further loans is bound to place an excessive 
burden on the already strained economy of the Island ... 
what cannot but be considered by all Malta and her friends 
as most unfair is that the new defence policy, which at this 
juncture may spell disaster for the Island, should be put into 
effect without prior agreement with the Government of 
Malta on appropriate remedial measures and before 
adequate plans for the absorption of the labour to be shed 
meet with reasonable success ... 
Borg Olivier flatly and significantly refused to accept any limitation 
on his requests for a wider delegation of power in the field of 
external affairs - there had been none during the meeting of 
17th August - particularly Malta's right to deal directly with the 
E.E.C.: 
I wish to to stress that our request in connection with the 
European Economic Community is for full authority to 
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negotiate and conclude agreements of any kind with that 
Community and the authorities constituted thereunder, and 
I earnestly trust that when the final document embodying 
the delegation of power under section 83 of the Constitution 
is drawn up, it will contain a provision on these lines. Indeed 
at the meeting held on 17th August 1962, you made no 
reference to any limitation based on Britain's participation 
in the Community such as is contained in the third 
paragraph before last of your letter, nor, in my view, is any 
such limitation warranted. 
A condensed reassertion of the points he had made in his national 
broadcast on the eve of his departure for London, bringing to mind 
Fortunato Mizzi's strident "Appello" addressed to the Maltese from 
London in 1886 on the eve of the attainment of Representative 
Government, the two concluding paragraphs of Borg Olivier's letter 
have all the power of shot. They provide as succinct a reassertion 
of the kernel of Maltese anti-colonial nationalism, albeit in a slightly 
more controlled phraseology than one might have expected to hear 
in its heyday, when constitutions once given were subsequently 
withdrawn. But now a final heyday was clearly at hand; and there 
would be less Royal Navy ships around "to dirty the harbour". In 
carefully thought out words, Britain is told firmly and squarely that 
Malta had served British needs for much too long. The Maltese now 
felt that they would be better off without her tutelage. Colonial rule 
had acted as a restraint on Maltese development whereas in full 
freedom Malta was confident that she would thrive and prosper. In 
return for a golden handshake by Britain as befitted the occasion, 
Maltese friendship was held forth - an olive branch not to be freely 
dispensed with: 
As you well know, Malta has been tied down to a fortress 
economy ever since her connection with Britain and that 
economy cannot now be diversified overnight. It should be 
borne in mind that in respect of Malta the fortress concept 
has always prevailed under British rule and this had in fact 
considerably hampered and delayed our constitutional 
progress and conditioned the whole of our economy. Britain 
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Sheet 4. 
The recent talks have indeed had an unfortunate 
outcome, but at least th~ must certaihl~ h~ve served to 
bring home to you the grave difficulties which ccnfront 
my'Government and people. I have always been confident 
and you know that I have been given a clear mandate in 
respect of independence - that'we will be fn a better 
position to face those problems if we have full freedom 
of action in the shapin~ of Malta's' future as an independent 
,member of the Commonwealth. The experience which I have 
gained'duringmy prolonged talks has pressed on me the 
necessity and importance of greater urgency in this metter. 
In the circumstances I have consulted my 'Cabinet col.lear;ues 
a.'ld I have their tull support in the pursuit of independenc,e 
as a matter of urgency. 
Borg Olivier's letter to 
Sandys of 20th August 
1962 restating and 
justifying Malta's case. 
~~~ 
20th AUjl;ust 1962. 
b.L<1-'-~-t~, 
I hn.ve received ;your letter of the 
17th Augunt 1962. on tho oub;j<lct of our te.lkl:l. 
\'Iith ro[",rence to tne ~econd paroGrnph 
of your lotter, I wish to strllllHI onco Dorn the bn3ic 
tloint, cloarly cade in my mOJ:l.ornndUlll or the 25th July 1962, 
th"t !Q.T request is elUlle.ntialll one, 1.0. the operation of 
the financial arl'Mp:el:lents proposed by Her Majesty's 
Govor1Ulloot for Malta. on the 25th Nnrch 1958, and contained 
in the otntemont ll'.ade by the Sec.retary of State in the 
House or COlI\QonG on that date. Th. other ito:l'l$ tc which 
you llIake re:fercnce in that plU'ajl)raph are lIIerely !'Iome of the 
conttlmplated :fcaturotl or the forthconing esti:Mtes frWlted 
on the basic of Hor Ua.ictrtY'g Governlllnnt's contingent 
3.t;rIUllIlent to the operation of thoae finoncilll arrangoll'.ento 
for the remllining period of the curront devolopment plan. . 
'l'hitl, I &ugge.t, i5 how (b) in the second parograph of your 
let~er io to be understood. 
You otll.te in yOw:' lo'ltter that tbe 1'in!ll1cial 
assistance o!Iered in 1958 was B.n intus:ru.1 part ot. propol'lo.ln 
. .depip.;ned to cover an interim period ot' five years pending 0. 
£inD~ decision on whether 'Maltll-ehQ\lld .be~j.ntcgrD.t,ed ,.,i th 
the United Kingdolll. Ill'ld you add that those pro'posru.a wore not 
li.cccptel1 by the then GovernJlleD,t of Malta. and consequ~ntly 
laY80d. It appeara that :you have overlooked the point. 
6lt1pha&:i zed by lIIe. that the o!!er wa:! not connect=d solely 
with integration and th1a iO' borne out not only by the 
terms ot. the offer itoo1£ but alao by the tact that when, 
attor lfr. Mintott'o reoignotion, Governor Sir Robert Laycock 
invited me to tor:& a government, he extendod the oIrer to 
me and he knew full well that I was cnsae;:ed in a ver-r active 
and l'Iuntllined e",mpaign against integration in accordll1lce with 
r.ry Part:yla eloctoral llIanifec-to. I advised the Governor to 
hold ir:lrncdiate election.; addinS that, if elected, I would 
then COll'1l:t forwnrd for the JIIoney. Although at .first promised, 
eleotions wore evell,tuall:y not held and a period o! strict 
c-olonial aW:liniGtra.tion !ollo'led. At the first subsequent 
elections held in Malta. lIlY Party "'U r~turnod to powcr. 
The orror, which Was con!irllutd by thc Secrotur:r or 
SLato in the House of GOlllrnonn on the 31Gt July 1958, could not 
but have bllen esaentially based on what Her Majesty's Governllent 
oonsidered wile needed by Ma.lta to Ul).dertake a develoPJnent 
prop;rlllrdile in order to st:llrt: divorsifying her economy and to raiSE 
the eduoAtional .a.nd aocinl level of her people to wlInt is 
rell13onab1u by :Europttan stMdards. I cannot Gee how it co.n 
conceivably be said that [inlUlcial contribution on that) 
The iu,ght Honouru.ble DunCM Sandyo', M.P., 
Seore~w::y or State for Cor.m:onwealth Relations 
and [or the ColonilHl. 
79 
80 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
;-:"~(-:;;-EivED 
"-""" ......... .,..; 
PRiVATE OF?iC:;:: 
::." AUGi962 SAVOY BOTEL, 
London, W.C.2. 
20th Au~st 1962. 
Sir, 
On behalf of the Government and People of 
the Island of Malta and its Dependencies, I have the 
honour to invoke for my country the right to be an 
independent State. 
I request you therefore to fix as a matter 
of urgency a date for the Maltese Islands' independence 
within the Commonwealth. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 
~
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
-and for the Colonies. 
Dr Borg Olivier's letter of 20th August to the Colonial Secretary invoking 
for his country "the right to be an independent State", and the corrected 
draft of a reply by Mr Sandys on the day. 
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Colonial 
20th August, 1962 • 
.J)~?~~'~/ 
Thank you for your letter of to-day's date, (11) in which you ask that Malta should be granted ~ ,independence. 
~ n1tl1e ! am SdI pl1Sed j ou ,did no t (01 lIlally 
r..aizse Mlis bap01 bunt isscre nitlt me iit Odl i eCent 
~, r shall be pleased to arrange a meeting 
between our two Governments, as soon as 
practicable, to consider your proposal. 
7;p 21.~· Sa.... 
~ 
The Hon)(Borg Olivier. 
~~ 
hl. Since r understand you ""'*'t CCl't'!><\\>e~to the 
press the contents of your letter to me, 
r am likewise publishing my reply. 
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cannot now, without seriously jeopardising the traditional 
good relationship between the two countries, shed her 
responsibilities towards Malta's economy so lightly and 
improvidently. 
The outcome of the recent talks had been indeed unfortunate, Borg 
Olivier continued to Sandys, but at least they must certainly have 
served 
to bring home to you the grave difficulties which confront 
my Government and people. I have always been confident 
- and you know that I have been given a clear mandate in 
respect of independence - that we will be in a better position 
to face those problems if we have full freedom of action in 
the shaping of Malta's future as an independent member of 
the Commonwealth. The experience which I have gained 
during my prolonged talks has pressed on me the necessity 
and importance of greater urgency in this matter. In the 
circumstances I have consulted my Cabinet colleagues and 
I have their full support in the pursuit of independence as 
a matter of urgency. 30 
The long letter in fact provided the rationale behind the short and 
much more historic one, bearing the same date. In the shorter letter, 
so much more typically epigrammatic of him, Borg Olivier said that 
after having consulted his Cabinet colleagues he was making a formal 
and urgent request to Britain. Obviously coordinated in advance by 
Borg Olivier and his advisers so as to be a more poignant and historic 
document all to itself, it read simply as follows: 
On behalf of the Government and People of the Island of 
Malta and its Dependencies, I have the honour to invoke for 
my country the right to be an independent State. 
30 Borg OlivierlSandys, Savoy Hotel, London, WC.2, 20 Aug. 1962, CO 926/11831 
48583. The letter starting 'Dear Secretary of State' was registered at the Colonial 
Secretary's private office on the day. 
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I request you therefore to fix as a matter of urgency a date 
for the Maltese Islands' independence within the 
Commonwealth.31 
83 
With this formal demand for Independence - urgently - placed 
before Britain by the Maltese Government, all the earlier 'manifesto' 
talk of independence suddenly became acutely real. 
Sandys replied to Borg Olivier's letter of 20th August on the very same 
day. Thanking him for his letter bearing that day's date, in which he 
asked that Malta should be granted independence, Sandys added 
simply: "I shall be pleased to arrange a meeting between our two 
Governments, as soon as practicable, to consider your proposal."32 
There was a little less sang froid in the draft of the letter which Sandys 
had intended sending Borg Olivier. In this Sandys expressed 
"surprise" at the fact that Borg Olivier had not formally raised "this 
important issue" with him "in our recent talks". This significant 
qualifying clause expressing "surprise" was crossed out form the draft, 
as was the less formal "yours sincerely". There was also a post script: 
"Since I understand you communicated to the press the contents of 
your letter to me, I am likewise publishing my reply."33 
Disappointed by the dismal failure of the financial talks, Borg Olivier 
seemed challenged, if not gratified, by the prospect of a new era 
dawning on Malta through independence from Britain. The cloud 
had a silver lining. Reared as a Nationalist, in a Nationalist family 
of long standing from Valletta, he had come to appreciate British 
31 Borg OlivierlSandys, Savoy Hotel, London, W.C. 2, 20 Aug. 1962, CO 926/13091 
48655. 
32 SandysIBorg Olivier, 20 Aug. 1962. The text of this was published in The Scotsman, 
21 Aug. 1962, under the heading "Sandys replies". 
33 Draft letter, Sandys/Borg Olivier, 20 Aug. 1962, 926/1309/48655. This draft is 
noteworthy for the parts crossed out as these betray a certain annoyance on the part 
of the Secretary of State. It seems he had not anticipated such a sharp and 
immediate reaction from the Maltese prime minister. 
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liberal norms but not at the expense of patriotic ones. A Borg Olivier 
ancestor bearing the same surname was Malta's Chief Justice when 
the British had first arrived in Malta, while the prime minister's 
paternal uncle had been a fiery Senator and a Speaker in the 1920s. 
Dr Borg Olivier had led the political opposition to Mr Mintoff's quest 
for Malta's integration with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland in the mid-fifties, and then had the 
uncommon satisfaction of gleefully seconding Mr Mintoff's own 
parliamentary resolution to "break with Britain" in December 1957 
when the whole integration campaign flopped. 
Now Borg Olivier's financial talks had also flopped. He set the stakes 
at £25 million in grants over five years, a package offered to Mintoff 
at the time of Integration, arguing that it was fallacious to claim that 
some £12 million of development aid was still unspent. Of that, £5 
million was available as loan: no further loans would be feasible. Of 
the balance of £7 million, £5 million was in respect of projects in 
progress and £2 were for new schemes which the Colonial Office had 
not yet approved or improved. On top of all that, Malta now faced 
the rundown, growing unemployment, economic destabilization. No 
Maltese Government ever had to confront so formidable a challenge, 
Borg Olivier held. The specific claims made mainly for 1964/1965 
were for additional grants totalling nearly £4 million, to subsidize 
education, health and social service costs, and for new employment-
generating projects, together with a conversion of £5 million from 
loan to grant. Borg Olivier limited himself to British Government 
funding, as broken down in grants and loans under the still 
operative 1959-1964 development plan. These excluded loans 
totaling £7,250,000, of which about £2,250,000 had been paid to 
Bailey (Malta) Ltd., for the modernization of the dockyard. All told, 
the Maltese government expected Britain to grant Malta a further 
nine million pounds or so. After eight weeks of haggling, the only 
tangible cash offer Borg Olivier got, one which he indignantly 
turned down, was for an additional £100,000. 
Before leaving London in that unusually long month of August 
1962, while recovering from a bout of flu, Borg Olivier gave the most 
widely-reported press conference of his life. It featured in all sections 
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of the British press, from Conservative to Communist; even Izvestiya 
in Moscow found space for it. 34 On the same day that he had 
addressed the two 'independence' letters to Duncan Sandys, just 
before returning to Malta Borg Olivier made his demand for 
Independence known to the world. 
Giving the reasons for it, he held out a brighter prospect for a Malta 
independent of Britain than some of his own countrymen would 
have been keen to endorse at the time. At home, the Mintoff-Ied 
Labour opposition were critical ofBorg Oliver for not having acted 
faster and asked for more; other parties were circumspect and wary 
of what the future might hold if Malta set sail in what Governor 
Dorman would soon describe as stormy weather - rough seas under 
a dark sky. "Worse I feel we can never be", stated Dr Borg Olivier 
confidently when announcing Malta's official demand for 
independence on the day that he made it. "Now I shall fight tooth 
and nail for independence", he stated. 
Press comment in Britain about this turn of events veered between 
admiration on the one hand and commiseration on the other. Dr 
Borg Olivier, never easily ruffled, put as bold a face on it as he 
could. 
One of the British diplomatic correspondents most au courant with 
Maltese affairs - and who knew the Commonwealth inside out - was 
Patrick Keatley of The Guardian. Keatley was among the journalists 
present for Borg Olivier's press conference at the Savoy. As he 
walked into the conference room at his West End hotel, Borg Olivier 
34Izvestiya published a Tass report under the headline "Fruitless Talks", 21 Aug. 
1962, translated and relayed to the F.O. by the British embassy in Moscow, enc. 
Smith/Youde, 22 Aug. 1962, 926/1179/48655. It reported Borg Olivier as saying that 
Britain had even failed to comply with a request for the "comparatively small sum" 
of £2,163,000, and that was why the talks had been "fruitless". It also reported 
Malta's official demand for independence. That such a report was published "when 
the papers were once again almost entirely filled with the cosmonauts", commented 
Mr H.F.T.Smith from Moscow, was "indicative of Soviet interest in developments." 
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was "the same polished and urbane figure" which Whitehall had 
come to know well over the years, Keatley observed; "but when he 
spoke it was the voice of an exasperated man at the end of his 
tether." 
Borg Olivier set out his case "crisply and bitterly", according to 
Keatley: he and his Cabinet on coming to power had inherited a 
five-year development plan from the colonial administration which, 
in Borg Olivier's view, was proving to be woefully inadequate. It 
had provided so far 750 new jobs against a target of 7,500, while 
the budget on current account was showing a deficit. In recent 
years, Borg Olivier said, Malta had been living "from hand to 
mouth". The reserves of £830,000 in 1958 had changed into a 
deficit of £450,000 in 1962. The upshot of eight weeks of 
negotiations in London, interrupted by the change of Colonial 
Secretary from Maudling to Sandys, was the offer of a sum of 
£100,000 in assistance for the current budget. This Borg Olivier 
regarded as "not merely a dusty answer but an insult." Although 
Malta had already raised her annual revenues by £1.25 million 
through heavier taxes, there was still a shortfall of over £2 million 
in recurrent expenditure. Worse still, of course, were the omens 
surrounding the closure of the Naval Base as a result of the Defence 
White Paper, and Borg Olivier would have wanted to make 
provisions to counter the anticipated rise in unemployment. It was 
in the light of all this that the offer of £100,000 was seen as 
preposterous. "I could not accept such a meagre sum", Borg Olivier 
told the press. And he added pointedly: "I did not come here to 
make a silver collection."35 
Practically every British newspaper picked up this "sniffy" remark, 
which to a colonial subject would have evoked Poppy Day, the 
35 Patrick Keatley, "Immediate Freedom Demand by Malta", The Guardian, 21 Aug. 
1962. In an editorial comment, "Malta's Banker", The Guardian concluded that it was 
"hardly reasonable to ask that Britain's economic assistance to Malta should continue 
at the present rate" if Malta became independent and Britain could no longer 
"exercise any control over its application." 
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RSPCA or some such Empire-associated jamboree - a sixpence in 
return for a poppy stuck to your lapel. Borg Olivier also hoped to 
be better positioned to attract overseas aid from sources other than 
Britain if and when Malta would be an independent state. He saw 
himself, at this stage, almost at one with Mintoff, who had been led 
to favour independence after other approaches had failed to bear 
fruit. Dr Borg Olivier freely admitted this: 
My predecessor, Mr Mintoff, went through the same kind 
of stress. I am now invoking the right of my people to 
independence as a matter of urgency. Malta has been left in 
the lurch - abandoned in her great hour of need. It seems 
so very strange that this should happen to the George Cross 
island which helped to win the last war ... We have a few 
friends still, I feel, especially those who knew Malta in the 
war years. Up to now we could not approach these countries 
- our friends in the West - who have helped many other 
countries. We have not resorted to violence in order to 
achieve independence although others have. 
This was probably a reference to some of the non-European ex-
colonies and indeed Cyprus, but it could have also been a dig at 
Mintoff who in 1958 had resigned and dramatically taken his new-
found anti-British slogans to the streets. While renouncing violence, 
Borg Olivier emphasisied that he would "fight tooth and nail" for 
independence. According to John Dickie of The Daily Mail, Borg 
Olivier seemed to underline the comparison between certain Mrican 
territories which had raced to independence despite a short 
apprenticeship in self-government and Malta which had produced 
a succession of premiers and a skilled European-style 
administration. "He left his audience wondering whether Malta's 
pace would have been quicker if the Maltese had been a black 
African community."36 
36 John Dickie, "Malta demands freedom - Britain has left us in the lurch says 
Premier", Daily Mail, 21 Aug. 1962. 
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Borg Olivier was fully aware of the need for economic 
diversification. The Birmingham Post reported him as saying that 
Without independence, we were obliged, for more than a 
century and a half, to accept a situation where the economy 
of Malta must depend solely and exclusively on defence 
needs. Because of these needs, we could never explore other 
avenues.37 
A fair solution would be not to put into effect the new defence policy 
as regards Malta before adequate plans for the absorption of the 
labour to be shed are yielding results, Borg Olivier said. It was in 
his view, reported The Scotsman, "quite unfair that the transition from 
a fortress economy to a civil one should, after a century and a half 
of British rule, operate so as to lower the standard ofliving." 
Responding to this comment editorially, the newspaper assumed 
that Dr Olivier had been expecting too much. While appreciating 
the fact that the British Government had at least agreed to postpone 
the initial discharges and to spread the rundown over an additional 
year, and offered a technical redeployment of grant and loan 
moneys on projects still to be agreed on the capital side, it wondered 
if Borg Olivier recognised that changes in strategic concepts had 
unpleasant consequences in Britain too, mentioning as an example 
the unemployment caused by the abandonment of the Blue Water 
missile. At the same time, however, Borg Olivier's refusal to accept 
loan money intended for investment in order to meet current 
commitments was regarded as reasonable. 38 
37 'Malta asks for Freedom - "Britain Slams the Door"', The Birmingham Post, 21 Aug. 
1962. 
38 "Malta Demands Freedom - Dr Olivier speaks of bitter disillusionment with Britain 
- "Door slammed on my country", The Scotsman, 21 Aug. 1962. "The real difficulty 
seems to be", the Scotsman concluded in its editorial about "Malta's difficulties" 
carried on the same day as the report, "that Dr Borg Olivier has been expecting too 
much." 
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The prominent coverage given in all sections of the British press to Dr Borg 
Olivier's international press conference at the Savoy Hotel on 20th August 
1962 announcing his demand to the British Government, on that day, for 
Malta's independence. These newspaper reports are from (left) The Scotsman 
and (right) from The Times. 
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The Northern Daily suggested a White Paper setting forth the 
current financial position and a definite plan for future 
development. 39 
Although he said he believed Malta could become economically 
viable, Borg Olivier understandably was not sure of the extent or 
the pace at which such a turn-around could be achieved without 
overseas aid. His reference to "our friends in the West", who had 
known Malta "in the war years", could very well have been directed 
at the two countries which had dropped most bombs there, Italy 
and Germany, but he was probably thinking mainly of the U.S.A., 
and possibly of NATO, which had its Allied Forces Mediterranean 
headquartered in Malta, at Floriana. He would also have had in 
mind, certainly, a steady gravitation towards the European 
Economic Community. Earlier, reported The Daily Express, 
Dr Olivier had announced his intention to seek urgent talks in 
Brussels for Malta to become an associate member of the Common 
Market.4o 
There were, he believed, practical reasons for hoping that aid might 
come from the United States, Western Germany, France and Italy 
in particular. In the course of the press conference Borg Olivier 
specifically mentioned the Common Market. It was a plain fact, he 
noted by way of reassurance to the doubtful, that Archbishop 
Makarios and his government had only been able to negotiate 
outside aid after achieving political independence from Britain. The 
Maltese people thus had before them the tangible example of 
39 In an editorial called "Malta Muddle" accompanying its news report on 21 Aug., 
The Northern Daily concluded that Britain must aim to make the Maltese financially 
independent; at the same time, "the Maltese themselves might take some pains to 
reconcile their own bitter internal differences and get on with the job in hand." This 
paper's concern about a White Paper would be catered for by the Joint Study and 
the Stolper reports, as well as the 1964/1969 Development Plan itself. 
40 "WE GO! Malta's angry Premier demands independence after aid snub", The Daily 
Express, 21 Aug. 1962. 
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Other reports of Borg Olivier's 'independence' press conference in (above, 
left) The Daily Mail and (right) The Daily Express of 21't August 1962. 
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Cyprus, which was similar to Malta in terms of democratic 
government, size and population. Further reassurance of a more 
emotional bent came in the form of a Maltese saying, translated 
literally into English: "worse than we are - I feel we can never be." 
(Ma nistghux inkunu aghar milli ahna.) It was, in Keatley's words, an 
"emotional, half-grammatical declaration, spluttered out with an 
accompanying gesture of defiance and despair." 
A warning (or so Borg Olivier reckoned) came towards the end of 
the press conference when Malta's premier hinted darkly at what 
Britain's want of magnanimity towards Malta could lead to in the 
sphere of international politics. "I am afraid the door has been 
slammed on my country at these London talks", Borg Olivier said. 
"But at the same time it has been opened wide to elements which 
are unfriendly to NATO in Malta." This comment, reported in more 
than one British newspaper, was clearly a reference to the Malta 
Labour Party which, under Mintoff's dynamic and demagogic 
leadership, had veered towards positions of neutrality and non-
alignment, courting states and movements which were openly 
critical of the West in general and of military alliances such as 
NATO in particular. In the prevailing Cold War context of 
ideological-military super-power blocs, such a remark from an 
aspiring new state on Europe's southern-most flank, was meant to 
strike a red button. In some quarters it was interpreted as a threat, 
in others as a ploy, a bluff or simply a miscalculation, but it did not 
fail to make its mark. A number of correspondents could not fathom 
who, other than the Soviet Union, might be interested in 
befriending or using Malta, although that was not a shift to be 
encouraged. They rather disregarded the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean as a potential source of trouble that could destabilize 
the region: Algeria was probably too far away to figure in any Malta 
equation and, like Tunisia, which was quieter, it was within the 
French ambit, whereas Libya still seemed safely under Anglo-
American patronage, and ambitious Egypt nonetheless had enough 
problems of its own. To the East, the Arab-Israeli conflict simmered 
still. 
Dr Borg Olivier saw no reason why "at least in the first place" Malta 
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should not go to Western countries for aid, reported the Yorkshire 
Post; and Borg Olivier thought they would give consideration to her 
needs. "Malta is in the centre of the Mediterranean and I cannot 
visualize a situation where the threat of Communism coming from 
Africa to Europe could be allowed to drift."41 According to The 
Financial Times, Borg Olivier indicated that his mandate did not 
prevent him from seeking help from non-Western countries if it 
should prove necessary. Meanwhile Mintoff was taunting Borg 
Olivier at the "snail's pace" with which he was approaching 
independence. Had it been for him, The Daily Telegraph reported 
from Valletta, he would have had Malta both independent and out 
of the Commonwealth by now. Unemployment in Malta by August 
1962 had climbed to 6% of the working population, that is 5, 600 
workers out of a job; this was regarded as a peak in the post-war 
era.42 
Having made the point that with full freedom of action Malta would 
be in a better position to tackle her grave problems, on the following 
day Borg Olivier was reported as having said that it would be "a 
great relief to become independent" (The Times), that he was "not 
bitter" about the British Government's attitude (Yorkshire Post), and 
that his visit to London had "speeded up my request a little" (Daily 
Telegraph). 
Over the week-end, The Economist, The Observer and The New 
Statesman were some publications which commented editorially 
about the Malta situation, variously comparing it to that in Aden, 
Iceland and Southern European countries from Portugal south of 
41 'G.C. Island Wants Her Freedom - "Matter of urgency", says Malta Premier - Talks 
to be held', The Yorkshire Post, 21 Aug. 1962. 
42 "Malta crisis as aid talks break down", The Sunday Telegraph, 19 Aug. 1962; 
and see R.H.C.Steed, "Malta wants Independence - Britain refused £83/4 m. aid 
request", The Daily Telegraph, 21 Aug. 1962. See also 'Malta Demand for 
Independence - Threat to Fight "Tooth and Nail" if Request Refused', The Times, 
21 Aug. 1962. 
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the Tagus to the Greek Islands.43 As for continental Europe, Italy 
and West Germany were the countries most mentioned as possible 
helpers of Malta in future. Malta was referred to as "the obsolete 
fortress" and Borg Olivier as having "overplayed his hand", 
although Britain had "a debt of honour" to meet. Malta, it was 
claimed, had the highest per capita rate of assistance from colonial 
welfare and development funds for any dependent territory for the 
years 1959-1964. Borg Olivier had "a large, bitter and active 
Opposition ready to wring every shred of advantage from his 
difficulties" but he had been "driven into using some ofMr Mintoff's 
weapons." Whereas however Mintoff "could at least hint that he 
would play off East and West", Borg Olivier and his backers could 
hardly go to Moscow and they had "nothing to offer anyone else." 
Not absent from some of the editorial reasoning was a touch of 
resentment at Malta's daring: what, "if anything", did Malta stand 
to gain by independence? To the pro-Labour New Statesman, the 
basic problems of Malta and Aden were "identical", but Aden 
retained its value whereas Malta was no longer necessary to British 
strategy: 
Since 1957, when Duncan Sandys, then Minister of Defence, 
brusquely told the Maltese cabinet that the navy was to cut 
its establishment in Valletta, the Maltese problem has been 
how to maintain its standards oflife when the predominant 
43 In 1963 the former British colony of Aden (at the mouth of the Red Sea in the 
Gulf of Aden where this meets the Arabian Sea just across from the Horn of Africa) 
joined the Federation of South Arabia, after a short stint of self-government. 
Although its situation was not quite like that of Malta - it already had an oil refinery 
in 1953, and offered free port facilities - Aden was or had been, like Malta, Gibraltar, 
Cyprus, Singapore and elsewhere, what might be called an 'outpost of empire', a 
strategic port. Acquired by Britain at about the same time as Malta (in 1802), Aden 
became, not unlike Malta, a coaling station on the sea route to India, but it was only 
designated as a 'crown colony' more than a century after Malta had been; its socio-
political texture and constitutional history were quite different and non-European. 
After intra-nationalist struggles in the mid-1960s Aden became part of Yemen, its 
capital city and its main port. 
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factor in its economy was removed. It was this problem 
which destroyed the hopeful plan of integration and which 
led Dom Mintoff to resign as Prime Minister. 
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His successor, Dr Borg Olivier, had now been driven to demand the 
same independence which Mr Mintoffwas reviled for suggesting. In 
its view, Independence would not solve the economic problem; nor 
was it likely that an independent Malta could solve its 
unemployment difficulties without birth control, "which the 
dominant Roman Catholic Church forbids". 
But one can sympathize with the Maltese, after the 
indignities heaped on them by the Colonial Office, for 
seeking the moral stimulus of becoming masters of their 
own island. 
'The Communist threat tended to be dismissed because, in the 
words of The Economist, it "would not be at all acceptable to the 
Maltese church." Borg Olivier was seen as dependent on Church 
support and therefore he could hardly be expected to play the 
Soviet card. 
Some reporting and editorial comment persisted in the British press, 
with the provincial papers somewhat more prone to question 
London's miserliness than the national dailes. In an editorial entitled 
"Poor Malta" on 22nd August, The Yorkshire Post said it was doubtful 
if even the rosiest of long-term prospects would keep Dr Olivier in 
office, and the only conceivable alternative to him was "the 
troublesome Mr Dom Mintoff'. Of course, it continued 
patronisingly, 
the British Government's reluctance to keep handing out 
aid to Malta is not entirely inexcusable. The Maltese are in 
the habit of expecting to be looked after, and are slow to try 
to do something for themselves. Many of them want it both 
ways; they want independence and a rich aunt. But just this 
once more for old times' sake, could not the British Treasury 
muster £9m.? 
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One staunch Maltaphile, the Conservative MP Patrick Wall, 
publicly shamed the administration for treating Dr Borg Olivier 
badly. That decision should have been taken while Parliament 
was sitting, he said during a speech in Hull. "It was becoming clear 
that any friend of Britain could expect little help ... Britain appears 
to go out of her way to help his (Borg Olivier's) political rival, Mr 
Mintoff, whose policy is to link up with the Afro-Asian Powers and 
to take Malta out of the Commonwealth." Wall also noted that 
whereas in Nyasaland Dr Hastings Banda had received several 
millions in aid, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia had been refused a 
£5 m. loan.44 
When he arrived in Malta Borg Olivier gave another press 
confererence at the airport there on the following day, Tuesday 
2pt August. Met by supporters waving Nationalist flags who 
accompanied him boisterously in a long carcade to Valletta, he 
could announce that the British Government had agreed to treat 
Malta's request with urgency and that an independence conference 
would be called. It was now the turn of the Maltese press during 
the days that followed to highlight and dissect the prospects and 
implications of what had just come to pass. Reactions were mixed, 
with the pro-MLP press of the General Workers Union, especially 
the mass circulation It-Torca, generally toeing the party line. 
Although fundamentally supportive of Borg Olivier's pro-
independence direction, they had reservations about when and how 
independence would come, demanding consultations. The main 
MLP organ was Il-lfelsien, which demanded Borg Olivier's 
resignation for not having requested independence before having 
sought aid, and then failed in his bid to obtain even that. The 
44 "'No" to Malta criticised - Tory M.P.'s comment', 22 Aug. 1962. In a syndicated 
news item set as an accompanying sideline, headed 'Disappointment', the paper 
reported Borg Olivier's press conference on his arrival at Luqa, saying how 
disappointed he was that Britain had refused his request for a grant-in-aid of 
L8,750,000. Wall's speech was reported in other sections of the press; see e.g. 
'Colonial hotspot: Britain let Malta down, says Tory", Daily Mail, 22 Aug. 1962. See 
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English language press in Malta was largely dominated by the 
Strickland-owned Progress Press stable, which although anti-Mintoff 
saw independence as suicidal. The three small parties opposed the 
independence policy for one reason or another, and their weekly 
newspaper organs reflected these views. The well-established 
Catholic paper Lehen is-Sewwa, was worried lest independence 
would adversely affect the church, a corner-stone of Maltese social 
life. This was a familiar concern fully shared by Archbishop Gonzi 
and the Curia. Gonzi was aghast at the way Britain had treated 
Malta, forcing Borg Olivier's hand.45 The Partit Nazzjonalista, Borg 
Olivier's party in government, was weakly organized in this sphere, 
having only a struggling publication, Il-Poplu; there was an 
independent pro-Western evening daily, The Bulletin, which 
frequently gave space to pro-Nationalist views. One such strident 
article in this paper, a copy of which made it to the Colonial Office 
desks, sought to uncover "the true purpose behind Sandys' offer" of 
£100,000: 
... they thought of bringing Dr Borg Olivier down on his 
knees; making the mistake, however, of offering the 
contemptuous sum, that has steeled the people of Malta into 
a grim determination to shake off the yoke that has stifled 
their existence whilst at the same time paying lip service to 
the ideals of freedom and liberty. This trick has 
boomeranged ... This is the game that was started in 1954. 
Eight long years during which the British Government, 
through its officials, had as its sole aim the forcing of Malta 
into a position where it could not do anything but accept the 
terms that would be imposed ... Malta is still steady as a rock, 
with only the weak, the vacillating, the lackeys ready to do 
the British Government's bidding.46 
45 Wakefield/Kisch, 24 Aug. 1962, 926/1179/48655. 
46 "The True Purpose Behind Sandys' Offer", by "Hannibal", The Bulletin, 1 Sept. 
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2L.th August, 1962. 
On Wednesday evening I reoeived 8. message :Crom the Governor 
to the effeot that the Archbishop would lilC6 to see m'e, and 
I oalled on him yesterday. 
'J. The Arohbishop, after brief preliminary courtesies, becllJllO very 
excited. He told me that he had trust.d the British and had been 
grossly betrayed. Th. British had broken e. .olemn pl.dge. He 
oomplained al.o th .. t IIr. M .. udling (in .. letter which I h .. ve heard 
about but have not •• en) had promised sympathetic oonsideration of 
lIalt .. •• needs. As it turned out, he s .. id,'" lIalt .. had been given 
not sympathy but insults and contempt. 
~. I .. sked the Archbishop to tell me what pledge had been broken 
and he brought up the old story of the 1958 statements. I explained 
H.II.G.·s attitude in this regard, told him of the massive oapital aid 
which had b.en given and pointed out that the lIalta Government had 
av .. ilable more money than thay oould pos.iply spend over the remaining 
two years of the five-year oapital programme. 
'to I told him th .. t Malta's future diffioulties would d.rive from the 
S.rvio •• run-down and the eoonomio probl.me o .. us.d ther.by. I told 
him of Bars Olivier'a suooes8 in obtaining valuable oonoessions 
relating to the phaeing of the run-down; and I said that H.II.G., 
so far from r.fusing help to J,(aJIa in meetiilg the eoonomio difficulties 
oaus.d by the run-dOwn, had not y.t had the opportunity .ven of 
disoussing this question. 
~. At the end of my .xplanations the Arohbishop " .. s .omewhat 
mollified < but urged that our .id. of the qu.stion should b. explained 
to the publio. I told him that I did not want to b.come involv.d in 
argume"t with Dr. Borg Olivier. In any oas., I said, it was only 
oourteous that explanations by me should await Dr. Barg Olivierts 
stat.ment to the As •• mbly next week. 
,. The Arohbi.hop is ohi.fly di.tr •••• d on acoount of the d.mand 
for .arly ind.p.ndeno.. ThiS, he says, would b. disastrous for Malt .. 
and i. not want.d by the great majority of the I!al te •• peopl •• 
1· I .ought to allay hi. apprehenSions about independenoe and 
suggested that, provided Dr. Borg Olivier did not seek to embitter 
Anglo-Maltese relations, I saw no reason why the friendly link between 
Britain and lIalta should not continue though its form would nec.ssarily 
be diff.rent. 
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The Maltese and British governments having ended up at opposite 
poles in the question of financial aid in the face of a quickening 
British forces' rundown, matters came to a head and now assumed 
a sudden impetus in the constitutional sphere . 
..... In this significant account of a meeting requested by Archbishop Gonzi 
immediately following Borg Olivier's demand for independence and the 
international coverage given to his press conference, Sir Edward Wakefield 
explains how angry Gonzi was at the miserly treatment Britain was meting 
out to the Maltese. At one time a patriot and a loyalist, the Archbishop did 
not mince his words, accusing Britain to Wakefield's face of betrayal, insult 
and contempt; but he still felt that Independence would be disasterous for 
Malta and was not wanted by the great majority of the Maltese people. 
5 
Settling Scores 
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No sooner had Borg Olivier and his delegation left London in 
August 1962 that the Oversea Policy Committee and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff directed their attention to the prospect that Malta could soon 
become independent. 
The main question they had to address was this: how far, and in 
what ways, was Malta still important to Britain for defence purposes? 
If Malta was still sufficiently important, would it be advisable to think 
in terms of a defence treaty, as the Borg Olivier administration 
seemed to be suggesting, or would that be too binding on Britain? 
If Malta was no longer important as a base but only as an advance 
post, what facilities would still be needed there? Under what 
conditions could these be assured? If it was the Maltese who needed 
the British to stay on, because of the economic injection which their 
presence provided locally, any financial terms for this arrangement 
could be negotiated on that premise. 
Some views were at variance. There were those who thought Malta's 
importance had decreased considerably, although not that it should 
be dispensed with. There was also a noteworthy view that Malta's 
importance for defence purposes could be increasing, if North Africa 
100 
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became increasingly unstable. There were those who thought 
defence would have to be linked up to financial assistance, by way 
of rent, whereas others thought the two arrangements should be 
kept separate. There were those who thought Britain would 
determine when and how to make use of the facilities in Malta, 
others who reasoned that unilateral action would diminish Maltese 
sovereignty. 
On the whole, the view in London was that it would be better to deal 
with Borg Olivier, but at the same time the likelihood that Mintoff 
would be returning to office could not be discounted. The reasoning 
about defence and finance tended to be intertwined in the minds of 
the decision-makers. If Malta were to become independent, would 
it not be better to keep any aid package for the time when 
independence itself would be negotiated, rather than frittering it 
away, as it were, in ad hoc subsidies? 
It was the Oversea Policy Committee that co-ordinated strategy 
through consultations with the ministries most directly concerned, 
including the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the Treasury. 
However, the power house remained the Colonial Office, with much 
of the thinking especially on constitutional and treaty arrangements 
being provided by its senior officers for the consideration of the 
Secretary of State who, often enough, endorsed the considered and 
already filtered advice put before him on set general policy lines. 
It was clear that there would be no time for a draft defence 
agreement to be ready by 4th December, when Dr Borg Olivier and 
his team were due to meet Duncan Sandys and his aides. Moreover, 
there seemed to be little sense in basing financial discussions" on the 
past and on dreams, and everything to be said for basing our 
discussions on a fully-worked out development programme", 
probably for a further five-year period. l The meeting was due to last 
I Fairclough/Kisch min., 24 Oct. 1962,926/1309/48655. 
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for only a few days, it being intended chiefly as a follow-up to Borg 
Olivier's 20 th August request. Both governments wanted to 
straighten out so far as possible an agreed position for a later all-
party conference with special reference to the new state's 
constitution, although defence and finance remained paramount. 
The latter two subjects continued to be seen, increasingly, as 
inextricably connected: in the inelegant phraseology of one official, 
"the Maltese will certainly want sterling quids for a Defence 
Agreement quo."2 Any preliminary inter-governmental posture 
would have included agreeing to disagree, but as it turned out the 
Maltese and the British positions were generally not too far removed 
in principle. That did not yet refer to the haggling over money for 
land, considering that the Treasury went so far as to suggest that by 
virtue of its would-be independence from Britain, Malta should get 
less not more money. "Perhaps I might comment even at this stage", 
wrote the head at the Treasury to the Secretary of State shortly 
before the December talks with Borg Olivier, "that it seems to be 
doubtful whether independence will be any reason for Malta to 
receive more financial help than she would have had otherwise. It 
is, I think, arguable that it should mean less."3 
The original plan was to have a small representative team for all-
party preliminary talks before the end of the year, with a full-scale 
conference to follow. 4 However, it appears that the UK 
Commissioner in Malta Sir Edward Wakefield prevailed upon the 
CO staff and had Sandys modify his original intention. If Britain 
wished to delay matters, Wakefield advised, calling an all-party 
conference would be the way to do it; but if not, it would be more 
practical to have a government team lead by the Maltese premier to 
thrash out a common basis of agreement first. If, as Wakefield 
believed it to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government, "we 
2 Eastwood/Poynton, min., 8 Nov. 1962, 926/1309/48655. 
3 See the letter to Sandys from Treasury Chambers, 25 Oct. 1962, ibid. 
4 Poynton/Wakefield, tel., 6 Nov. 1962, ibid. 
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,Tre~bers, Great George Street. S, W I 
-;r ( \6 010 
'iJ 0.' ;) I f) 25th October, 1962 
(61) 
/; ..fW] /; er) )cr:.v.-] I 
Thank you f or sending me a copy 
of your letter of 17th October to the 
Minister of Defence about independence 
for Malta. I welcome your suggestion 
that your paper on this subject might 
first b'e discussed by offiCials in 
the Oversea co-ordinating (Official) 
Committee. Perhaps I might comment 
even at this stage that it seems to me 
doubtful whether independence will be 
any reason for Malta to receive more 
financial help than she would have had 
otherwise. It is, I think, arguable 
that it should mean less. 
~ I am sending copies of this letter 
to the Foreign Secretary and the Minister 
of Defence. 
r~ 
Tho .. , Ho., "".l.~~,P_' 
Commonwealth & Colonial Secretary of State. 
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A typical 'hands off' reaction from the Chief Secretary at the Treasury, who 
rather felt that if Malta became independent she should get less nor more 
money from Britain, Before Duncan Sandys became Colonial Secretary in 
mid-July 1962, while Borg Olivier was actually in London requesting a 
budgetary supplement and a heftier capital grant commitment, his 
predecessor Reginald Maudling had already intimated that he was having 
trouble with the Treasury, 
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want to strike a bargain with the Malta Government while a friendly 
political party is in power", he thought the ground would have to 
be carefully prepared before opposition parties were brought into 
the ring. The M.L.P., he noted, were most strongly opposed to what 
they regarded as the qualified form of Independence advocated by 
the Nationalist Party, adding that: "In any case, Mintoffwould never 
willingly agree to Malta achieving Independence under Borg 
Olivier." 
Ganado and Pellegrini opposed Independence until Malta was 
"more nearly economically viable" while Mabel Strickland, of course, 
opposed Independence "in any form and at any time". As matters 
then stood,Wakefield insisted, the Nationalist Party was the only one 
that wanted to have independence within the Commonwealth - a 
prospect which Britain naturally also found appealing. When 
Sandys had seen Borg Olivier on 21 st September, two weeks earlier, 
it had been agreed that it would be "a very good thing" if the British 
and Maltese governments "could know each other's minds before 
the Conference began". 
As it was "most important that the Conference should succeed", they 
had agreed that "some preparations would be required."5 Rather 
sanguinely, it was hoped that eventually the Maltese political parties 
might be able to hammer out a draft constitution among themselves, 
one which would then be presented, discussed and finalised in 
London in an all-party conference early the following year. Mr A. J. 
Fairdough noted that an agreed all-party draft constitution would be 
"unfortunate since, if there were provisions in it which we did not like, 
it would be more difficult to secure amendments than if all the Maltese 
parties produced their own drafts and the final version were thrashed 
out in conference." But Sir John Martin promptly rejoined that he 
would rather have "one draft Maltese constitution than five!"6 
5 Wakefield/Eastwood, 6 Nov. 1962,926/1309/48655. 
6 See Martin's min., 27 Nov. 1962, on a memo of the same date by Fairclough to 
Kisch and Eastwood, 926/1339. 
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In fact, there were still reservations in various quarters as to what 
kind of independence Malta could be permitted, and in particular 
how exactly to balance out defence requirements with financial 
constraints. There were also other variables, such as any changes in 
the impending discharges and the span over which the "run-down" 
could last; the fate of the dockyard and of Bailey's; the findings of the 
so-called 'Joint study", and of the UN expert Dr Stolper. 
At the Malta end, there was mounting concern at the discharges 
being announced, and Borg Olivier needed no prodding from the 
pro-Mintoff General Workers Union to realise that. A strike and a 
protest march in the Autumn of 1962 were grist to his mill, as a 
means of conveying to Britainjust how serious the situation was, and 
how necessary it was that they listen to his requests for aid, and a 
postponement of discharges until alternative employment avenues 
would have been created. 7 Britain had agreed that no naval 
discharges would take place before pt January 1963, and that the 
run-down should extend into 1967, as Borg Olivier had duly 
informed parliament in September.8 
When it was announced that the date for preliminary talks had been 
fixed for the first week of December, the Malta Labour Party 
reminded the prime minister that while they supported 
independence they had their own version of it, and that his 
administration and the British would have to take account of that. 9 
7 The silent march against discharges, called by the GWU, was held in Valletta on 
Monday yd December 1962, but it was emphasized that discharges were "not a party 
matter". See the reports and comments in II-Helsien, l-Orizzont, The Times of Malta, 
Il-Berqa, 4 Dec. 1962. 
8 Wakefield memo, 3 Sept. 1962, 926/1179/48655. 
9 See the parliamentary reports of the long sitting on 27 th November when Borg 
Olivier announced his forthcoming meeting on 6 th December in London; he 
expected that preparations for setting an Independence date would be undertaken, 
while the other parties, especially the MLP, insisted that their views be also heard. 
The Times of Malta, Il-Helsien, 28 Nov. 1962. 
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Valletta, 1962: A silent march protesting against discharges. 
In the meantime, Borg Olivier's administration had been quietly 
drawing up a substantive manifesto oftheir position. In October, a 
senior Minister, Dr Giovanni Felice, had beefed up the arguments 
in favour of independence in a television address; and before Borg 
Olivier went up to London, accompanied by Felice, among others, 
he had transmitted to London a comprehensive statement of his 
government's thinking on what kind of independence Malta was 
seeking, and modalities as to how this should or could be brought 
into effect. A seven page consolidated statement of intent despatched 
from the Auberge d'Aragon on 24th November 1962 laid down the 
fundamental principles of the Maltese government's policy, plans 
and expectations for the immediate future. II 
10 Enc., Borg Olivier/Sandys, 24 Nov. 1962,926/1339. 
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AUBERGE O'ARAGON. 
MALTA. 
).,~ ~ November, 1962. 
4~' 
.&-.<A-<-~ ~-.;.r ... V; 
I thank you for your invitation, conveyed 
to me by Sir Edward Wakefield, to visit London early 
in December for an exchange of views on Independence 
preparatory to the calling of a conference in the 
first half of 1963. 
Meanwhile I am enclosing a Memorandum which 
seeksto set out what I feel are some of the main 
points for consideration. 
The Right Honourable 
~~~ /(~. 
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations and for the Colonies, 
London. 
Borg Olivier's covering letter to the policy memorandum of November 
1962. 
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Recapitulating recent events, Borg Olivier noted that the pro-
independence parties had between them polled 75.84% of the votes 
in the general elections held earlier that year (in February), and 
referred to his London letter of 20 th August demanding 
independence "as a matter of urgency". "The principle of 
independence for Malta having been accepted", Borg Olivier wrote, 
thereby rendering the endorsement of his request a jait accompli, it 
was now desirable to establish in a new constitution "sound and solid 
foundations on which the Maltese people can build a prosperous, 
happy and progressive independent State." 
Paragraph four of Borg Olivier's expose contained five tenets, to the 
effect that: 
1. Malta should become a sovereign independent state in 
a monarchical and not a republican form, within the 
Commonwealth; 
2. Malta should seek full membership of the 
Commonwealth, "of the Common Market subject to 
negotiation of suitable terms", and of the United 
Nations and other international organisations; 
3. Malta's foreign policy "under my Government" would 
be aligned with the West and NATO "We would not be 
neutralist; the main opposition party might be if it came 
to power"; 
4. Malta should see to reach "defence agreements" with 
the U.K.; and 
5. A date should be fixed for "the restoration of 
sovereignty" as early as practicable in 1963. 
This last statement, that Malta's sovereignty be restored, is both 
interesting and provocative. It presumes, somewhat gratuitously, that 
Malta had been robbed of her sovereignty, presumably by the British 
in 1800, or earlier on. In other words, politically and patriotically 
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speaking, independence was not a concession but restitution, not a 
plea but entitlement; it was a coming even, akin to a settling of scores. 
Ifso, that is quite revealing of Borg Olivier'sforma mentis with regard 
to domination in general and to colonialism in particular, Malta's 
rights and Malta's destiny, however legendary or mythological that 
may have been. It brings to mind a similar and still more striking 
position he would take in this 'colony to nation' context, in his first 
address to the consultative assembly of the Council of Europe three 
years later, when he would refer to Malta's membership as a home 
coming: "like returning home after a long absence". An intellectual 
Borg Oliver was not, nor was he a fanatic italianista, but from the 
Maltese nationalist font he had drunk since his birth. The "return 
home", like the "restored sovereignty", are idealistic notions in his 
psyche, almost an irredentist vindication. Pregnant with conceptual 
and historical implications, they are not just bargaining chips. Home 
to him was continental Europe, Malta's nearest spiritual and cultural 
terra ferma: Great Britain and her Empire were never 'home'. That 
gave expression to an old sentimental and cultural affinity with the 
continent. Nor had Malta deserved to be reduced to a colonial subject 
status, he seemed to be saying. The Maltese had valiantly fought and 
shed their blood to liberate themselves of the French yoke, but the 
British had usurped sovereignty in their stead and reduced them 
unjustly to centuries of subjection ... Yet Borg Olivier says nothing of 
this explicitly. These are subtly implied messages in his 
characteristically epigrammatic turns of phrase - as in this unusually 
important negotiating document of 24th November 1962, unfurling 
the sails for an independent country, and hoping for a good wind. ll 
In his memorandum to Sandys, the Maltese premier felt he must 
add, somewhat ominously, "that if satisfactory agreement cannot be 
reached, I shall of course have to reconsider my Government's 
present intentions." He sincerely hoped that would not be so, as he 
regarded the above outline of policy as "in the best interests of Malta 
at present." 
11 See below, Ill, 17. 
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Agreement between the UK and Malta would have to be reached on 
an Independence Constitution; a Service Lands agreement; a 
Defence Agreement; a Financial and Economic Agreement. 
Five main points to be kept in mind when formulating Malta's 
Independence Constitution would be these: 
1. There need be no second chamber; 
2. Certain provisions safeguarding fundamental rights and 
freedoms would be included; 
3. There would be adequate provisions safeguarding the 
independence of the judiciary, public service including 
the police, and audit; 
4. Maltese citizenship qualifications would be embodied in 
it; and 
5. Certain important provisions should be entrenched. 
As for lands held by the British Services, Borg Olivier proposed that 
on Independence these should be all transferred to the Government 
of Malta. With some exceptions and subject to certain conditions, the 
Government would be prepared to lease such lands as would still be 
required at a nominal rent. 
On defence, the Government of Malta would negotiate an 
agreement under which in peace time facilities would be made 
available to British forces; this would not be an exclusive agreement 
and Malta would reserve the right to make other arrangements with 
other powers. On the assumption that "the Services may ultimately 
remain so integrated into the ordinary life of these Islands", issues 
to be considered would include the establishment of consultative 
machinery; the future of the Navy, Army and Airforce Institutes 
(NAAFI) and duty free imports; the future of the RMA and 
Territorial Regiments; facilities in time of war or emergency; 
association with NATO; and plans for the defence of Malta. 
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An overall financial agreement should be negotiated keeping in 
mind the needs for economic diversification and the provision of 
defence facilities, as well as the outcome of studies and consultations 
in progress about the run-down, the dockyard and the economy. 
Agreement "on a once-for-all separation endowment" was not 
indicated. 
Other matters to be negotiated were citizenship and diplomatic 
representation. Borg Olivier's administration on its part would in 
the new year draft an Independence Constitution "and secure 
consultation thereon in Malta prior to the holding of the London 
Conference in the first half of 1963." 
This policy statement was generally well received in London, where 
brainstorming about Malta had anyway been going on irrespective 
of it. "The memorandum is sensible, to the point and on the whole 
moderate", minuted Fairdough: 
In very many particulars it follows broadly our own lines of 
thinking and leads one to the conclusion that it should not 
be in any way difficult to reach agreement or sensible 
understandings with Dr Borg Olivier during the December 
talks. Whether or not it will subsequently be possible to 
reach agreement at a formal All-Party Independence 
Conference is of course very much another question. 12 
There were reservations, however. First of all, it was "of course not 
true to say that the principle of independence for Malta has now 
been accepted." The Secretary of State might need to make plain to 
Dr Borg Olivier, it was believed, that this was the case, and would 
remain so, until a satisfactory All-Party agreement on the shape of 
independence arrangements had been arrived at. 13 Although the 
12 Fairclough min., 27 Nov. 1962, C0926/1339. 
13 Ibid. 
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. ,.,.. ;\ i I agree that- t.here: is advantage in studying X. "'" )<t ,\,.... Borg Ollvler'. proposals, that is independence 
o ___ .. w.tth~.CommoJU¥Ct\.J..!h..Jtnd a Defence agreement, 
\\" ~ \,~. ~t-Xt. soonet;' t"attt~r than later1 . In 'the past when he 
.~ . was ptessed on who ,would'have the flnal say in 
interpretihg 'the ,p~i'en'ce agreement .. he accept:.ed 
chat we shQuld have this" In other words \dlile 
'it- might- be an .agreement. between. equals, one wus 
mone equal than the otherl r do nOt- believe: he 
would mind this (Mint-off' might) provided that he 
can attend t\ Commom,,"ealth Prime f\Unlst.ers f 
Conference on exuctly the s:atne terms as any other. 
~,( 
Although I am for the study being made now,. 
I would hope that we need nor. get involved in 
discussion with Borg 01ivler tor quite a while .. 
Rat-her should our approach to him be based on th. 
economic pN>blems that we face t.ogechel~ and the 
need to get these out of the way and ensure that 
Malt~ can st.und Of). her own feet before tackling 
Malta,t s'futur'e 'St~tU5t although we might make 
p ,lite noises in'r.:egard to the latter. Another 
reasOn. why r hope we will play it. long is ehat I 
bell eve Malt:;.a in the years -to come will become 
important aga.in (rom a Defence angle. Nt)ct.h 
AfriCl\"lnay .go .sour on ufj:.~n.d then that Malta 
should be fniendly is .exceedingly important .. 
,To th~s, e"te~,t; 1, ,,!!~ee with Edward l'iakefield' s 
Y-'!:-11inking(ih hls memo~a~~,~'P-;-;.ach.ed at 'H' when h~ says :the int.im.,·t~ :f1s:sp'e1:at1ld" of .Malta with 
Western £urope l . .£.g' ,ex..,. .'nl9ro, important than l"Cs 
continued memboF"lShl:p" of .the,Conmonwea.lth.. 15 
the idtufnT sOIq-e, par~tcutaX" :a$soC1atlon Or'" status 
withlrd'lATO 'a'.tar~,"'? Q 
13th March, 19&2. 
SIltatUUY, Of· $TATI 
MEMORANDUM 
'f; :=P:I~~~~~;:~~ 
'I"'H\.W.ll~.$.l .. ti>lon1t re !ne 









This memo of 13th March 1962 is by Lord Perth, then the Minister of State 
for the Colonies. Representing a cautious, strategically-minded and 
basically anti-Independence line of reasoning, it floats the idea that for 
Western security purposes Malta could be somehow integrated with NATO. 
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prospect of independence for the onetime indispensable fortress -
the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" - of Malta was begininng to sink in, 
not everybody in Britain was in as great a hurry to dispense with 
Malta, as Sir Edward Wakefield seemed to think. Maybe he was, 
because he had nightmares of Mintoff coming to power. There was 
a quite different view among some of the top brass at the CO, more 
so in the Defence Ministry, that a go-slow approach would be 
preferable. The gradual resolution of economic problems was one 
consideration. Security, however, was as always the overriding 
concern. 
In the considered opinion of Lord Perth, the Minister of State at the 
Colonial Office: 
Another reason why I hope we will play it long is that I 
believe Malta in the years to come will become important 
again from a Defence angle. North Mrica may go sour on 
us and then that Malta should be friendly is exceedingly 
important. 
Perth agreed with Wakefield that the intimate association of Malta 
with Western Europe was even more important than its continued 
membership of the Commonwealth.l4 It was this line of reasoning 
that would soon lead to prompting Malta's possible membership of 
or association with NATO. This possibility was mainly originated, 
discussed and explored by the British rather than by the Maltese 
side, although Borg Olivier went along with it in principle. 15 
Other reservations about the Malta memorandum concerned lands 
used by the Services, what the Maltese would have seen as a recovery 
or hand-over to themselves the British regarded as a take-over and 
expropriation by the Maltese of their own acquired title. It was 
14 Min., 13 Mar. 1962, C0926/1309/48655. 
15 See below, II, 15 and 16. 
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suggested that Malta might have to pay to get back lands which the 
Services would no longer need. The Malta Government's 
proposition that defence facilities be only available to Britain in 
peacetime was quickly shot down. "I don't think Dr B.O. realises that 
in war the soldiers take over", noted Sir John Martin. It was 
expected that such facilities as were retained would be equally 
available both in peace and in war. 
As for agreements with other powers, British policy-makers had 
been thinking of including in the Defence Agreement an 
undertaking by Malta "not to enter into defence agreements with 
other powers without H.M.G.'s agreement." By declining a once-
for-all endowment, Borg Olivier was seen to want "a pension payable 
indefinitely." 16 
Borg Olivier's memorandum formed the basis of the December 
preliminary talks. Some sensitive topics were however being played 
close to the chest by the British for the time being, and they were 
reluctant to let the Maltese into their confidence. These related 
mainly to defence and financial combinations: they included the 
suggestion that Malta become a member or an associate member of 
NATO. 
Although the Malta Government said in their policy statement that 
they were pro-Western and against neutralism, they did not 
specifically allude to NATO membership, whether full or associate. 
The British saw the NATO integration prospect as a double 
assurance that Malta would not go astray, and as a fallback position 
for themselves. Here again, however, they were uneasy at the 
prospect of Mintoff coming to power and upsetting arrangements. 
For constitutional purposes, the British side were using as their 
drawing board the Blood Constitution of 1961, as amended by 
Order-in-Council in 1962 at Borg Olivier's behest. Some changes 
16 Fairclough, min., 27 Nov. 1962,926/1339. 
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would be necessary, obviously, but for the most part these were 
technicalities or self-evident matters: a Governor General not a 
Governor, a High Commissioner qua Ambassador, Cabinet 
responsibility. They were keen to ensure human rights, which the 
Blood Constitution had endorsed for the first time as a set of 
principles, and they realised there could be some haggling over 
these. One of the points of concern related to the continued validity 
of existing laws, or otherwise, once the new Independence 
Constitution would come to pass. Another concerned checks-and-
balances to ensure impartiality in bodies such as the Public Service 
Commission and the judiciary, Borg Olivier's position on the latter 
being that judges should serve quam diu se bene gesserint, i.e. subject 
to good behaviour, with removal only upon a decision of the 
legislature. In such matters he would have been consulting with his 
Attorney-General, Professor J. J. Cremona, who became much 
involved in constitution drafting. 
Borg Olivier's general stance made the prospect of an independence 
agreement for Malta more amenable: he would retain the Queen as 
the Head of Malta in a monarchical set-up, and he would want Malta 
to become a member of the Commonwealth. And he could be 
depended on as an ally within the Western democratic fold. It was 
argued emphatically, even by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, that it was 
more important that Malta remain within the Western European 
fold than that it join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Here 
was an easy understanding between two broadly conservative 
parties, not prone to experimentation in foreign policy during the 
Cold War. 
There had been some discussion already as to whether Malta, 
being so small, could be admitted to be a full member of 
the Commonwealth, but it quickly dawned on the officials concerned 
that various other small states, not all of them with Malta's 
record, had already been admitted to that Commonwealth in 
recent years, from Sierra Leone to Cyprus. Their Prime Ministers 
could attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences, 
as Dr Borg Olivier too would then be able to do, on an equal 
footing. 
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0P 
~ 
'Lt Dr.Borg Olivier forms a government he will no 
doubt aeek vety early di:scu5siona with H.M.a.. with the 
object of seouring the 'objective he has always desired, 
"na'mely independenoe for Yal to. within the Conunonweal th. 
It fD1~ht be well ror U15 to submit to Mini.3.ters fairly 
500n our ideas on the line we should take to suoh a 
request. 
2. If independeooe within the Cot1lllonwealth were 
granted it would presumably havo to be coupled with a 
Defence Treaty. 
3. In the past objeotion has been aeen to i~ependenofJ 
plus a Detenco Troaty f'or two reaaons, first the small' 
sise of the o'ountr;1: we did not wish to depreoia.te the' 
ourrenoy ot Commonwealth Membership, and seoondly oould 
'Wo really rely on 8. Defence Treaty to sive U3. all that we 
requiredl . 
4. To take 'tho second point first, what we require 
is I in the f'uture, going to be oonsiderably less than it 
has been in the past. We ~hall not need Malta as a 
ballo 1 only to provide "advance faotii ties" This 
reduoes the risk attached to a Defence Treaty. It is 
true tha.t our experienoe of Defenoe Trel1tie~ elsewhere, 
'e.g •. Nitreria. has not been all that happy but in the 
cue of Mal ta surely the Nalte~e are bound really to 
want us to IIta.y and not to turn us out beoauae we 
prov:fde 80 much employment and contribute in other ways 
110 lSubl!tantially to their eoonomy. No doubt they will 
nah to lay down oondition~, e.g. to demand a very large 
ront or subsidy in some other, form, but it seems to me 
the. t there i~ no esoape from. the U .K. ~overnQent aUilS ting 
Mal ta. to 8. sizeable extent in one way or another for a 
good many years to oome. 
5. Aa regards depreciating the ourrenoy of Co:r.mon-
wealthM.emberl!hip, this 14 surelY·in a. fair way to 
depreoiation alrea.d,y. The number o£ Commonwealth, ' 
Yemoor8 has inoreased (Sierra Leone, CYl?rus, Tanganyika) 
a.nd is going to increase still further (Jamaica, '(! 
Trinidad, ? :British Guiana, Kenya, Uganda, ? Zandbar)!. 
Malta. (3';0,000) ia comparable in nUZltbers with Zansibar 
(301,.,000) and almost with British Guiana (558,000); 
Trinidad 1:1 82.5,000. It is oomparable with any or theu 
three and indeed Cyprus a.nd Sierra. Leone in 
·civUisation". I should heve thcught that the argument 
against tllembership tor HeJ.ta 18 now much 1e88 strong 
th.a.n it was tive or six years ago. 
6. WUJ....you please have this coosidered further in 
the Offioe {I doubt if' we should seek the views or 
other Departments until 11'0 have some guidanoe from 
llinia ters,. 
I attacb a. second copy of' this minute so that the 




No sooner had the PN 
won the February 1962 
general election than at 
least one senior Colonial 
Office official was 
already expecting Dr 
Borg Olivier to ask for 
Independence within 
the Commonwealth, 
and figuring out 
possible responses to 
such a request. This 
minute from Mr 
Christopher Eastwood 
to Mr John Kisch, Head 
of the Mediterranean 
Department at the C.O., 
is predicated on the 
assumptions that in the 
case of Malta a Defence 
Treaty might work out, 
and that although small 
Malta would probably 
not be barred from 
Commonwealth 
membership. 
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There was a recurring concern that consensus should be sought 
among the various Maltese political formations, so far as possible, so 
that the proposals as set out by the Malta Government at the 
December preliminary talks need not be regarded as final. Indeed, 
as already noted, there was disapproval of Borg Olivier's publicly 
stated assumption that independence was being granted. The 
British Government had agreed to discuss it, not to grant it. Borg 
Olivier's position had also seemed to be that no referendum on 
independence would be necessary since the two major parties were 
in favour of it, but as things turned out that predisposition would 
grudgingly changeY 
On the whole, however, the proposals from Valletta constituted a 
sufficiently malleable working document to go by, and that was the 
general understanding reached in these talks. The discussions 
neither dotted the "i" nor crossed the "t", nor were they meant to 
do that. Both sides wanted some leeway, and more time, to get on 
with the project in due course. 
Before leaving London on 13 th December Borg Olivier gave a 
televized interview at the Savoy which was relayed on MTV that same 
evening. It was hoped, he said, that Malta would become independent 
"early next year", and that she should be a member of the 
Commonwealth according to his party's programme. He also referred 
to talks he had in Rome about the possibility that Malta join the 
Common Market. 18 On his arrival in Malta, Borg Olivier told the 
press that agreement had been reached with the Secretary of State on 
all issues that could be foreseen to arise during the forthcoming 
Independence Conference. All political parties would be invited to 
participate in it, he added. He would seek, before then, as soon as 
possible, to consult with all the parties on the various questions that 
were likely to arise. Such talks, he said, would not be simply to fix the 
17 See below, II, 9. 
18 Il-Helsien, 14 Dec. 1962, p. 1. 
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- 2 ;';OV 1/\)2 Si."'.I . 
..... c~f'J4!'f.,!:..t;;,.y.r.t-, I QONFlDllNTIAL 
November 2, 1962 .. b 01 r"-~}_cc-
You sent me a oopy or your letter or October 
17 to the llin1ster or Defenoe, enclosing a draft Paper 
on the future or !l!Uta for circulation to the overseas 
Policy C onuni t tee. 
V.altese membership or NATO might certainly bring 
advantages to !\!Uta and this country, and indeed to 
NATO. But even if Malta agreed to join a ''Western'' 
alliance, our a.111es would expect us to convince them 
that Malta's accession would be or real mHitary and 
political advantage to NATO, and would outweigh the 
administrative problems or having as a member a small 
new ex-colonial country. Malta's membership or NATO 
would not automatically secure for us the purely 
British defence facilities we should want there. 
It is important that nothing should be said to 
the Maltese on this aspect before we have consulted 
the other members or NATO and SMJEm. 
The Rt. Hon. Duncan Sandys, M.P. 11 should 
-2-
I should therefore like to see the last two 




"There might be some advantage in an independent 
Malta becoming a member or NATO. Prior 
consultation with our NATO partners would be 
necessary before this possibility could be 
discussed with the Maltese." 
But I agree that the Whole question should 
first be considered by efficials. 
I am sending copies of this letter to the 
llinister or Defence and the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury. A~/li< 
Only weeks after Malta 
had requested Inde-
pendence, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home as 
Foreign Minister 
agreed with Mr Sandys 
(and Lord Perth), that 
the possibility of 
Malta's membership in 
NATO should indeed 
be considered and 
discussed, but that for 
the time being nothing 
should be said to the 
Maltese on this. The 
note in the margin "I 
agree" is by Sandys. 
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time and place of the conference, but with a view that "together" we 
might present a constitutional draft, and start preparing for the 
conference in other ways.19 Borg Olivier may also have been trying 
to parry criticism of the fact that only the government party had been 
represented at these preliminary talks in December, to the exclusion 
of the other parties, including the Malta Labour Party. 
His new agenda of not just asking for independence, but actually 
preparing and negotiating for it, still needed attending to in many 
respects. He would want to report back to Cabinet and his party 
about the latest round of talks and possibly take some soundings. He 
was unlikely to want to face Mintoff and the other party leaders before 
he was surer of his ground. In the meantime various questions about 
the prospect, the nature and the likely consequences of Malta's 
independence, were being raised in the Maltese as well as in the 
British parliaments, and no less in all sections of the Maltese press. 
If 1962 was the year of decision, 1963 was a year of deliberation. An 
eventful and anxious year, it saw the problems and the prospects 
facing Malta in the throes of (a still much debated) independent 
status. 
While efforts to diversify the economy and to plan ahead 
infrastructurally and institutionally were being devised and set into 
motion during the year 1963, the Services run-down hung like a 
noose around its neck. Equally, the prospect of independence, seen 
by the leading political parties as the best if not the only way out of 
the impasse, was feared, even dreaded, by others, as a predicament 
that would make matters still worse, possibly a lot worse, with the 
likes of Mintoff lurking in the shadow of power. 
There was a general fear of the unknown - if not, to use Eric 
Fromm's phrase, the fear of freedom. But there was too a growing 
19 See the coverage of his press conference in all sections of the Maltese press on 15 
Dec. 1962. 
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determination to face up to the future, whatever the breaks of the 
game might bring. 
In addition to the harrying and the scuttling characteristic of this 
year, there were two pivotal intertwined political events. However 
much one might have kept back initially from pronouncing Malta's 
would-be fate unequivocally, both of these may with the advantage 
of hindsight be seen unmistakably as steps in seqence on the road 
to the same destination. 
The first of these was a visit to Malta by the Colonial Secretary, Mr 
Duncan Sandys. Some weeks later, a first round of multi-party 
constitutional talks began in London. 
Increasingly, the bent of the argument was not whether Malta could 
or would become independent, but under what terms and 
conditions - and especially under what genre of constitution - would 
it become so, and how soon. The fact that such a prospect was held 
forth was not to say that misgivings and reservations did not exist 
in British quarters about letting Malta go. 
But times had changed. End of Empire had been in the air since the 
late 1940s and more so since the late 1950s, after the failed Anglo-
French assault on Egypt (partly via Malta) following Nasser's 
nationalization of the Suez Canal. By 1963 not only had Nehru's 
India and Bandaranaike's Ceylon obtained independence. So had 
the tribally and religiously torn Sudan, on 1st January 1956 - a green 
light for the Gold Coast (re-named Ghana), and for Nigeria, to 
follow in the same footsteps. A year later, in August 1957, racially 
divided Malaya, which had survived a state of emergency as the 
result of a Communist threat, became independent under its 
premier Tungku Abdul Rahman. In the 1960s the escape quite 
suddenly became "a stampede", as Porter calls it.2o By the Autumn 
20 Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism (Longman, 
London & New York, 2nd ed., 1984), p. 335. 
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of 1962, another nine colonies had obtained independence. Apart 
from the Cyprus of Archbishop Makarios to which Borg Olivier liked 
to refer (August 1960), these were, also in 1960, British Somaliland 
(in June) and Nigeria (in October). In 1961 there was Sierra Leone 
(in April), followed by the Cameroons (which joined Nigeria and 
Cameroun); and, on 28th December, Tanganyika (which with 
Zanzibar would soon become Tanzania) under the long-lasting 
presidency of Sir Julius Nyerere. Jamaica, and Trinidad and 
Tobago, got independence in August 1962,just as Malta was asking 
for it; while Ugandajoined the growing list in October ofthat year. 
During 1963, in the exit line-up with Malta, were Singapore, North 
Borneo, Sarawak, Kenya and Zanzibar, which became independent 
in that year. In the queue there were, among others, Nyasaland, 
later Malawi; and Northern Rhodesia, later Zambia. 
These, like Malta, became independent in 1964. Whereas Malta 
continued to be called Malta - however you chose to pronounce it -
they generally changed and 'indigenized' their names, confusing a 
generation of laymen and history students in the West. Another 
onetime outpost of empire, Aden, became independent in 
November 1967, as the People's Republic of South Yemen.21 Egypt 
was supposed to have become independent as early as 1936, by a 
pertinent coincidence during the Abyssinian War; but until Nasser's 
nationalization and the Suez crisis of 1956, it had been deprived of 
control over what since the 1870s had become its nerve-centre: the 
Suez Canal Zone. 
On succeeding Reginald Maudling in mid-1962, Duncan Sandys was 
fully aware of this "tide in the affairs of men". It was indeed a flood. 
Whether that would lead to fortune or not, there was the rub. 
However, the British prime minister Harold Macmillan 
acknowledged this state of affairs plainly and squarely when, in a 
speech to the Houses of Parliament of the Union of South Africa on 
yd February 1960, he declared that the wind of change was blowing 
through Africa, 
21 On Aden see above, I, 4. 
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~ 
~. 
ECONOIlIC CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS. • h,...t4 
u:-'{ 
H .t J p' i eh.' a,. ••• , .•. Unemployment/is already 
almost 6,000 (t$%). The Servicea run-down will mean 6ver the next 5 years 
a reduction of some 4,500 in direct local employment and 1500 in indireot 
employment .... and a drop in Service expenditure from about £20 m. to .£lO Ill. 
~Malta's budget totals about £13 m.l 
2. We are in for a row with Baileys over the' dockyard and it will have 
to come under new management. If it is ever to work properly, the labour 
:rora. must be brought down to an eoonomio level.. This will probably 
involve another 2,000 men losing their jobs, and more if' the Admiralty 
work is withdrawn as is at present threatened. 
3. The birthrate continues high and emigration is still fairly low, 
between 2 and 3,000 a year. These two factors combined produoe a steady 
increaso in the population; the labour force increases by at least 1,000 
a year. 
4. The 19.59/64 Development Plan which was to have produced 7,500 new 
jobs has 50 far produood less than ],000. This figure "ill b aotteil ...L~4. 
present population at the present stan~~ ... Her tourist potential is 
limited4- she has no natural resources ~ the harbour ~ 
S~i5'.t 8' cB, p200sd pp shipping fOUte.a. Emisne"'"iOM mllst be 0 Uittt6e:.d 
w..t--i41 Ri to us :AaI'd to sot .I.h •• a»~9t)y onerous •• 
5. Unless emigration can be stepped up Jlprg tho III likely and 
unless development oan produce £ar more jobs .than expected, Hag combined 
unemployment over the next £iV8 years 
,,J;L~ 
~ioh '1 15%) ........ 
As the politely crossed out parts of this brief dated 14th November 1962 
make clear, there was not much faith in Malta's ability to pull through as a 
viable economic unit, or anyway, in Whitehall; such forebodings were not 
uncommon in Malta as well. The 15% unemployment forecast here is 
modest compared to other predictions later on. 
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and whether we like it or not this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, 
and our national policies must take account of it.22 
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If Kwame Nkrumah's Gold Coast could get independence, why not 
Borg Olivier's Malta? 
People in Britain had ceased to care much about the once glorious 
empire on which the sun never set; they became more interested in 
their jobs and houses, their motor cars, supermarkets, television, 
and holidays in Spain. The sixties saw so many momentous changes, 
including the landing of man on the moon, that imperialism was 
eclipsed by the welfare state and consumerism, just as Britain had 
been by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. as a world power. The 1957 
Defence White Paper which scheduled the abolition of national 
service by 1960 and emphasised nucelar deterrence, when Sandys 
was at the defence ministry, led to greater British reliance on the 
U.S.A. because an independent nuclear deterrent proved too costly. 
Britain's brakes on defence were made public, in fact, only some 
weeks before the Treaty of Rome was signed. Harold Macmillan's 
'Winds of Change' speech in February 1960 was followed, in July 
1961, by Britain's (unsuccessful) application to join the Common 
Market. The early sixties were also a time of turbulence, when 
mutual annihilation on a global scale for a while seemed chillingly 
likely. In August 1961 the Berlin Wall was built, and in the Autumn 
of the following year the Cuban missile crisis brought the world face 
to face with the chance of a globally devastating nuclear war between 
the two post-war super-powers, led respectively by presidents 
Kennedy and Khruschev. Britain felt constrained to purchase, with 
some difficulty, Skybolt missles and Polaris submarines from the 
U.S.A., although a first Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was at least signed 
in August 1963. That was a few months before President Kennedy's 
assassination, which shocked the whole world. The Maltese Prime 
22 See e.g. Immanue1 Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (Vintage Books, 
New York, 1961). 
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Minister had only recently met him, and as Kennedy was a Catholic 
and the leader against Communism in Cuba and everywhere else, 
his untimely, dramatic death naturally had great resonance in Malta, 
where television was fast becoming a household commodity. 
Empire was no longer a priority against this background. Americans 
and Commonwealth members winced at Britain's surge towards 
Europe, which however de Gaulle vetoed (in January 1963). No 
wonder that in such circumstances the remark by the former V.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson - that Britain had "lost an Empire 
and not yet found a role" - hit a very raw nerve indeed. In the same 
speech, in December 1962, Acheson invited Britain to retire from 
the nuclear arms race, as the Americans were much better equipped 
to deal with the Russians. 23 
"One of the most remarkable stories in the world's history was 
coming to an end", wrote Bernard Levin: 
And yet the lion must needs adjust its dress before leaving ... 
But the flag that had once flown over so many lands was 
coming down now, as dusk fell; and - ultimate indignity -
there was none to give it the ritual sundown salute. As late 
as the Fifties it was possible to hear regrets, or even 
complaints, about the Attlee Government for, as it was put, 
'giving India away'; by the Sixties such voices were all stilled, 
and the shrinking dominions could no longer boast a Clive 
or a Rhodes, a Milner or a Lugard, an Elgin or a Curzon.24 
"I did not", Winston Churchill had said, "become His Majesty's 
Prime Minister in order to preside over the dissolution of the British 
Empire." Macmillan did, and 
23 See T. O. Lloyd, Empire to Welfare State; English History 1906-1976 (Oxford, 2nd 
ed., 1979), p. 383. 
24 B. Levin, "Run it down the flagpole", The Pendulum Thars; Britain in the Sixties 
(Lond., 1970), p.124. 
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to this day there are those among his erstwhile followers 
who cannot forgive him for putting down the White Man's 
Burden with a haste that suggested he had found a 
poisonous snake sticking out of it. 25 
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The anguish was trenchant. A visit to Malta, notedJames Morris with 
a flair rivalling that ofD.H. Lawrence in his earlier visual description 
of a band playing down Valletta's main street,26 was "less an 
experience than an indoctrination". And among the grandest 
historical spectacles of the day was the return of the Mediterranean 
fleet, after exercises at sea, to its incomparable haven: 
Crowds hastened to the quays to watch the fleet come in, 
flags ran up poles and yard arms, children hopped about in 
excitement, wives chatted happily beneath their most 
fetching parasols. The distant thump of a band, the muffled 
thudding of engines - and there they were! First the 
destroyers, smoke streaming, swept past the harbour mouth 
to their Sliema moorings. Then the big ships approached in 
line ahead, their decks lined with ratings, their lamps 
flashing, their Marine bands overlapping in rich discord as, 
one by one, they entered Grand Habour to the strains of 
'Rule Britannia' ... 
All the ships were moored facing out to sea, for it was a maxim of 
Malta that the Mediterranean Fleet was ready for instant action at 
all times, against all corners. The majesty of it all, and especially the 
arcane and gorgeous ritualism of the Navy, "certainly helped to 
overawe potential enemies of the Crown" for it gave an impression 
of strength more than merely military or economic, but actually 
organic: 
25 "The walrus ... ", ibid., p. 206. 
26 See H. Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony; The Maltese Experience (Malta, 1979, 
2nd ed., 1991), p.124. He was sitting in a Valletta cafe' in 1920. 
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Malta felt both powerful and permanent, for the British 
were of the opinion that the base was absolutely essential to 
the security of the Empire, and therefore destined to be 
British forever and ever.27 
27 James Morris, Farewell the Trumpets; An Imperial Retreat (Lond., 1978), pp. 152-154. 
6 
Testing the Terrain 
DUN CAN SANDYS VISITS 
Ibis et redibis non morieris in bello. Thus did the oracular Latin adage 
pronounce itself in response to an anxious mother who asked ifher 
son would or would not return from battle. It all depended on the 
comma. A pause before the 'non' would get her son safely back, 
whereas one after it, would not. 
And thus Duncan Sandys in his farewell statement on the afternoon 
of Thursday 6th June 1963, after a week's visit to Malta. "We are in 
no hurry to lay down the responsibilities of Government so long as 
you still need us", said the first sentence. "But once you are ready 
and willing to manage your own affairs we have no wish to hold you 
back", said the second. Now where was the comma? 
Having been accused of "desertion" in his meeting with Mabel 
Strickland's PCP, warned of "a Cuba in the Mediterranean" by 
Herbert Ganado's DNP, and told by Toni Pellegrini of the CWP that 
they would "take over" rather than permit a Mintoff dictatorship, 
the former Defence Minister had to sound circumspect. Yet he well 
knew at what pace the onteime British Empire was being disbanded 
and, more pertinently, that Britain's defence needs were being 
127 
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radically and irrevocably readjusted. He also knew that both the 
leading Maltese political parties wanted independence steadfastly 
and immediately. 
Dominic MintofI's MLP and Joe Attard Kingswell's GWU had told 
him they even objected to the negotiation of any defence agreement 
before Malta would have first become a sovereign state. In meetings 
and exchanges with him during this visit, they wondered whether 
it would be desirable to have any defence agreement with Britain at 
all. While striving to be reassuring, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies could not be stingy, not on this issue. So here we had it, a 
finely tuned send-off, combining English understatement with a 
balance that would have bemused Tacitus. Investing in goodwill, 
Sandys did not wish to seem too far inclined one way or the other; 
yet intelligenti pauca. What he was really trying to do, without an 
overt commitment, was administering the medicine with spoonfuls 
of sugar. It was almost as if Britain no longer had much to do with 
the final decision really: it was up to you, Maltese. "At moments of 
great decision it is natural that there should be doubts and heart 
searchings", Sandys concluded. "But of one thing you may be sure, 
whatever you may decide Britain will always remain Malta's 
friend."l 
In trying to figure out how the English mind ticked, Nirad 
Chaudhuri was once reminded of the third calendar in The Arabian 
Nights. That is the story of a prince who spent a delightful year in 
the company of forty princesses and then (when they had gone to 
pay a visit to their father) came to grief by opening a door which 
they had implored him in tears not to open. "I have wondered", 
writes Chaudhuri, "why the girls, when they were so afraid of the 
risk, did not take the obvious precaution of carrying away the key 
with them": 
I 'Malta Independence Conference to be held in July - Statement by Mr Duncan 
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But, of course, the story-teller made them give it to the 
prince, because for once an Oriental wished to demonstrate 
that, besides Fate, man's perverse will and fallible nature 
also could bring about his ruin and degradation. So the 
prince duly succumbed to the temptation, and opening the 
door came upon a beautiful horse in the hall beyond. As he 
was a lover of fine horses he took it out to ride. But the 
animal was a winged horse, and as soon as the prince 
mounted its back it spread out two mighty wings and flew 
away .... 2 
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Mr Sandys held the key close to his chest, but he did not envy that 
prince. In truth, the door was already ajar, even as the George Cross 
rested in its frame. "I intend to convene a conference under my 
chairmanship to consider the request for independence and to discuss 
the draft constitution and any amendments which may be proposed", 
he announced in his sixth of June statement. "I have agreed with the 
Prime Minister that all parties in the Malta Parliament should be 
invited to send representatives to this conference which will be held 
in London during the second half of July." 
In 1963 the run-down started taking its toll and by mid-year 8% of 
the population was already unemployed, while frantic attempts were 
being made to increase the emigration rate. The trade unions did 
not pull their punches, although they were in no position to dictate 
matters. Recalling "a chain of broken promises", the GWU was 
passionately convinced that "we cannot put our trust any longer in 
Britain's representatives and that we must work for our economic 
survival independently from Britain. That is why we cannot accept 
and will strongly oppose any defence agreement before we are free 
to shape our future political and economic life", Attard Kingswell 
wrote to Sandys: 
2 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, Part IV, "State of the Nation", A Passage to England (Lond., 
1959, repr. 1966), p. 185. 
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It is now the duty of your Government to accelerate the rate 
of economic expansion and to create sufficient alternative 
employment opportunities to cushion the effect of the 
required structural and rapid change in the economy ... we 
will repudiate any defence treaty that is signed before our 
people could freely express their views on the matter. .. 
Malta cannot go out into the world and earn its living by 
industrial enterprise, if she is going to remain a British Base 
of a different type ... no threats of hunger and starvation by 
your local apologists will now stop us from demanding to 
first become free and independent and decide later on the 
terms of a properly negotiated defence treaty, if necessary. 3 
Sandys was the same person who in 1957, as Secretary of State for 
Defence, had inaugurated a controversial programme of cutting 
costs and streamlining the Forces: it was he who had conveyed the 
decision to close down Malta's Royal Dockyard as an Admiralty 
concern. Ironically, Sandys in 1935 had married Winston Churchill's 
daughter, Diana;4 how his father-in-law, who was still alive, must 
have baulked at this hasty dismantling of that onetime Empire for 
which he had so bravely fought, even in what was probably its most 
strategic and successful outpost during the Second World War, and 
of her Royal Dockyard where, in November 1943, he had so 
resolutely given the 'V' sign in the midst of cheering Maltese 
dockyard workers.5 
Moreover, that Sandys announcement in 1957 had come all too soon 
after a declaration made in the course of the Integration Round 
Table Conference in 1956: to the effect that there would be no 
3 Attard KingswelI!Sandys, 3 June 1963,926/2080/48543. 
4 They were later divorced; Sandys married a French divorcee. 
5 See Churchill's foreword to The Epic of Malta, first published in Britain at that time; 
a facsimile edition ofthis illustrated war-time book (c. 1943) was published in Valletta 
in 1990. See also e.g. P. Vella, Blitzed but not Beaten, Malta, 1985, illus., pp. 196-197. 
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reductions of defence services' expenditure in Malta in the 
forseeable future. Attard Kingswell pointed to Sandys personally: 
"Your decision of 1957, followed by the abrogation of the 
Constitution in April 1958, proved the hollowness of British 
promises", he charged. "This also ended any hopes about Britain's 
willingness to restore our ability to earn a living in an increasingly 
competitive world after 160 years of British tutelage and 
trusteeship."6 
Through researched memoranda, the Confederation of Malta Trade 
Unions went to great lengths to demonstrate just how badly hit 
Malta would be by the run-down, and recommended various 
measures which could facilitate the necessary economic 
diversification and transition. It strongly suggested that the run-
down be extended from five to ten years, up to 1972 instead of 1967. 
This suggestion was considered to be "more than justified because 
of the crude fact that for 150 years the Maltese economy has been 
ruthlessly subjected to Defence requirements - and no Government 
could possibly be expected to alter the structure of its economy in 
just five years": 
The Colonial Administration's miserable failure in its 
attempt to do so, is a tangible proof of this statement. It is 
strongly contended, therefore, that a period of ten years is 
the least possible time required for a radical diversification 
of the Island's economy.7 
The CMTU was largely behind the newly formed National Front 
Against Discharges; this was in fact chaired by the CMTU president, 
A.M. Callus, while the Confederation's general secretary, W. R. 
Zahra, was an active member of it as well. They insisted on the 
publication of the report made by the Joint Study Group, and that 
6 Attard Kingswell/Sandys, 3 June 1963,926/2080/48543. 
7 See the enclosures in W. R. Zahra et, submitted to Sandys, 6 June 1963, 926/2080/ 
48543. 
132 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
Duncan Sandys 
Opposite: An impression ofMr 
Duncan Sandys as sketched in 
pencil by Professor J. J. 
Cremona in London, some 
weeks after the Colonial 
Secretary's visit to Malta. 
Other 'portraits', executed by 
the same miniaturist on the 
same occasion, depict the 
Minister of State for Colonial 
and Commonwealth affairs, 
Lord Lansdowne; Dr Borg 
Olivier; and himself. 
(By courtesy of Pr of. J. J. Cremona.) 
Maltese trade unions should be represented in any constitutional 
conference which was due to take place in the near future. 
Between them, the GWU and the CMTU represented practically all 
organized labour and the existing unions, the former being older, 
larger and more industrially based than the latter, which however 
comprised numerous unions and associations representing some 
40,000 members. These included the Malta Civil Service Association 
(whose secretary was Callus, a health inspector in his late thirties), 
the Malta Union of Teachers (founded in 1919, this was the oldest 
of all the existing individual unions), and the General Retailers and 
Traders Union. The GWU, which spoke for 65% of organized labour 
in Malta, was more secular, blue collar, better organized and Labour-
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oriented. Its secretary-general, Attard Kingswell, a former dockyard 
ship fitter (like Callus, in his late thirities) was respected in British 
circles. Perceived to be a "close ally" of Mintoff, to whom he was 
related by marriage, Attard Kingswell was "more cautious" and he 
generally "put the interests of the workers before purely political 
considerations."s 
The meetings Sandys had with leading representatives of each of the 
Opposition parties were held in camera and pledged to secrecy. The 
exchanges were frank and crispy. To the extent that he was linked 
to the position of the Borg Olivier administration, with whom 
naturally the talks were mainly being conducted, Sandys fell in 
between two stools. By one side he was accused of rushing, by the 
other of stalling. 
The confidential meetings with the smaller self-styled "centre 
parties" were held on 5th June; each lasted about half-an-hour. The 
first meeting was with the Democratic Nationalist Party, which was 
represented by Dr Herbert Ganado, Dr Albert Ganado and Dr 
Riccardo Farrugia, three lawyers. Asked by Duncan Sandys to 
explain why Independence without economic viability would be 
"dangerous", Herbert Ganado replied that independence was 
dangerous for two reasons. In the first place, Mintoff had declared 
that he would "arm the people". He had actually declared this in the 
Assembly. Secondly, Herbert Ganado continued, Mintoff would 
"play off the West against the East". He would "turn Malta into a 
Mediterranean Cuba". He would "establish a dictatorship of the 
Left." To this strong and evidently alarming language, the former 
Defence Minister promptly retorted that "the West would not 
tolerate a Cuba in the Mediterranean." When asked by Albert 
Ganado what Her Majesty's Government would do if at the 
forthcoming conference the Opposition parties united in opposing 
8 Maltese Personalities", a secret note for the Secretary of State, drawn up by the 
office of the UK Commissioner in Floriana, in connection with Sandys' visit to Malta, 
C0926/2080/48543. 
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the fundamentals of the Constitution, that is if they resisted the 
concept of Independence, Sandys replied: "That will be for me to 
decide when the time comes." On financial aid, he said that the 
British would "give as much as they could afford whether Malta were 
independent or not." But he added that if Malta were independent, 
"it might perhaps get aid from the U .S.A. and other foreign 
countries who do not give aid to Colonies." 
The main political purpose of the Ganado party at this meeting was 
clearly to press for a referendum, specifically on whether the Maltese 
wanted "immediate Independence" or not. Sandys argued that 
since both the major parties were asking for Independence they 
would ensure that the result of a referendum would be in favour of 
Independence. Asked to explain why he might expect a different 
result, Herbert Ganado said he expected "an overriding vote against 
immediate independence because, at the last election, the 
Nationalists only voted against Mintoff. They did not want, and did 
not vote for, Independence." In the course of this meeting, 
however, Ganado also observed that Independence would only be 
acceptable to the people of Malta "if Malta's economy were 
adequately supported by the British." Otherwise, he declared, the 
Maltese would reject it. Sandys concluded by saying that economic 
progress and political stability, though connected, were really 
separate things. It might be ten years before Malta was viable but he 
did not see "why independence should interrupt economic 
progress."9 
Sandys then saw a three member delegation from the Christian 
Workers Party led by the party leader, Toni Pellegrini, who 
formerly had been the secretary general of Mintoff's Malta Labour 
Party. Pellegrini was the only one to speak up. Absolute 
independence, he told Sandys, would mean "death to the Nation". 
"If Britain goes", he declared, "my party will take over. We will 
9 Minutes entitled "Democratic Nationalist Party", enc. Wakefield/Eastwood, 18 June 
1963, 926/2080/48543. 
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forestall Mintoffwho aims at dictatorship." Asked by Sandys why 
he would not support the constitutional government, meaning the 
Borg Olivier-led majority party heading the administration, 
Pellegrini replied: "Because it is not strong enough to resist 
Mintoff." Like Ganado before him, he clearly favoured a 
referendum on the issue of independence. If there were a 
referendum on independence, according to Pellegrini 75% would 
be against and only 25% for. He held, again like Ganado before 
him, that at the last elections (in February 1962) the Nationalists 
did not really vote for Independence. "Independence", Pellegrini 
added, "was only one of the eighty-four items in the Nationalist 
Party's programme." Moreover, he continued, the Nationalists 
had included Independence in their electoral programme ever 
since 1931, but had never, when in office, done anything about 
it. (Here he must have forgotten that as early as 1932 the 
Nationalist leaders Ugo Mifsud and Nerik Mizzi had gone up to 
London and asked for Dominion Status.) Stability, vital for Malta's 
economic progress, depended on the British presence, Pellegrini 
held. He suggested "co-citizenship" as a solution to the 
constitutional problem. He also raised other issues concerning 
the Broadcasting Authority and its unfair disregard of the 
opposition parties; and the transfer of Maltese ratings to the Royal 
Navy who, he said, should be given the same treatment as British 
sailors. ID 
Sandys then met in confidence the PCP delegation composed of Miss 
Mabel Strickland, Wilfred Mamo and Captain Formosa. A 
referendum on independence was also on the agenda of this 
traditionally loyalist party, mixed with deeply hurt feelings about the 
unfolding British posture on independence. 
For the third time in succession during the same morning, Sandys 
heard it said that "independence was not an issue at the 1962 
10 Minutes entitled "Christian Workers", enc., ibid. 
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elections." In those elections, according to Mr Mamo, "there was the 
straight issue of socialists versus anti-socialists": 
The Church, through the Junta, supported the anti-
socialists and instructed people to vote for the Nationalist 
Party, which in the Church's opinion had the best chance of 
defeating Mintoff. 
IfSandys wanted the truth, Mamo insisted, he could get it by means 
of a referendum. He said that at an election people would vote for 
a party but in a referendum, they would vote on the issue put to 
them. Captain Formosa said that the Maltese were hurt by "British 
desertion" - thus using a military term for an offence which in other 
circumstances might have led to execution by firing squad. Taking 
the cue from this not unfamiliar setting, Miss Strickland said that the 
Maltese would like to support the British but she could not rally this 
support "unless the British showed that they were really interested 
in staying in Malta." Reiterating that the issue at the 1962 election 
was "between Mintoffand the Church", she suggested two questions 
in the proposed referendum: 
1. Do you want Independence? 
2. Ifso, do you want Independence immediately, i.e. at 1st 
January 1964?11 
Mr Sandys seems hardly to have put in a word with Mabel there. He 
listened and registered in his head what he was being told with a 
rather monotonous regularity by these three parties which, though 
small, were not wanting in vigour or articulation. Like the roll of a 
drum they all invoked: referendum, referendum, referendum. 
In pouching his minutes of the proceedings, Sir Edward Wakefield 
could not help butting in with his own view as to whether a 
11 Minutes entitled "Progressive Constitutional Party", enc., ibid. 
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referendum should or should not be held. In a 'Nota Bene' attached 
to the minutes ofthe DNP meeting, during which Herbert Ganado 
had flown the kite of a possibly acceptable independence 
arrangement depending on how much financial assistance actually 
would be forthcoming from Britain, Wakefield noted that he had 
discussed the question of a referendum briefly with Sandys. 
Minuting his own views, he said that he thought that the important 
question that Malta's voters would ask was "What help will the 
British Government give?" He was of opinion that: 
If the British Government were willing to guarantee 
substantial financial support for an independent Malta, the 
Maltese would probably vote for independence, .. , if no such 
guarantee were forthcoming, they would vote against it. I 
pointed out that, if a referendum produced a decision 
against independence, the British would be accused of 
rigging the result. In particular, the Church would be 
accused of undue influence. In these circumstances the 
question of United Nations, or other supervision, would 
certainly arise.1 2 
The two meetings which may have somewhat perturbed or at least 
perplexed Sandys and his aides, were those they had with the GWU 
and the MLP delegations, led by Attard Kingswell and by Mintoff 
respectively. In both, fairly well known positions were essentially re-
stated face to face, perhaps a little more tellingly. Attard Kingswell's 
first statement was: "We want Independence as soon as possible." 
His second, that if a Defence Treaty was necessary, it should be 
negotiated "after Independence". And his third, that the British 
Government "had to put the economy right" because they were 
responsible for the consequences of the Services rundown. In the 
course of the meeting George Agius, the GWU Assistant General 
Secretary, said the Union was afraid that if defence requirements 
remained paramount, "Malta would never develop a viable 
12 Wakefield min., 14 June 1963, enc., ibid. 
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economy." Attard Kingswell seems to have got rather carried away 
by this intervention, adding: "We want the troops taken away as 
quickly as possible." He later took this back, saying that he did not 
mean his demand for troops to be removed at once to be taken 
seriously. But Sandys was quick to point to the tenuousness of this 
position, telling the GWU that they were in effect saying: "You, the 
British, should create maximum unemployment and then solve the 
ensuing problem." According to the minutes of the meeting as 
recorded by Wake field, Attard Kingswell insisted that the Union 
could not tolerate "men being discharged without having alternative 
jobs to go to." It was agreed that they should help Malta adjust its 
economy to the new conditions being created by the Services 
rundown. 
The political rhetoric, very much echoing that being used by Mr 
Mintoff and other MLP officials - who prided themselves now on 
being more nationalist than the Nationalists - seems to have had the 
better of Attard Kingswell on this occasion. The sooner the troops 
left more dire would the consequences of the rundown be. But with 
the troops around, there might be no economic take-off. That 
winged horse again. Had the rundown's further extension not been 
desired? On the other hand, it was felt there had been a breach of 
trust; patience with British policy twists and turns had run short. If 
Malta had to sink or swim, it would be as well for her to take the 
plunge and go free style. In particular, there was the suspicion that 
with a sleight of hand the British might divest themselves of all 
responsibility while still somehow retaining Malta as a base, thereby 
restricting its political and economic manoeuveribility in 
international affairs. 
The meeting with the MLP reinforced such attitudes and fears. 
Present for it, together with Sandys, Wakefield and Christopher 
Eastwood from the Colonial Office, were Mintoff, his deputy Dr 
Anton Buttigieg, Attard Kingswell again, and Danny Cremona. 
Opposing any defence treaty before independent status had first 
been attained, Mintoff said: "We want to be neutral. Wars have 
harmed our economy and us. I do not want to be involved in a war. 
We can get a guarantee of security from the United Nations 
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Organisation." He wanted "Independence without any conditions. 
We can then negotiate any military or economic agreement that suits 
us." He also said that "if there was a Polaris base in Malta this would 
make the Island a priority target for an enemy." 13 Any such link with 
the U .S.A. would ipso facto floor any chance for Maltese "neutrality" 
in the then context of an ideological and military divide, from which 
the Mediterranean Sea or region was in no way exempt. 14 
Reluctant to be drawn yet again into an incipient discussion of the 
merits of the 1962 election by the losing parties, Sandys changed the 
subject to explain that the Ministry of Defence regarded Malta as "a 
convenience - but nothing more than that. The Services want to 
withdraw from Malta. I am trying to persuade them to keep forces 
here, and even to send more men." Mintoff said that he did not want 
the Services rundown prolonged. What he wanted was economic 
development that would absorb labour, made redundant by the 
rundown. Supporting him, Attard Kingswell explained: "We only 
complain of the rundown because alternative employment has not 
been provided." Mintoff then made a statement which again 
complemented what Attard Kingswell had said about the troops 
leaving as soon as possible. "I say unequivocally", Mintoff declared, 
"that we do not want a British base in Malta." Responding to a 
comment by Sandys, he denied that the removal of the British base 
from Malta would disrupt the island's economy. The MLP wanted 
the forthcoming conference to concern itself only with 
13 In fact there was at this time some loose talk of the possibility of an American 
Polaris submarine base in Malta, which the pro-Western Borg Olivier seemed to 
regard favourably, partly no doubt with an eye on American money. On Polaris and 
the prospects for an American base in Malta, see below esp. Il, 11. 
14 On this see e.g. B. Ranft and G. Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Macmillan, Lond., 
2nd ed., 1989), ch. 1; A Mazzeo, ch. 1, "It Mediterraneo, un mare di guerra", in A. 
Mazzeo, Sicilia Armata (Armando Siciliano ed., Messina, 1991); D. Holloway, "Soviet 
policy and the arms race", and G. Kennan, "The state of US-Soviet relations: 
breaking the spell", in G. Prins (ed), The Nuclear Crisis Reader (Vintage, New York, 
1984); but see below on Maltese-American relations and Malta-NATO relations, Part 
Il, 11, 15; and Ill, 16. 
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Independence. When Sandys enquired whether this meant that he 
did not wish to discuss a Defence Treaty or Financial Agreement, 
Mintoff replied that, in regard to financial aid, Malta would hold the 
British Government to its past declarations. Past promises must be 
fulfilled. He would ask: "Are you going to make financial aid 
dependent on defence?" To this Sandys replied by saying that he 
had "an open mind." 
Mintoffthen started criticizing Borg Olivier, who would not call an 
early general election, nor accept to get UN observers to supervise 
it; he also complained of what he regarded as restrictive 
parliamentary procedures, of the absence of religious freedom, and 
of Rediffusion's bias in favour of the Catholic Church in Malta. 
Danny Cremona inveighed against what he called "the tyranny of 
the Church", giving as an example his wife not being allowed to be 
a godmother "simply because her husband had been interdicted." 
Mintoff asked for the constitutional talks to be held urgently, as his 
party was being continually put off by Borg Olivier; they had still not 
seen a Draft Constitution. 15 
To greet his arrival in Malta, Sandys had found a scathing four page 
letter from Mintoff dated 31 st May, which he signed as leader of the 
MLP but wrote from his home in Tarxien, doubtlessly typing it 
himself. That might be described as a long preamble to the meeting 
which they later had. In this letter, Mintoff spelt out the MLP's grave 
reservations as to having what he repeatedly called "alien forces" in 
Malta after independence. Interspersed with some gratuitous 
allegations and coloured by a turn of phrase typical of the man, all 
in good English, its main import was this: listen here, in spite of 
church sanctions we speak for 33% of the electorate, you have failed 
us before and woe be it to you if you do not heed us now. "We 
reserve the right," Mintoff concluded, "to repudiate the terms of any 
treaty or agreement negotiated behind the backs of the people of 
Malta at this inappropriate stage." 
15 Minutes entitled 'Secret', enc., ibid. 
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- 4 -
in the treaty but also with the 100% certainty that 
the economic advanta~es accruing from the treaty will 
be such as to make i~ forever unnecessary to resort to 
these hazardous and humiliating practices. 
\ 
Above all we believe no honourable terms what-
soever can be negotiated on defence before our people 
have become free and independent - befere our freely 
elected spokesmen can meet the representatives &f the 
United Kingdom Government en a basis of strict equality. 
That is why we reserve the right to repudiate the 
terms ef any treaty er agreement negotiated behind the 





'0/7 .... ~ ... 
D<:lMMIN'l'OP'? 
Leader, 
Malta Labour Party. 
Excerpts from Mintoff's letter to Sandys of 31 st May 1963. 
He felt left out, and was annoyed. "The National Executive of the 
Malta Labour Party have learnt of your impending visit to Malta 
through the Press", Mintoff's letter to Sandys began. "The papers 
speak also of official discussions you intend to hold with the Prime 
Minister, Dr Giorgio Borg Olivier. .. the future of Britain's forward 
base in Malta and that of NATO will, we presume, feature 
prominently in these talks." Briefly, Mintoffheld that in principle a 
British military presence in Malta after independence would be a 
risk rather than a reassurance for Malta but that if, because of 
imposed economic constraints, some such agreement would be 
necessary after independence would have been obtained, its benefits 
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would have to be doubly assured and the assumption of full 
sovereignty on its expiry guaranteed. 16 
A number of jabs were directed at Sandys himself: 
... as Minister of Defence in 1957, you unhesitatingly brought 
the axe down on the naval dockyard in Malta because it no 
longer suited your new defence policy. No philantropic, 
moral or political considerations could then move you to 
reconsider your decision. 
We are, however, not un mindful of the very precarious 
economic conditions in which our country finds itself after 
163 years of British tutelage and trusteeship. The British 
Governor, Sir Maurice Dorman, made no bones about the 
huge number of Maltese citizens that must seek voluntary 
exile if by 1967 the number of our unemployed is not to 
exceed 25% of our total working population. Neither are we 
comforted by the failure of our priests-backed Government 
to improve upon the record of your own Colonial 
Administration ... 
What, in practice, was to be the outcome of such a harangue? To 
Mintoff's mind, it was an either-or situation: 
Either on independence day we shall be in a strong enough 
position to coerce your Government into fulfilling the 
obligation to repair the economic damage wilfully done to 
our people and to proffer, without any strings attached, the 
aid necessary ... 
Or if unfortunately our people do have to part temporarily 
with a portion of their newly-gained sovereignty, this must 
not only be done with all the conceivable safeguards 
16 MintofflSandys, 31 May 1963,926/2080/48543. 
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ensuring the restoration of full sovereignty on the 
expiration of the term contemplated in the treaty but also 
with the 100% certainty that the economic advantages 
accruing from the treaty will be such as to make it for ever 
unnecessary to resort to these hazardous and humiliating 
practices ... 
How would an independent Malta, assuming Independence was 
being given, be in a position to "coerce" Great Britain to cough up? 
And that "without any strings attached", after all the damage caused 
to the Maltese "wilfully"? In what textbook of economics or politics 
was there a "100% certainty" of economic success "for ever"? There 
can be little doubt that such touting would not have impressed 
Sandys other than negatively, all the more so in the light of Mintoff's 
reluctance to settle for any package before Independence, 
demanding instead everything for nothing, as it were. This was, at 
best, a very tough negotiating position from the Opposition benches 
at this delicate stage. However sincere or idealistic they may have 
been in pushing it, Mintoff and his party were simply playing into 
Borg Olivier's hands by convincing Sandys and the British 
Government that Mintoff was unreasonable and impossible. 
However much Sandys may have said he had an open mind, the 
calculated reasoning in London was very much cast in the mould of 
negotiation and bargaining - to the point of at first expecting being 
paid market prices by the Maltese for lands which the British had 
taken from them in the first place. To the British, defence was still 
the single most important consideration. The threat of instant 
coercion rather than some reasurrance about security, not even one 
of a prearranged transitional nature, could not have endeared the 
prospect of dealing with a Mintoff to British hearts or minds - quite 
the opposite. At the same time, however, Mintoffwas conceding the 
military base, if that were necessary for economic reasons, subject to 
certain conditions and a time limit. 
Sandys had gone some way to assure Mintoff that "Malta would not 
be a base in the sense that Cyprus is a base from which operations 
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Malta would not be operational. Malta is very convenient to 
us but no more and it is not indispensable. I spend my time 
trying to persuade the military to keep more troops here. 
145 
This was arguably the most important part of the conversation 
Sandys had with Mintoff, yet Wakefield failed to minute it. This 
information derives from a minute by Eastwood, the other English 
official present at that meeting. Eastwood felt he should brief John 
Kisch on the matter, filing a type-written script detailing his version 
of how the conversation had actually gone, as follows: 
Mintoff: Malta will not be in a position to make a defence 
treaty until it becomes independent. Mter independence then 
if it is necessary we can make this Island into another base. 
Sandys: "If it is necessary"? You would like British forces to 
go away? 
Mintoff: No. We want to remain neutral. All these wars have 
left us weak. Another war would mean the end of us. 
Sandys: I cannot believe that the rest of the world will 
destroy itself in a nuclear war and that Malta alone would 
survive. It is unrealistic to think one can isolate oneself in a 
nuclear war. 
Mintoff: Malta would certainly be in the thick of it if there 
were a Polaris Base here. That I do not agree ... 17 
Apart from the question of independence as such, Sandys also used 
his visit to familiarize himself at close quarters with the economic 
situation as this was developing, and with what the prospects for 
development and diversification were. He came armed with a whole 
series of briefs about every pending matter at hand, from British 
EuropeanAirways to Bailey to Hilton,just in case one or other of these 
17 Min., Eastwood/Kisch, 28 June 1963,926/2080/48543. 
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items would come up in conversation during his stay. These briefs 
included land sales or transfers, comprising an Admiralty site 
required for the new power station project. There was a lengthy brief 
about emigration, which was being seen as indispensable. British 
European Airways, to Borg Olivier's chagrin, had intended raising 
their fares without the required permission from the Malta Licensing 
Authority. There was a confidential preview of the report and 
recommendations for long-term economic survival by the Stolper-led 
UN team of economists; and one about another possible American 
defence interest, other than the Polaris: that for a "tropospheric 
scatter station" .IS Another brief was about the Royal Opera House, 
for the reconstruction of which Borg Olivier was trying hard to get 
funds. It was a dismissive and somewhat uninformed brief, parroting 
the Treasury: "a white elephant involving heavy subsidies and 
recurrent costs. The suggestion that tourists would go to Malta to hear 
third-rate opera is manifestly absurd." 19 
The financial situation, industrial and tourist development were very 
much on the agenda, with considerable interest in how new 
industries and hotels would be faring, together with other plans -
such as a yacht marina. With this project in mind, the Malta 
Government had already sought technical advice and assistance 
from the UN and Italy. The rundown and the ongoing Bailey 
litigation concerning the dockyard also figured, of course. 
Notwithstanding the foreboding attitude taken by Sandys, there was 
a discernible conservative shift representing a more cautious line in 
British thinking on the proposed defence agreement as well as on 
Malta's would-be relations with NATO, of which it seems Borg 
18 On the possibility of a tropospheric 'Scatter Station' in Malta for the V.S. Air 
Force, see below, 11, 11. 
19 'Malta Opera House - Brief for the Sec. of State', enc. 926/2980/48543. Opera 
buffs in Malta would have argued passionately against such an arrogantly dismissive 
attitude, because various opera singers who later rose to fame had performed first 
at the Royal Opera House. So long as it existed, this was well patronised by the 
Maltese public. 
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Olivier had not yet been informed. Then there was the so-called 
Joint Study, which was ready but secret, with the British side 
unwilling to publish the fairly ominous findings of a report which 
they themselves had proposed to Borg Olivier and his delegation in 
December 1962. Stolper had seen it, and Borg Olivier, for good 
reason, wanted it out. 20 
Before leaving Malta, Sandys gave a wide-ranging account of what 
had been achieved or was in the pipeline by way of economic 
diversification, a veritable progress report. Perhaps wishing to 
counter-balance the generally daunting mood, he struck an 
optimistic note. He sought to substantiate this by reference to 
specific initiatives being undertaken by the Malta Government and 
the private sector, as well as the British authorities. 
The Council of Administration at the dockyard had put in, as 
managing agents, one of Britain's leading firms of ship repairers -
Swan Hunters - and business at the yard was "steadily increasing." 
In the last four weeks 25 ships had come in for repair and 15 more 
were due to arrive shortly. The British Admiralty was sending 
H.M.S. Troubridge for an extensive refit, which would provide work 
for 400 men for eighteen months. Splendid efforts were being made 
to launch new industries: "excellent factories" were being provided 
by the Government at specially reduced rates with exemptions from 
taxation, in some of which "the most up-to-date and expensive 
manufacturing machinery" had been installed. Many of these light 
industry goods were destined for export. Tourism looked promising. 
As however 8% of the working population was unemployed while 
(due to the post-war 'baby boom', in an already densely populated 
land) the number of workers for whom jobs were needed was 
growing, emigration was being encouraged. The British 
Government was providing money to help pay the fares. "My own 
grandfather emigrated to New Zealand and my mother was born 
there and I am very proud of this," Sandys empathised: 
20 These briefs for the Secretary of State's visit, prepared in May 1963, are enclosed 
in the volume 926/2080. 
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Other relations of mine emigrated to Australia. With the 
help of the Australian Government several thousand (more) 
Maltese are moving to Australia ... For those who do not 
want to go so far from home there are good prospects 
nearer at hand ... tens of thousands of vacant jobs in the 
south of England for which British workers are not 
available. These include jobs in the building and 
construction trades and in the engineering and 
manufacturing industries. There are also good openings for 
women in the clothing and tailoring trade in hospitals and 
hotels. 
An experienced official, Mr Hector Bond, would be based at Malta 
House in London to help find jobs for Maltese in Britain, process 
applications and get entry permits. 
Independence would not prevent Malta from continuing to receive 
financial aid from Britain. Britain was giving assistance to overseas 
countries, mainly in the Commonwealth, to the tune of £300 million 
a year, and had undertaken to provide nearly £30 million in grants 
and loans towards Malta's current five-year plan.21 
But what would become of Anglo-Maltese relations once Malta 
gained independence? Here Sandys was clearly thinking of such 
misgivings as the MLP and the GWU leaders had expressed. He 
sought to assuage these, while appealing to what he knew to be the 
"pro-Western" feelings of the majority, taking in the PN together 
with the small parties, who together represented 66% of the votes 
polled in the 1962 general election. From Britain's point of view, 
the main items on an agenda for the future were still defence and 
finance; the constitutional provisions were ultimately an internal 
matter for the Maltese to sort out since it was they who in that case 
would be independent anyway. "I have had it suggested", Sandys 
21 On adjustments, breakdowns and shifts in British aid figures, promised or 
effected, see esp. I, 4; Il, 13; and Ill, 16. 
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ventured, "that the question whether Britain should be allowed to 
retain military forces in Malta after independence should depend 
upon the amount of money we are prepared to pay for this right". 
In response to that he said again that Britain would do her best to 
help Malta economically "whether we have forces here or not." 
I believe it is just as much in your interest as it is in ours that 
British forces should continue to come to Malta. Apart from 
the security they afford they give direct and indirect 
employment to many thousands of Maltese and in one way 
or another they spend many millions of pounds here each 
year. 
The British navy was being reduced owing to the increased flexibility 
of long-range transport aircraft, so it was "no longer an absolute 
necessity for us to maintain a military base in the central 
Mediterranean." Nevertheless, Malta was "not without importance 
or attraction" to Britain's armed forces: 
We have established valuable facilities here and provided 
they are welcome our three Services would certainly like to 
stay. They have always been very happy here. They like 
Malta and its people and I believe you like them ... Together 
we have faced danger and death and together we have 
shared in the honours of victory. The people of Britain on 
their side have deep affection and respect for the people of 
Malta. If Malta now decides that she wishes to resume her 
separate and independent identity this does not I am sure 
mean that she intends to severe her close links with 
Britain ... 22 
22 "Malta Independence Conference to be held in July - Statement by Mr Duncan 




IN THE FORGE 
During the December talks in 1962, Sandys had already asked Borg 
Olivier to prepare a draft for an Independence constitution, to 
serve as a basis for discussion. Borg Olivier referred this task to his 
Attorney-General's office, then led by Professor John Cremona. 
Cremona formed part of his delegation in London during the 
December talks, as he had done four months earlier, when the 
Prime Minister had made his urgent request for independence. 
Cremona worked hard on this draft, consulting various other 
constitutional models, and he had it ready by the following April.! 
The draft text was then submitted to the PN Parliamentary Group 
and to a legal commission nominated by the PN Executive to 
examine it. This commssion, which was made up of three backbench 
lawyer MPs on the Government side, assessed the draft and made 
I J.J. Cremona, "Recollections of Constitution-making", The Times, Valletta, 21 Sept. 
1989. A copy of the original covering note from Cremona to Borg Olivier outlining 
the constitution's philosophy and contents is being reproduced for the first time here 
(p. 155) by courtesy of its author. 
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some recommendations. Its members were J.F. Cassar Galea and 
Benny Camilleri with G.M. Camilleri as chairman. Among other 
things, the Camilleri commission recommended that a 
Constitutional Court be set up as the Cremona draft had not made 
provision for this. The party executive and Cabinet accepted these 
recommendations which were incorporated into the draft. 2 This 
draft, having been further discussed in Cabinet, was shown to 
Sandys when he visited Malta during the Whitsun parliamentary 
recess in the first week of June 1963. A week later, on 12th June, 
Borg Olivier broke the news to parliament in an important speech 
outlining the fundamental characteristics of the proposed basic law 
for Malta as a new state. 
Malta would be a parliamentary democracy "benefiting from the 
experience of other constitutions in the free world". A constitutional 
monarchy and a member of the Commonwealth, she would retain 
universal suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. 
Within the short space of three weeks, the prime minister's 
statement was debated in parliament (on the 14th June), copies of the 
draft were made available to the party leaders, and they were invited 
to discuss it at the Auberge d'Aragon, with the prime minister in the 
chair, without much success. The MLP said they needed more time 
to study the draft and prepare their amendments to it, while smaller 
parties left soon after they had entered the Auberge d'Aragon for a 
continuation meeting because the Prime Minister refused to issue a 
communique' to say that those attending the conference did not 
necessarily agree with immediate Independence. They were angry 
at an allegation made on Rediffusion by Dr Mario Felice who 
accused them of not wanting independence "to keep the people in 
darkness".3 Sandys had just informed Borg Olivier that the 
planned Malta Independence Conference would open at 
2 C.M.Camilleri, "Kif giet l-Indipendenza", Malta Nazzjon - 10 Snin (PN, Progress 
Press, Valletta, 1974). 
3 "Canado, Pellegrini u Miss Stricklandjitilqu '1 barra", ll-ltelsien, 8 July 1963, p.!. 
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The first articles of the Malta Government's draft Constitution for 
Independence, revised in the hand of the then Attorney General, relating 
to territory, religion, national flag and national anthem (manuscript by 
courtesy of Prof. J.J. Cremona). The second article, establishing Roman 
Catholicism as the official religion of Malta, was buttressed further after 
long and delicate negotiation. The source reference in the bottom left-hand 
corner "LGO" is to a file from the Lieutenant Governor's Office, 
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Marlborough House in London in a fortnight's time. The other 
political parties were therefore invited to submit amendments to the 
draft circulated to them, preferably a week in advance of the 
conference which was scheduled to start on 16th July. 
This short notice did not deter them, they all submitted 
amendments. They were familiar with the administration's thinking 
and with its electoral manifesto. They had already met Sandys and 
knew more or less what their respective stands would be. In fact, 
before the parties even went up to London, relations between Dr 
The opening of the Malta Independence Conference at Marlborough 
House, London, in July 1963. The British delegation is led by Mr Sandys 
(left, centre). Governor Dorman (right, centre) is in between Dr Borg 
Olivier and Mr Mintoff. To Borg Olivier's right are Dr Felice, Dr G. M. 
Camilleri, Dr J. Cassar Galea, Dr B. Camilleri and Prof. J. J. Cremona, 
among others. To Mintoff's right are Dr A. Buttigieg, Mr E. Attard Bezzina, 
Mr D. Cremona, Dr H. Ganado, Mr A. Pellegrini and Miss M. Strickland, 
the only woman around the table. 
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Borg Olivier and the Opposition parties were said to have 
deteriorated. Dr Borg Olivier was convinced that he could not 
persuade the party leaders not to speak at the opening of the 
conference; he even doubted if he could persuade them to speak 
briefly. 
The afternoon of the opening day of the conference was already 
intended as a business session, with the flurry and flourish of 
opening speeches behind it. In the evening a reception was held for 
the delegates at Marlborough House itself. Some socializing in such 
circumstances does not hurt, even if it may be simply perfunctory. 
The morning of the following day, 17th July, was again a working 
session, but in the afternoon there was a Royal Garden Party, which 
many VIPs from both sides of the British Houses of Parliament, as 
well as former governors and lieutenant-governors of Malta, 
attended in addition to the delegates.4 That no doubt was a grand 
4 At the reception held in honour of Dr Borg Olivier and the Malta delegation, 
hosted by Sandys, in addition to Dorman, Olivier and the 25 conference delegates 
and advisers, there were also Lansdowne, Nigel Fisher, Sir Hilton Poynton, Martin, 
Eastwood, Kisch, Fairclough, N.B.]. Huijsman, ].D.Higham, Trafford Smith, the 
legal advisers ].C.McPetrie, A.R.Rushford, G. De Winton; Sir A. Grattan-Bellow, 
P.R.Noakes, R.W.Frands, A.N. Galsworthy, and two members of the Joint Study 
team, D.J .Kirkness and P.Selwyn. From the Office of the Commissioner-General for 
Malta in London: Mr J. Axisa and Mr H.P.Bond; Wakefield; Knighton, Crawley, and 
D.J.L.Moore from Secretariat; from the Commonwealrh Relations Office: the Duke 
of Devonshire, Sir Saville Garner and G. St. ]. Chadwick; from the Ministry of 
Defence: The Rt. Hon. Peter Thorneycroft, Earl Mountbatten and F.W.Mottershead; 
from the Admiralty: The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, Sir Clifford Jarret and 
P.S.Newell; from the War Office: ].B. Godber, MP; from the Air Ministry: Rt. Hon. 
Hugh Fraser; from the Treasury: Rt Hon John Boyd-Carpenter, Sir Ronald Harris 
and C.J.Hayes; from the Ministry of Labour: Miss B.M.Graigner, another member 
of the Joint Study team. From the Shadow Cabinet there were four guests: A. 
Bottomley, J. Callaghan, D. Healey and]. Strachey, together with other MPs 
including, from the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation, Sir 
Ronald Robinson, Lt. Col. J .K.Cordeaux, J .Rankin, M. Woodnutt and Lord Braye; 
as well as 'Maltaphiles' Sir W. Teeling, Major P. Wall and Wing Cmdr. R.G.Grant-
Ferris. Lords Boyd and Perth attended as former C.O. Ministers. There were in 
addition five members from the Council of Administration of Bailey (Malta) Ltd., 
including its chairman Sir Eric Millbourn; and four former colonial governors of 
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The Attorney General 
had a draft constitution 
ready by April 1963. This 
lengthy covering note to 
it explains its main 
provisions. This text was 
then examined and 
commented upon by a PN 
commission comprising 
three lawyer MPs 
G.M.Camilleri, J .G.Cassar 
Galea and Benny 
Camilleri, set up for the 
purpose, before its 
endorsement by Cabinet. 
Malta: Grantham, Creasey, Douglas and Laycock. Sir Harry Luke, a former lieutenant 
governor, and Sir Hilary Blood were also invited, as were the trade unionists Sir G. 
Woodcock and A. Hayday from Transport House (who had been a member of the 
Blood Commission). The Clerk at the House of Commons and other officials together 
with Mr Lindsay-Fynn of the 'Friends of Malta' were also listed, as was Fr Coppola, a 
churchman who was in charge of the welfare of Maltese in London. 
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and a memorable occasion for all concerned, where memories, good 
and bad, could be renewed or scored away in a comparatively 
relaxed ambience. The eighteenth July was strictly reserved for 
negotiations. It was a rather long conference.5 
In the main, the parties rather went along with most provisions set 
out in the draft constitutional text they had before them. That 
contained ten chapters and various sub-chapters, which were grosso 
modo set out as follows: the State, including a Declaration of 
Principles; citizenship, which discounted dual citizenship; 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual; the organs of 
government; finance, the public service, etc. The small parties 
agreed to speak only on the understanding that they were against 
independence being granted at that stage or at all. In other words, 
they were discussing a document with the underlying principle of 
which they did not agree - for the object of discussing an 
Independence Constitution was surely with Independence in sight 
- but they hoped to delay or stop it, or at least to influence the 
outcome. 
5 See the covering minutes to the programme, enc. MC(63)B.36, 926/1908/48543. 
The Chairman and the Secretary to the Malta Independence Conference 1963 
Committee were Mr C.G.Eastwood and Mr W. M. Knighton respectively. The other 
members were, for the UK, Mr J.B.Sharp and Mr A.J.Fairclough; Dr V. Ragonesi 
(NP); Prof. J. J. Cremona qua Attorney General; Dr A. Buttigieg (MLP); Mr Dingle 
Foot (MLP Adviser); Dr D. Micallef (CWP); Dr A. Ganado (DNP), Dr C. Scicluna 
(PCP) and Prof. O. Hood Philips (PCP Adviser). At the conference itself those 
present under the chairmanship ofMr Sandys on the UK and Malta side respectively 
were: Marquess Lansdowne, Sir John Martin, Mr Eastwood, Mr J.M.Kisch and Mr 
A.J.Fairclogh together with Wakefield and, as advisers, Mr J.C.McPetrie, Mr M.G. 
de Winton, Sir Charles Dixon and Mr C.W.St J. Chadwick; Borg Olivier, Felice, 
G.M.Camilleri, J. Cassar Galea, B. Camilleri (PN) with Ragonesi and Dr V. Tabone 
as advisers; Mintoff, Buttigieg, Attard Bezzina and Cremona (MLP) with Arthur J. 
Scerri and Mr J. Attard Kingswell as advisers; Pellegrini, Micallef and Mr A. Sammut 
as adviser (CWP); Ganado, Dr R. Farrugia and Dr A. Ganado as adviser (DNP); 
Strickland, Capt. V. Formosa and, as adviser, Dr C. Scicluna. In addition there were 
J.J. Cremona and Mr E. Cuschieri as Malta Government officials, and, from the 
Secretariat, MM. W.M.Knighton, E.W.J.Crawley. R.J.Harding and D.J.L.Moore. 
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There were some sticky points, the stickiest of all concerning the role 
of the Roman Catholic Church in public affairs. Here, as in some other 
areas, the parties were arguing either ad hominem (with Gonzi in mind) 
or out of their own experiences (especially Mintoff) as they perceived 
them, with a view to avoiding any repetition of such possibilities in 
future. Although the art of compromise was not regarded as exactly 
a Maltese trait, some slight modifications and arrangements were 
eventually reached after much haggling and repetition. The Malta 
Labour Party - which saw and portrayed itself as the aggrieved party 
- withdrew from the conference before this had finished on the 
ground that Sandys would not guarantee to have fresh elections called 
in Malta before Independence. The smaller parties continued to insist 
mainly on a referendum but Ganado and Pellegrini showed 
themselves prone to also play the Mintoff card of "fresh elections". 
In Malta newspaper coverage of the London talks was from different 
angles: the church side was taken care of mainly by the Lehen is-Sewwa 
and Il-Haddiem while the MovimentAzzjoni Socjali organ I1-Qawmien 
also made its voice heard; the Progress Press papers and the Union 
Press papers were fed information daily by their respective party 
representatives from London by telephone and otherwise; the MLP 
organ I1-lfe1sien carried day-by-day accounts, and the Nationalist 11-
Pop1u tried to catch up. 
The opening speeches by the party leaders were predicatable. Mr 
Sandys gave a rehash of his "if ... but" parting statement in Malta a 
few weeks earlier: 
With regard to defence, we no longer have an absolute need 
for a military base in the Central Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless we would like to retain facilities in Malta for our 
forces, if this is acceptable to you. This again is a matter, which 
I propose to pursue with your Government if we reach 
agreement on the question of independence. However, it 
may well be your feeling that this important question should 
not be finally settled until after Malta has achieved her full 
sovereignty. If so, we would not wish to press you ... 
And again: 
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If you decide that independence is what you want, you will have 
to consider whether you wish to have it inside or outside the 
Commonwealth, I am sure you will be welcomed as a free and 
equal partner in this great world-wide association of sovereign 
nations. But whatever you decide on that, or on any other matter 
before us, of one thing I am certain: the friendship between 
Britain and Malta will remain unchanged ... 
If, however, the majority principle was what the British government 
would be guided by in concluding this business, Mr Sandys knew 
that he was playing with two majorities, both of which came up 
trumps. One majority he had was in favour of retaining close links 
with Britain, that to include Commonwealth membership; the other 
majority he had was in favour of independence as soon as possible. 
The component parts of these two majorities differed drastically, 
however. The former, which in electoral terms amounted to some 
66%, comprised the pro-independence but security conscious 
Nationalist Party led by Borg Olivier, together with the three smaller 
parties led by Pellegrini, Ganado and Strickland. The latter were 
fearful of independence in principle or immediately, precisely 
because of perceived security risks coupled with economic 
unpreparedness. But Sandys knew there was another and a 
considerably larger majority: both Borg Olivier's Nazzjonalisti and 
Mintoff's Laburisti wanted independence. His chickens were 
hatched: a majority was in favour of immediate independence; 
another majority was in favour of retaining close ties with Britain. 
Whatever the disagreements about constitutional amendments, 
therefore, these ultimately amounted to questions of degree, form 
or timing, given that Britain now, rather suddenly, seemed ready to 
go along with the first premise: independence for Malta - if you want 
it, you can have it. 
When Mintoffhad demanded "immediate and full independence" in 
1958 he had been told that was" quite unrealistic" and could not be a 
basis for negotiation. It was not quite but almost the "never" word 
used a few years earlier with regard to Cyprus. In his letter to Mintoff 
of 30th November 1958, the then Secretary of State, Lennox Boyd, 
had said that he "was not prepared to start discussions with a fixed 
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date for independence or with a view to fixing a date". While 
independence had not been excluded "as an aim", Britain then had 
indicated that apart from defence she also had to take account of the 
economic well being of Malta and her people. If the British left, they 
would be condemning the Maltese people to appalling poverty, mass 
unemployment and the extremes of hardship. To do so would be 
"completely contrary to Her Majesty's Government declared policy 
and would be regarded by the world as an irresponsible abdication 
of her international duties ... " Independence - the British position 
then was - did not mean "just political independence. It demanded a 
high degree of economic independence as well ... " Three years before 
that, the report of the all-party Malta Round Table Conference in 
1955 had categorically stated, at paragraph 70, exactly as follows: 
Having considered the special circumstances of Malta, we 
are obliged to reach the conclusion that the road to full self-
government is blocked, in that the Parliament at 
Westminster must, in order to maintain the defence of Malta 
and the facilities necessary to enable it to fulfil its role as one 
of the principal Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. bases in the 
Mediterranean, exercise overriding powers in Malta in the 
fields of defence and foreign affairs. These requirements 
inevitably involve a limitation in possible advances open to 
the Maltese Parliament itself.6 
Little wonder that Mabel Strickland started her opening address to 
the Malta Independence Conference on 16th July 1963 by saying: 
In fact it was only on the 5th June that I learned for the first 
time that this country was willing, if pressed by what they term 
the two major parties, to lay down British sovereignty in 
Malta, and they very kindly said that we would take our queue 
in the Commonwealth for the continuance of financial aid ... 
6 See the confidential background brief entitled "Attitude of Her Majesty's 
Government in the Past to Independence for Malta", MC (6) B13, inc. annexes I-
IV, quoting verbatim statements and communications, 926/1908/48543. 
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the people of Malta were totally unaware of that when the 
election was fought in 1962. That election was fought to my 
knowledge to keep out the honourable Leader of the 
Opposition, who speaks with a very different voice at 
Marlborough House to what his representations are at 
Tanganyika and at the United Nations, where we have Cam-
bodia and Russia pressing for independence for Malta. 7 
The 5th June was a reference to Strickland's meeting with Sandys in 
Malta, when the charge of" desertion" had been levelled at him. The 
second reference was mainly to a Cambodia-sponsored resolution 
adopted by the UN's Committee of24, which at Mintoff's behest had 
discussed Malta in early May. In Tanganyika Mintoffhad attended a 
meeting of the Mro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation in January. 
Actually seven other Afro-Asian members of the Committee of24, in 
addition to Cambodia, had put forward the resolution favouring 
Malta's independence and the holding of fresh elections under the 
scrutiny of international observers, which however London (and 
Valletta) regarded as in no way binding, to say the least. 8 
Strickland's dismay at Britain's changed posture was amply shared 
by Ganado and Pellegrini. Apart from other considerations, these like 
Strickland did not trust Mintoff's party at all. The prospect of a "Cuba 
in the Mediterranean" was again mentioned more than once. Malta's 
independence was being negotiated against the backdrop of a Cold 
War in full swing, with fresh memories of the Khruschev-Kennedy 
missle crisis over Cuba, the scare of a nuclear world war in 1962, let 
alone the Communist takeover in Castro's Cuba in 1959, whose 
dependence on Russian aid was growing. If Harold Wilson's well-
7 These proceedings are contained with the original correspondence; official 
statements appear in a report on the conference which was published. The opening 
speeches and extracts from the new Constitution may also be consulted in Henry 
Frendo, Maltese Political Development, 1798-1964; A Documentary History (Ministry of 
Education and Human Resources, Valletta, 1993), pp. 885-915. 
8 See the confidential background note 'United Nations Resolution on Malta', inc. 
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The Hon. Miss Mabel Strickland, Leader of the Progressive Constitutional 
Party and its only M.P., was an owner and the overall managing director 
of Malta's largest printing and publishing establishment, the Progress Press, 
which her father Lord Strickland (d. 1940) had set up in the 1920s. In the 
Sixties this included the daily newspapers The Times of Malta and Il-Berqa, 
and a weekly, The Sunday Times of Malta. Inset: Miss Strickland with Mr 
Pellegrini and Mr Mintoff. 
worn quip about a week being a long time in politics were taken to 
heart, Britain's round-about-turn on Malta at such a time must rank 
as millennary. The Suez fiasco, the 1957 Defence White Paper and 
other factors, even Mintoff, came in between one phase and another. 
In this drill Mintoff too got caught because in the space of a few 
months in 1957-1958 he had changed track from a policy of full 
integration with Britain to one of full independence from her. Borg 
Olivier's Nationalists and their predecessors had been talking of 
Dominion Status - by which they increasingly meant independence 
within the Commonwealth - since the Statute of Westminster, 1931. 
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Britain's "no" in 1955 even to "full self-government" for Malta had 
ante-dated the Suez crisis of 1956, but her refusal to consider any 
discussion of independence in 1958 had not: that was in the wake of 
the failed (but well and truly tried) prospect of Malta's integration as 
a part of the V.K. It was after the "British Get Out" fireworks, a 
disappointing interregnum, and a political change of guard in Malta 
in 1962 - coinciding with the quickening implementation of Britain's 
newly defined defence priorities and retrenchment policies after 
1957 - that what had been so impossible in the late fifties had become 
so possible in the early sixties. 
Not just the economic situation in Britain but the mood itself 
towards 'surrendering colonies', any colonies, had changed. Was 
that solely and simply as a result of the drastic defence cuts in overall 
policy? Was it because by 1960 Britain, in a tripartite agreement 
involving Greece and Turkey, had relieved herself of Cyprus as a 
troublesome colony to the East while retaining for herself two 
sovereign military bases there? In addition to Gibraltar on the 
Mediterranean's northern shore in the West, Britain also had a 
presence on the southern shore of the Central Mediterranean, 
mainly through its air base at El Adem in Libya, where the 
Americans had a larger complex at Wheelus. Was it the better 
aircraft carriers, equipped with nuclear warheads, and the longer-
range transport facilities, that rendered Malta dispensable? Was this 
reverse on Malta just one more 'abdication' in a long row, the game 
no longer being worth the candle? Was it to some extent also 
realpolitik, making hay while the sun shone? After all, whether by 
circumstance or design, Malta had asked for it: independence. And 
the matter was pressing, for Sandys and his Tories were due to face 
a general election in the Autumn of the following year (which, as it 
turned out, they lost). There were good devils and bad devils: 
Britain had come to know the ones in Malta well enough by now. 
Maltese would think and say much the same of their British 
'counter-parts', administrators and politicians - as indeed several of 
them, whether in the language of Dante or of Shakespeare, had been 
doing for a very long time. 
The overriding importance given to Catholicism and to the 
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Church's position during the Malta Independence Conference may 
be seen from the amendments tabled to the Nationalist draft. 
Amendments proposed by the Malta Labour Party sought to restrict 
and to redress that position, whereas those proposed by the smaller 
parties sought further to protect and to enshrine it. These 
amendments were the main bone of contention between the 
Nationalists and Socialists. For these amendments and counter-
amendments to make sense, Malta's recent past has to be kept in 
mind, in particular the bitter clashes and recriminations between Mr 
Mintoff and Archbishop Gonzi since the 1950s. The unfolding battle 
("glieda" in Maltese, which actually means a fight) was dominated by 
two strong-minded and stong-willed characters who represented 
and symbolised opposed world-views.9 Mintoff, a rumbustious leftie 
nicknamed "il-Bolxevist" since his student days and later, while 
living in England, reputed to be a Fabian, had first attracted Gonzi's 
ire when on his return to Malta after the war he had been involved 
in the singing of the Hymn to the Red Flag with party supporters 
in a ~easide restaurant. Gonzi was a princely conservative, an 
authoritarian Roman Catholic prelate and, ironically a former 
Senator of the Malta Labour Party whose initially doubtful loyalty 
to the British Crown had not stopped him from rising to the 
episcopacy. According to The Economist of 20th 1963 July the Maltese 
church hierarchy was "at least two Popes behind" in its views on the 
church's function in politics, while The Guardian of 17th July 1963 
quoted Ganado as confirming that the church had "rightfully 
exercised great influence on the (1962) election." 
Archbishop Gonzi saw himself as pastor to the one Maltese flock, 
protecting them from any approaching wolf, be it in sheep's clothing 
or otherwise. Traditionally the bishop had tended to be regarded by 
British governors of Malta as the islands' first citizen, a spokesman 
and interlocutor for the population at large. In protocol he was 
second after the Governor, before the Prime Minister. Such 
9 On this see the introductory remarks above, I, 4; but see esp. below, I, 9 and 10; 
Ill, 16; and passim. 
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unchallenged pride of place was being slowly chipped starting in the 
nineteenth century, when forceful laymen like Dr Fortunat Mizzi 
and later his son Nerik became leaders of newly-formed political 
parties dominating public debate. Worse still for the hierarchy, 
there were rare instances of some audacious unorthodox critic, like 
the excommunicated and exiled Protestant-inspired Manwel 
Dimech (whom Archbishop Gonzi in 1971 still regarded as an "anti-
Christ") castigating the ecclesiastical establishment's hegemony of 
power. IO Times were very slowly changing, although in colonial 
Malta the church had since 1800 found in Britain a strong protector 
and ally, Protestant proselytizers notwithstanding. Mintoffwould not 
push for guarantees desired by Gonzi in the impending Integration 
Act before the referendum on Integration in 1956, nor until 1958 
would Mintoff consent to returning two Caravaggio masterpiences 
from the national museum to StJohn's co-cathedral in Valletta, from 
where he had taken them in the first place. 
Gonzi was out on a limb with Mintoff's party when he publicly 
condemned the violent rioting in April 1958 following Mintoff's 
resignation. In this respect Mintoffhad shown his mettle earlier still, 
when in protest at a unilateral radio announcement by the Governor 
to fishermen to keep clear of flying-boats evacuating British civilians 
from Egypt in 1956, he had the Rediffusion cables cut by supporters. 
At the time of the independence negotiations, Mintoff's MLP were 
still giving as one of their 'six points' a recourse to violence when 
necessary. While soliciting attention, this may well have been an 
error of judgement, but that was how under Mintoff's direction the 
MLP still felt about it. Briefly, by 1961 the MLP executive had been 
interdicted, together with the MLP newspapers, in an escalating 
confrontation where MLP leaders and supporters were subjected to 
moral and ecclesiastical sanctions, exposed to mortal sin and eternal 
damnation, barred from the sacraments. This (historically not 
10 On this see e.g. A. Koster, Prelates and Politicians in Malta (The Netherlands, 1981); 
Henry Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony; The Maltese Experience, op.cit., Birth 
Pangs of a Nation: Manwel Dimech's Malta, 1860-1921 (Valletta, 1972), and Story of a 
Book (Malta, 1972). 
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unfamiliar scenario for Malta) must be understood in the texture of 
a Southern European society in the second half of the twentieth 
century where the very lifestyle of most people still rotated on 
church-related functions, from baptismal font to confessional, from 
family to classroom, the parish festa, and all the rites de passage. 
Mintoffjani retaliated and became more extremist: Mintoff called his 
followers "soldiers of steel" (presumably to distinguish them from 
"soldiers of Christ", as the religious organisations called their 
members). 
Perhaps in extremzs ill 1961 Mintoff, allegedly without his 
executive's consent, affiliated his party to the Mro-Asian Peoples 
Solidarity Organisation, which was generally seen as a Communist 
front, while he also sought closer ties with the Socialist 
International. Gonzi's church however was still quoting the 1931 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno which held that you could not at one 
and the same time be a Catholic and a Socialist - not even a 
"moderate" one. Electoral manifestoes and party traditions apart, 
such indeed was the main context in which the 1962 general 
elections had been conducted. Understandably, therefore, what 
the MLP sought to obtain above all else in 1963 were 
constitutional safeguards ensuring freedom of conscience, equality 
before the law for all, and some such civil rights as would be 
acceptable in a secular state, including civil marriage. Such rights 
loosening the church's grip also stood to benefit them, or at least 
not to damage them, politically as a party. 
The MLP had other positions which challenged the Nationalist draft 
constitution. Some of these may have been more political than 
constitutional, while others could be regulated through ordinary 
legislation following parliamentary debate and, ultimately, through 
the natural democratic cycle of alternating succession by means of 
party government. The MLP wanted to press the point that since 
what they were proposing was essentially different to what the PN 
in government were submitting, there should be no independence 
before fresh and early elections were called in Malta. This was a 
political demand, not a constitutional one. A substantially different 
constitutional model on offer was grist to its mill: the electorate 
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would have a choice. Malta, the MLP held, should be a republic not 
a constitutional monarchy, with a democratically elected President 
as Head of State. To the President not to the Monarch, would 
allegiance be sworn. Whether Malta would remain a member of the 
Commonwealth or not should only be decided after Malta would 
have become independent - and that, again, only after fresh 
elections would have been called. The George Cross should no 
longer feature in Malta's national flag. 11 
The administration's draft was obviously more acceptable to the 
smaller parties, as well as to the British, than the MLP's would have 
been on this score. Borg Olivier was electorally committed to 
independence within the Commonwealth. His ambition now was to 
seek and to ensure that Malta's difficult transition from colonialism 
to statehood would be as smooth as possible, with a fair mix between 
change and continuity. In the circumstances of the time, Borg 
Olivier's approach was more cautious and pragmatic whereas 
Mintoff's was more idealistic and unpredictable. 
Some of the MLP's recommendations were complementary to what 
the Borg Olivier administration was proposing, some being 
somewhat legalistic, more specific or far-reaching. The MLP upheld 
devolution through the creation of autonomous and elective local 
councils; it wanted the rights of asylum respected; it opposed 
refoulement. Mintoff at Marlborough House strove to present himself 
and his party as the champions of tolerance and progress, the victims 
of intolerance and reaction. 
On citizenship, one of the debating points, the MLP would grant 
Maltese who had obtained another passport the right to be treated 
as Maltese citizens while they stayed in Malta without being forced 
11 All amendments are included in the original correspondence, but they were also 
published together with the draft of the proposed independence constitution in 
1963. Minutes of the 19 sessions, 16 July - 1 Aug., background papers and other 
conference exchanges are mainly in the six volumes 926/1907 - 92611912. According 
to the MLP minutes Mintoff's proposal to join AAPSO was unanimously approved 
by the executive in January 1961. 
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to renounce to their other passport. Those whom they had in mind 
were persons entitled to become citizens of Malta who "for reasons 
of residence or employment abroad or employment with the 
British forces in Malta" elected not to accept the citizenship thereby 
conferred. Persons who, for such reasons, elected not to accept the 
citizenship "will nevertheless be considered as citizens of Malta 
during their stay in Maltese territory." Daunted by the prospect of 
an exclusive reliance on the new Maltese citizenship, the CWP and 
PCP positions variously labelled under the headings of "co-
citizenship" and "interdependence" would have favoured the right 
of at least dual citizenship albeit in different ways, mostly through 
the British/Commonwealth connection. The Nationalists, faced by 
the spectre of the rundown, were wary of the possibility that many 
overseas Maltese would or could suddenly flock 'back' to a 
struggling, independent Malta, thereby becoming a strain on the 
public purse in a small, already densely populated archipelago. 
Maltese citizenship was clearly a proud prerogative of the new 
statehood. But it was also true that there was much talent and even 
wealth among the Maltese diaspora which could be somehow 
garnered to Malta's benefit, while it was unlikely that too many 
people would suddenly abandon their homes, jobs and lifestyles to 
return to Malta especially if, on arrival, they would have to 
surrender their other dearly earned and secured citizenships. Those 
who had retained or applied for Maltese citizenship in time would 
be able to repatriate anyway. Most Maltese settled in northern Africa 
had left by this time and taken up residence in France, the U.K., 
Australia, the U.S.A., Canada, Italy, southern Africa and elsewhere. 
In the course of time and generations, thousands of others 
descended from Maltese stock had become assimilated - Hellenized, 
Frencified, Americanized, Australianized or otherwise 'indigenized' 
- and if they ever returned to Malta few would not go simply as 
sojourners for a holiday or out of curiosity. 
In the end however, here as in most cases, the principles and the 
terminology of the Maltese administration's draft prevailed. Sandys, 
for one, had taken to it - "a very admirable job", " a most excellent 
basis for discussion", he called it. "Nice words", Professor Cremona 
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was only too pleased to recall years later, "to the point of 
embarrassment". 12 
Long and complicated discussions took place on other issues, such as 
the validation oflaws, within which time-frame exactly and to what 
extent; what to entrench or not and how; but also, given the drift of 
the conference, on such terms as "moral" or "spiritual" in 
safeguarding against what in Britain were known as "corrupt 
practices". This was on MLP insistence. Basing itself on the British 
model ensuring against undue influence, as embodied in the 
Representation of the People Act, the MLP's stand was palatable to 
British public opinion: in fact "corrupt practices" remained on the 
bargaining table until the very end of the Anglo-Maltese negotiations. 
The discussion on electoral law terminology took the legal advisers 
all the way back to the nineteenth century, to exchanges and 
amendments concerning a Maltese electoral law enacted in 1924. 
That had involved the then Head of Ministry, Dr Francesco 
Buhagiar, the Leader ofthe Opposition, Sir Gerald Strickland, and 
Dr Enrico Mizzi, leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party.13 In 
1963, should the phraseology on unacceptable electoral influences 
now read "temporal and spiritual", as in the original British text of 
1883, or should it rather read "material and moral"? 
In drafting that law, Dr Buhagiar, Malta's second premier under 
Self-Government, had drawn upon the U.K.'s Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act, 1883, which had since been replaced by the penal 
provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1949. Nerik 
Mizzi however had moved that the word "moral", which may have 
had a rather wider radius, susbtitute the word "spiritual". The 
amendment was opposed by Gerald Strickland, but Buhagiar then 
went along with Mizzi. When asked for an opinion now, forty years 
later, the Crown's legal advisers in London refused to give it, saying 
that they did not know enough about the Maltese situation, not 
12 J. J. Cremona, "Recollections of Constitution-making", op.cit., p. XII. 
13 Decades later, Ganado's party was named like it. 
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sufficiently to figure out what the difference between the terms 
implied exactly. More insightfully and not without a touch of 
humour, the Crown Counsel in Valletta Dr Victor Frendo put it thus 
to his opposite number the perplexed Legal Adviser in London B. 
G. Smith, in words which the latter made his own: 
On the information at present before him Dr Frendo, 
Crown Counsel, is inclined to agree with me that the 
probable intention of the Assembly was that the clergy 
should not be fettered. We know that Strickland intended 
to fetter the clergy, we know that Dr Mizzi did not. What we 
do not know is whether the other members accepted the 
amendment because they remembered the Prime Minister 
saying that for him the two expressions had the same 
meaning, or whether they agreed with Dr Mizzi.14 
On the church and religion question, the Borg Olivier draft (in 
article 2 of chapter 1 entitled "The State") established Roman 
Catholicism as Malta's religion. Religion would also be taught in all 
state schools, ete. The smaller parties wanted more. In separate but 
identical amendments to article 2 it was proposed, particularly by 
Ganado's party, that the following clause be added: 
The Roman Catholic religion and the Roman Catholic 
church in Malta shall continue to enjoy all those rights, 
privileges and prerogatives, in accordance with the law of 
Malta and the code of Canon Law, obtaining on the 
appointed day. 
By contrast, the Malta Labour Party brought out from its sanctions 
cupboard a procession of skeletons, each one to proclaim hand on 
chest that the Maltese church should not continue to enjoy all those 
rights, privileges and prerogatives. They would change section 24 
("Protection of freedom of expression"), to read, inter alia, as follows: 
14 See the confidential "Note on the Parliamentary History of Section 71 (f) of the 
Electoral Law, 1924 (No. XIV of 1924)", by B. G. Smith, Legal Adviser, 25 Sept. 
1963,926/1913. 
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The holding of holy ceremonies in places of worship close to 
the public thoroughfares where a public meeting or 
demonstration is to be held shall not serve as a pretext for the 
Authorities to forbid the public meeting or demonstration. 
The police are empowered to enter places of worship even 
during the performance of sacred functions to stop the 
ringing of bells or other nuisances that may disturb public 
order during public meetings. 
No person shall be considered to have offended religious 
sentiment ifhe maintains his arguments within the limits of 
reasonable discussion without resorting to vilification ... 
Dr Ganado, a devout Catholic lawyer and confidante of Archbishop 
Gonzi who had edited the church paper Lehen is-Sewwa for some 
years, moderated this amendment with another one, which laid 
down that meetings in a public place could be forbidden on grounds 
of public security, public order, ete., 
provided that the previous notification of the holding of 
another meeting in the neighbourhood and the holding of 
a holy ceremony (arranged previously to the proposed 
meeting) in the neighbourhood shall be deemed to be a 
sufficient reason for forbidding the proposed meeting. 
While accepting that the religion of Malta would be the Roman 
Catholic, the Labour Party held that all religious denominations 
should be "equally free" before the law, while no person would be 
subject to any disability or be excluded from holding "any office" by 
reason of his religious profession. Such provisons, while carefully 
worded, bore on other delicate matters, such as school teachers, 
education, and broadcasting - another 'hot potato' of Malta since the 
mid-fifties. 
The church objected to it being denied the so-called privilegium fori, 
whereby those in communion with the church should not bring 
clergymen before the secular courts without the permission of the 
competent ecclesiastical authority. In Malta the state still recognised 
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the church's claim and applied for permission in official proceedings 
to bring a priest before the court, whereas in private cases the onus 
for obtaining permission lay with the plaintiff. Permission was 
usually granted by the Archbishop without delay, but a plaintiff who 
proceeded without the permission required disclosed by his action 
that he was not in, or was prepared to leave, the communion ofthe 
church. 
Although many thought that the exemption of the Maltese bishops 
from criminal proceedings resulted from privilegium fori, it was 
regarded actually as a direct provision of the Criminal Code. 
There was a long-standing argument as to whether privilegium 
fori had continued to exist despite Proclamation V of 1828, which 
had abolished the temporal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical 
courts. The 1963 draft constitution was sufficiently liberal at 
least in its declaration of principles to render all this open to 
serious question, but the MLP wanted the prevention of privilege 
to be constitutionally and therefore unequivocally enforceable at 
law. 
The MLP also moved that civil marriage - and arguably, at least 
indirectly, divorce - be made possible through constitutional 
provisions, although it took care to exclude Catholics from both acts. 
Whether that would include lapsed Catholics was not disclosed. It 
was perhaps these proposals which, generally speaking, were the 
most resented of all by the church and the parties faithful to it. They 
were seen as an uncalled for importation from abroad, an attempt 
to weaken the traditionally Catholic and united Maltese family, the 
backbone of society. 
Further to the situation then prevailing in the validity and nullity 
of marriages subject to Canon Law and the ecclesiastical Court, the 
MLP requested (under section 1 in the second part of chapter 3) that 
the law provide "also for marriages to be celebrated before a public 
registrar or the recognised minister of some other religion", in which 
case they would not be subject to Canon Law. Marriages" celebrated 
according to Canon Law" or where any of the contracting parties 
was a Catholic, would not be "soluble by divorce." (All marriages 
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celebrated differently, in other words, were; and when faced by a 
broken marriage the chance to divorce might ipso facto render one 
or both the parties non-Catholic, or ex-Catholic.) 
While such proposals would not have been regarded as unduly 
disconcerting or unusual in Britain or elsewhere in Europe or the 
Americas in the 1960s, given the church's role in Maltese public life 
and the incensed feelings of the anti-Mintoffian electorate, there was 
no way in which any of the other political parties were going to agree 
to them, either for religious or for political motives or both. Sensing 
that, and faced by a refusal to guarantee fresh elections, in a gesture 
which would have aroused sympathy in Britain, the MLP walked out 
of the conference, having made its points. 
The writing was on the wall. Shortly before the parties went up 
to London, an announcement was made by the Arbishop's Curia 
in Valletta, under the signature Bishop Emmanuel Galea, to say 
that while the church would like to make peace with the MLP it was 
not possible to do so on the conditions being mentioned by Mr 
Mintoff. While on a recent visit to Rome, Mintoffhad referred to six 
points, the bishop said. These were summarized by the Curia as being: 
1. The separation of Church and State; 
2. The State should be "secularist" and should treat all 
religions equally; 
3. The acceptance of civil marriage; 
4. Privilegium fori should be limited; 
5. Censorship of films and books should be carried out 
exclusively by Government, and the Church would be 
unable to interfere; and 
6. In certain cases violence is admissable. 
Before entering into the merit of any of these points, Bishop Galea 
noted that, first of all, 
the Ecclesiastical Authority of these Islands will never 
approve of a political party, which prides itself as being 
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socialist, so long as the Supreme Authority of the Church 
continues to teach, as it has taught up to now, that Catholics 
cannot embrace any type of socialism, even that which calls 
itself moderate ... 15 
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The Maltese church would keep up and even step up the pressure 
against any dilution of her role in the new constitution. It was to take 
much effort, behind the scenes, to reach some kind of respectable 
compromise before a bill could be put before the British parliament 
for approval, although other denominations (and of course Mintoff's 
party) continued to protest until the end. 16 
But there was another sticky question: the referendum. The small 
parties had been drumming on this all the time, underlining that 
they were not there to endorse independence but to postpone or 
even (in the Strickland case) to prevent it. They wanted to define 
"the appointed day", that is the day appointed for Malta to become 
independent on, as: 
the day after the expiration of ninety days from the 
declaration in the Gazette that a referendum on the 
question 'DO YOU WANT INDEPENDENCE NOW?' has 
had an affirmative result. 
Not only would they have a referendum, they would also word 
the question put. However, the MLP would have none of this, its 
position on independence having long been abundantly clear. They 
pledged to boycott any such referendum. The PN too saw no reason 
for a referendum, because they had an electoral mandate to obtain 
independence. Borg Olivier did not have an absolute majority of 
the popular vote, he only had a relative one of 42%; but he had 26 
out of the 50 MPs in the House, so in the last resort, with 
15 'Statement by the Church Authority', sgd. Mgr. E. Galea, Vicar General, 
Archbishop's Curia, Valletta, 22 May 1963, enc. 926/912/48583. 
16 See below, esp. I, 10; and Ill, 16. 
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independence at stake, he could call the shots and be damned. 17 
Sandys, too, was not too keen on this referendum, because he 
reckoned it would be unreliable, that if people voted by party, much 
the same results as those of the recent general election would be 
likely. However, faced by the insistent disagreement between the 
parties and their respective fixed positions, and in an effort to find 
some way out, he tried nudging his way in favour of this expedient. 
Borg Olivier came round to agreeing to a referendum provided that 
all the other parties would agree to it. But the MLP had already said 
they disagreed and would boycott it if held. The small parties 
therefore left the conference table as well. 
With some minor understandings and compromises in the course 
of the discussions over nearly two weeks, the Maltese parties had 
agreed only in so far as they disagreed: they had not agreed to any 
of the issues of substance on which they had disagreed, be it the 
place due to religion and the church, or the holding of a referendum 
and even less fresh elections. 
The British Government therefore decided for them. "In these 
circumstances", Sandys began his concluding address at 
Marlborough House on 1 August: 
there was no longer any justification for withholding a 
decision on the Malta Government's application for 
independence, supported as it was by the results of the 1962 
elections, which, in the opinion of the British Government, 
showed that a substantial majority of the Maltese people 
wanted early independence. 
17 Under proportional representation counting of votes could vary, depending on 
whether one listed the votes obtained on the first or at the last count. In fact the % 
vote obtained by the PN in 1962 on the first count went up until the last count 
because almost all of those voting for the four smaller parties contesting (three of 
which returned MPs) transferred their preferences to the PN. On the independence 
referendum see below, I, 9. 
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With a wreath placed around his neck, Borg Olivier is seen here greeted 
by members of his family and supporters on arrival from London. 
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He accordingly announced that: 
Her Majesty's Government had decided that Malta should 
become independent on a date not later than 31st May 
1964. 
Ifin further endeavours to agree upon joint constitutional proposals 
the Maltese parties failed to do so, the British Government could not 
divest itself of its share of responsibility for Malta's future 
constitution. Nevertheless, it was probable that the British 
Government would feel able "to accept any provisions agreed by the 
Maltese parties". In the absence of agreement, "the outstanding 
issues could be referred for decision either to the people of Malta 
or to the British Government ... "18 




Breaking the Deadlock 
POLITICS, TRADITION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The news that Malta would become independent by 31 st May 1964 
was first broken by the World Service of the BBC in its 5 p.m. news 
bulletin on Friday 1st August. Hailed as a triumph by one side and 
as a betrayal by the other, it electrified the country. 1 A great 
challenge lay ahead. 
In the Autumn of 1963 the pace began to quicken. Borg Olivier was 
in London in September and again in November. In December, he 
went up again, this time together with the leaders ofthe other four 
parties, for another round of December talks. Meanwhile, things 
were heating up in Malta as well. In Rome Archbishop Gonzi met 
Paul VI, who gave him what was interpreted as a signed letter of 
support, announced by the Arcbishop during a press conference he 
gave in Valletta on 18th September (to which the MLP's vigorous 
church-banned newspaper organ Il-lfelsien was not invited). All this 
further kindled rather than pacified the flames. In a letter to Sandys 
countering an earlier one by Mintoff, Gonzi denied that it was 
I See the banner headlines in e.g. L-Orizzont and The Times of Malta, 2 Aug. 1963. 
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necessary to obtain permission from parish priests to hold political 
meetings, nor were ordinary religious ceremonies to be regarded as 
reasons for banning such meetings.2 
The MLP was holding and attending meetings here and there, 
inaugurating a new headquarters, parading the issues of human 
rights and fresh elections, resorting to more fiery language, 
denouncing the blue pencil vetting of its public broadcasting texts 
by the authorities, and actually asking that ifby 31 st May Malta had 
still not become independent on its terms, the UN should take over 
the administration of the Island ad interim. 3 
Various British officials visited Malta on different errands, including 
defence. The Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the C.O., Sir John 
Martin, accompanied under cover by a senior Defence Ministry 
official (Mr Stephens), was in Malta from 24th to 28th November.4 
(Some time later Lansdowne also visited Malta.) For Malta it was 
necessary to start financial discussions as soon as possible, preferably 
before the next budget. At the same time, there was a sneaking 
suspicion in London that Mintoff actually wanted to play for time 
in anticipation of a possible Labour victory at the forthcoming 
British general election, on the assumption that he might get a better 
deal with them than with the Tories. Mintoff had a few staunch 
Labour friends there, such as Barbara Castle, as may be discerned 
from several parliamentary questions in the Commons. 
In fact, the Maltese and British Labour parties were not altogether 
on the same wavelength, probably because of foreign policy. For 
example, at the eighth congress of the Socialist International in 
2 Local Intelligence Committee (Malta) Report (henceforth Int. rep.), 5 Sept.-4 Oct. 
1963, sec., f. 1, para. 2-3, 926/1822, 48655. 
3 Int. rep. 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., f. 1, para. 3, 926/1822/48655. 
4 Int. rep. 6 Nov. - 5 Dec. 1963, f. 1, para. 4, sec., 926/1822/48655. 
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Discussions about the defence agreement were the subject of a number 
of visits to Malta especially in 1964. The picture shows (from left): 
Dr Borg Olivier's secretary Mr George Borg; Mr F. W. Mottershead, 
Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Defence heading this delegation; Mr 
Ian Watt, Deputy UK Commisioner; Mr John Kisch, Head of the C.O.'s 
Mediterranean Dept.; Mr B. B. Hall, from the Treasury Solicitor's Dept.; 
Mr F. H. Mower (largely hidden) of the Admiralty; and Mr F. J. Stephens 
from the Defence Ministry. 
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Amsterdam, the British Labour Party delegation would not propose 
an MLP motion although it would back it because, Tom Driberg told 
Anton Buttigieg, the British Labour Party did not entirely agree with 
the MLP's stand. Mintoff was openly critical of the British party for 
that, saying that if necessary they would fight them in future as they 
had fought them in the past.5 Generally speaking, that was all the 
more reason to hurry up the Independence process, to get it over 
and done with, and particularly so from a Tory point of view. 
Outlining Britain's policies and legislative programme for the fifth 
session of the forty-second Parliament of the UK, the Queen's 
Speech to both Houses of Parliament on 12th November 1963, 
committed the British Government to introduce bills "to provide for 
the independence of Kenya, Malta, Nyasaland and Zanzibar, and to 
provide a new Constitution for the Bahamas." As a result of the 
successful outcome of the Victoria Falls Conference, proposals would 
also be laid before Parliament to transfer the responsibilities of the 
Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the 
territorial Governments. Her Majesty noted with satisfaction the 
signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Moscow, pledged to 
continue to support the freedom of West Berlin and to seek solutions 
to the problems of European security and Germany, to support the 
UN, NATO and the European Free Trade Association, while at the 
same time continuing to work "for the strength and unity of Europe, 
through the Council of Europe and the Western European Union." 
Her Ministers believed that the Commonwealth had "a significant 
part to play in ensuring stability and peace in the world", she 
emphasisied; and they would continue to take "all possible steps to 
strengthen the links between the Governments, and peoples, of the 
Commonwealth", also in their efforts to expand world trade.6 
In his address in reply, Lord Tweedsmuir noted how Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II had seen "the Colonies turning into nations" and 
5 Int.. rep., 5 Sept.-4 Oct. 1963, sec., ff. 3-4, para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
6 Hansard, 5th ser., vo!. ccliii, Lords, 12 Nov. 1963, cols. 1-3. 
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"with this history made in the last decade with such furious 
momentum", the historians would always link her name. To his 
mind, these newer nations were "the greatest achievement of the 
British race." In support he quoted the Marquess of Hastings (whose 
greatest claim to fame was not his consolation retirement posting in 
Malta as her governor at the age of 70, from 1824 to 1826, although 
that coincidence becomes a pertinent one here). The former British 
general Rawdon Hastings famous in Canada after he lost out to 
George Washington in the American War of Independence, had as 
early as 1818 noted in his journal that a time would arrive when 
England would, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the 
domination that she had "gradually and unintentionally" assumed 
over India (whose Governor-General Hastings was from 1813 to 
1821). In that hour it would be "the proudest boast and most 
delightful reflection" that she had used her sovereignty "towards 
enlightening her temporary subjects so as to enable the native 
communities to walk alone in the paths of justice." A lot of that, 
Tweedsmuir told his Lords, had come about, as he welcomed the 
mention in the Queen's Speech of "the independence of Kenya, 
Nyasaland, Zanzibar and Malta, and of a new Constitution for the 
Bahamas." In heartily wishing them well, he gave vent to some 
ponderous thoughts, heavy with true blue nostalgia as much as with 
a premonition of future faltering: 
The making of a new nation is a moment of triumph. But 
unless that nation be a free nation, there is no triumph. In 
wishing them well from the bottom of our hearts, let us also 
fervently hope that, in these new nations, men of all races will 
be able to live free and equal as citizens; that their 
Governments will rest on the maximum attainable degree of 
consent; and that they will say in their enactments: 'This is 
not fair because it is the law, but it is the law because it is fair.' 
Tweedsmuir also referred subtly to Britain's desire to join the E.E.C., 
from which so far she was being rebuffed by France. As a Scotsman, 
he referred to the 'common market' Scotland and England had 
formed between them at the end of the eighteenth century, which 
permitted Scotland to trade with the English colonies. The benefits 
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hung fire for a time, but within a lifetime the population of Scotland 
rose by two-thirds and her revenue by 51 times: 
Now people see this thing, so often, in hard and fast rules, 
either for the Commonwealth or for Europe. Great is the 
perplexity of someone like me who has both outlooks at the 
same time. But I believe that they can be reconciled by 
careful and patient statesmanship. It was Dean Inge who 
said that: 'History never repeats itself, but it frequently 
resembles itself.'7 
In spite of all this political rhetoric, so far as Malta's Independence 
was concerned the existing deadlock still had to be broken, 
somehow. Who could break it? If the die was cast for Independence, 
was that so too for the deadlock overshadowing it? 
One likely opposition strategem in the hope of wrecking the 
prospect of early Independence for Malta appeared to be that of an 
alliance of convenience between the MLP on one hand and the small 
parties on the other. This alternative seemed increasingly tempting 
as the year drew to a close in an attempt to force Borg Olivier's hand. 
All together, the Opposition parties still could not muster enough 
votes to defeat a motion in the Maltese Parliament, but a common 
front would exercise moral and political pressure on the British, as 
well as on the Nationalist administration. They could all oppose 
Independence unless this or that happened first, especially early 
elections; but ultimately what they really wanted to happen was quite 
different. There was no consensus there. If such a common front 
were put up for tactical reasons in favour of fresh elections, where 
would that leave the church? If and when another Independence 
package came, what would that be like then? What about the British 
Government, which had now committed itself not only to 
Independence for Malta, but also to a date for it? As year's end 
approached, that date was only five months away. 
7 Ibid., col. 9, col. 13. 
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The only possible way out of this morass was for Borg Olivier to 
agree to some form of electoral consultation before Independence. 
If so, what would that be? Fresh elections, less than halfway through 
his term of office, with the possibility that the administration might 
lose its one seat majority, possibly resulting in a hung Parliament? 
A referendum, as the small parties had been clamouring for? If so, 
what would that be about exactly? In a referendum, how far would 
the party allegiances shift? Another possible scenario was a behind-
the-scenes compromise broke red directly with the Holy See which 
would make the Maltese hierarchy swallow hard but take the wind 
out of Mintoff's sails, and ensure support in the British Houses 
of Parliament for a Malta Independence Bill. But how far 
would the Holy See, even if it were rather more liberally inclined, 
wish to be seen as letting 'its side' in Malta down? And that to please 
the likes of Mintoff? In late September a whisper attempt at some 
mediation between the church and the MLP through Mintoff's 
brother, the monk Dionysius, came to nothing. s Here was a 
chicken-and-egg situation: would Mintoff first withdraw his 'six 
points' in return for which the church would readily lift its interdict, 
or vice-versa? No deal there; neither side seemed ready to concede 
anything. 
Judging by the nature of the conversation he had with Sandys in 
London on Monday 23rd September following his return from 
America over the week-end, Borg Olivier hoped that he would 
obtain some specific information on what financial aid Malta 
could expect after independence. He might thus have had 
something up his sleeve before facing the Maltese political parties 
again. At about the same time that Borg Olivier went to the U.S.A., 
Dr Felice, his Minister of Industrial Development and Tourism, 
went to Rome for a conference on tourism and to sound out the 
possibility ofItalian financial aid to Malta.9 Financial considerations 
8 1nt.. rep., 5 Oct.-6 Nov., sec., f. 2, para. 5, 926/1822/48655. 
8 Ibid., 5 Sept.-4 Oct. 1963, sec., f. 2, para. 6, 926/1822/48655. 
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could evidently also bear on a decision whether or not to hold a 
referendum about Independence, and in that case how to pitch the 
question. 
In the course of the conversation during the 2yd September 
meeting, Sandys said he would prefer to get Independence through 
well before May, say by February. However, there were two things 
that were worrying him. The first was the allegations that would be 
made in London (as well as in Malta) that there should first be an 
election. The second was "the more extreme passages" in the 
Nationalist draft Constitution about the Church. Although Borg 
Olivier did not say so explicitly, the two things that were most on his 
mind were what financial aid would be forthcoming after 
Independence, and stopping or slowing down the Dockyard 
discharges. What also emerges from this discussion is a recognition 
of Archbishop Gonzi's pivotal role in Maltese politics: whether it 
would be early elections or a referendum or both, Borg Olivier saw 
the Church's position as crucial. An unstated outcome of the 
meeting was that Sandys was the one pressing for momentum to 
build up in order that the schedule his administration had set for 
Malta's Independence would be met, whereas Borg Olivier on his 
part kept prodding about the money and the jobs. Once the British 
Government was now officially committed to a date - and that 
commitment would soon after this meeting be enshrined in the 
Queen's Speech, a few weeks later - it seemed as if delay and the 
leisurely pace with which in any case Borg Olivier was more 
comfortable, could become a bargaining chip in Malta's hands. 
When Sandys spoke of an impending decision to discharge an 
undetermined amount of workers from the Dockyard, Borg Olivier 
played a Mintoff card and threatened instant resignation, taking 
Sandys unawares. 
This London meeting of 2yd September, for which Lansdowne 
and Eastwood were also present with Sandys, began slowly by a 
rambling overview of how the parties were behaving, although 
Sandys started by saying that he wished to discuss with Borg Olivier 
"the next steps" following the Constitutional conference and "the 
decision that Malta should become independent." Borg Olivier said 
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that the smaller parties were a bit sour. They were reluctant to accept 
that Independence was coming and would do their best "to make 
nuisances of themselves but they did not amount to much in 
Malta." 
Referring to the meeting he had had with Mintoff, Borg Olivier 
painted a rather bright picture of it. Mintoff, he said, had been 
"quite reasonable". He was thoroughly committed to Independence. 
Indeed, he added, he was taking the credit for having persuaded the 
British Government to take the decision to give Independence. 
Mintoff did not want any referendum because he was asking for 
something to secure the rights of a minority and that would clearly 
never be conceded by a referendum determined by the majority. 
According to Borg Olivier, Mintoff seemed rather to prefer that the 
British Government should take their own decisions on the points of 
difference between the two constitutions because he thought they 
would give him something. IO This posture was much the same as 
that reported upon at this time by the Local Intelligence Committee 
in Malta; nor was it far removed from doubts about the usefulness 
of holding inter-party discussions expressed by the Government in 
the Speech from the Throne on 28th October. While the attitude of 
the smaller parties against early Independence appeared to have 
hardened, the MLP had commented that there was scarcely any 
reason for holding any discussions as they had little or no faith in 
their usefulness. They had therefore said that H.M.G. should 
"shoulder its responsibility" and decide all the outstanding issues, 
ensuring that democratic principles as pronounced in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights were inserted in the Constitution. The 
GWU echoed this view, saying that the major parties should follow 
10 Detailed minutes of this meeting were recorded in a 'Note of a discussion 
between the Secretary of State and Dr Borg Olivier in the Secretary of State's room 
.. .', which was typed and carbon copied immediately afterwards, hereafter referred 
to as 'Note ofa discussion between the Secretary of State and Dr Borg Olivier', 926/ 
1915/48583. 
186 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
the example of political parties in British Guiana and leave it to 
H.M.G. to decide. l 
What reasons would Mintoff give for refusing to co-operate in a 
referendum, Sandys asked pointedly. Ifhis object were to preserve the 
rights of a minority, how would an election benefit him more than a 
referendum? Presumably he would only get a minority in an election. 
Borg Olivier said that people who would vote against Mintoff on 
religious points would probably vote for him at an election. However 
if there was an election he was inclined to think that he (Dr Borg 
Olivier) would get back with approximately the same number of seats 
as at present. He thought it might be worth considering an election if 
he could know "the terms of a financial agreement with Britain first." 
Sandys however was all against an election fought on the basis of a 
financial agreement since "whatever it was, the M.L.P. would be sure 
to say that they would have done better and it would be contrary to 
nature if the Nationalists said that they were fully satisfied." 
Sandys was inclined to think that after consultations with the parties, 
the next step should then be a referendum. Borg Olivier thought 
that Miss Strickland would eventually fall in with his views; "she was 
in some ways the most sensible of the three small parties." Of the 
other two, Pellegrini wanted first to know what financial agreement 
there would be with the British Government. As between a 
II Int. rep. 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., f.I, para.I, 926/1822/48655.) The first premier 
of British Guiana (Guyana) from 1961 to 1964 was CheddiJagan, whose Communist-
inspired People's Progressive Party had secured a majority in the House of Assembly 
in 1953, whereupon the Constitution was suspended by the British, the premier and 
his ministers dismissed, and British forces sent to the territory. In 1954 Jagan was 
imprisoned for violating an order restricting his movements to Georgetown but in 
1955 he was re-elected leader of the party, which was returned to power with a two-
thirds majority in 1957. He became minister in an executive over which, however, 
the British governor of British Guiana now had extensive powers of veto and 
nomination, until the grant of Independence. Some comparison is possible between 
the Maltese and Guianan colonial-constitutional experiences between 1933 and 
1961, and to some extent between J agan and Mintoff (who however was never 
dismissed from office or imprisoned under British rule). 
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referendum and an election Borg Olivier was not sure which they 
would prefer. 
The important thing was perhaps that the Archbishop did not want 
an election, Borg Olivier said. The Archbishop now took the line that 
as Independence must come soon in any case, "he would rather it 
came now with a Conservative Government in London and a 
Nationalist Government in Malta" than a little later when there 
might be a Labour Government in London and possibly an MLP 
Government in Malta. To this Sandys replied that he would prefer 
to get Independence through well before May, say by February.12 
Reverting to the question of an election, Sandys thought that this 
might be covered by a referendum either on a choice between the 
two constitutions or on specific questions. 
In saying he would be prepared to think about a referendum, Borg 
Olivier was afraid that the small parties might boycott it, and also 
Mr Mintoff. He himself had got 48% of the votes last time (here he 
was counting all the preferences received on the final count) but not 
all even of his own party would vote in a referendum. A great deal 
would depend on the attitude of the smaller parties. Sandys 
suggested a referendum could be either on whether the PN or the 
MLP drafts would be preferable, or more specific questions, of which 
he handed Borg Olivier a copy, could be asked, as follows: 
1. Do you want Malta to be a monarchy? 
2. Do you want Malta to apply at once for Commonwealth 
membership? 
3. Do you want the Government to conclude with Britain 
a treaty for mutual defence, which would allow British 
troops to remain in Malta? 
12 'Note ofa discussion between the Secretary of State and Dr Borg 0Iivier', f. 1,926/ 
1915/48583. 
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4. Do you want the status and rights of the Catholic 
Church to remain broadly as at present? 
5. Do you want to proceed to Independence without 
further elections? 
If the choice were between the two constitutional projects, answers 
to all of these questions would have been given, except the one on 
defence. 
Borg Olivier said much depended on the attitude of the Archbishop. 
If the Archbishop supported the referendum, he thought it would 
be all right to have one, even if it included a question about an 
election. It was a pity the Archbishop was going to be in Rome but 
he must see him. He could perhaps see him on the way back to 
Malta. He knew that Gonzi had been in touch with Pellegrini 
indirectly and he knew also that he was "angry with Dr Ganado 
because he had been in favour of an election." 13 At the same time, 
however, Borg Olivier did not seem too keen on sticking to the more 
stringent passages inserted in the draft constitution in July 
concerning the position of the church. He thought it might be best 
"if we reverted to our old position". He said that he "only submitted 
some of the new proposals" (which were now incorporated in the 
Command Paper) "in order to balance out some of Mr Mintoff's 
amendments." He would be quite content with a Constitution 
following the draft he submitted at the beginning of the conference. 
He thought that the Archbishop wanted to get the authorities at the 
Vatican to urge upon the British government, through the British 
Minister to the Vatican, that "some of Mr Mintoff's amendments 
should not be accepted."I4 
Borg Olivier said that he would be "much happier ifthere could be 
a financial agreement first." Sandys repeated that he doubted if it 
13 Ibid., f. 3. 
14 Ibid., f. 2. 
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would help. He asked how quickly it would be possible to get things 
moving. On the assumption that the Malta Legislative Assembly 
would approve a vote for a referendum, Sandys advised that there 
would be advantage in getting legislation through before the House 
of Commons reassembled on 24th October. Borg Oliver seemed to 
think that it should be possible to have a decision on a referendum 
by then. It would take a full six weeks to organise a referendum after 
that but he did not see why the result should not be known by the 
end of November. Sandys said that in that case he did not see any 
reason why Independence should be put off beyond February. 
Borg Olivier insisted that it would help ifhe could know something 
about the financial assistance Malta was to receive soon - not 
necessarily a full financial agreement but "perhaps you could turn 
loans into soft loans or something of that sort." Interestingly enough, 
while again changing the subject, Sandys then asked whether Borg 
Olivier thought there was any chance of Mintoff trying to stage a 
coup d'etat after Independence. He understood that some people in 
Malta were afraid of that. Borg Olivier dismissed the fear; he did not 
think so. 
Finally Sandys sought to warn Dr Borg Olivier that "a time was 
coming when a decision would have to be taken by the Council of 
Administration of the Dockyard as to the amount of labour which 
was surplus to their future requirements." The Dockyard was 
running at a loss of something like £50,000 a month which "we could 
not go on bearing indefinitely and a plan would have to be made to 
run down the labour force." Sandys was not making precise 
proposals just yet, and of course Borg Olivier, he said, would have 
to be consulted about any plan but he thought it well "to warn" him 
that this was in the offing. Borg Olivier replied by saying that he had 
agreed that there should be no replacement of natural wastage but 
that "any plan to sack men from the Dockyard" would inevitably 
make it necessary for him "to resign at once." 
Borg Olivier had meant to enquire what was to be the future of the 
Dockyard after Independence. Back-tracking momentarily, Sandys 
said he had not given much thought to this yet. One suggestion had 
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It is on the cards that Dr. Borg Olivier might thl'O# his hand 
in and that no other government could be fanDed to carry on till a 
general election. In that event it 'would be necessary to give the 
Governor powers to conduct the adlil.inistro.tlon himself. 
2. In cue this position should ar1s:c, a drart Order in Council 
has over recent months been prepared in consultation with 
Sir Edward. Waketield. A copy is attached. We understand that the 
Governor agrees with it, but we are conrirming this. 
,3. The Order would suspend the operation Of certaln parts of the 
Constitution, i.e. princ;:lpally those governing the Executive and 
legislatj.on. -Executive Ilnd leglsl11tiyc power woUl.d then rest with 
the Governor'. He 'ftiQuld have an .Executive COuncil :01' 'not len3 than 
flye members (we are Dsk1ng him ",'ham he WOUld. appoint) and he would 
have to con9ult them before actlp8 but !le wou14 ~t have t9 tollow 
their advice .. 
4· The Order would also suspend the sect!ons sett,1ng up the 
COJnalisDioner and his orf ice because the Gavernor WOuld then .be 
actins 8a the represent.ative or t.he British Government and it 
would not ,aecl3l ri8ht technically to provide also for a Conun1ssioner 
to act in that capacity. We are askfng the Governor and 
Sir Edwllrd what they envisage would happen to the Commissioner and 
his staff" 
5a If Dr. Dorg Olivier resigns within the courae of the next- 1'ew 
days and reruse. to carry on pending the apporntment at a successor 
(irresponsible though t.his would be and inconsistent with the claim 
that Malt.a is qualified for independence), we will have to seek 
approval for the passage of the Order as' a .matter or urgency. If, 
while not 1llll1ediat,ely resigning, he indjl.ll1tcfI that he is likely to 
do 80 in the neat" future, we may have to at"range for the Order to 
be passed a8 a "Dormant Order", 80 that it can be brought into 
effect immediately if required. The next ordinary meeting of the 
Privy Council 1B on the 26th March. 
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Borg Olivier's resignation threat, mainly over the prospect of mass 
discharges from the Dockyard, led to initial preparations for a return to 
emergency rule, as in 1958-59. Lord Lansdowne seemed to agree with Sir 
John Martin's mise-en-scene for such an eventuality. Sandys was wiser and 
more optimistic, as he had come to an arrangement with Borg Olivier to 
stave off such drastic action; moreover much would now depend on the 
outcome of the forthcoming referendum. 
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been that ownership should pass to the Malta Government who 
should set up a public corporation which would in fact be the 
Council of Administration much as at present. Borg Olivier said that 
he could '''not give them a free hand to discharge labour." 
In reply to a question, he said that Mr Attard Kingswell seemed quite 
happy at present about labour relations in the Dockyard but if 
discharges started "these good relations would break down at once." 
"We must play together on this", Sandys rejoined. It was most 
important that any recommendations made by the Council of 
Administration when they met to consider this subject in Malta 
towards the end of October "should not become publicly known 
before they had been considered by the Governments."15 
While in London, the Prime Minister attended and addressed the 
Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council being held there, as 
plannned. In a speech that was widely reported in the Maltese press, 
Borg Olivier explained what had befallen the Maltese economy due 
to the changed British defence policy, and made a plea for assistance. 
On returning to Malta after an absence of three weeks spent in Italy, 
the U .S.A. and Britain, Borg Olivier announced that he would be 
summoning Parliament shortly, where his recent overseas visits, as 
well as the July conference, were naturally brought up in the light 
of ongoing developments. A fortnight later he paid another flying 
visit to London, at the Colonial Secretary's request, to pursue the 
confidential discussions regarding Malta's path to independence. In 
the meantime, Borg Olivier had not followed the Colonial 
Secretary's advice of holding further consultations with the Maltese 
political parties about the Independence question. 
The next meeting between Sandys and Borg Olivier took place on 
9th November. The upshot of it was that a timetable was agreed upon 
containing the steps to be taken between December and the time 
15 'Note of a discussion, f. 3. 
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A typical scene at Luqa Airport in the early Sixties as the Prime Minister 
returns from another session of "the London talks" and addresses the press 
in the VIP lounge. Above, descending from the British European Airways 
flight, Dr Borg Olivier is on this occasion accompanied by his wife, 
Alexandra nee Mattei. With him in the picture below, from left, are Minister 
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when Malta became independent. It was also agreed that the steps 
they had decided on should remain confidential. An eleven point 
aide memoire was drawn up, of which Borg Olivier retained the top 
copy, wherein these steps were outlined, briefly as follows. 
On returning to Malta, Borg Olivier would have formal 
consultations with the other political parties. He would ask them 
whether they could agree upon the form of the constitution or 
alternatively upon a procedure for referring the outstanding issues 
to the Maltese people, through a referendum or elections. Borg 
Olivier would write to Sandys "within a fortnight" to inform him of 
the result of his consultations. In the event of there being no 
agreement either on the form of the constitution or on the procedure 
for referring the matter to the electors, the prime minister would ask 
the British government to decide the outstanding issues and to enact 
the necessary legislation. Borg Olivier would ask Sandys, before 
reaching decisions, to have further consultations with leaders of the 
Maltese parties. So pre-planned was the whole thing that this aide 
memoire even included a draft letter, at Annex A, saying exactly that. 
Assuming the absence of agreement, Sandys would reply to Borg 
Olivier acceding to his request and proposing that the consultations 
should take place in London during the first week in December. 
Another draft letter, now saying that, was attached to the aide memoire 
as Annex B. Borg Olivier and Sandys however had to agree together 
"the exact texts of the letters to be exchanged". After these 
consultations with the political leaders, Sandys would announce 
before Christmas the general lines of the British Government's 
decision and the date for independence. This was now set for 2yd 
April 1964. Presumably February was too soon, and May too late. 
The Malta Independence Bill would be introduced into Parliament 
as soon as possible after the recess, that is at the end of January. 
On defence, the British government would send the text of the 
proposed defence agreement to Malta within ten days, together with 
experts who would give any necessary explanations to the Malta 
government. Outstanding points would be settled by Sandys with Borg 
Olivier when the latter would go up to London for the constitutional 
consultations early in December. Sandys would consult with the 
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Foreign Secretary with a view to taking whatever steps were best "to 
ensure the retention of the NATO Headquarters in Malta." On 
finance, the British government would discuss financial arrangements 
as soon as Borg Olivier was ready to do so. These financial talks would 
be conducted confidentially and without publicity. 16 
This scenario, more or less as set, would duly unravel as the weeks 
ticked by. It was like a dress rehearsal for performance night. 
Quickly cutting out all the tautological waffle, it made it snappy, as 
the loitering sailors used to say. 
On his return to Malta, Borg Olivier revealed little of what had 
passed between him and Sandys, but the Maltese public and the 
party lea-ders, particularly Mintoff, concluded that the Prime 
Minister had been hustled by the Colonial Secretary into some form 
of agreement, in accordance with the British desire to impose 
independence on Malta as soon as possible. Quickly the impression 
spread that they had reached an understanding that Sandys would 
probably have to arbitrate about the Constitution; and the 
Opposition party leaders each made clear that such arbitration was 
unacceptable. 17 
When asked in the Commons on 19th November by Mr Awbery what 
progress had been made in his discussions with Borg Olivier on the 
arrangements for Malta's independence, Sandys replied tersely that 
the Prime Minister of Malta had gone to London "for a confidential 
16 Gilmore/Eastwood, 11 Nov. 1963, conf., comprising encs., annexes, 926/1915/ 
48583. Borg Olivier wished NATO to retain its Headquarters in Floriana. This 
conformed to his pro-West position and it would be reassuring to all those afraid of 
taking the leap to independence NATO employed some Maltese workers, and 
attracted ships to the harbours; it also sponsored a prize-winning annual essay 
writing competition about itself in Maltese secondary schools. On the vitally 
important question of security, and Malta's would-be relationship with NATO, see 
esp. n, 15. 
17 Int. rep. 6 Nov.-5 Dec. 1963, sec., f. 1, para. 2, 926/1822/48655. 
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discussion" with him ten days ago, and he had no statement to make 
at present. When asked by Mr Wall on 26th November if he would 
announce long-term plans for the financial assistance of Malta "prior 
to any discussions on the independence constitution" for the island, 
Sandys again replied in one sentence: "I agreed with the Prime 
Minister of Malta during his recent visit to London to discuss 
financial assistance as early as practicable." He was a little more 
expansive when asked by Mr Biggs-Davison on yd December about 
emigration to Australia, saying Her Majesty's Government had 
agreed to increase to £300,000 the assistance they had offered for 
this purpose out of their general financial aid to Malta, as he had 
already told Mr Wall in reply to a P.Q. during an earlier sitting on 
14th May. 
In November 1963 Borg Olivier finally held discussions with the 
other party leaders to try to narrow the differences between them 
over the Constitution. Mintoffwas more uncompromising than ever 
over human rights and the church. Ganado, Pellegrini and 
Strickland likewise refused to budge from the positions which they 
had taken up in London in July. As soon as he had finished these 
discussions, such as they were, Borg Olivier informed Sandys that 
he had not been able to obtain any agreement between the parties. 
In these circumstances it appeared only reasonable to refer the 
outstanding issues for decision to him (Sandys). Borg Olivier asked 
Sandys that before taking decisions he should himself hold 
discussions with the other political leaders. On 29th November, 
Wakefield, on behalf of Sandys, issued invitations in these terms to 
Borg Olivier, Mintoff, Ganado, Pellegrini and Strickland to "come 
to London" for discussions beginning on 3rd December. 18 
It seems there could be no departure from the set script, no ad 
libbing. When on 30th November Pellegrini moved the adjournment 
to discuss a matter of urgent public importance (that being 
18 For this and what follows, see esp. Int. rep., 6 Nov.-5 Dec. 1963, sec., f. 2, para. 
5, 926/1822/48655. 
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Above: Dr Herbert Ganado, Leader of the Democratic Nationalist Party, 
being interviewed by Harold Scorey of Rediffusion outside the Auberge 
d'Aragon following constitutional 'consultations' with the Government. 
Behind him (from left) are Miss Strickland, Dr Daniel Micallef and Mr 
Pellegrini of the Christian Workers Party, and Dr Albert Ganado (DNP). 
Below: the discussions in progress in the office of the Prime Minister at the 
Auberge cl' Aragon. Dr Censu Tabone, the new PN general secretary, is third 
from left. 
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A former PN general secretary and 
since 1962 the prime minister's 
public relations secretary, Dr Victor 
Ragonesi was Borg Olivier's right-
hand man throughout the 
Independence negotiations, some-
times conveying messages or 
conducting inquiries. 
Wakefield's letter asking them to proceed, almost immediately, to 
London for further discussions), Borg Olivier opposed, on the 
grounds that the positions of the parties were well known and that 
further discussion in the Assembly was inopportune. As if that were 
not reason enough, the Speaker (Paolo Pace) invoked Erskine May 
to rule that the invitations, coming as they did from the Colonial 
Secretary, were not within the "administrative responsibility" of the 
Maltese Government, and that therefore Pellegrini's motion could 
not be accepted. This provoked a row, and the Opposition MPs 
walked out. 
However, all the party leaders accepted the invitation to proceed to 
London for more talks about the same things. Mintoff expressed 
private doubts about whether his talks with the Colonial Secretary 
would yield any results, but he was believed to feel that a trip to 
London would be worthwhile for meeting British Labour leaders, 
the British press, and perhaps also for revisiting the Soviet embassy 
in London, as he was alleged to have done for the first time in July 
1963. While the minor party leaders insisted that the issue of 
independence be put to a referendum or an election, Mintoff 
repeated that Britain must quit Malta at 31 May and that if human 
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rights were not secured the UN would have to take over until these 
were. Believing that Sandys was determined to have his way and 
take Borg Olivier with him, Mintoff said that his party would not be 
bound by any decision reached by Sandys. As evidence that Sandys 
could not be trusted, he referred to his treatment of Dr Jagan. If 
anyone should arbitrate, the MLP held, that should be the UN "until 
liberty, equality and true democracy reign in the country." Mintoff 
was in no mood to be conciliatory. To make matters worse, while 
Gonzi was in Rome, a Mrs Zammit, a minor MLP official, was killed 
by a car and refused Christian burial. The MLP made much of this, 
and Borg Olivier was known to have been privately disturbed by the 
church's attitude. 19 
As foreseen, a second round of December talks took place from the 
yd to the 6 th December - in the first week of the month, right 
according to schedule. The first 'December talks' had been those 
between Borg Olivier and Sandys in 1962, after the demand for 
independence had been lodged the previous August. This time, a 
year later, Borg Olivier was accompanied by the other party leaders, 
as had happened already only five months earlier. There was thus 
a sense of deja vu. 
The C.O. staff and advisers had done a lot of spade work, comparing 
and sorting out all that had been said and suggested during the Malta 
Independence Conference in July. In examining the amendments 
proposed by all sides, especially but not only those by the two leading 
parties, they listed where disagreements existed, and gave their 
considered opinions as to what would be acceptable or not to the 
Maltese and British governments and to the British Parliament. They 
marked out, irrespective of party, which of these amendments 
seemed the more reasonable and acceptable, and which not. In this 
way they hoped to be in a better position to pin and narrow down 
some of the differences, and perhaps to reach a modicum of 
19 Ibid., f. 3, para, 7, para. 9. Mrs Eliza Zammit was the secretary of the Gzira 
committee of the Labour Women's Section. 
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compromise on some of the points, the most troublesome of which 
still concerned the position and power of the church, or what Mintoff 
liked to call by a catchy tune "human rights". 
Arguing meticulously on a clause by clause basis, they gave a special 
designation - "R" - to signify a point of religious significance. The 
"R" clauses comprised sections 4 f (iv), 4 1, 24 (5) and (6), 28 (4) A 
and 28 (7), (9) and (10), as well as 37 A. The section 25 (3) and (4) 
must not have been marked "R" through an oversight, because this 
concerned public meetings and the reasons why freedom of public 
assembly could be curtailed, such as public order - or a pre-advised 
religious gathering. Mintoff wanted to spell this out in more detail. 
On this, the C.O. advisers held that Mintoff's wording was not 
acceptable to Borg Olivier, "nor was it reasonable". Ganado had "a 
much better draft" and Borg Olivier "might be able to accept 
something on these lines."2o 
The other sections and sub-clauses related essentially to the MLP's 50-
called six points, to which the Maltese church was adamantly 
opposed. In the opinion of the C.O. advisers, it would not be 
appropriate for the Constitution to say simply that a law would 
provide for civil marriage, not could it provide for such a law in any 
detail. The present position was that all marriage was governed by 
the Canon Law. This covered not only all born Catholics but also all 
others married in a church of their choosing. There was no provision 
for divorce for anyone. There was no provision for civil marriage for 
atheists. The result was that "interdicted Catholics who are banned 
from the sacraments cannot get married",21 but, it was noted: 
We shall certainly get nowhere by trying to alter the present 
provision for Catholics or by trying to introduce provision 
for divorce. It is an apparent gap that there is no provision 
for civil marriage for atheists but there is really no demand 
20 See above, I, 7. 
21 In practice they somehow could - in a sacrasty. 
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The burial in the early Sixties of "interdicted" MLP supporters on 
unconsecrated ground in a section of the Addolorata cemetery known 
colloquially as the "miibla" (rubbish dump) was a rallying point for Mintoff's 
party. Here, after a corteo led by MLP officials, Labour Brigade children 
stand to attention by graves strewn with flowers. 
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for this. The real solution is a reconciliation between Mintoff 
and his party and the Church.22 
No action was recommended on this point. 
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On the question that children of parents who objected, to be exempt 
from religious teaching in schools, it was felt that that this would not 
be unreasonable and it could go into the Constitution. However, it 
was likely to be strongly opposed by the Prime Minister. It was 
"probably a point of secondary importance with Mintoff and not 
worth pushing the P.M. very hard on it." 
The next section concerned broadcasting. Mintoff wanted 
"broadcasting on religious questions to be allowed" provided there 
was no "resort to vilification" and that there would be a right of 
reply even if it offended "religious sentiment". This was not 
considered suitable for a Constitution. The real solution really 
would be "an impartial Broadcasting Authority" and "a more 
reasonable attitude" on the part of the church and the MLP. It was 
thought possible that the P.M. could be "induced to make some 
constructive proposal" regarding the Broadcasting Authority, for 
example that the Leader of the Opposition should have the right to 
appoint one member. 
There were then the provisions in section 28, starting with Mintoff's 
expectation that "public morality, decency and public order" be 
interpreted "according to the principles generally accepted in 
Western European democracies" and not according to the standards 
of morality or decency upheld by one particular creed. In British 
eyes, it would be "perfectly practicable to draft something on these 
lines", that is the Western European democratic principles. It would 
of course still be for Maltese judges to interpret such a clause but "it 
would mean much to Mintoff (and to opinion in Parliament here)". 
22 'More serious points of difference between Nationalist and MLP Parties', f.l, enc. 
926/1915/48583. 
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The P.M. "would not be on strong grounds for refusing. He 
might be told that we think it very desirable to include such a 
provision."23 
Another clause in this section propsed that all existing laws should 
be held not inconsistent with the fundamental rights provisions. 
Mintoff wanted the exemption limited to laws to be specified in a 
schedule. Professor J. J. Cremona argued that it would be "a major 
task to draw up a schedule but we think Mintoff is right and that 
omnibus exemption could defeat much of the object of the 
fundamental rights provisions." It was reckoned that Dr Borg 
Olivier "could probably be induced to agree." 
There were then, in the draft as it now was, sub-sections 9 and 10 
of section 28, whereby the Maltese Government was proposing that 
things done by the Catholic Church in the exercise of her spiritual 
powers or anything done for the protection of religion should not 
be inconsistent with the fundamental rights provisions. The MLP 
wanted these clauses deleted. The C.O. officials, including 
Christopher Eastwood, thought the Government's draft "quite 
unreasonable". They could "hardly believe" that the P.M. had put 
it forward "very seriously." It was suggested Borg Olivier be told that 
"we could not agree to their inclusion". 
In section 37 A, Mintoff wanted to have a provision "on undue 
influence in elections on the lines of s. 101 of our Representation of 
the People Act." The departmental view was that it would be 
"unusual" to put this in the Constitution but "perfectly practicable" 
to do so. Since 1924 Malta had had a legislative provision very 
similar to the British one but which used the phrase "material or 
moral injury" in place of "temporal or spiritual injury": 
We made no comment when this law was passed and it could 
be argued we should not change the phrase now. But there 
23 Ibid., f. 2. 
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is no doubt the Church did after the last election impose 
spiritual injuries on those who voted for the M.L.P. The 
point is of importance. It was raised by Mr Harold Wilson 
in the House. There is much to be said for doing what 
Mintoffwants and P.M. might be so informed.24 
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It is odd that the Department should here have been stating 
incorrectly, and underlining the fact, that it was after the last election, 
i.e. after 1962, that the Church had imposed spiritual injuries on the 
MLP, when the general interdict had in fact been imposed in 1961, 
before the last election. What could be meant here perhaps is that these 
sanctions were continuing, and they could thus influence voters' 
choices in forthcoming ballots, unless they were rendered 
unconstitutional and therefore illegal. On this point, however, the 
social, moral, cultural, religious, ecclesiastical and political textures 
of the constituencies being addressed by Wilson and by Borg Olivier 
could hardly have been more different. Simply stated, in one the 
Church belonged to England whereas in the other Malta belonged 
to the Church. No politician worth his salt in so staunchly Catholic 
a Southern European and Mediterranean island as Malta, with an 
energetic archbishop and three other political parties breathing down 
his neck, would gamble his own survival, on the eve ofIndependence, 
to deny the Catholic Church the right to exercise spiritual sanction 
over her faithful - whatever Mr Harold Wilson (or a boat load of 
British civil servants) may have thought about it. 
Other serious and still unresolved points of difference were these. 
On emergencies - and the Maltese parliament had updated some 
legislation on this already - Mintoff wanted the parliamentary 
majority necessary to declare or confirm them to be 4/5ths instead 
of 2/3rds. This was because he thought that the rest of the legislature 
could declare an emergency against the MLP and then he and others 
might be detained. But 2/3rds (s. 28 (2) and (3» seemed reasonable. 
Actions by the MLP "might well be what caused the emergency." 
24 Ibid., f. 3. 
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On electoral commissioners, the Government wanted these 
appointed by the Head of State on the advice of the Prime Minister 
after consulting the Leader of the Opposition. The MLP wanted it 
to be on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 
Opposition, disputes to be settled by the Constitutional Court. They 
also wanted these provisions to cover assistants as well as 
commissioners. On appointments to the main Commission there was 
some sympathy with Mintoffbut the matter was fully argued at the 
conference and perhaps "we should let" the Government draft 
stand. 
There was then the question as to whether Malta should have a 
Governor-General or a President (sections 29 to 31), and provisions 
made for the Queen (s. 32). There was also a difference of opinion 
as to the extent and manner of proportionality in the electoral 
system (sections 33 and 37), but the Government draft seemed 
acceptable as it was. 
Other differences concerned the method of amending the 
Constitution. The Government wanted three methods: (1) a bare 
majority of all Members, (2) 2/3rds, and (3) referendum after 2/3rds 
vote. The MLPwanted only two methods: (1) bare majority, and (2) 
4/5ths. The C.O. internally was proposing two methods: (1) 2/3rds, 
and (2) referendum after 2/3rds. Borg Olivier resisted their proposal 
that amendments to the fundamental rights should require a 
referendum. Mintoff did not believe a referendum useful. 
Section 83 provided for appeals to the Privy Council. Mintoff wanted 
this omitted. The C.O. position was: leave it but not entrench it 
deeply.25 
25 The question was raised as to whether Malta could be entitled to have a judge 
sitting on the Privy Council, but the suggestion was dismissed on grounds of size and 
calibre, and as impractical. However, a lecture given about Malta and the Privy 
Council by the Professor of Civil Law at the Royal University of Malta, Professor J. 
M. Ganado, just at this juncture, attracted the attention of the C.O., enc. 92611915. 
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On s. 100A, Mintoffwanted a general election to be held under his 
proposed new electoral provisions before the rest of the Constitution 
came into force. This was a major point, but they had no comment 
at this stage. On s. 100 B, Mintoffwanted all Crown and Services 
land to revert to the Malta Government. This aspect would be 
covered by the Defence Agreeement in due course.26 
During this round of all-party talks much of the argument was 
political rather than constitutional as such. Mintoff insisted that he 
wanted "fair" elections, that is elections held under the Constitution 
as amended in accordance with MLP demands at the July 
conference. Pellegrini and Ganado sided with Mintoff to the extent 
of demanding elections before independence, but did not support 
his demands as to the conditions under which such elections would 
be held. Strickland asked for a referendum on the question of 
'independence now', to be followed by elections if the majority of the 
Maltese wished for early independence.27 
In his memoirs, Ganado recounted in some detail what hapened, but 
relished in particular the common front taken by the parties for 
early elections, which apparently took Borg Olivier by surprise. 
Sandys therefore asked them, one by one, whether they wanted 
elections under the 1961 Constitution or under that which Mintoff 
was proposing. It was, Ganado observed, "a trap with Borg 
Olivierian cheese".28 They asked first that Sandys declare that there 
would be fresh elections, then they would answer his question. They 
also objected to Governor Dorman's participation in the talks as he 
was seen to be taking the Government's side. They did not see why 
he should be participating in a political conference and he had to 
withdraw. One of their suggestions was that the independence 
26 'More serious points of difference .. .', op.cit., f. 4. 
27 Int., rep. 6 Dec.-6 Jan. 1964, sec., f. 1-2, para. 1- 4, 196/1822/48655. 
28 "In-nassa kienet b'gobna Borg Oliverjana." Herbert Ganado, Rajt Malta Tinbidel, 
op.cit., Vol. 4, p. 402. 
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question be postponed until after the next elections in 1966, which 
would be contested on that platform. Borg Olivier knew, Ganado 
recalled, that by 1966 the MLP would not have recovered the 
thousands of votes it had lost, but he still refused to accept this 
suggestion because a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. 
Before leaving London, Mintoff, Ganado and Pellegrini (but not 
Strickland) together asked Sandys to commit himself to fresh 
elections before the conference would continue discussing what form 
an independence constitution would take. It was immediately after 
this - on 6th December - that Borg Olivier wrote to Sandys and 
officially proposed that a referendum be now held. 29 
Reference to these encounters and exchanges was made in the House 
of Commons a few days later. In the sitting of Tuesday, 10th December 
1963, Mr Nigel Fisher, Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations and for the Colonies, answered several related questions by 
Mr Hector Hughes, Mr Stonehouse, Mr Sorensen, Mr Wall, Captain 
Litchfield and Mr Awbery. He also made reference to a statement by 
Mr Sandys made on the morning of the 6th December, in the course 
of which he had read out a letter from Dr Borg Olivier to him bearing 
the same date. In his statement Sandys said that since the British 
Government had definitely decided that Malta was to become 
independent by not later than 31 st May next, the final form of the 
Constitution had to be settled without further delay: 
In the light of the views expressed to me by all political 
parties, I have reluctantly reached the conclusion that there 
is no likelihood that the differences which exist between 
them on important constitutional questions will be resolved 
by further discussion. In these circumstances there remain 
only two courses open. The first is for the issues to be 
referred to the people of Malta, either through a 
referendum or through elections. The second is for the 
British Government to proceed to take the necessary 
decisions on their own authority ... 
29 Ibid., pp. 406-407. Little did Canado know that had been the plan all along. 
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In his letter Borg Olivier referred to the decision that Malta should 
become independent by 31 st May and to the Colonial Secretary's 
invitation to him that he hold discussions in Malta with 
representatives of all political parties, in an endeavour to agree upon 
joint constitutional proposals: 
The further talks in Malta and in London have shown 
conclusively that the parties cannot agree on the 
constitutional arrangements for Independence. However, 
there is general agreement that an imposed solution should, 
if possible, be avoided. I consider therefore that before 
accepting this necessity, we should all make a further effort 
to agree on some procedure by which the people of Malta 
could be directly consulted on the matters at issue. 
The two main questions on which there was disagreement were: 
1. whether there should be new elections before 
Independence; and 
2. what should be the form of Malta's future Constitution. 
In order to give the people an opportunity to express their opinion 
on these two precise questions, Borg Olivier continued, "I propose 
that a referendum should be held ... "3o 
In a summing up of these December talks by one London paper just 
before they ended, it was reported that the differences between the 
Maltese parties, and particularly between Dr Borg Olivier, the Prime 
Minister, and Mr Dom Mintoff, the Labour Party leader, "are now 
regarded as too great for negotiation." The paper mentioned the 
question of early elections and Commonwealth membership: 
But the biggest stumbling block is the position of the Roman 
Catholic Church and its alleged intervention against Mr 
30 Hansard, Commons, 10 Dec. 1963, esp. cols. 189-190. 
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Mintoff's Labour Party. It is hoped that Mr Sandys will be 
able to draft a series of safeguards in the constitution which 
will set Labour fears at rest on this score. In any event this 
week's discussions are likely to be final. 
A draft constitution was expected to be produced either before Mr 
Sandys' departure for the Kenya and Zanzibar independence 
celebrations that weekend, or shortly after his return.3I 
Some colour was lent to the talks by Mabel Strickland who produced 
a petition for a referendum signed by 4, 163 electors. "What is also 
very important", she wrote in the letter covering it, "is that among 
the signatures are members of the MLP and of the NP, even some 
very prominent Nationalists connected with the party executive." 
She also enclosed a request by a former M.P. for Gozo "who has come 
specially to London to ask me that if it turns out that Malta is to be 
sacrificed, to do my best to save Gozo from the folly of 
Independence. " 
The Gozitan plea was from two brothers, Paul and John Portelli 
(known locally by the family nickname 'tal-Lingi'). Describing 
themselves as "leading citizens of the Island of Gozo and a former 
Member of the Legislative Assembly", 32 they had "come specially to 
London" to ask Miss Strickland that should Britain insist in granting 
independence to Malta she was to demand on their behalf "and on 
behalf of the majority of the people of Gozo" that 
Independence be not imposed on them, they do not wish to 
give up their security which Independence would imperil, 
but demand that they keep the Union Jack and all that it 
implies flying over the Island of Gozo. 
31 See 'Arbitration on Constitution for Malta' by the Foreign Staff of The Financial 
Times, 5 Dec. 1963, enc. W095/2764. 
32 Paul Portelli, a businessman, had been returned in the 1950 election for the 
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Dated 5th December 1963, the letter was addressed to Sandys and 
written in ink on a letter-head of the Lansdowne Club in Berkeley 
Square, W. 1, one of Mabel's favourite haunts. 33 
33 Enc., 5 Dec., 1963, Strickland/Sandys, 5 Dec. 1963, et al, 926/1919. The letter and 
petitions were acknowledged by Sandys' private secretary, N.B.]. Huijsman, to which 
was added in his hand this note: "As you will see from the dateline, we are occupied 
with our Cyprus crisis!" Huijsman/Strickland, 26 Dec. 1963,926/1919. 
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A Referendum Strategy 
THE CONSTITUTION OR 
INDEPENDENCE? 
When Dr Borg Olivier wrote to Mr Sandys in December 1963 
offering to hold a referendum, it may have seemed as if an 
acceptable way out of the impasse had finally been found. In 
proposing a referendum, the Maltese Government was at the same 
time asking for a stay of judgment on the part of the British, subject 
to the result of this popular consultation. Any resolution of the 
difficulties encountered in the negotiations would be put into 
abeyance, pending the result. In conceding to hold a referendum, 
the Borg Olivier administration was bowing to pressure from the 
opposition parties, and the British Government. At the same time, 
they were avoiding to go back to the people in an early general 
election. 
A referendum too could be risky, however. While Independence had 
figured in the electoral programmes of the two main parties, the 
1962 general elections had not been fought primarily, much less 
solely, on the Independence issue. What a majority of the Maltese 
electorate actually felt or thought about the prospect of immediate 
Independence in the new circumstances, was really unknown. 
210 
THE CONSTITUTION OR INDEPENDENCE? 211 
Some of the newly independent states were already in turbulence. 
In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, a pan-African nationalist pioneer, had 
established a neutralist one party dictatorship, arresting his main 
political opponents by October 1961. In Zanzibar, where the 
constitutional adviser in 1960 had been Sir Hilary Blood, there was 
bloody racial rioting as the Zanzibar Nationalist Party led by Ali 
Muhsin, a Nasserite, consolidated its position. In Cyprus the 
independence constitution barley lasted three years: it went haywire 
in December 1962. There was murderous ethnic fighting in 1963 
with the threat of a Graeco-Turkish war looming over it. Malta had 
no racial problem, and she could only be said to have had a religious 
one in so far as secular pressure was beginning to make itself felt in 
a tension with traditional attitudes in what was ultimately a power 
struggle. But Malta had not been a sovereign state either; its political 
ups and downs had been largely within the ambit of a colonial 
tutelage which, for better or for worse, had come to have a ring of 
familiarity if not reassurance about it. And then there was Mintoff 
as an eminence grise. 
Since July 1963 the Malta Independence negotiations had been 
conducted on the premise that the main parties wanted early 
Independence, even as they disagreed on what form it should take. 
In December 1963, two questions 'for a referendum had been 
mentioned by Borg Olivier - fresh elections and the Independence 
constitution. After the exchanges which Borg Olivier had with the 
party leaders in December and January - as well as other encounters 
which Sandys had in London with Borg Olivier and, on one 
occasion, even with Gonzi, these were reduced by the Maltese side 
to one question. That question would simply ask whether the voters 
approved ofthe Independence constitution being proposed by the 
Malta government or not. 
When Borg Olivier had been unable to obtain the concurrence of 
the party leaders to the questions he proposed - Mintoff insisting on 
one of the questions but not the other, and the smaller parties 
demanding a different question or otherwise expressing reservations 
- Borg Olivier referred back to Sandys on 2pt January 1964, again 
saying that no agreement was possible and asking the British 
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Government to decide. On 21 5t January 1964 Borg Olivier also 
published the texts of the letters he had sent to the party leaders. 
None of the parties, he said, had wholly accepted the form of the 
referendum that he had proposed. Consequently he had no choice 
but to refer matters to the British Government, asking that the 
Secretary of State take the responsibility of settling the form of 
Malta's Independence constitution. He did suggest that before doing 
this he (Sandys) should ask the Opposition leaders whether they had 
any further submissions to make on the draft constitution. l 
Sandys was ready to meet the party leaders for a third time in 
conference in February, in spite of the pressing colonial problems 
in East Mrica. Mintoff, aftering seeing him, assumed that some of 
the MLP amendments would be accepted, probably because Sandys 
may have confided to him that he personally thought they should 
be. 
All the political leaders visited London for discussions with Sandys 
in February. Borg Olivier and Mintoff each went twice, in the middle 
and at the end of February, in the attempt to devise a compromise. 
Borg Olivier said very little, but Mintoff felt there was something of 
a "thaw" in relations between the British Government and the MLP. 
A news item in The Sunday Telegraph hinted that Sandys was 
attempting to curb the power of the church, provoking renewed 
appeals and petitions against any curbs on the freedom of the 
church.2 
Fortified by assumptions that he was making headway, Mintoff 
petitioned Khruschev, Lyndon Johnson, and U Thant. 3 He 
I Borg Olivier/Sandys, 6 Dec. 1963; Sandys statement, 6 Dec. 1963, Hansard, 
Commons, 10 Dec. 1963, cols. 187-192. 
2 Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., f.l, para.3, 926/1822/48655. See below, 1, 10. 
3 See below, n, 14. 




SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME, PRTI.IE MINISTER AND 
RT. HON. R.A. BUTlER 
9 FEBRUARY 1964 
C/O THE COMMANDANT, LONDON AIRPORT, LONDON. 
THE UNDERSIGNED RESPECTFULLY DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO UNNECESSARY 
DUPLICATION OF CYPRUS POSITION IN MALTA IF INDEPENDENCE IS 
!REM'ATURELY GRANTED STOP NATO AND UNO WOULD THEN BE INVOLVED IN 
ISLAND'S SECURITY THROUGH COLD WAR TACTICS STOP KRUSCHEV'S 
INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH ISIAND IS 
MIRRORED BY MINTOFF'S TELIDRAM DATED FEBRUARY 5 TO KRUSCHEV 
JOHNSON AND U.THANT STOP THIS FOLLOWED IUNTOFF'S RECENT VISIT TO 
ISRAEL AND HIS WELL-KNOWN CONTACTS WITH RUSSIAN EMBASSIES AND 
AFRO-ASIANS STOP HIS TELEGRAM REQUESTED ADDRESSEES INTERVENTION 
IN KlLTA ON INDEEENDENCE CONSTITUTION STOP RESPONSIBLE AND 
MODERATE MALTESE SUPPORTING BRITAIN AND THE WEST CLAIM REFERENDUM 
ON THE SINGLE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE ALONE OR AN ELECTION IS 
THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT BEFORE SUCH AN IRREVOCABLE STEP .is 
INDEPENDENCE BEING IMPOSED IS TAKEN STOP 
TONI PELLEGRINI, LEADER CHRISTIAN WORKERS l'll.RTY 
HERBERT GANADO, LEADER DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST PARTY 
l!ABEL STRICKLAND, LEADER PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY 
OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL PARTIES, FLAT 1, NUMBER 8 BRITANNIA STREET, 
VAIETTA, MALTA. 
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A copy of the telegram sent to Douglas-Home and R.4.Butler by the leaders 
of the three 'centre' parties expressing their fears of Independence and 
requestigng a straight question in an Independence referendum, or fresh 
elections. 
implored the UN to stop Britain from handing Malta over to a 
priests-ridden government, as he liked to call it. The smaller parties, 
on their part, telegraphed Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr R. A. 
Butler, the Foreign Secretary, insisting on a straight referendum 
question about independence: now or not.4 
4 Enc., 92611871148489; see above. 
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Cm"" m.. Q ij VII..L. ... 1"' ..... Iw..~ "' ... 1..'; ... 
1 Oth February. 1964. 
Rt. Hon. D.moan SandYB,M.P., 
Seoretary of State for 
Oommonweal th Releat10ns and for 
the Coloniest 
Commonweal th Relations Office, 
Downing Street, 
London, S. W. 1. 
/)~4<-)~ 
You will have rece1 ved the text of the enclosed 
telegram via the Aoting High Oommissioner whioh I hastened 
to send you. 
~e present position here 1a heading for chaos and 
collapse. Why persue it? 
Cyprus has shown the Ru8sian hand of 1ntil trat10n 
and interference. It has a1ao demonstrated the over-
riding lessons of history. 
POe:1tiO! ~o~l~~.muBt be, 8S we are. apprehensive of the 
It ie now.!!Q...t a question/lo!' re-entering Malta legally 
or illegally w1 th the help ot the American Sixth Fleet but 
ot staying here "on the will ot the people". Moreover, 
thinking Maltese see the similarity of the pattern here 
duplicating the Cyprus situation. This pattern unfolding 
in the Mediterranean with XruBohevfs intervention in the 
Cyprus si tuation has been copied by Mintoff" 8 request for 
Krusohey.f s intervention in Mal tal s oonst1 tution to curb 
"the priest-ridden COWltry". The "Sunday Telegraph" 
announcement of the 9th Pebru.e.ry headed "Malta ourb on the 
Churoh" :to an item ot news that undermines all confidenoe in 
Britain in the popular mind. It i8 exactly a6 Minto!'f 
wants to play it - to weaken the morale of the Church and 
ot law and order whioh the 'discipline of the Churoh has 
done so much to maintain. 
of'!'ens1 ve message to Sir Alec Home accusing him of using the 
Cyprus situation 4S an exouse to get baok to Cyprus ",,1 th 
Minto:C.f's repeated suggestion that Nato's presence in Malta 
ie a. threat to Maltese existsnoo .. 
I encloss you a note on the poli tioal si tUat-ion 
aa I aee it .. 
j....----~ ~v--
~.........-~ a;::;.-  
~ .• <1--I~~~-......-.~ 
Ij~ .. ~~~ 
r ....-<- ~. '.? 
/~!~ 
--
Miss Strickland's letter to Mr Sandys dated 10,h February 1964 ending with 
the handwritten sentence: "An Independent Malta cannot survive." 
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Mintoff was "in fairly regular communication with Mr Harold 
Wilson". Through Labour and trade union contacts in Britain he 
was pressing for human rights provisions to be brought into effect 
before the referendum took place. Until Sandys received Borg 
Olivier's letter in late January it was still not sure whether there 
would be fresh elections or a referendum or neither, and which 
constitutional draft would be adopted. Lord Lansdowne told Mr 
George Thomson, M.P., and Mr Cunningham of Transport House, 
who went to see him together about Malta in early January, that "it 
was by no means clear that there would be a referendum."5 In 
January also, Pellegrini saw Lansdowne in London, claiming that 
fresh elections would reduce the P.N. and the M.L.P. representation 
in parliament, putting himself into a position to hold the ring and 
thus insist on the dropping ofindependence.6 
As rumours that the British were giving in to Mintoff's demands 
began to run rife, the Diocesan Commission quickly went into action, 
summoning a large popular assembly on 16 February, during which 
a gathering of some 15,000 people resolved to remind the British 
Government of its promises to Malta in 1802. On 19 February, when 
asked in parliament whether he was prepared to accept any 
compromise on the church's status, Borg Olivier would not give a 
straight answer, saying the question was hypothetical. 7 
Borg Olivier's position, as he had. told Sandys, was not so rigid on 
the two most objectionable clauses, inserted to counter Mintoff's 
amendments. He also knew what the British position was. He could 
not therefore just dismiss any compromise formula. This made 
matters worse on the church front: the church organisations took the 
issue to the streets with more rallies and assemblies in March. 
5 Eastwood min., 8Jan. 1964,926/1817/48655. 
6 Int. rep., 6 Jan.-7 Feb. 1964, sec., 926/1822/48655, f. 1, para. 2. 
7 Dobie, op.cit., p. 244; Times of Malta, 7, 13-15 Feb. 1964; lnt. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 
1964, sec., para. 4-5, 926/1822/48655. See below I, 10. 
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Thousands of people attended these popular manifestations, armed 
with placards and banners, chanting and praying. 
Borg Olivier went up to London for confidential talks with Sandys 
on 7th February and again on 23rd February 1964. In between, at the 
Colonial Secretary's invitation, Archbishop Gonzi also went to 
London for talks on 20th February. Although other issues were 
continuing to be discussed in these and other meetings being held 
fairly intensely by now - particularly about defence, security and 
finance - Sandys was using these discussions to try and devise a 
compromise which would respect tradition and progress. Sandys 
pressed hard for such a compromise and seemed prepared to put 
Independence itself into jeopardy. He indicated to Borg Olivier and 
Mintoff during his mid-February meetings with them that his own 
preference would be to make a draft constitution the subject of a 
referendum in the form: 'Do you want independence now, with this 
Constitution, or do you want Independence postponed?" There was 
no objection to British observers being present during the 
referendum. However, to suggest, as Sandys did at this stage, that 
the draft constitution would contain a proviso that there should be 
elections within six months after Independence, was a different 
matter altogether. 8 
What was behind such a proposal? Was this a bargaining chip? Was 
it to make independence conditional on elections and thereby more 
palatable to the MLP, or at least to their supporters in the House of 
Commons? Or was it to delay things, perhaps in view of the now 
deteriorating political and security situation in the Mediterranean? 
Mintoff assumed that his threats of violence had had a good effect 
and were forcing the colonial secretary's hand on the human rights 
question. Borg Olivier, on the other hand, was bitterly resentful: he 
regarded the position now advocated by Sandys as "a betrayal". He 
insisted that the Secretary of State should give Malta a constitution 
largely identical to that suggested by the Nationalist Government, 
8 Int.rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 6., 926/1822/48655. 
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THE UNrrED KINGDOM C<JMMISSIONE~ 
7. SI. An.e StI'HI 
'., ... 4:32/62. Floriana 
M.lta G.C. 
13th January, 1964:. 
~~ 
You ma.y be intere5ted in the enolosed note which I made after 
a talk with !t!abel Strlokland yesterday. As you know, a "talk" is 
not quite the right word to use to deacribe e. meeting with Y.abel. 
Yeaterda,y J she telephooed early in the morning to S8,j" that she very 
muoh wanted to soe me. r asked ber to the house at noon. She 
arrived in a state of great exoitement about Zanzibar and Cyprus. 
She had ono of her niece. with her, and left this girl 10 the 
drawingroom with Susie. Mabel herself, acoepting a swig of' neat 
brandy, shoved me off into the diningroom and then into the kitchen 
wbere .she sat down and held forth for three-quarters of en hour. 
2. She dOGa tnt.nd, unless ahe haa ohanged her mind, to leave 
for London tomorrow, 14th, and then to move in a mysterious way to 
iofluenoe backbenchers and K101.ters during the Dofence debat •. 
J. M. Ki.sch, Esq., 
Colonial Office, 





Male chauvinism apart, Mabel Strickland's entreaties tended to be seen as 
unduly righteous and alarmist, yet she persisted regardless. On this 
occasion (when Cyprus was in turmoil) she quoted Sandys as having once 
said that "with the Cyprus base secure Britain could let Malta go ... " 
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and should stick to the Independence date of 31't May. Unless the 
colonial secretary did this, the Prime Minister said he was prepared 
to resign and side with Mintoff in making trouble. Although Borg 
Olivier did not take the Cabinet into his confidence on this threat 
until he was due to meet Sandys a second time later on in the month, 
they supported him when he did. 9 
This was at least the second time that Borg Olivier was having 
recourse to the resignation threat as a political weapon, the first time 
having been in connection with large-scale dockyard discharges 
without consultation. It was a powerful weapon because while the 
British were keen to satisfy Mintoff and themselves on the secular 
content of the constitution, they were reluctant to do business on 
Malta with him in the driving seat on just about anything else. 
When Sandys told the leaders of the small parties about his proposal, 
they were very pleased. 10 That was the sort of referendum question 
they wanted, and in that case, elections six months after 
independence would not have been so bad either. They were 
confident that a straight 'yes' or 'no' to immediate independence 
would have tilted the balance in their favour. They would then have 
faced the electorate with a track record of success. In fact they still 
had no guarantee whatsoever of success, first of all because the PN 
was a far better established party than any of them, and also because 
a postponement of Independence could have been seen as simply 
increasing Mintoff's chances to be the one to get it in due course, 
with whatever that would have entailed. 
Before seeing Borg Olivier and Mintoff the second time, Sandys 
invited Gonzi to visit London. This visit was widely regarded by most 
Maltese as the supreme attempt by the people's spiritual head to 
avert danger. Extremist church supporters reminded themselves 
that Sandys was not only a Protestant, but a Freemason, and a man 
9 Ibid., para. 7. 
10 Ibid., para. 8. 
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Archbishop Gonzi greeting the crowds as he makes his way in an 
open car through a rally before the referendum. 
(By courtesy of the Public Record Office, London.) 
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who had been in the divorce court. 11 He was not somebody to be 
entrusted with the task of imposing a constitution on Malta - and the 
Prime Minister should have known better than to surrender this 
responsibility into such hands. When it became known that the 
Archbishop had had two long meetings with the colonial secretary, 
and an audience with the Queen, public respect and admiration for 
his activities was intensified. On his return to Malta, the church 
turned his arrival into "the largest public demonstration since the 
1962 elections." The Archbishop, who was unusually demagogic, 
stigmatised Mintoffas "an apostate". He had told Sandys that if the 
constitution contained any intrusions in the exercise of the church's 
spiritual jurisdiction, then he, the clergy and the vast majority of 
Maltese would firmly resist it. 12 
Sandys held further meetings with all the Maltese party leaders in 
London between the 24th and the 28th February. On their return to 
Malta all the Opposition party leaders indicated that they felt that 
the Secretary of State was making some attempt to meet their points 
of view. Mintoff repeated his earlier statement that relations between 
the British government and the M.L.P. were improving. Borg 
Olivier, choosing his words with care, gave a broad hint that he 
would not stay in office if the colonial secretary forced a referendum 
on unacceptable terms. Borg Olivier had recourse to his resignation 
strategy once more. 13 
Borg Olivier went up to London again on 12th March. The outcome 
of these talks became clear on the 16th . In a joint statement, Dr Borg 
Olivier proposed to present the draft of a constitution to the Malta 
Legislative Assembly and, after endorsement by the Assembly, to 
11 Sandys twice married divorcees: Diana Bailey nee Churchill, ex-wife of a South 
African millionaire, in 1935 (divorced in 1960), and Marie Claire Hudson nee 
Schmidt, a Parisian, in 1962. Diana, a heavy drinker, died in 1963. See above I, 6. 
12 Int. rep., 7 Feb. - 6 Mar. 1964, sec. 1, para. 10, 926/1822/48655. 
13 Ibid., para. 11. 
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submit it to the electors through a referendum in which they would 
be asked the question: 'Do you approve of the proposed 
Constitution for Independence?' Mr Sandys stated that, provided 
such a referendum be held under fair and free conditions, the 
British Government, with whom the ultimate responsibility rested, 
would, in deciding the form of Malta's constitution, endeavour to be 
guided by the wishes of the people as expressed through their vote 
in the referendum. 14 
The operative phrase in this joint declaration of 16th March, from 
the British point of view, was "under fair and free conditions". In 
other words, the Church was not expected to take sides through 
spiritual sanctions or otherwise. Although some of the archival 
material in London relating specifically to the Mintoff-Gonzi clashes 
has been subjected to a 50-year rule and therefore it will not be 
available before several years from now, it would be safe to assume 
that privately the Vatican would have been nudging Gonzi in the 
same direction: not to pronounce himself openly one way or the 
other in a referendum on the independence question. Gonzi himself 
was in something of a quandary: he was no militant for early 
independence but nor would he risk being saddled with Mintoff's 
version of it. The parties which had been closest to the Curia, were 
the three smaller ones opposing early independence, including Dr 
Ganado's; but the only party which could effectively stand up to 
Mintoff's and carry the day was Borg Olivier's. 
By the time that the referendum was held at the beginning of May 
1964, it was as clear as ever it had been where the Church and the 
Archbishop stood with regard to the MLP's 'six points'. On his return 
from London on 1 st March, Archbishop Gonzi said at the airport that 
he had made it clear to Sandys that he would help so far as he could 
to resolve matters but that he would reject any attempt 
14 See the stencilled file 'Government of Malta: Background Material on the 
Referendum on the Proposed Constitution for Independence within the 
Commonwealth 1964', Dept. ofInformation, Valletta, 1964, fr. 4-5, OPMArch.; and 
above, I, 8. 
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constitutionally to shackle the church's freedom in Malta. 
Interestingly, some weeks earlier the archbishop had met in Rome 
with Dr Albert V. H yzler of the MLP and Cardinal Cicogniani. 
According to H yzler, the main point made to him by Gonzi was that 
it would be enough for the MLP to bind itself to the teaching of the 
Roman Catholic Church for the interdict to be withdrawn. I5 
Nothing came ofthis; the church and the party periodically blamed 
each other for not wanting to make peace. Mintoff on his part 
disparaged Gonzi to an extent that led Hugh Kay of The Catholic 
Herald to write that such insults "would lose all sympathy for any 
political party in this country."I6 
Mintoffhad told a public meeting on 28th February, while Gonzi was 
in London, that he had no quarrel with the Church or with religion 
"but those who represented Christ had denigrated His teachings 
and brought you misery and poverty." The Vicar General, Mgr 
Galea, promptly telegraphed a message of solidarity to the 
Archbishop in London. That was shortly before Gonzi's return to a 
tremendous popular welcome at the airport. 
Addressing a crowd from the main balcony of St john's in Valletta 
on 1 st March, the Archbishop delivered a political homily in the 
course of which he denounced Mintoff as "an apostate" who had 
denied Christ's teaching, at least in practice. He accused Mintoff of 
lies, insults, insinuations, and asked those gathered before him in the 
square below if they wanted Malta to have such a person as Prime 
Minister. The MLP organ retaliated by asking if the Public Meetings 
Ordinance applied to everyone alike, and what action was the Police 
Commissioner taking?I7 On the following Sunday 8th March, during 
l5 Int. rep., annex, 6 Jan.-7 Feb 1964, sec., para. 2; ibid., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., f. 
1, para. 3. See above on earlier threats of resignation by Borg Olivier, esp. 
l6 Ganado, op.cit., vo!. 4, p. 416. 
l7 "Il-Meeting Kontra l-Ligi Quddiem San Gwann: L-Ordinanza tal-Meetings 
Tapplika ghall-ArcisqoP.", Il-Helsien, 4 Mar. 1964, p.l. 
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a large meeting in his home base of Cospicua, Mintoff enumerated 
all the "lies" told about him by the Archbishop and asked the crowd: 
"Do you want a liar as your Archbishop?" More ominously, during 
his Cospicua meeting in the morning Mintoff had claimed that his 
'six points' had already been conceded by the British Government. 
Early that evening The Bulletin - a good news story from the morning 
always greatly boosted its sales - had listed these 'six points': civil 
marriage would be permitted; religious teaching in schools would 
become voluntary; there would be a common right of burial in state-
maintained cemeteries; the police could enter churches if bell-
ringing interfered with public meetings; public morality, decency 
and public order would be interpreted according to generally 
accepted Western principles not according to one particular faith; 
the privilegium fori would be withdrawn and threats of temporal or 
spiritual i~ury would become an electoral offence. 
On the same day, Gonzi again warned against the possibility that 
anti-Catholic clauses could be inserted into the new Constitution. In 
what Ganado called "the strongest speech I have ever heard him 
make", the Archbishop told the crowd: 
We must resist a constitution that is unbecoming of Catholic 
Malta and, if this were to be imposed, your bishop is the first 
one who would not obey such a law. First we must obey God, 
and then men. Your bishop is ready to suffer like so many 
other bishops who have suffered behind the Iron Curtain. 
If that happened, they would have to enlarge the prisons to 
half the size of Malta because the clergy will follow me. IS 
Evidently keen to keep up the morale of his supporters and to 
ensure a continuing rift between the PN and the 'church' parties, 
Mintoff was saying that the 'six points' were in the bag (not unlike 
when he had declared that Integration was 'in the bag'; but then it 
wasn't). Gonzi's 'prison' speech was delivered that evening, at a 
18 Ganado, vo!. 4, pp. 416-417. 
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ceremony in St John's Co-Cathedral in Valletta, when about one 
thousand members of the clergy and religious orders assembled to 
renew their ordination vows before His Grace, after having marched 
in procession all the way down Kingsway in a pilgrimage to St 
John's.19 
Gonzi was not one to pull back punches when attacked. The 'prison' 
speech was followed by a huge rally in Mintoff's hometown Cospicua 
on 15th March, in which a resolution was passed declaring that the 
Maltese people and the parties loyal to the Church would not accept 
a constitution that contained clauses contrary to the Church's 
freedom. Whether by coincidence or design, on the following day the 
joint Anglo-Maltese declaration was issued saying that no decisons 
would be taken on the constitution before a referendum was held. 
On the assumption that early independence was desired, since the 
main parties agreed on that - and what was holding things up was 
a disagreement as to its constitutional form - the question posed by 
the Borg Olivier administration seemed a perfectly legitimate one. 
It would tell the British Government, through a secret ballot, 
whether a majority of the electors approved of the Independence 
constitution being proposed by the Maltese Government, or not. On 
the surface ofthings that made perfect sense. But there were many 
undercurrents which rendered that seemingly simple and 
straightforward question suspect and open to question. The small 
'church' parties opposed Mintoff's 'six points' - and Mintoff - with 
at least as much vigour as they opposed immediate independence 
from Britain. Their quarrel with the Nationalists was not actually 
about the administration's choice of constitution at all: it was about 
the grant of Independence. As things now stood, Independence was 
still due on 31 st May, which was no more than three weeks after the 
dates set by the administration for the holding of the referendum. 
These were the 2nd, yd, and 4th of May, 1964. 
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The train had left the station and Borg Olivier had no intention of 
stopping it in its tracks. In a sudden burst of energy, which left the 
Opposition breathless and seething, on 30th March he laid on the 
table of the House a copy of the proposed independence 
constitution, which was basically the same draft advocated at the end 
of July 1963. The debate opened on the night of 31 st March and in 
one division after another carried by 26 to 23 votes the time limits 
for it were fixed. On 1 st April Borg Olivier had this endorsed (by 26 
votes to 16), and opened the 'debate' on the second reading of the 
referendum bill. On 4th April this was passed in an all-night sitting 
(by 25 votes to 5).20 The smaller parties held that the consitution 
being debated would not be the one granted because Britain had the 
final say, so the six points would be put into it anyway.21 The 
question, in its final form, would read thus: Do you approve of the 
Constitution for Independence proposed by the Government of 
Malta, endorsed by the Legislative Assembly and published in the 
Malta Government Gazette? 
On the very same day a list of referendum commissioners to serve 
under the principal electoral officer were named, submitted to the 
governor for approval, and promptly approved by him. The 
confidential written opinion from the Prime Minister to the 
Governor was initialled by every member of Cabinet, also on the 
same day. Of the eight commissioners one, Paul Sceberras, an 
accountant, was a former president of the GWU. The others were 
lawyers. 22 Three days later, Dorman, acting on Borg Olivier's 
20 'Government of Malta: Background Material on the Referendum .. .', op.cit.; Int. 
rep., 7 Mar-7 Apr 1964, sec., enc. (in six copies) Wakefield/Sandys, 11 Apr. 1964, sec., 
f. 5, 926/1822/48655. 
21 "Debate on Constitution in Malta Parliament", Times of Malta, 1 Apr. 1964, p.l. 
22 Edwin G. Bonello, Hugh Harding, Ugo Mifsud Bonnici,John Pullicino, Vincent 
Scerri, George Vassallo and Edwin Busuttil, who was also a university professor. 
Harding was a judge. 
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recommendation, appointed nine revising officers, all Magistrates, 
in accordance with the Referendum Act (Act VI of 1964).23 
On 10th April in a written parliamentary reply Sandys announced 
the names of the persons who had been appointed as referendum 
observers. The head of the delegation was Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton, 
President of the Pension Appeals Tribunal for England and Wales; 
he was ajurist of great experience having served as attorney-general 
in Cyprus, Kenya and Malaya in the 1940s, then as Chief Justice in 
the Federation of Malaya, and of Nigeria, as well as President of the 
West African Court of Appeal in the 1950s. Of the other four 
members, two were MPs, Sir Lionel Heald, Q.C., Conservative, and 
Elwyn Jones, Q.C., Labour. Of the remaining two, Sir Richard 
Ramage, C.M.G., had had some direct experience of Malta, having 
assisted the Lt. Governor from 1935 to 1939, before serving in 
various African colonies. The other member was an academic, 
Professor R. E. Wraith, C.B.£'; specialized in electoral questions, 
Professor Wraith had lectured at Ibadan, Nigeria's leading university 
at that time, and also chaired the electoral commission there. 24 It 
was a representative and high level delegation that would brook no 
nonsense. 
As the referendum dates approached, the temperature started to 
rise. The press were on the look out for signs or clues as to what 
Britain really intended to do. Replies to parliamentary questions in 
the British Houses of Parliament went under the microscope, as did 
anything said or done officially or unofficially by anyone presumed 
23 The seven magistrates appointed for Malta were John M. Formosa, Giovanni F. 
Gouder, Joseph Salomone Reynaud, Giovanni O. Refalo, Joseph Soler, Joseph 
Debono and Fortunato Mizzi. Two revising officers were appointed for Gozo. These 
were magistrates Carmelo Scembri and John Anastasi. 
24 'Referendum Observers Named', British Information Services, Press Release, 11/ 
64, 10 Apr. 1964; enc., Wakefield/Borg Olivier, 9 Apr. 1964,691/63, OPM Arch., 
Castille; Hansard, Commons, 10Apr. 1964, cols. 247-248. The two MPs joined the 
other four members at a later stage due to parliamentary business. 
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to be in the know. Broadcasting was as controversial as ever, because 
the MLP kept probing with script submissions that in some way 
offended or could be said to offend against 'religious sentiment' - and 
such references would be objectionable under the existing 
broadcasting ordinance. BBC broadcasts were also relayed to Malta, 
so commentaries on that medium were similarly subject to scrutiny 
and liable to arouse controversy. Religious public gatherings could 
easily turn political or be seen to have political connotations, if only 
by the presence of certain politicians but not others, a stir, a 
handshake, a cheer. The logistics of the referendum itself were 
competently taken in hand in accordance with traditional Maltese 
electoral practices in what were now the ten electoral divisions (eight 
before 1962), so that when the voting days arrived no serious 
complaints arose on the conduct of the referendum or the counting. 
The 'trusted friend' formula used in the Integration referendum in 
1956, purportedly to assist illiterates in the polling booths, was not 
resorted to again. 
What position would the Church take? Would it advise, instruct or 
morally oblige voters to sway in this or that direction? And how 
would answers to the question put, be interpreted? What directives 
would the parties give, and why? Was this at all a referendum about 
Independence itself, now or later; or was it solely and simply about 
the Constitution being proposed for it by the government of the 
day? The instructions to voters in English and in Maltese on the 
ballot paper were clear enough: 
The voter should indicate his vote as follows -
If he approves of the Constitution for independence ... , he 
should place a mark in the square opposite the word 'YES'. 
Ifhe does not approve of that Constitution he should place 
a mark in the square opposite the word 'NO'.25 
25 'Ballot Paper - Directions to Voter', Fourth Schedule (Section 24) of the 
Referendum Bill, C 37, Supplement, Malta Govt.Gazette, no. 11623,30 Mar. 1964, 
Part C. 
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For two months there was a barrage about the referendum in the 
newspapers. The most disadvantaged in this domain were the 
Nationalists, who had no mass circulation paper. Labour had easy 
access to the Union Press papers, which belonged to the General 
Workers Union, especially now the daily l-Orizzont. The 'church' or 
'centre' parties - Mabel's PCP above all - were given generous 
coverage in the Strickland House papers, the daily Times of Malta 
and Il-Berqa. Ganado and MPs from the 'church' parties also 
contributed articles to the church paper Lehen is-Sewwa. On the 
church side there were also Il-Haddiem which became a daily in 1964, 
and the MovimentAzzjoni Socjali's Il-Qawmien. The smaller parties 
had their official organs, none of which were fully-fledged 
newspapers, although strident efforts were made to carry the 
message across in Pellegrini's It-Tarka, Ganado's Malta Taghna. Apart 
from her daily and Sunday national mass circulation newspapers, 
Strickland also had a strictly party publication, Forward 'Il Quddiem. 
Although weakly organized Borg Olivier's party had the advantage 
of being in office, and could make some use of the usual trappings 
of officialdom through national broadcasting, the Department of 
Information for photography and press releases, and also its freely 
distributed information publication Ir-Review. In a front-page article 
by Dr Benny Camilleri, the PN organ Il-Poplu lambasted the smaller 
parties for not knowing what they wanted: first they opposed 
Independence because it would bring hunger and misery; now 
because it would bring Russia and the sitt punti. Camilleri then 
emphasisied that the existing Constitution did not have the clauses 
"in favour of the Church" which the proposed Constitution would 
have. And it quoted verbatim in bold print the two clauses exempting 
the Church from the human rights provisions of the Constitution, 
in the exercise of her spiritual rights and duties, or with regard to 
any law enacted to protect the religion of Malta. 26 
In its 1 st April issue, Ir-Review carried a front-page story explaining 
the Independence Constitution, together with a quotation from a 
26 "Huwa I-Poplu li Jrid JiddeCiedi", Il-Poplu, 27 Mar. 1964, p.l. 
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statement by Sandys in the Commons on 17th March, wherein he 
expressed a hope that a referendum would show how the Maltese 
people felt about delicate ecclesiastical questions, which he did not 
wish to resolve himself. The story was illustrated by a photograph 
of Borg Olivier being carried shoulder-high during a Nationalist 
demonstration. Strickland's party objected in particular to this 
selective quotation from Sandys, as well as two photographs showing 
supporters waving the Nationalist Party flag: 
This Ghanaian touch in Malta conflicts with the political 
geography since the single party state is not yet established, 
as in most cases this contemporary trend evolves after 
independence ... 27 
PeIIegrini, Ganado and Strickland gave press conferences 
immediately after the announcement by Sandys in the Commons 
that referendum observers were being appointed to witness and 
report on the conduct of the referendum. They claimed that the 
referendum proposed would be on the wrong question, as the 
electorate would not be asked whether they wanted independence 
now or not. Strickland and Pellegrini hinted that their parties might 
well be instructed to boycott the referendum, while Ganado reserved 
his position. The boycott stratagem had been employed to good 
effect by the PN during the 1956 referendum on Integration, when 
only 44% of the total electorate had supported Integration, although 
most of those who did vote had supported it. As a result, and for 
other reasons, Integration had been deferred and after further 
complications it was abandoned. 
In replying to supplementary questions by Jo Grimond, the Liberal 
leader, and Mr Williams, which sought to establish that the people 
opposed to Independence could express such views in the 
referendum, Sandys had said that those who wished to express 
themselves against Independence would be able to do so. On 
27 Mamo/Director ofInformation, 11 Apr. 1964, OPMArch., Castille. 
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returning from London, Borg Olivier had said that his referendum 
did not envisage an opportunity for people to give their views on the 
issue of independence since this chance had been available at the last 
election, the majority of people had shown themselves in favour of 
independence, the Prime Minister contended. 
Political leaders in Malta also gave wide publicity to another of the 
replies by Sandys in answer to a supplementary question by Harold 
Wilson, the Labour leader, that he had very much in mind the 
question of "human rights and liberties", and that the British 
parliament had the last word in regard to the constitution for Malta. 
The small parties quickly exploited this to argue that Borg Olivier 
had betrayed Malta into the hands of a Protestant arbitrator who 
intended, as they claimed ad nauseam, to include the MLP's 'six 
points' in the Independence Constitution whatever the result of the 
referendum was. 
During the Easter weekend a British MP, Mr M. Woodnutt, visited 
Malta, apparently in a personal capacity. He had talks with party 
leaders, including Borg Olivier, as well as with Gonzi. Pellegrini said 
in the Assembly that Woodnutt had assured him as coming from the 
Colonial Secretary that the 'six points' would be included in the 
constitution, and also that the issue of Independence was still far 
from determined. When however Borg Olivier spoke to Woodnutt 
on the telephone, the latter said that he had only expressed a 
personal opinion as to what was likely, and that Pellegrini had in any 
case quoted him inaccurately. Pellegrini countered with the reply 
that Woodnutt's remarks both on Independence and the 
Constitution had been typed out and approved by him in the 
presence of the leaders of the three small parties. Speaking in the 
Legislative Assembly on 1st April, the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr 
Felice, retaliated by saying that unless the people supported the 
Nationalist draft constitution by a large majority in the referendum, 
then Sandys would be given the opportunity to introduce Mintoff's 
anti-clerical provisions in it. The issue was a crucial one because if 
the smaller parties attracted votes away from the PN out of fear that 
the constitution being voted on was not the one that would be 
granted, the MLP would gain in proportion to the PN. The curious, 
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if not comic, Woodnut episode bore this out, as Borg Olivier took 
care to make known in the Assembly in exchanges with Pellegrini. 
When shown Pellegrini's interpretation of what he had purportedly 
said, Woodnut told Borg Olivier: 
He is a naughty; he is very naughty, a very naughty man ... 
Anything I said to Pellegrini was what I personally felt. I can 
assure you that it did not come from Mr Sandys ... But of 
course not, good Lord, no!. .. No, no. If you have a good 
result they (the six points) will not be touched; but if the 
'yeses' are few, there would be great pressure in the House 
from several quarters. They would certainly insist that the 
points be given due weight... I can assure you that if the 
'yeses' are great enough I shall do everything in my power 
so that you can have the Constitution you want. I would not 
wish it to be touched. Many of us in the House would do the 
same.28 
Borg Olivier feared a boycott; he knew from experience how 
effective it could be. During a PN public meeting on 5th April, he was 
at pains to reassure the Maltese public that his government's form 
of independence was "dependent on British financial assistance and 
a defence agreement, both of which were being negotiated." 
Mintoff's party did not issue any directives to supporters until the 
very end, requesting in the meantime that the MLP version of 
"human rights" be incorporated through an Order-in-Council (that 
is, direct from London, over the head of the Maltese government 
and of the legislature). This request was of course turned down. 
Borg Olivier was still hoping that the date of 31 st May could 
somehow be met, although Sandys warned him that it might be very 
difficult to find parliamentary time for a Malta Independence Bill 
by then. There was already a presumption that the set date might 
have to be extended, at least by a short time. 
28 "Mr Woodnutt us-sur Pellegrini", Il-ltaddiem, 7 Apr. 1964, p.1, quoting a press 
release signed by P. J. Naudi, Director of Information. 
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During debates in the Assembly, an important amendment 
supported by all the Opposition parties exept Pellegrini's Christian 
Workers Party, would have allowed for blank votes to be shown 
separately in the referendum results and not treated as invalid. The 
intention behind this amendment was that such blank votes should 
be regarded as cast specifically against early independence.29 This 
was mainly a Ganado idea, and in fact his Democratic Nationalists 
were later advised so to vote, neither 'yes' nor 'no' but a vote 
nonetheless. The Nationalists rejected the amendment so it fell 
through; but there was nothing to stop at least the three small parties 
from issuing a common directive to the electorate so to vote, even 
were such votes to be counted as invalid. In the end, the Opposition 
parties split. Pellegrini and Strickland said: boycott. Ganado opted 
to spoil the vote. Mintoff (and the GWU with him) said: vote 'no'. 
Borg Olivier of course said: vote 'yes'. 
What did Gonzi say? He could hardly object to a constitution that was 
exempting the church in the exercise of her mission from the human 
rights provisions set out in the constitution itself. But if he gave the 
nod to the 'yes' vote he would be accused of interfering in politics and 
the result, whatever it was, would be blamed on him. Moreover, he 
would have abandoned the parties closest to him, who were against 
early independence: for that reason, none of them were answering 
the referendum question in the affirmative. He was under pressure 
from the Nationalists to back them for fear that if he did not, and as 
the MLP would be voting against, that could benefit the MLP. 
Wakefield had a long talk with Gonzi on the night of 16th April. The 
church still had not pronounced itself. The Archbishop, who was 
nearly eighty years old, was looking tired and strained. Wakefield 
made it seem as if Gonzi was not averse to the prospect of an 
inconclusive referendum result, which could put off the prospect of 
an early independence. On the following morning he sent London 
a telegram using these words: 
29 Int. rep., 7 Mar.-7 Apr. 1964, sec., ff. 2-6, para. 5-11, 926/1822/48655. 
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He has been under heavy pressure from Cabinet to advise 
Catholics to support constitution in referendum. Centre 
parties have exerted pressure in opposite direction. He had 
no wish to facilitate independence and in light of what I told 
him about consequences ofincondusive referendum result he 
will definitely not (repeat not) advise Catholics to vote "yes." 
233 
Lacking positive guidance from the Church, a substantial proportion 
of the electorate would abstain or put in blank ballot papers, the UK 
Commissioner expected. He was also giving further thought to the 
advisability of using an "arranged P.Q. to counter misrepresentation 
of Secretary of State's intentions."3o 
The telling implication in this authoritative communication lies in 
that, for Britain as for the Church, it might not be such a bad thing 
if, in the circumstances, Malta's independence were indeed 
postponed, perhaps indefinitely. An "inconclusive" referendum 
result would legitimize such a reversal of policy. 31 Wakefield knew 
that Gonzi was wary of Independence, as he had occasion to sound 
him out and to report about it more than once. In his own way a 
patriot and a loyalist at the same time, Gonzi wished Malta to thrive 
but without untying the colonial knot. What was he up to now? 
Relations between the Maltese and British governments were 
somewhat strained now. Some of the replies Sandys was giving to 
parliamentary questions in the Commons were annoying the 
Nationalists. They were particularly annoyed by his replies to 
questions put by two Labour MPs, Mr Driberg on 21 st April, and Mr 
Bottomley on 24th April. Pleasing to the small parties, these replies 
greatly annoyed Borg Olivier. They seemed to him to imply that the 
British Government had an open mind on the issue of 
Independence, as well as on the form of the Constitution. Borg 
30 Tel., Wakefield/Lansdowne, 16 Apr. 1964, sec., no. 105A, 926/1872/48489. 
31 For a fuller understanding of the political implications of this timely encounter, 
see below, II, 15; see also above, I, 4. 
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Olivier made a strong protest to Sandys about the answer he gave 
Bottomley. Four days later, practically on the eve of the referendum, 
Sandys issued a public statement in London to the effect that the 
position of the British government regarding the Catholic Church 
and the question of Independence remained unaltered.32 
Obviously fed by his Malta contact, Driberg on 21 st April asked if 
Sandys was aware that Borg Olivier in a public speech on 29th March 
had stated that if the Maltese people voted "yes" in the forthcoming 
referendum, he would guarantee that no clauses would be included 
in the constitution that did not enjoy the blessing of the Maltese 
Roman Catholic hierarchy. Driberg wanted to know if such a 
guarantee was supported by Her Majesty's Government. Sandys 
already knew of Borg Olivier's speech, so much so that he said he 
had read differing newspaper reports of it, but he added: 
I have, of course, given no guarantees which would restrict 
the complete freedom of decision of the British 
Government, with whom the ultimate responsibility rests. In 
coming to any such decision, we shall naturally take full 
account of the wishes of the Maltese people.33 
On 24th April Bottomley had asked whether, for the guidance of the 
electors in the forthcoming referendum in Malta, Sandys would state 
the policy of Her Majesty's Government regarding the interpretation 
to be placed on a "Yes" vote, a "No" vote, a spoilt or blank vote, and 
an abstention; and what was now his policy regarding the grant of 
independence when the result of the referendum was known. In the 
last sentence of his reply to this, Sandys had said: "If the result of the 
referendum should prove inconclusive, the whole position will 
obviously have to be reviewed afresh." In the light of what Wakefield 
seems to have told Gonzi about the consequences of an "inconclusive" 
result - followed by Gonzi's double-fisted assurance that electors 
32 Int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May, f. 2, para. 3, sec., 926/1822/48655. 
33 Hansard, Commons, 21 Apr. 1964, col. 152. 
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would in no way be advised to vote "yes" - this discourse could assume 
a different shade of meaning. To put it mildly, it was unduly 
recalcitrant. But Sandys had also said, before that: 
If the referendum produces a decisive affirmative vote, we 
shall proceed at once with the grant of independence under 
a constitution on the lines framed by the Malta Government, 
with such amendments as the British Government may 
think it necessary to make after further consultation with the 
Prime Minister of Malta. 
Sandys said further that he would regard a "No" vote as implying 
that the elector either wanted independence under another type of 
constitution, or that he was "opposed to independence at present." 
If there should be an abnormal number of spoilt or blank votes, or 
abstentions, he would "endeavour to determine what significance 
should be attached to them."34 
This meant, at face value, that a large 'no' vote could be taken to mean 
opposition to independence as well as a preference for a different 
independence constitution; but the two positions were not the same, 
least of all in Malta when to vote "no" was the MLP's directive to its 
supporters. Such words remained sibylline, liable to be interpreted as 
suited the moment, and therefore pretty meaningless. 
Borg Olivier's "guarantee" was part of his referendum campaign 
strategy. In a Nationalist meeting at Hamrun on 29th March, he was 
reported as having said that: 
If the majority votes for the Draft Constitution, the 
Nationalist Party guarantees that no Clauses or the 'Six 
Points' would be incorporated in the Constitution without 
the blessing of the Nationalist Party and of the Church.35 
34 Hansard, Commons, 24 Apr. 1964, cols. 213-214. 
35 "Political Meeting: Nationalists at Hamrun", Times of Malta, 30 Mar. 1964, p.5. 
236 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
On 19th April a circular letter from the Archbishop was read out in 
all churches. It declared that Independence was a political issue in 
which the Church would not intervene. The circular letter was 
couched in vague terms and gave no clear guidance about how to 
vote. The Nationalists were disappointed but argued that the actual 
meaning of the circular was that the church had no real objection to 
the constitution. The centre parties were ostensibly heartened by the 
circular, interpreting it in support of their assertion that failure to vote 
"yes" in no way meant disrespect for the church. In the MLP, some 
said that the church had only taken this position because of the 
presence in Malta of the British referendum observers; others said 
that in spite of that individual priests would still keep up a whispering 
campaign against their party, as no doubt some would have done. 36 
Gonzi's position in Malta, and in this referendum campaign, brings 
to mind the charismatic Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr Daniel 
Mannix, in an earlier referendum. Half-way through the First World 
War, in 1916, and again in 1917, the Labour-led Australian federal 
government sought to introduce conscription, to beef up support for 
Britain and the British Empire in what until then was proving to be 
a trying confrontation with Germany and her allies. Having lost a first 
referendum, the government geared up for a second one a year later. 
Archbishop Mannix opposed conscription, the second time more 
decidedly than the first. An Irishman and a Home Ruler,Archbishop 
Mannix had seen Sir Edward Carson, a 'mutineer' and founding-
father of the Ulster Volunteer force, being taken into the British 
Cabinet in 1915 after Asquith's Home Rule Bill had three times been 
approved by the House of Commons supposedly becoming law; and 
in 1916 he had just seen, also, the leaders of the Easter Rising in 
Dublin executed. Although Mannix had not wished to be involved, 
in his view Australia was doing as much as it should be called upon to 
do, and he said so. He did not agree that Australians should be forced 
36 Int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., f. 3, para.4; 926/1822/48655; "Bishops' Circular 
Letter - Independence a Political Issue - 'Church does not intervene', Times of Malta, 
20 Apr. 1964, p. 9. 
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to fight on Britain's side during the First World War. It was hardly a 
religious question, although arguably a moral one. The government 
again lost the referendum, this time blaming Mannix for their defeat. 
The Labour Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, wrote Evatt, "made his 
fight definitely an anti-Mannix fight, as a matter of tactics. Mannix, 
said he, is against the British Empire. Very well, then we are against 
Mannix. At one time it looked as if the whole organization of the 
campaign was very much less concerned with the defeat of the Hun 
than with that of a turbulent Catholic prelate."37 Thus provoked, 
noted Santamaria, 
Dr Mannix chose to fight, not on the issue of the morality 
of conscription - he did not oppose conscription when 
Australia was threatened during the Japanese War - but on 
the issue of the limits of Australian participation in a war 
which was predominantly European. This issue coalesced 
the ancient emotion of Irish nationalism and the burgeoning 
realization of Australia's national identity. 38 
In terms of Empire, Archbishop Gonzi was no Irishman. Although 
necessarily Italianate by educational formation, he had never in 
politics been a Nationalist, except by force of circumstance. In a way, 
Gonzi was to Mintoff what Mannix was to Hughes. Quite unlike 
Mannix, however, Gonzi was a loyalist. He secured his nomination 
to the archbishopric having proved his credentials during the 
Second World War. In an over-long career, he had his fair share of 
37 H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, Angus and Robertson, 1940, p. 410; quoted 
after B. A. Santamaria, Against the Tide, OUP, 1981, pp. 29-30. (In the history of 
Maltese emigration, Hughes is infamous for his refusal to allow Maltese migrants to 
disembark in Sydney in 1916, sending them instead to New Caledonia. Listen to Il-
Ballata tal-Maltin ta' New Caledonia, recorded in Sydney by a community group some 
years ago.) 
38 Santamaria, op.cit., p.30; see esp. chap. 3: 'The Mannix Tradition', pp. 20-32. On 
Mannix and anti-Communist politics in the Democratic Labour Party between the 
wars, see also G. Starr, K. Richmond and G. Maddox, Political Parties in Australia, 
Heinemann, 1978, esp. pp.335-344. 
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travail and he strove to organise the diocese with a paternalistic 
pastoral authority conveyed in the articulated diction of a typical 
opening address: "Gheiiei huti u mahbubin uliedi. "39 Between 
Church and Empire, Gonzi would always choose the Church, his 
Church - which is why he opposed Mintoff's plan for Malta's 
integration with Britain in the mid-fifties, and now the 'six points'. 
Moreover, in Malta as in Ireland, the Catholic religion had long 
been emotionally and politically a bastion of patriotism and anti-
colonial nationalism. The British were Protestants - and British. 
Thus Catholicism was a factor, perhaps the overriding factor, in a 
Maltese national identity. But the Catholic prelate in Malta, unlike 
Ireland, had not been persecuted by the occupying regime, so he 
was not a rebel. A bishop suspected of nationalist sentiments in the 
fortress colony, and therefore of disloyalty to the Crown, would be 
'transferred' before he knew what hit him, as happened to the 
francophile Mgr Antonio Maria Bugahiar in 1890.40 On the whole, 
the Maltese bishop tended to mediate for the Ascendancy (if that 
Irish term bears transplantation), which in Malta ever since 1800 
took good care not to disturb his weaning of the flock. Belonging 
essentially to the Establishment, he still was not, like Archbishop 
Makarios in Cyprus, an Ethnarch; he did not actually rule. His 
power was more moral than strictly political, but in the Maltese 
colonial context that power was very considerable indeed. Even 
after the advent of political parties and elected leaders, in his 
Candlemas 'state ofthe colony' speech in the first week of February 
each year, the Governor had all the parish priests gathered before 
him at the palace. The British had liked to regard the Maltese 
bishop as the first citizen, an interlocutor for the subject people; the 
parish priests represented the localities. Gonzi served as military 
chaplain during the First World War and was knighted for his 
39 "My dear brethren and beloved children." On Gonzi see the two volume 
biography by Tonna and Galea, op.cit .. See also D. Fenech, The Making of Archbishop 
Gonzi (Malta, 1976), and the full-scale interview with him, "L-ArCisqof Gonzi 
Jitkellem", in Storja 78. 
40 On Buhagiar see H. Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony, op.cit., pp. 70-72. 
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services during the Second World War by George VI in 1946. In 
1963, the caudillo Francisco Franco conferred on him the title of 
Grand Cross of the Order of St Raimond de Penafort; and in 
accepting that decoration from a Spanish cardinal visiting Malta, 
Gonzi praised Franco for having saved Europe from 
Communism. 41 Equally anti-Communist, and inveterate by 
longetivity, Mannix would have been all out for independence. In 
this Gonzi was, at the very least, more guarded. When it came to 
the referendum, he stood aside, if that is what he did. Sandys too 
stood on the fence: it was not "his" referendum, he told the 
Commons, waiting to see how things would turn out. 
There were various incidents before the voting took place, 
practically all of them bearing on religious or ecclesiastical aspects. 
One concerned a typical MLP skirmish with the Broadcasting 
Authority over the vetting of a script because of giving offence to 
religious sentiment. That was little wonder, given the trading of 
attributions going on - "apostate", "liar" ... During a press conference 
given by the referendum observers at the UK Commission in 
Floriana on 29th April 1964, Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton was pressed 
on the question of broadcasting. Responding to an assertion that the 
MLP had been "refused time on Malta TV" because it had been 
alleged that it was "offending against religious sentiment", Foster-
Sutton said that "it was not refused ... " 
The M.L.P. felt unable to accept the facilities because of the 
state of the law. There were objections to some passages in 
their script. We have had an opportunity of examining the 
script. That is arguable.42 
41 'Spanish Cardinal's Visit -Malta's Archbishop Honoured', Times of Malta, 18 Feb. 
1964, p. 3; Int. rep., 7 Feb. - 6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 5, 926/1822/48655; see below, 
H, 14. 
42 'Referendum Observers - Press Conference held at the Office of the U.K. 
Commission at 11.15 a.m. on Wednesday, 29th April 1964', f. 3. This is a stencilled 
transcription, OPM Arch., Castille. 
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Asked if they regarded it as fair that a person should be allowed to 
express his opinion in the press and at meetings and then be barred 
from broadcasting because of a clause regarding religious sentiment, 
Foster-Sutton did not think they should be asked to express opinions 
on "the suitability of legislation." In reply to a further question, he 
said that they were aware of the difference existing between the 
Press Law and the Broadcasting Ordinance. 
In reply to another question, Foster-Sutton confirmed that the 
Archbishop had done them "the courtesy and honour" of receiving 
them on two occasions. Yes, at their own request, on both occasions. 
Would he say that "any individual priest" could offer advice to 
anyone who came to him for personal advice? It was difficult to say 
that he (a priest) was not entitled to his personal view. Were the 
observers aware that "in the confessionals" the faithful were being 
told that to support the M.L.P. was "a mortal sin"? They had heard 
that being alleged. Did he have any proof of it? They had only heard 
it alleged, but it had to be remembered that everybody was free to 
give personal advice. Did he think it was fair and free for Union 
leaders to address and issue directives to vote as near as possible to 
the directive of a political party? First the church, now the union 
leaders - they would be reporting about that. 
During the last elections aged and handicapped persons were taken 
out of institutes to vote: did the observers think that was fair? "The 
same thing happens in every civilized country in the world." Did he 
think there was freedom of speech in Malta? "Yes."43 
On 18th March, as the referendum campaign was picking 
momentum, and in the wake of the renewed 'politico-religious' 
conflagration, a BBC commentator stoked the coles. In a broadcast 
from London on the BBC's Overseas Service, Honor Balfour 
described the Maltese church as "mediaeval." Miss Balfour also took 
it upon herself to define Archbishop Michael Gonzi as "the complete 
43 Ibid., if. 3-6, and passim. 
6 
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The British referendum observers during their press conference and 
(below) doing the rounds and talking over matters, in cooperation with the 
police. 
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political prelate." Music to Mintoff's ears, such unrestrained talk 
from the mouth of a foreign journalist, relayed into thousands of 
Maltese homes via the Rediffusion set in their bedrooms and 
kitchens, provoked a furious reaction. In one fell swoop it counter-
weighed anything Mintoff might have been prevented from saying 
locally in the media for fear of offending religious sentiment.44 
In the opposition sections of the local press, there were no holds 
barred. L-Orizzont sometimes allowed scaremongering which put the 
M.L.P.'s own pro-independence stand into question. The people 
wanted to know what the position of the Malta pound was going to 
be, the position of those who had their money deposited in local and 
foreign banks, how our money would be employed in the sterling 
area or in other countries, what the bleak prospects forecast by the 
Governor in the Candlemas speech were, asked one 
correspondent. 45 Borg Olivier's exercise in presenting his 
Constitution to parliament, said one editorial, was all a waste of time, 
for the simple reason that the position of all the parties was now well 
known.46 The same edition of the paper quoted Ganado's conviction 
- a favourite of both Mabel's and Pellegrini's - that what had 
happened in Cypus and in Zanzibar could happen in Malta because 
"we were not yet prepared for it"; independence could lead to a coup 
d'etat and "bring the Russians to Malta." Those who voted in favour 
of Borg Olivier's constitution would be "throwing a noose round 
their necks." You could ask the people whether they wanted a 
republic or a monarchy, whether to stay in the Commonwealth or 
44 In commenting on this incident in their monthly report, the Local Intelligence 
Committee said that "the rage and fury of the Catholic Press in Malta showed their 
skins to be childishly thin." Int. rep., 7 Mar.-7 Apr. 1964, sec., f. 7, para. 12,926/ 
1822/48655. 
45 L-Orizzont, 7 Mar. 1964. Such articles, especially editorials, were translated into 
English or summarised in English by the U.K. Commission and circulated to a 
restricted circle. The newsaper which was most accessible, but not necessarily to the 
populace, was The Times of Malta; no translations of that were necessary. 
46 Ibid., 17 Mar. 1964. 
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not, but you could not ask the people to say "whether they want 
human rights and freedom" and decide by the majority, according 
to L-Orizzont. So long as there was a section, however small, which 
wanted these rights and freedoms, the British Government as the 
metropolitan authority was in duty bound to grant them. If it was a 
question of postponing independence a little for something 
worthwhile, that wouldn't matter.47 In another editorial, the GWU 
paper held that the MLP had already notified the Colonial Secretary 
that no consultations in the country would be considered to be free 
unless certain human rights were included now "by Order-in-
Council." The endorsement of the independence constitution by the 
Maltese parliament within only two days was insulting and 
irresponsible. The paper published the directive for a boycott of the 
referendum by the Pellegrini party, which laid down three 
conditions: that Borg Olivier obtain guarantees from Sandys that 
Mintoff's points would not be included; that he make public the 
financial and economic arrangements which were being negotiated; 
and that he should say how Malta's internal security would be 
safeguarded.48 In another editorial, L-Orizzont held that the 
amendment to chapter IV of the government's own constitution (on 
human rights) which privileged the church went against the 
fundamental basis of those same rights. To make exception to these 
laws, these rights, meant creating grounds for abuse, harm and 
corruption, because a privilege often generated corruption and was 
in itself the negation offreedom and democracy.49 The paper again 
questioned independence on economic grounds: what would be the 
effects on Malta's economy of a defence treaty and of Commonwealth 
membership? The people had practically forgotten the economic 
implications of the vote which they were being asked to give.5o 
47 Ibid., 21 Mar. 1964. 
48 Ibid., 26 Mar. 1964. 
49 Ibid., 30 Mar. 1964. 
50 Ibid., 1 Apr. 1964. 
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No sooner had the referendum campaign opened than l-Orizzont 
objected to the haste being shown: under the circumstances the 
people's answer ought to reject the government's constitution as they 
deemed fit. In a meeting at Mosta the MLP's president Danny 
Cremona, went so far as to allege that under the 'exception' clauses, 
ten shillings could be retained from each pay packet for the church's 
fund. Under such a law, he added, the government could say that 
the MLP should cease to exist. Cremona also alleged that under the 
proposed constitution those who left the Island could not return. 51 
Another strident paper was Pellegrini's It-Tarka. A referendum was 
being held through their efforts.52 Mintoff's "points" would come 
with independence - that was a certainty. Everything pointed to the 
fact that Sandys would concede some of Mintoff's "points" if not all 
of them, if independence came now. This meant that the learned 
Borg Olivier, thanks to his childish obsession with independence, 
51 Ibid., 6 Apr. 1964. He may have been referring to the MLP's amendment which 
would facilitate the repatriation of Maltese who had been naturalised overseas, as 
in the UK, whereby these would be treated as Maltese citizens while they stayed in 
Malta if they returned, without having to renounce to their other passport. There 
was no prohibition in the draft constitution against returnees; but there was no 
provision for any kind of dual citizenship for Maltese after the appointed day either. 
The allegation that under the Nationalist constitution Maltese who left Malta would 
be unable to return was made more than once, not least by Cremona. The point at 
issue was citizenship not freedom of movement. As however there were tens of 
thousands of Maltese emigrants and many others who had taken jobs or got married 
in the UK and elsewhere, while they still had family in Malta, the problem of 
mobility in relation to citizenship after independence directly or indirectly interested 
a large segment of the population. It was not known that those of Maltese descent 
who had become nationals of other countries would have wanted to revert to a 
Maltese citizenship, losing their other one from Britain, Canada, the U .S.A., 
Australia, etc.; hence they could be seen as disadvantaged should they ever wish to 
return for a long stay or indefinitely as expatriates in their own country. The MLP's 
amendment to the draft constitution was more liberal, it was a facilitator, but it did 
not go so far as fully to recognise dual citizenship rights for Maltese nationals. Such 
dual citizenship rights for Maltese nationals as were introduced in the late 1980s 
were in fact still quite restricted. 
52 It-Tarka, 19 Mar. 1964. 
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would cause the church to be deprived of some of her rights. 
According to the Nationalists, if the church did not interfere in the 
referendum she would be failing in her duties and obligations.53 
Another article was headed: 'Every "Yes" in the Referendum is a 
Vote in favour ofthe Six Points.' 54 Borg Olivier's referendum was 
immoral. Catholic Malta had been betrayed by Borg Olivier when 
he left the last word to Sandys. Every person who voted "Yes" would 
be "putting the noose round the Archbishop's neck." The 
Nationalists made no mention of the Pope's warnings that "from the 
frying pan of Colonialism we will fall into the fire of Communism." 
To vote "Yes" in the referendum would "sign the death warrant of 
the workers if it were successful. "55 
The church paper Lehen is-Sewwa also carried articles that tended 
to show independence in a bad light. In much the same strain as 
Pellegrini, Ganado wrote that if the government constitution were 
approved by a considerable number of votes, the British 
government would immediately grant independence and the British 
Parliament would undoubtedly insert the worst of Mintoff's 
amendments. 56 One article was entitled 'A "Yes" Vote means 
disaster for the church!": 
As usual, Dr Borg Olivier wants to deceive the Catholics by 
forcing them to vote "yes" so that he can get independence; 
and then, when the "Points" will have been included in the 
Constitution, he will strike his breast and exculpate himself 
by saying that not enough people voted "Yes".57 
53 Ibid., 26 Mar. 1964. 
54 Ibid., 2 Apr. 1964. 
55 Ibid., 9 Apr. 1964. 
56 Lehen is-Sewwa, 2 Apr. 1964. 
57 'Our Forum', ibid., 11 Apr. 1964. 
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Looplt>les ill Urait ConstItutIOll 
'CHURtill'S POSITION WEAKENED' 
BY A STA.FF JtEro}tTEF! 
Re!eli..~ ... t'.e dlstTibuted. to PreoMlI11>'n by the DemocratiC NaUonall$t Party 
yestl!nl[l), morning dur!n[: a Pft'Sl! Contertluce. pre~l1led oVl'r by Dr. HerbC'rL Gllna.Llo. 
lll,fr:u·tYleudcr. 
When Dr Ganado in a press conference a week before the referendum 
claimed that the Malta Government's proposed Independence Constitution 
was not truly or sufficiently Catholic, the Department of Information issued 
an instant and revealing rebuttal. See below Il, 10; and Ill, 16. 
THE CONSTITUTION OR INDEPENDENCE? 
trtJ-, J f: 11 ft.1} 
~
GOVERNMENT REPLY TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY OR HERBERT 
GANADO REGARDING THE CONSTITUTION 
With reference to the statement made yesterday by Dr Herbert Ganado in 
which he alleged that "It is not true that the Constitution is Catholic", it is hereby 
declared as follows: 
(1) "That when the ecclesiastics who were in London to give advice at the 
tilne of the Independence Conference were shown by the representatives of the 
Nationalist Party in Government 
(a) Section 2 of the Constitution which says: "The Religion of Malta is 
the Roman Catholic Apootolic Religion"; 
(h) Section 48(10) of the ConstitJUtioll which says: "Nothing dOlle by the 
Roman Catholic Church in the exercise of its spiritual powers and duties shall 
be held to be in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapler (Fun· 
damental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual)"; 
(c) Section 48(ll) of the Constitution which says: "Nothing contained 
in or done under the authority of any law for the protection of the Religion of 
Malta shall be held to be inconsistellt with or in contravention of any of the 
provisions of this Chapter (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 0; <he Indivi· 
dual)", 
the said two ecclesiastics showed themselves to be satisfied and agreed with these 
clauses and did not suggest any alterations or additions to such clauses. 
(2) That when the said two ecclesiastics were shown by the representatives 
of the Nationalist Party in Government the proposal of the Democratic Nationalist 
party which says: "The Rom"" Catholic Religion and the Roman Catholic 
Church in Malta shall continue to ha'le in Malta those rights, privileges 
and prerogatives which it had up to independence day", the said ecclesiastics 
agreed that this proposal was no longer necessary once the Government inserted 
in the Constituti011 the clauses mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
It is also declared that these two ecclesiastics were happy with what relates 
to the Religion and the Church in the Constitution proposed by the Government. 
Department of Information, 
24th April, 1964. 
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"The people were never as muddled as they are now with the 
coming referendum", wrote Emidio Caruana, a member of the 
LegislativeAssembly. "There are very few who know exactly what the 
Maltese people are voting for in this Referendum, or better still what 
was left for the people to decide ... "58 The government's 
announcement that a set of independence stamps would be issued 
was seen as nothing but Nationalist propaganda by Dr Daniel 
Micallef, writing in Il-Haddiem (The Worker). The referendum 
would be denounced as immoral by the observers who had come to 
see that everything was free and fair. 59 
According to the 'Stricklandian'Il-Berqa, Borg Olivier had asked for 
independence when everyone in his right senses was seeing or 
hearing of the bloodshed between brothers in countries which had 
become independent... when certain persons were waiting for 
independence to stifle the freedom of the church.6o Commenting 
editorially, Il-Berqa said that Sandys was as determined as Wilson to 
include in every constitution an anti-Catholic clause hindering the 
church from leading the Catholics during election time. The 
Nationalist propaganda, stating that it was expedient to form a 
constitution now whilst the Conservative Government was in power 
in England, vanished into thin air. Both Sandys and Wilson spoke 
in favour of a Maltese lay-socialist minority which was taking 
advantage of Borg Olivier's independence to rebel against the 
Catholic Church.61 Borg Olivier did not need to make use of the 
'trusted friend' because he wanted to snatch the vote from those 
who were against independence, editorialised Il-Berqa. 62 The 
58 Ibid., 14Apr. 1964. 
59 Il-Haddiem, 13 Apr. 1964. This was a more modern style tabloid published by the 
Young Christian Workers. 
60 Il-Berqa, 16 Mar. 1964. 
61 Ibid., 19 Mar. 1964. 
62 Ibid., 20 Mar. 1964. On the 'trusted friend', see above, p. 227. 
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~'-rT:";~T'rn A -·-~~n:rf;rll,i>!ful;-"rin~r:l···~-pril, 
An anti-independence cartoon depicting the referendum question as a 
snare. 
Nationalists were playing into the hands of the Socialists ... 63 A 
referendum with a twisted question could only be defended by 
twisted arguments.64 A budget with a deficit of £ 1 m, it editorialised, 
was not suitable propaganda for the Nationalists' independence 
referendum.65 
63 Ibid., 23 Mar. 1964. 
64 Ibid., 24 Mar. 1964. 
65 Ibid., 25 Mar. 1964. 
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According to the MLP organ Il-lfelsien, "those two absurd clauses" 
had rendered agreement between the pro-independence parties 
more difficult: it had made it harder for Sandys to reach a decision 
and would bring about the postponement of independence. 66 
These clauses had been included in Borg Olivier's constitution after 
two priests went to London from Malta to give advice These two 
clauses destroy all human rights which may be included in the new 
constitution. These give power to government and the church that 
whatever they do under the guise of defending religion cannot be 
regarded as being against human rights. In a word they opened 
wide the door to fascism. 67 Borg Olivier had not had the courage 
to hold fast against the Junta's pressure, as he had indicated (he 
would do) earlier. After asking Mr Sandys to draw up a democratic 
Constitution, he changed his mind. The target date of 31 st May had 
been destroyed ... 68 The political meeting which was held on St 
John's square and the rallies and pilgrimages of reparation 
organized by the Junta during these last weeks; were a clear 
indication of how a constitutional struggle could be changed into a 
religious one, editorialised Il-lfelsien ... 69 Workers should realise in 
time that this referendum contained something fishy. Some time ago 
Borg Olivier had stated that before independence it was not 
necessary to hold elections or a referendum. He had asked Sandys 
twice to arbitrate on the constitution. Later he changed his mind and 
was now holding a referendum on it.7o Danny Cremona was again 
reported as declaring that the Nationalists wanted to include a clause 
so that those who left Malta would not be able to return ... "But we 
66 Il-Helsien, 3 Mar. 1964. 
67 Ibid., 17 Mar. 1964. Fr J. Bernard, S. J., was mentioned by name; Fr B. Tonna 
was not. On this see below, esp. 11, 10. 
68 Ibid., 19 Mar. 1964. 
69 Ibid., 23 Mar. 1964. 
70 Ibid., 31 Mar. 1964. 
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harassed them so much that they had to withdraw it."71 Notary 
JosephAbela wondered if Borg Olivier wanted independence. All he 
wanted, he said, was to let the country's situation deteriorate to a 
point when the Nationalists would say that to be saved the country 
would have to integrate with Italy.72 Certainly, prophesised Karmnu 
Zammit approvingly, no independence constitution would be 
granted without the six points.73 Il-lfelsien announced that on that 
day - 11 th April - the MLP should have delivered their talk in the 
referendum series on MTV, but once more they had been denied 
the opportunity to be heard, for the people "to hear what we have 
to say on what others are saying about us ... " Dr Karmenu Caruana, 
Minister of Agriculture, Power and Communications, was criticised 
for having addressed employees during working hours and told 
h · h . d 74 t em It was t elr uty to vote ...... . 
In the meantime, the Archbishop and the Prime Minister had been 
in touch. On 20th April, the day after the 'neutral' episcopal circular 
had been read in the churches, the Prime Minister sent for the UK 
commissioner. With the Prime Minister were two ministers, Dr Felice 
and Dr Caruana. 
Dr Borg Olivier first inquired how Sandys would be replying to a 
parliamentary question by Tom Driberg on the following day. There 
is evidence that the Maltese government had tended to be informed 
in advance of parliamentary questions tabled in the Commons, 
particularly perhaps if it was felt that their advice was needed or 
would be helpful in the drafting of replies. It was also a courtesy; and 
that would normally be done through an exchange of written 
71 Ibid., 6 Apr. 1964. 
72 Ibid,., 7 Apr. 1964. 
73 Ibid., 11 Apr. 1964. 
74 Ibid., 11 Apr. 1964. 
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communications through the agency of the UK Commission. That, 
clearly, was not the case now.75 
Borg Olivier then told Wakefield this: "The Archbishop has 
informed me that you have told him that the British Government 
will not grant independence unless 50% of the electorate vote 'yes' 
in the referendum." Wakefield denied having told Gonzi that. Borg 
Olivier replied: "I am glad to hear it. I will tell the Archbishop that 
he is mistaken." 
According to Wakefield, he had not in fact mentioned 50%; he had 
referred to "an inconclusive result". If so, Gonzi may have 
understood that to mean less than 50%, and conveyed that 
impression to Borg Olivier. According to Wakefield, however, Gonzi 
had "promised that he would not pass on to Borg anything I said 
but he has of course been subject to extreme pressure from Borg 
and Ministers." 
Gonzi also told Borg Olivier that he (Gonzi) had received a letter 
from someone "high up and in close touch with Mr Sandys" saying 
that even if the referendum showed a 'yes' majority, the British 
Government would include Mintoff's six points in the Constitution. 
To this it seems that Wakefield did not react, as he made no mention 
of any rejoinder from his side. 
75 See, for example, Hobden/Cuschieri, 25 Jan. 1964, OPM/857/63, OPM Arch. 
Castille, in relation to the P.Q.s by the M.P.s S.S. Awbery and P.H.B. Wall, due for 
oral reply on Tuesday 28th January, and the texts of the replies intended. The 
Secretary of State duly replied to one question, for instance, that if the MLP desired 
a UN commission to supervise the referendum or a fresh election they should "make 
their proposals direct to Dr Borg Olivier." Another P.Q. down for 4th July 1964 
concerned a request that a copy of the draft independence constitution for Malta 
be placed in the library of the House of Commons, to which the suggested (and 
actual) reply was that this was a confidential document belonging to the Government 
of Malta and it would not be proper for the Colonial Secretary to make it available 
to honorary members at the present time. This question was put by Mr Stan Awbery. 
'Aide Memoire', attached to Reg Hobden's letter from the UK Commission to Edgar 
Cuschieri at the OPM, 25th Jan. 1964, op.cit.) 
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Angry at what he regarded as a breach of confidence by Gonzi, 
Wakefield informed London that he did not propose to see the 
Archbishop "unless he invites me to see him." His interview with Dr 
Borg Olivier and Ministers Felice and Caruana had lasted more than 
an hour. "It was not a happy one.,,76 
The letter which Gonzi told Borg Olivier he had received from a 
confidante of Sandys may have inclined Gonzi to think that it would 
be better to have a solid Nationalist majority in the referendum to 
safeguard against undesirable constitutional changes. Equally, it may 
have rather convinced him that, whatever happened, if 
independence came, the British were still likely to tamper with the 
final version of Malta's new constitution. In that case, an inconclusive 
result might well have the effect of putting independence off for the 
time being, averting any impending danger to the status quo for 
church and religion. At the time it was sometimes also assumed that 
if Mintoff lost the next general election in 1966, as he was expected 
to do, he could be removed from the MLP's leadership. Such a move 
would then pave the way for a reconciliation with the church; and 
it would facilitate the MLP's return to power in the election after 
that, under a new leadership. 
It is clear that Wakefield anticipated, and perhaps desired, an 
inconclusive result from the referendum: "I expect that lacking 
positive guidance from (the) Church (a) substantial proportion of 
(the) electorate will abstain or put in blank ballot papers", he had 
telegraphed Lansdowne after seeing Gonzi on 16th April.77 The 
church had officially pronounced itself without giving a directive to 
practising Catholics one way or the other (on 19th April). In the light 
of the government's evident anxiety or suspicion that there was 
double play at work (implicit in the meeting of 20th April as 
reported), Wakefield must have felt comforted and reinforced in his 
76 Tel., Wakefield/Sandys, 20 Apr. 1964, sec., 926/1872/48489. 
77 See above, pp. 232-233. 
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assessment of the situation, although he also felt let down by the 
Maltese archbishop. 
The intricacies in a grand design for independence or its alternative 
were probably above the heads of many ordinary folk. What mattered 
more was partisan affiliation and trust in the leaders; but religious 
feelings and the disposition towards the church and hierarchy played 
a visceral part in all that. 78 An incredible lot can be achieved with a 
bare one seat-one vote majority in Malta, however obtained; or even 
by a Speaker's casting vote. 79 Changing the existing 'Blood' 
constitution would normally require a two-thirds majority; this draft 
constitution was only being approved by the Legislative Assembly for 
referral to a popular referendum. There was a popular sovereignty 
tinge to it; the final say was not that of the MPs.80 
78 Steering ahead was partly a question of legitimacy, governability and political 
expediency. What was in the minds of voters is always difficult to know exactly. In 
a small, tightly-packed and insular communal society, the tendency 'to get away with 
it regardless' has probably also had much to do with a customary deference to raw 
power, the sway of hierarchy over merit and of the collective over the individual, 
inculcated family-oriented partisan leanings which can defy rationality, 
simultaneously making for an institutionalized oppositional current; and related to 
that, in-group interest or inward-looking ad hominem piques and jealousies as 
perceived traditionally at the local and parochial levels. Elements of class interest, 
however interpreted, could not have been far below the surface, but they would have 
been largely interwoven with partisanship. 
79 Mintoff's behaviour was later to demonstrate this more forcefully after 1971. With 
that one seat-one vote he would in the end bring his own side down (in 1998). 
80 Ganado makes a hue and cry of this, saying the constitutional argument should have 
been decisive to stop the vote, in which his party and Pellegrini's did not take part, they 
walked out. KurunatAttard, a Gozitan contractor, who had been elected to parliament 
in 1962 on an 'anti-independence' platform with Ganado's party before choosing to 
cross the floor almost instantly to the government side, voted with Borg Olivier, as 
Ganado could not fail to observe. H. Ganado, op.cit., vol. 4, p.418. Ganado says that the 
two-thirds majority requirement was the same argument used by Borg Olivier when 
the 1964 constitution was due to be changed into a republican one. True, but he must 
have forgotten to add that in 1974 there was no referendum about the constitutional 
changes proposed. These were enacted, admittedly by a two-thirds majority, by the 
parliament - with Borg Olivier and some other Nationalist MPs voting against. 
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Typical of this mould of doing politics was a church celebration on 
the occasion of the feast of St J oseph the Worker on pt May, which 
coincided with the MLP-GWU May Day demonstration. One of those 
who foresaw how this occasion could easily turn into a political 
manifestation was Mabel Strickland who was not too happy with the 
dates chosen for the referendum. She exchanged at least two letters 
with Borg Olivier. He objected to her suggestion that the religious 
rally at Floriana on the occasion of the feast ofStJoseph the Worker, 
which happened to be the eve of the first polling day, was bound to 
influence voters. (In other words, he was not prepared to advise the 
governor to prohibit it, in terms of section 31 of the existing 
constitution.) In so far as the MLP-GWU defile was concerned, he 
reminded Strickland that the Referendum Act 1964 prohibited 
political meetings and demonstrations "only on the days fixed for 
polling". Borg Olivier had told her that independence was not an 
issue "that impinges on faith and morals" - a rehash of what the 
bishops had said in their referendum circular.SI The smaller parties 
would have liked nothing better than to drive a wedge in between 
the P.N. and the church in the mind of the electorate; they were 
afraid that their votes could be snatched away by the largest party. 
On the eve of polling day, Borg Olivier was answering to three libel 
suits instituted against him by Ganado, Pellegrini and Strickland over 
allegedly incriminating words he had used in their regard during a 
broadcast.s2 On its part, the PN left no stone unturned to depict itself 
as the bulwark of Catholicism in Malta. Still, it is very doubtful how 
far the would-be result depended on what happened on the day 
before the polling opened. The campaign had been going on for 
months. Minds were already set by then. All the parties had made 
their views known publicly, vociferously and insistently. 
Voters turned out in earnest on 2nd May in 337 polling places spread 
around the Maltese Islands. The highest number of unclaimed 
81 See her draft, initialled on 21 Apr. 1964, as a follow-up to her letter of 14th April 
"about the dates of the forthcoming Referendum", enc. OPM Arch. Cast. 
82 See the law court reports, Times of Malta, 2 May 1964, pp. 1-2. 
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notices to voters by those registered as voters were in the Valletta and 
Sliema districts, 5.65% in the former (1,007) and 5.36% in the latter 
(1,019). In all, 3.74% of the registered voters for various reasons had 
not claimed their votes. The poll was held on the three specified days 
between 7.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 2.30 p.m. to 7 p.m. The poll 
ceased on Monday 4th May at 7 p.m. 
In all, nearly 80% (79.67%) of the total number of registered voters 
went to the polls. Ifhowever those who had not claimed their notice 
to voters were excluded, and among them were hundreds who had 
simply passed away since the last register had been taken, as many 
as 82.66% of those entitled to vote went to the polls. In terms of 
figures, this means that 129,649 out of 156, 844 went to the polls. 
Of these, 84,395 were females and 72,449 were males, with the 
lowest percentage being, as usual, on the island ofGozo (68.5%). The 







The number of those who abstained was 27,238, compared to 14, 
474 in the 1962 general election (which had recorded the highest 
percentage of people voting ever).83 This means that about half of 
those who abstained had done so with political intent, in compliance 
with party directives or individual opinions. If so, those who had 
invalidated their vote or 'voted' by purposely abstaining, because 
they did not want independence yet or at all, amounted at most to 
some 22,000. This represented about 14% of the electorate. Those 
who had voted in favour, by comparison (65, 714) amounted to 
about 42% of the electorate. Those who had voted against (54, 919) 
came to about 35%. 
83 For detailed breakdowns per electoral division, etc., see the Principal Electoral 
Officer's stencilled report to the Prime Minister, 'Report on the Referendum, 1964', 
ff. 14, plus appendices, OPM Arch., Castille. 
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Mr Mintoff and Mr E. Attard Bezzina (MLP) in the counting hall (above), 
and (below) well-wishers cheerfully greet Dr Borg Olivier as the results are 
announced. 
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Borg Olivier waiting for Sandys to call him about the referendum results. 
It was possible that among those who voted in favour there were 
some who may not have preferred independence immediately but, 
seeing that it was to come, preferred the constitution on offer. 
Similarly, those who voted against, might have included some people 
who were opposed to immediate independence rather than to the 
constitution as such. But this is even less likely. The percentages 
grosso modo reflected the strength of the parties at the 1962 general 
election. There was no noticeable swing one way or the other, except 
that clearly there was no swing to the anti-Independence vote at all. 
The 'two majorities' reared their head once again. If those voting 
'yes' and 'no' were to be taken to support the PN and the MLP, both 
of which advocated immediate independence, the percentage would 
go up to 77%. If those consciously abstaining or spoiling their votes 
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belonged to the 'church' parties, it would mean that those broadly 
supporting the proposed constitution would go up to 66%. Prima 
facie, both combinations could thus be said to have two-thirds 
support - for Independence, and for the Constitution - but when 
taken apart these combinations were far from uniform, of course. 
In terms of sheer figures, there were a relative majority of 10, 795 
'yeses' over 'noes'. There was also a relative majority of 1, 779 of 
'yeses' over the 'noes' and the 'invalids' counted together. And then 
there was the boycott, which was not too impressive. In the 1956 
referendum on Integration, in which the PN in opposition had called 
for a boycott, in a smaller electorate the total number of abstentions 
recorded was 59, 921. Of all those voting then, 67,607 or some 44% 
had opted for the MLP's policy ofIntegration with Britain, which still 
did not come through. There were then other variables which did 
not depend on the referendum result, as there were again now. 
So, what was new? Where did the referendum leave Malta's 
Independence and her Constitution? In declaring that he had "no 
responsibility for the conduct of the referendum or for the choice 
of the question to be put to the electors" on 7th April, Sandys had 
nonetheless reteirated that he would do his best to assess from the 
results the wishes of the Maltese people, and he would have 
observers to assit him.84 He was also on record having said, on 24th 
April, that if the referendum produced "a decisive affirmative vote" 
they would "proceed at once with the grant of independence on the 
lines framed by the Malta Government, with such amendments as 
the British Government may think it necessary to make after further 
consultation with the Prime Minister of Malta ... "85 
Commenting on the BBC's Overseas Service about the referendum, 
MichaelJacobson said that this had produced a result which placed 
84 Hansard, Commons, 7 Apr. 1964, cols. 189-190. 
85 Hansard, Commons, 24 Apr. 1964, cols. 213-214. 
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the whole problem "firmly back into Britain's lap." As many people 
had anticipated, if not feared, the voting largely reflected the 
previous pattern between the island's two main political groupings. 
The inspired British commentator added that 
although the Prime Minister won a 10,000 majority, this 
margin in an electorate of more than 160,000 may not be 
conclusive enough to permit his draft Constitution to be 
introduced as it stands. Some compromises will still be 
necessary to meet the Opposition parties' objections - at 
least, that is thought likely to be the advice which will be 
given back in London by the team of six experts who were 
sent out to watch over the poll ...... . 
The position was further confused, Jacobson told his audience, by 
the fact that Malta's three minorty parties instructed their followers 
to boycott the referendum. This was reflected in the extremely high 
number of abstentions - well over 30,000, most of them evidently 
deliberate. The upshot is that Mr Sandys will have to make his own 
decisions about the Constitution, and it seems likely that he will be 
obliged to produce an amended form which, in taking note of all the 
shades of opinion, succeeds in giving complete satisfaction to none 
of them. 
The more fundamental issue was religion: 
The church has always had an exceptionally strong 
influence in Maltese affairs, and Dr Borg Olivier wants the 
Constitution to safeguard its role. Mr Mintoff, on the 
contrary, demands constitutional clauses against the 
Church's exercise of political influence. 
Although there may have been individuals who had their own ideas 
about this, the BBC's commenator's allegation that it was noteworthy 
that many members of the three minority parties, although 
staunchly Roman Catholics, also came out in favour of limiting the 
clergy's political power, was basically unfounded. The opposite was 
true. The point he emphasised was that despite the Nationalists' 
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Dr Ragonesi's protest telegram me to the BBC. 
majority, "the strength of opposition will have to be taken into 
account in any new constitutional proposals." 
Archbishop Gonzi was credited with having done his best "to ensure 
a fair vote": before the poll he issued "a decree" declaring that the 
referendum was a political issue and the Church must not intervene. 
However, there were reports that the Archbishop's orders were "not 
fully observed by all priests at the local level." 
This problem will be by far the hardest nut for Mr Sandys 
to crack. So far, one of the most optimistic signs for Malta's 
future had been that, despite the deadlock, the islanders 
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have avoided a repetition of the violence of six years ago. We 
can only hope that they continue to do so.86 
Jacobson also dropped a hint, which seemed only logical, that in the 
ciscumstances the date originally set for Malta's independence- "the 
31 st of this month" - might have to be postponed. 
The reaction to the BBC commentary from the Office of the Prime 
Minister at the Auberge d'Aragon was immediate. In a letter to the 
Controller of the BBC Overseas Service, Mr D.M. Hodson, Dr Borg 
Olivier's public relations secretary Ragonesi wrote to clarify or 
contradict a number of points. 
First, the team of six experts were asked by Sandys to report on 
whether the referendum was held under free and fair conditions, as 
noted in a joint Sandys-Borg Olivier statement on 15th March. The 
experts therefore "are not expected to tender advice on whether 
'some compromises will still be necessary to meet the opposition 
parties' objections', as this would go beyond their terms of reference.' 
Second, 82.7% of those entitled to vote had gone to the polls. This 
was considered high by all standards. In the six elections since 1947, 
as many as 90% had voted in 1962, which was exceptionally high; 
the average for the other five general elections stood at 77%. In the 
Integration referendum held in 1956, 60% voted. The assertion, 
therefore, that "the position was further confused by the fact that 
Malta's three minority parties instructed their followers to boycott 
the referendum. This was reflected in the extremely high number 
of abstentions", was neither substantiated by fact nor by practice. 
Third: 
The Church in Malta has never exercised any 'political' 
influence. The draft independence constitution prepared by 
86 "COMMENTARY - 'The Malta Referendum", by Michael D. Jacobson. Producer: 
Michael Sumner; Wednesday 6th May 1964 1109 GMT", enc. Hodson/Ragonesi, 7 
May 1964, OPM Arch. Castille. 
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the Malta Government ensures the continued exercise by 
the Church of its spiritual functions, whilst Mr Mintoff's 
amendments are meant to curtail them. 
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Fourth, none of the members of the three minority parties ever 
"came out in favour of limiting the clergy's political power." Such 
power did not exist, "barring the clergy's individual rights, as 
citizens, to freedom of expression and to vote." 
Fifth, in so far as the position of the Church was concerned, "the 
strength of the opposition" was limited exclusively to the Malta 
Labour Party, as all the other smaller parties had informed in clear 
terms the British Government that they were against the insertion 
in any new constitution of any of Mr Mintoff's amendments. 
Sixth, it was true that the Archbishop had decreed that the question 
of independence, as such, was a political matter. Such decree did not 
preclude priests from expressing an opinion in their personal capacity 
as citizens. "In point of fact some expressed themselves in favour of 
the Government's proposals, whilst others advised against same."87 
Jacobson was right to wonder about a postponement of Malta's 
independence date, but the postponement would not be indefinite. 
The two majorities were reasonably clear. There were still problems 
to thrash out, with the Maltese or if necessary without them. There 
were also pratical and logistical considerations. Negotiations about 
defence and finance would continue and intensify, as would further 
attempts at somehow resolving the church question in the 
constitution. As for the referendum result itself, all sides claimed 
victory. In a machismo taunt, the London Times said the referendum 
had given "a Maltese answer": everybody won. 88 
87 Ragonesi/Hodson, 11 May 1964, ibid. 
88 On this see also Ganado, op.cit., vol. 4, p. 423. Naturally, the 'centre' parties had won 
too. More people had voted against, blank, spoiled their ballots or not gone to the polls 
than had voted for. Ganado even sliced the PN's tally by 2%, rounding it off to 40%. 
10 
Enter the Mediators 
THE CHURCH QUESTION 
The church question continued to be the greatest stumbling block 
to the finalisation of an Independence constitution until late in the 
summer of 1964. The referendum campaign had shown all too 
evocatively how deep were the rifts between the sanctimonious 
'umbrella' church grouping, which commanded an overall majority, 
and the no less obstreperous Mintoff-Ied 'socialist' minority. 
Between February and May Mintoff and Gonzi had literally traded 
accusations, insinuations and even insults in large public gatherings, 
arousing tens of thousands of faithful and partisans devoutedly to 
rally to either side. The Archbishop had declared publicly that 
he and the Maltese clergy would break the law and go to prison 
if any religiously objectionable constitutional clauses were 
accepted. 
The end of the Malta Independence Conference at Marlborough 
House had seen a shift in the British position, when Britain decided 
that she would be granting Malta independence, whether or not the 
Maltese political parties managed to reach any consensus on the 
new constitution. A deadline was even set and announced: 31 st May 
1964. The decision to hold a referendum however had largely 
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reopened the whole question of Malta's Independence, stopping or 
at least postponing the plans in hand. What of the result, and how 
to interpret it? 
It had seemed increasingly likely that decisions would have to be of 
an inter-governmental nature. Although in certain influential circles 
there continued to be a decided view that it might be better to delay 
Malta's independence, even to stop it, delays for the most part had 
been caused by the Maltese parties due to their inability to agree on 
how, if not whether, Malta should get independence. At the time that 
the Marlborough House encounter was being planned, some 
Colonial Office officials were wondering whether it would not be 
possible to put together a Malta Independence Bill, for presentation 
to the British parliament, before the Christmas recess - Christmas, 
1963. That schedule was ruled out as being too tight; but it was 
cursorily noted, in these deliberations, that Sandys was of the 
opinion that independence might become possible by February 
1964. Once a decolonization project was in hand, the prevailing 
feeling at the Colonial Office was that it should be expedited, almost 
in the French sense of se debarrasser; even if for strategic reasons 
some other ministries may have been far less hurried. 
Even so, putting the matter before the Houses of Parliament was not 
nearly enough. The British Government itself had to feel that it 
could go along with an Independence constitution which was, and 
was seen to be, sufficiently democratic, sufficiently liberal. Unless 
the party in government was itself convinced that the constitution 
being proposed was broadly acceptable, it would not wish to bring 
it forward and have to face a barrage of objections from the Labour 
and Liberal benches, exposing itself to criticism in the British press, 
and even internally, when backbench MPs could be quite outspoken. 
Apart from The New Statesman, Mintoffhad little open support in the 
British press, particularly in view of his suspicious foreign policy ties. 
On matters of religion, however, the situation was quite different, 
linked as these were to individual rights in a civil state. Atheist and 
agnostic, Anglican and non-conformist, liberal and radical could 
combine fiercely to oppose any "mediaeval" privileges being granted 
to - or rather retained by - the Roman Catholic Church. 
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The history of Roman Catholicism in Britain had been a very 
different one to that in Malta, which never lived through a 
Reformation and its resident Inquisitors had not been unduly busy. 
This Church, however, had been discriminated against in the United 
Kingdom for centuries, at least until the Catholic Emancipation Act 
of 1829. Catholics had often been portrayed as popish reactionaries, 
still then popularly caricatured on 5th November in the annual folk 
ritual of burning an effigy of Guy Fawkes, a Catholic conspirator in 
the 'gunpowder plot' of 1605. Ulster Unionists in the British-held 
northern part of Ireland still celebrated the Battle of the Boyne of 
1690 in which James II, a Catholic, had been defeated. Inter-
cultural differences in time did not apply only to prejudices against 
Roman Catholicism, and conversely to Protestantism, in mass 
culture; they also applied to the forma mentis of English Catholics 
themselves who had long been exposed to an open and lay society. 
Those who lived through the persecution of old had done so imbued 
with the courage of their convictions and a sense of fending for 
themselves rather than depending on state protection for survival 
or respect, much less privilege. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, stringent expectations by the Maltese church, such as the 
outright opposition to equality before the law for herself, or to any 
legal possibility in Malta of civil marriage for anyone who had been 
baptised a Catholic at birth, risked raising eyebrows even among 
English Catholics. 
When Harold Wilson rose to speak about the Malta Independence 
Bill in the House of Commons in July 1964 he remarked that 
members "on both sides of the House" were concerned about 
"safeguards for the voter" or the imposition of spiritual sanctions on 
a political party at election time, as he put it: "comparable and equal 
to the safeguards which have been written in the Representation of 
the People Act in this country about undue influence and putting 
the voter in spiritual jeopardy in the exercise of his vote." To which 
Sandys replied: 
I have very much in mind the question of human rights and 
liberties ... I have made it clear to the House that Parliament 
here has the last word in these matters. I agree ... that the 
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important thing is to get it right if we can, but I would also 
like not to have avoidable delay." 1 
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Mintoff went out of his way to pander to British susceptibilities in 
this sensitive domain, to the point of worrying the Electoral Reform 
Society who, like the Liberal Party, supported the proportional 
system of voting for Britain as in Malta. This was because in an 
interview carried by The Sunday Citizen, Mintoffhad said "the Labour 
Party of Malta will accept nothing less than the British pattern of 
democracy". 2 
While Malta seemed rather incapsulated in time, other parts of the 
world had moved on: for better or for worse, these had become far 
more permissive, and far less credulous. The Maltese argument that 
they did not have to change or "infect" their customs and beliefs 
because lifestyles may have changed elsewhere, as in Britain, seemed 
valid enough in Malta; but that touched a raw nerve when it came 
to legislating in a parliament that had been moulded quite 
differently, and which had a public opinion of its own to respond to. 
Some modus vivendi had to be found. While ensuring that a special 
place for the Catholic faith and the Church was assured, as Britain 
anyway had cleverly and conveniently tended to do for generations, 
it was equally necessary to show that other denominations or indeed 
citizens would not be discriminated against or harassed because of 
their religious beliefs or the lack of these. Gonzi and Mintoff were 
both familiar figures to the British press and public, as a result of 
the crusading dramas over the past years, which to many in Britain 
- leftists and liberals as well as Protestants and non-conformists -
would have seemed dated, esoteric or downright Guareschian. To 
those directly concerned, the issues at stake seemed vital, pregnant 
as they also were with political implications and consequences. In 
1 Hansard, Commons, 17 Mar. 1964, co1.1188. 
2 Lakeman/Sandys, 25 Feb. 1964,926/1913. 
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reponse to the mounting pressure not to give in to any of Mintoff's 
requests, Borg Olivier would not have wanted to seem as if he was 
distancing himself from the smaller 'church' parties, and 
consequently from the Church. While disinclined to see the Canon 
Law and the status quo specifically entrenched into the new Maltese 
constitution, his side tried to think of other ways in which to satisfy 
the Church's expectations. 
The original draft constitutional proposal in article 2 was simply and 
significantly that the Roman Catholic religion be the established 
religion of Malta. On the insistence of a jesuit militant, Fr J. Bernard, 
Canado and the other small parties had proposed that to this be 
added a clause guaranteeing that the Church "continue to enjoy all 
those rights, privileges and prerogatives, in accordance with the laws 
of Malta and the Code of Canon Law, obtaining on the appointed 
day". In the political climate of the time and before a referendum 
on the independence constitution was held, further to ensure the 
Church's protection the Nationalist side had suggested that two 
interpretative subsections be added relating to section 48 in the 
chapter on fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
whereby nothing done by the Roman Catholic Church in the 
exercise of "its spiritual powers or duties" would be held to be in 
contravention of the provisions in that chapter; nor, similarly, would 
an thing contained in or done "under the authority of any law" for 
the protection of the Religion of Malta.4 Another possibility which 
the Nationalist endorsed eventually, turned out to be a somewhat 
looser additional clause which without entrenching the Canon Law 
constitutionally would guarantee to the Church "the right freely to 
exercise her proper spiritual and ecclesiastical functions and duties 
and to manage her own affairs".4 
In so far as the two exempting clauses would have meant that the 
Church could flout the constitution in so far as human rights were 
3 H. Ganado, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 412, 421-422. 
4 See above, I, 9; and below, Ill, 16. 
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concerned, the implications were sinister. Much then would have 
depended on what "spiritual" meant exactly. Disagreements on 
interpretation could end up before the courts. Presumably, "spiritual 
functions or duties" would still comprise the interdict (which in 
practice was not any different to excommunication) as a "spiritual" 
sanction. Thus, as a result of the new Constitution, Mintoff and his 
entourage would not be somehow absolved of the spiritual sanctions 
they carried or, worse, the bishops held to be in contravention of the 
Constitution for imposing them, or if they imposed any such 
sanctions in future. On the other hand, could the church be denied 
the right to impose "spiritual" sanctions if and as it deemed fit, to 
ward off perceived antagonists, to guide and instruct its faithful in 
"a Catholic country"? Was it wrong or immoral for a church to 
impose a spiritual sanction? Definitions and perceptions of morality 
were in the eye of the beholder: these debatable exceptional clauses, 
which could open a Pandora's box, were unacceptable to the British 
government in principle. They might well have been found 
objectionable by the Maltese drafters of the Dichiarazione dei diritti 
degli abitanti di Malta e Gozo in June 1802, formulated in the wake 
of the French Enlightenment at the time of the Treaty of Amiens, 
when it seemed that Malta would be reverting to the Order of St 
John. 
It seems that the proposed hardline subsections 10 and 11 for 
section 48 of the chapter under review were initially disliked by some 
churchmen as still not quite good enough. Fr Bernard together with 
Fr Benny Tonna had gone up to London on Dr Ganado's insistence 
in July 1963 as unofficial church advisers to advise and mediate on 
church matters; in February 1964 Gonzi himself accompanied 
Bernard to London where they had a long meeting with Ganado. 
Bernard later told a Dutch researcher that these exempting clauses 
would still "have made the Church subject to the Nationalist Party."5 
By which Bernard must have meant that since it was the 
5 H. Ganado, op.cit., pp. 421-422, 424; Adrianus Koster, Prelates and Politicians in 
Malta, op.cit., p. 199. 
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government, not the church, which legislated, therefore "the 
authority of any law" could still become a matter of dispute, 
depending on who was in office. However well-intentioned and try 
as they might, Bernard and Tonna as ecclesiastics could hardly 
depart from the wishes of the episcopal curia in Valletta, by whose 
beneplacito they went to London. Bernard was involved up to his neck 
in the politico-religious struggle, taking the stand in Junta mass rallies 
even during the referendum campaign. Ganado later revealed that 
it was Bernard who had advised that the 'Canon Law' amendment 
be put forward - one on which at first Ganado himself had not been 
too keen - and then agreed that it be withdrawn, embarrassing 
Ganado and his delegation. The two ecclesiastical advisers had held 
the two exemption clauses to be "the greatest guarantee for religion 
and the Church in Malta", according to Ganado. Bernard then 
changed track and advised instead acceptance of the exemption 
clauses and then of the somewhat looser arrangement granting full 
freedom to the Church in the exercise of her duties and the 
management of her affairs. Why was there this about-turn? It now 
seems clear that the Maltese ecclesiastical side, including the 
Archbishop, found out that the Holy See were not at all keen on their 
hard-line church clauses, even less so was the British Government.6 
All this was going on behind the scenes.7 
Others who were no less Catholic, or perhaps less Malta-bound, could 
the more easily mediate with authority - with a view to sufficiently 
protecting religion and the church while guarding against inequality 
and discrimination. As this issue seemed destined to continue 
simmering and flaring while other initiatives were moving ahead on 
the economic, industrial, political, social, military and international 
fronts on the road to Independence, in 1963 third party soundings 
began with a view to finding a way out of it. One which would be 
acceptable, if not to the Church in Valletta, at least to the Church in 
Rome. However, it was not before Sandys had obtained the green light 
6 Ganado, op.cit., ibid., and see above, I, 9. 
7 See below, Ill, 16. 
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to push on with Independence after the referendum result, in mid-
May 1964, that more 'official' diplomatic demarches were undertaken 
with the Holy See through the Foreign Office specifically on settling 
this question through some agreed formulae. 
No sooner had the Malta Independence Conference in July 1963 
registered a deadlock than feelers went out and enquiries were 
initiated to try and secure a more liberal Catholic position. 
Archbishop Gonzi quickly found out about that, although he 
reckoned that the Vatican was intervening to prevent the sitt punti 
from being considered. Lobbying was obviously taking place at one 
time with the more conservative and the more liberal factions in the 
Holy See. In a personal letter to Duncan Sandys in September, 
Mabel Strickland let him know what she herself had just been told 
by Gonzi. "The Archbishop tells me", confided Strickland, "that the 
question of Malta is under consideration at the Vatican at this 
moment." She also informed him that Gonzi would be returning to 
Rome on the 27th September. Very much her father's daughter in 
this, Mabel would be at the Lansdowne Club in London for a week 
from 22nd September, before herself leaving for Rome, where she 
would be staying with Donna Isabella Orsini. Moreover, she had 
suggested to Borg Olivier, she said, that on his way back from the 
U.S.A., it might be useful ifSandys saw them "together" on "a vital 
Church issue."8 It does not seem that Sandys took to the idea of a 
meeting with Mabel, and even less so to one with her and Borg 
Olivier together. But she was wont to make her presence felt in 
London, where she was well connected, and kept pressing with 
letters, reports and passing visits, just like her father used to do. 
The "vital Church issue" was civil marriage, one of the Labour Party's 
'six points'. Objection to these 'points' motivated the protection which 
the draft constitution sought to afford to religion and the Church. 
Sandys had raised a number of questions in this area during the 
8 Strickland/Sandys, 20 Aug. 1963,926/1882; "Dear Duncan, .... With best regards 
to you and Marie Claire." 
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Malborough House meetings, without making headway. If there was 
a grave concern, where mediation was required, it was this. The 
Maltese church was as apprehensive as ever of the prospect that civil 
marriage, and directly or indirectly divorce, could be introduced into 
Malta. The non-existence of civil marriage, and the problems 
associated with mixed marriages, had long been a Maltese problem; 
much political agitation already in the 1890s had been linked to such 
issues. 9 In the British period, it could be traced back to a 
proclamation in 1828 which recognised the jurisdiction of the local 
ecclesiastical courts over Roman Catholics in Malta. 
Canon Law legislated only for Catholics but, Mabel held: 
it must continue in Malta to be also the civil law for them as 
regards marriage, and the law would not provide for a 
Catholic, lapsed or otherwise, marrying in Malta in fron of 
a Justice of the Peace. The jurisdiction of the Catholic 
Church over Catholics continued until death but it does not 
exercise jurisdiction over others. Marriages contracted 
outside Malta are valid according to the laws of the country 
where they are contracted. But in mixed marriages, where 
one of the parties is a Catholic, the religious ceremony must 
be followed as well according to Catholic teaching. 
She realised that when it came to a Catholic marrying in England 
in a Registry Office and the husband and wife returning to Malta, 
the husband refused to pay alimony because the marriage was 
declared null and void on the Catholic side: 
Are the children illegitimate and penalised by this in Malta? 
Is this the gap in the Civil Law that is causing trouble? 
9 See Sir Gerald Strickland's report on the Malta case before the Privy Council in 
1893 and the consequent Order-in-Council of 12 Aug. 1895, enc., ibid.; see also, 
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Should the civil laws of Malta be altered to be in line with 
the United Kingdom and international laws? 
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These were very fair questions but Miss Strickland was 
representative of the general position of the three other non-
Socialist parties when she held that such matters were not to be 
embodied in any Constitution. To attempt to define or entrench any 
such laws in a Constitution 
would result in religious questions being brought before the 
Constitutional Court or the United Nations in the event of 
Independence, based on far-reaching distinction and 
division on the interpretation of Human Rights - vide 
section 23 (3) of the Draft Constitution as proposed by the 
Nationalist Party (Cmnd. 2121): 'No person shall be subject 
to any disability or be excluded from holding any office by 
reason of his religious profession.' It is bad law to put too 
much into a Constitution. 
Her line essentially was against Independence being given: in that 
case the position which the Church held would be "completely 
uncovered." Any safeguard in any Independence Constitution, 
however much entrenched, she concluded with a prophetic twang, 
is valueless the moment a dictator usurps power or is elected 
with a majority of one. The Constitution can be abrogated 
and the Court dealt with by a dictator using his power to 
appoint judges. British troops, if here at all, with a Defence 
Agreement, after Independence would be on foreign soil, 
not committed to hold the ring in a purely domestic dispute 
for sovereignty will be Malta's own. IO 
10 Strickland memo, datelined Villa Parisio, Malta, 20 Aug. 1963, and entitled: "Miss 
Strickland's appreciation of the Position of the Church in Malta with special 
reference to marriage and its related questions arising out of present-day 
circumstances; and the Malta Labour Party's challenge to the Nationalist Party's 
Draft Constitution (Vide amendments presented at Marlborough House Conference, 
London: 15th July to 1st August, 1963", enc., 926/1882. 
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Mintoff had been pressing this question of marriages in his 
campaign for the safeguard of human rights in Malta. He told an 
MLP mass meeting in June 1963 that if two non-Catholics wanted 
to get married they would have to go to the UK Commissioner. 
When Mintoffsaw Sandys on 4th June 1963, in Wakefield's presence, 
he repeated this allegation and said there was no provision in Malta 
for civil marriages. He added that if two atheists or'agnostics wished 
to get married they would have to go to the UK Commissioner 
inasmuch as he had inherited the power to perform civil marriage 
from the old Maltese Imperial Government. "It is not right for a 
non-Catholic to go to Wakefield to get married", splashed the MLP 
organ Il-lfelsien, quoting Mintoff. In fact, the UK Commissioner was 
only empowered to receive notice of intention of marriage under the 
provisions of the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892; he could not actually 
perform a marriage ceremony. Wakefield's deputy in Malta, Ian 
Watt, confessed that he had to do that once, in Barcelona, "for a 
weird Maltese who seemed to want to marry an even weirder one 
in front of the Vice-Consul." 11 
What was the British Government to make of all this in sorting out 
an independence constitution for Malta? Advice was sought from 
Catholic emissaries such as the newly appointed Apostolic Delegate 
to Great Britain, Malta, Gibraltar and Bermuda. Archbishop 
Hyginus Eugene Cardinale was accredited to Britain in October 
1963 and entered the fray immediately. On his own admission 
Cardinale (who wrote a book in 1976 on The Holy See and the 
International Order) was asked to mediate by the British Government. 
Card in ale disapproved of the two clauses intended to curtail the 
application of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
Maltese church or not. He privately admitted that the British 
Government's disapproval of Mintoff had not dulled the British 
sense of fair play to such an extent as to have the 'mother of 
parliaments' allow Malta's Independence on these conditions. 
Cardinale held the view that in reflecting the expressed feelings of 
II Watt/Kisch, 7 June 1963,926/1882. 
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the Second Vatican Council, the Church could not ignore the human 
rights universally declared to be inalienably vested in every 
individual. Consequently, in his view, the Church should not stand 
upon privileges that would be regarded as infringements upon these 
rights. He told the Nationalists that exemptions in matters of human 
rights were dangerous because a future administration could have 
recourse to such a precedent using it against them. 12 An Italian by 
birth who had been brought up in Boston and spoke excellent 
English, Cardinale was reputed to be "a very liberal-minded man" 
and "one of the coming men in the Catholic hierarchy". 13 
An investigation was undertaken about the status of civil marriage 
in other Catholic countries, to see what the praxis was. One obvious 
intermediary for this, through the Foreign Office, was the British 
Legation to the Holy See. In his 'memoirs' thirteen years later, 
Cardinale credited himself with the eventual success of the Anglo-
Maltese negotiations, in so far as finally a compromise was reached 
that was more or less acceptable to the three main sides left: the 
Maltese Government, the British Government and the Catholic 
Church. It was said at the end of the negotiations, Mgr Cardinale 
wrote, that the Apostolic Delegate's contribution "made the 
difference between success and failure of the negotiations."14 
Cardinale was indeed influential. 15 He was the Vatican's man on the 
spot. When Borg Olivier and his assistant Dr Victor Ragonesi 
discovered that something was going on behind their backs - they 
were being portrayed by Sandys as "more Catholic than the Pope" 
- it was Cardinale whom they tended to suspect. At one point Borg 
12 Koster, op.cit., p. 199, p. 202. 
13 'His Excellency Archbishop Cardinale, Apostolic Delegate in the U.K.', enc. 
Wakefield/Eastwood, 12 Sept. 1964, conf., 926!l920/48583. 
14 Koster, op.cit., p. 203. 
15 Eastwood fully acknowledged this. See below, Ill, 16. 
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Olivier suddenly despatched Ragonesi to Rome to find out what was 
going on. 16 But who was Cardinale after all? Who had selected and 
appointed him to London, at a time when there was a renewed 
interest in institutionalizing Anglo-Vatican diplomacy and protocol? 
Without the nod from superior authority in the Church, how far 
would Cardinale have stuck his neck out? Someone far more 
important than the Apostolic Delegate was taking a direct interest 
in the Malta church question. That was Pope Paul VI, formerly 
Cardinal Montini, an intellectual who supported the humane 'open 
door' approach introduced by his predecessor, John XXIII - "il buon 
Papa Giovanni" - who had convened the Second Vatican Council, 
which Paul VI carried forward. 
Cardinale was his main intermediary, but not the only one. Another 
dignitary who used his good offices with both Whitehall and the 
Vatican in this tricky question was, we now know, Sir Maurice 
Dorman. Malta's Governor had an important private audience with 
the newly elected Pope on 12th November 1963. For half-an-hour 
he explained to His Holiness, who was all ears, what Malta's problems 
were. Much of the conversation dwelt on the rift between the Maltese 
Church and the Maltese Labour Party, which was seen to lie at the 
base of most of the Island's difficulties at that time. 
According to a reliable eyewitness, His Holiness asked anxiously of 
the relations between the British and "that great, tiny man" the 
Archbishop (Gonzi). Dorman assured Paul VI that these relations 
were good and that the last thing Britain wanted was to undermine 
the influence for good of the Church in Malta, but he did not 
disguise from His Holiness that the priesthood at lower levels were 
responsible for a certain share of blame. Saying that he would like 
"to give thought to the problem", Paul VI asked Dorman, who was 
not a Catholic, ifhe could indicate any short review which might give 
an up to date picture and took note that there had been two or three 
useful articles in the Corriere della Sera. Paul VI also invited Sir 
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interpret ln case of need. Thore was 11 ttle need ln 
the event tor DormaD told his story ln simple language 
and it was evident from the Pope's oommentn that he 
followed 1 t closely. 
3. The conversation dwcl.t a good deal. on the 
rift bet\'lcen the Mnl.tosc Ohurch and the tlaltese Labour 
Party which lies at the base of most of the Ieland1s 
present d1f'ficul.ties and HiD Holiness asl;:cd anxiously 
of th .... relations between UB and 11 that great, tiny man ll 
the .,\Z'chbishop. Dormae assured him that these \7el'O 
aood and that the last thing we wanted was to undermine 
the influence for good of the Church in l1o.1ta, but he 
did not discru1se from His Holiness that the priesthood at 
lower levels were responsible roI' a certain share of 
blame. 
4. The Pope said he y,fould like to give thought to 
the problem. He aaked if Dorman could indicate any short 
revie\"l which might give an up to date picture aod took. 
note that there had been two or three useful articles in 
the Corriere della Sera. He also invited Dorman to 
let him know any spocific matters (such as civil marriages) 
over which ha could help. He \'Ioul6. gladly do what 
he could to encourage a more liberal spirit. 
-/1 5. Altogether the conversation was most 
encouraging aod Dorltlan will send m" some suggestions for 
. considel'at-ien by His Holiness when he gets back to base. 




In his audience with His Holiness Paul VI on 12th November 1963, Sir 
Maurice Dorman was asked about "quel grande piccolo uomo", and how 
could the Pope "encourage a more liberal spirit". 
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Maurice to let him know any specific matters, such as civil marriages, 
over which he could help. The Pope "would gladly do what he could 
to encourage a more liberal spirit."l7 
Dorman kept up his link with Paul VI in the strictest confidence, as 
he had been asked to do, using the British Legation to the Holy See 
as his interlocutor. Among other things, Dorman promised to 
produce for Paul VI a note "about the provision for civil marriage 
which the Government of Malta is thinking of proposing provided 
that the Holy See will use its influence to reduce opposition from the 
Maltese clergy."l8 Once again it seems that the Borg Olivier 
administration was inclined to be less rigid but was afraid of political 
flak because of ecclesiastical opposition locally. 
The eyewitness in Dorman's audience with the Pope was Britain's 
representative at the Vatican, Sir Peter Scarlett. In this case he was 
rather more than that: he was acting as an interpeter to the Pope. 
The conversation was held in English, a language in which His 
Holiness was said not to feel entirely at home. Dorman evidently 
could not converse in Italian or in another language better known 
to the Pope. Scarlett found the conversation "most encouraging", 
and reported to the Foreign Office accordingly. 
On the day that Dorman met Paul VI, Archbishop Gonzi was also 
in Rome. That same evening, he had dinner with Dorman at 
Scarlett's residence. Dorman, who stopped in Rome on his way back 
to Malta from London, where he had held talks about the situation, 
briefed Gonzi on "the latest developments in London". They had "a 
long tete-a-tete." Paul VI had met Gonzi - "quel grande piccolo uomo" -
and taken his measure in more ways than one. 
17 ScarlettITomkins, Rome, 15 Nov. 1963, para. 3-4, f. 1, copy of FO despatch on 
CO 926/1882. 
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As if to underline the genuiness of Paul VI's offer to help out, on the 
following day Mgr Casaroli, the Cardinal Secretary of State, handed 
Sir Peter Scarlett a not insignificant memorandum about civil 
marriage in the Catholic world. Following the report about Mintoff's 
allegation that atheists and agnostics could not marry in Malta, and 
possibly Mabel Strickland's insistence on the long-standing question 
of civil marriage and mixed marriages, British diplomacy had been 
seeking more information about marriage legislation and practices 
in the Catholic world. Scarlett had first written to Casaroli about this 
on 27th August 1963, only three weeks after the breakdown of the 
Malta Independence Conference. More specifically, he had asked for 
information on how far the Church's privileges in Malta were 
paralleled elsewhere. 
The memorandum provided by the Vatican Secretariat was dated 
11 th November - before Dorman's meeting - but it was only delivered 
to the Legation afterwards, on the 16th . It held that the position of 
the Catholic Church in Malta had parallels in other countries and 
made textual reference to passages from Concordats between the 
Holy See and the States of Bad en, Austria; Bavaria, Germany; Italy, 
Lithuania, Prussia and Roumania. The documents, which had been 
published in Rome in 1951, referred to the position of religion and 
of the Catholic Church and free exercise of ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction; 19 the teaching of religion in the State schools and 
recognition of Catholic schools;2o and also the rights and privileges 
of the clergy with particular reference to 'privilegium fori'. 21 
Then followed a long paragraph about 'Marriage'. The legislation 
in force in Malta faithfully represented Catholic principles and 
Canon Law, it began. In deference to such principles and in perfect 
concordance with the Catholic tradition of the Maltese people, no 
19 Ibid., Enc. 1. 
20 Ibid., Enc. 2. 
21 Ibid., Enc. 3. 
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other marriage ceremony has ever been recognised in that Island 
as valid for Catholics than that celebrated in accordance with the 
laws of the Catholic Church: 
A similar position still exists today in other Catholic 
countries such as Colombia and Spain. This state of affairs 
has been respected by the British Government ever since it 
took possession of Malta. It would therefore constitute a 
grave damage to the conscience of the Maltese people if one 
wished to insert in the Constitutional law an institution 
which has always been and still is foreign to its tradition, its 
education and its history. 
This passage could contain a slight hint in the phrase specifying the 
insertion of civil marriage "in the Constitutional law". Was it 
advisable to have any such provision in a Constitution, in other 
words? But a rather stronger hint seems to have found its place in 
the following paragraph, which was included in parenthesis: 
As for the special case of a person baptised and educated in 
the Catholic Church who does not wish to contract 
matrimony in the canonical form, it should be noted that in 
Colombia and Spain, nations which are in a similar position 
to Malta, the Catholic Church, while maintaining its own 
principles as regards canon law, has shown itself disposed to 
find a practical way out which has permitted the 
Governments to regulate matters through the civil law. 
Finally there is a short comment on 'Cemeteries', referring to the 
MLP's hurt that those interdicted by the Church were buried like 
outcasts in the non-consecrated part of the Addolorata cemetery, 
which was actually a public cemetery - in what was all too unkindly 
known to Maltese at the popular level as "il-miibla" (literally, the 
rubbish dump). Again one has to weigh the Vatican's wording: 
These are ecclesiastical property in some States, for example 
Colombia (article XV of the Concordat of 20th July 1892); 
in others on the other hand they are public property. The 
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State by suitable legislation looks after their maintenance 
and safeguards their sacred and inviolable character in 
agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities. 
Once again here there could be a muted hint as to the importance 
of respecting human dignity in properly maintained burial grounds, 
the "sacred and inviolable character" of which had to be safeguarded 
in a general way. 22 
In the meantime the Foreign Office had conducted their own 
investigation and concluded that there did not seem to be any 
country, where the predominant religion was Roman Catholic, 
which made "no provision for the valid marriage of persons who do 
not profess any religion." In the case of Spain, however, the facilities 
for civil marriage were restricted to those persons who were able to 
prove, to the satisfaction of the ecclesiastical authorities, that they 
have never been baptized in the Roman Catholic faith. In Italy, the 
local law required either a civil marriage at a town hall, or a Roman 
Catholic marriage which had to be registered by the civil authority. 
In Portugal, a 1940 law held that marriages could be contracted in 
the presence of the officials of the civil registry, subject to the 
conditions and according to the procedure established in civil law 
or before the ministers of the Catholic Church in harmony with 
canon law. Marriage in accordance with canon law had full civil effect 
if the Church register entry were transcribed in the civil records. In 
the Republic of San Marino, the local law required civil marriage. 
In Spain, the civil code accepted two types of marriage: that in 
accordance with the Canon Law, which was the only form available 
to members of the Roman Catholic Church, that is all those baptised 
in accordance with Catholic rites; and the civil one, which was 
available only to those who were able to produce documents to show 
that they were not Catholics. 
22 Enc., 11 Nov. 1963, ScarlettITomkins, 15 Nov. 1963, CO 926/1882. 
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In Latin America, civil marriage was available and in fact required 
by local law in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela. In Colombia, the local 
law required civil marriage but Roman Catholics in addition must 
have a church ceremony. In Guatemala and Haiti the position was 
obscure but in Panama the local law required civil marriage or 
marriage performed "in accordance with the rites of the Catholic 
faith or of any other faith which has legally recognised 
representatives in Panama." The Foreign Office enquiry made no 
specific reference to the neighbouring Irish Republic, other than to 
say that it was understood that the law there too provided for civil 
marriage.23 
Mter the referendum result, and just before a high level decision to 
go ahead with Independence was taken, the Colonial Office briefed 
the Foreign Office in detail about the Malta situation, especially with 
regard to the church question. The main object of this exchange was 
to see whether it would be effective for (British) Ministers "to seek 
the Vatican support in bringing pressure on the Archbishop". 
"Following the Malta referendum we are now reaching a difficult 
and very delicate stage on the thorny path to Maltese 
independence", the secret communique' began. 
Although the result of the referendum was not very conclusive, 
largely because the question asked was ambiguous, it could certainly 
not be inferred that the majority did not favour independence, and 
it could be inferred that the majority favoured the Church 
safeguards included in Borg Olivier's draft constitution. In these 
circumstances, wrote Kisch, 
my Secretary of State is proposing to accept Borg Olivier's 
constitution with two important reservations. The first is 
that Section 48(10) and (11), which say that nothing done 
23 Enc. 'Memorandum', enc. IleylDavis, 4 July 1963, CO 926/1882. 
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by the Church in the exercise of its spiritual powers shall be 
held to contravene the Human Rights chapter, be omitted. 
The second is that the Maltese electoral law should be 
amended to bring it precisely into line with the British 
Representation of the People's Act, so that it will be an 
offence to inflict or threaten to inflict any temporal or 
spiritual injury on any person to induce or compel them to 
vote or refrain from voting. 
It was the second of these amendments which could cause very grave 
difficulty, "particularly as during the referendum campaign Borg 
Olivier guaranteed that nothing would be altered that was not 
acceptable to the Church". What the Secretary of State was 
proposing - right then Sandys was in Aden - was that these 
amendments should either be approved by the majority of the 
Maltese Parliament or by a majority of votes in a further 
referendum. Either course, it was expected, would be resisted by 
Borg Olivier who had been invited over for talks immediately after 
Whitsun. In the view of Kisch, 
Borg Olivier's attitude will be simply determined by the 
attitude of Archbishop Gonzi, and the question arises, as it 
has arisen before, whether anything can be done to 
persuade the Archbishop to take a reasonable view. 
The British Government were extremely loath to become involved 
in the relation of Church and State in Malta but the fact was that 
Parliament would have to approve the Independence Bill for Malta 
with reference to the independence constitution. It would not be 
possible to get the Bill through Parliament "without securing the 
voters against spiritual intimidation". Kisch did not think anybody 
believed that this would make any real difference to what actually 
happened at elections. In theory, positions might be brought before 
the Maltese Courts but in fact any such complaints were almost 
certain to arise from conversations in the confessional. That was not 
something which it would be possible for the Courts to deal with 
because the priest would of course refuse to give evidence. 
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Sandys did not intend to modify any of the other proposals affecting 
the position of the Church apart from the waiver of Human Rights, 
which was something the c.o. thought the Archbishop and the 
Malta Government would accept reluctantly, "bearing in mind that 
this exemption did not feature in the draft Constitution originally 
put forward by the Malta Government at the Independence 
Conference last July". 
Although Gonzi instructed the Church to refrain from putting 
spiritual pressure on voters at the referendum, there were individual 
priests who did not obey these instructions. One case where the 
sacraments had been withdrawn was given a good deal of publicity 
on LT.V. in Britain. This interference with voters in Malta was well 
known in Parliament and to the British public "and cannot but be 
regarded here as a scandal against which an independence 
constitution must make provision". On the other hand, as Sandys 
felt that these were matters which were far better dealt with by the 
Maltese people, it was not intended to entrench the electoral law in 
the Constitution. This meant that, after Malta became independent, 
it would be possible for the Maltese Parliament to amend the 
Constitution, if they really wished to do so, by a simple majority only. 
On the following day, Thursday 14th May, Sandys would be back 
from Aden and would be considering the position, which was being 
discussed by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on that day. 
Meanwhile, we will be very grateful if you could inform 
Scarlet of the position and seek his views on whether, if 
Ministers wish to seek the Vatican support in bringing 
pressure on the Archbishop, this would be likely to achieve 
any positive result. We have in mind, of course, the fact that 
the Pope himself has shown considerable interest, and ifhe 
were prepared to help in an endeavour to remove this 
stumbling block, which we imagine must be embarrassing to 
him also, that would be an enormous help.24 
24 Kisch/Ledwidge, 13 May 1964, sec., 926/1819. 
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A cable went out from the F.O. to Scarlet immediately paraphrasing 
the situation, and adding that if no agreement could be 
reached with Borg Olivier when he was due to return to London for 
talks immediately after Whitsun "it may be necessary to postpone 
Malta's independence until after the next general election in 
Malta".25 
Scarlett phoned the F.O. there and then, and, still on the same day, 
the F.O. responded with their advice: "the Vatican were displaying 
interest in Malta". Scarlett thought he might shortly be summoned 
to an interview. At the same time the British embassy in Rome had 
been provided with a brief on Malta and on the strength of this they 
had just spoken to the Italian Foreign Ministry. The F.O. did not 
object in principle to Sandys taking up this question with the 
Apostolic Delegate, but 
it should be borne in mind that to discuss a matter of 
political substance with him would create a precedent. He 
has no diplomatic status in this country and, as far as we 
know, no secure means of communication with the Vatican. 
We consider, therefore, that any formal approach on which 
Ministers decide should be made by our Minister (Mr R. A. 
Butler) to the Vatican, whether or not something is also said 
informally to Archbishop Cardinale.26 
Between now and mid-June 1964 there were several exchanges, 
references to the Italian electoral law of 195 7 (especially article 98) 
and suggested modifications thereof, various meetings, a dozen 
drafts and re-drafts of the controversial clauses, discarding this and 
inserting that. There was on at least one occasion a personal minute 
from the Pope himself to his Chancellery to the effect that "Her 
25 Tel., 14 May 1964, sec., 92611819. It was copied i.a. to Rome and the UK 
Delegation to NATO. 
26 Ledwidge/Kisch, 14 May 1964, sec., 926/1819. 
THE CHURCH QUESTION 287 
The Apostolic Nuncio, Mgr Igino Cardinale, who mediated between the 
various parties and factions in London, Rome and Valletta. 
Majesty's Government must be deeply concerned lest Malta should 
drift too far to the left and that his staff should be ready with 
constructive suggestions if consulted" .27 
On file, amidst these exchanges, was a copy of the Resolution of the 
Maltese People "gathered in their thousands at Cospicua, today, 
March 15, 1964" stating that the British Government were not in a 
position "to propose and much less to impose" limitations on the 
freedom of the Catholic Church in the exercise of her mission in the 
guidance of the individual and collective conscience, religious 
27 ScarlettlButler, teI., 16 May 1964, sec., 926/1819. 
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education and the moral standards of a Catholic country. 
Unconditional support was being given to the Hierarchy and Clergy 
in their stand regarding "the anti-Catholic clauses proposed by the 
Malta Labour Party" which if embodied in the new Constitution 
would be resisted "effectively by all legitimate means, each and every 
one of these clauses ... ". These clauses, the Resolution went on, had 
been unanimously rejected by all the other political parties during 
the Malta Independence Conference in July 1963; they exceeded 
"the mandate given to the Malta Labour Party by its own electorate" 
and hence such clauses should not be embodied in a permanent 
Constitution when the present position was "only a transitory phase 
in the history of the Maltese People ... "28 
Whether officially or unofficially, productive meetings were held 
between Sandys and Cardinale, and on at least one occasion Scarlett 
with them. On Borg Olivier's initiative there was at least one direct 
encounter between Cardinale and Borg Olivier, on 8th June, 1964. 
Cardinale had been "depressed" to find how rigid his attitude was. 
He would now "see him again before our Ministers see him to 
prepare him for what was coming", said a F.O. telegram to the Holy 
See. 29 Borg Olivier took a rigid line especially with regard to 
changing the Maltese electoral law. By mid-June the exemption 
clauses (Section 48(10) and 11) had been thrown out, an anti-
discrimination clause introduced for insertion before Section 47, and 
moreover, the Order in Council enacting the new Constitution was 
to include the following provision: Notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Constitution, Section 54 of the Electoral (Polling) 
Ordinance of Malta shall have effect as if the words "material or 
moral" were omitted and as if there were inserted after the word 
"loss" the words" of any kind". The proposed Order would also and 
28 The Resolution was forwarded to Gonzi, Douglas-Home, Sandys, Dorman, Borg 
Olivier, Felice, "The Hon. Leaders of the Political Parties loyal to the Church", the 
press and the Speaker of the House of Commons; enc. 926/1819. 
29 Tel. 35, 10 June 1964, conf., 92611818-1819. 
1 
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provide that the above provIsIOn would not be capable of 
amendment until after the next General Election and then only by 
law passed by a two-thirds majority. Briefly, this meant that both the 
phrases "moral and material" and "temporal and spiritual" had been 
left out; essentially it meant that the Church could not on political 
or moral grounds spiritually threaten, sanction, interdict or 
excommunicate anyone in public life especially at election time. 
From letters sent by Sandys and Eastwood to Cardinale it seems 
clear that the Vatican had agreed, verbally if not in writing, to these 
draft proposals as finalised. 30 In a subsequent letter on official note-
paper Cardinale confirmed that throughout their recent discussions 
he had been careful to inform the Holy See of the amendments and 
alterations under considerations. The proposals accompanying 
Eastwood's note to him of 26th June 1964 had been made known to 
the Holy See. In confirmation of his verbal communication to 
Eastwood Cardinale was "authorized to state that these proposals are 
considered acceptable in present circumstances by the authorities of 
the Catholic Church."31 
On 26th June Borg Olivier told Lansdowne in a telephone call that 
he was accepting the omission of Section 48 (10) and (11). This was 
taken to mean that moreover he was not objecting to the inclusion 
of a general non-discrimination clause. Borg Olivier also told 
Lansdowne however that he would not accept having the Maltese 
Electoral Law changed by an Order-in-Council. 
Sandys regarded an alteration on the lines proposed (by the British 
Government with the concurrence of the Vatican) as pretty well 
essential to get the Independence Bill through the Houses of 
30 Sandys/Cardinale, 18June 1964; Eastwood/Cardinale, 26June 1964,926/1818-
1819. Cardinale had been fully supplied with the relevant documentation by the 
C.O., including the Malta Electoral (Polling) Ordinance (section 54 on page 20), 
encs., Eastwood/Cardinale, 29 May 1964,926/1819. 
31 Cardinale/Sandys, 30 June 1964,926/1818-1819. 
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Parliament; it was one of the points on which Mintoff insisted and 
there might well be "quite a lot of feeling in favour of it" in the 
House of Commons. Unfortunately, Eastwood told his counterpart 
W.B.J. Ledwidge at the F.O., 
Dr Borg Olivier "guaranteed" to his people before the 
referendum that this alteration would not be made. He had 
of course no right to give any such guarantee but he now 
feels that his political reputation is involved. What the 
conclusion will be I do not know but it cannot be long 
delayed ... 32 
Apart from other pending and still unresolved matters of concern, 
here was a kernel which could ultimately make or break an 
understanding - and an Independence Bill's passage through the 
Commons and the Lords. The British knew that; the Maltese must 
have known it too. For the smaller parties, such a blockage would 
have been grist to their mill: no agreement, no Independence. Wait 
for the next general election in 1966. For the larger parties who 
were committed to Independence, it would have necessitated other 
justifications: 'clericalism', 'obscurantism' and 'human rights'; 
'imperialism', 'imposition' and 'obstruction'. 





Red Carpet and Red Herring 
THE PROSPECTS FORAN 
AMERICAN BASE 
Mter the Malta Independence Conference had ended as it did, Borg 
Olivier had shown no particular eagerness to go back to the other 
parties for further consultations, although he did have one 
inconclusive meeting with Mintoff. He made plans to visit the U.S.A. 
in early September 1963, where he had meetings arranged at the 
highest possible levels. He did not summon Parliament after the 
summer recess and the failed July talks - to resume discussions on 
the Independence Constitution. When Parliament was due to 
reassemble on 2nd September, he prorogued it - until after his 
return from the U.S.A. On his way back, however, he planned to 
stop in London for more meetings at the Colonial Office. 
Assuming that the parties had had their say and there was nothing 
very new to bring up, Borg Olivier chose instead to steal the 
limelight in Malta through meetings with President J. F. Kennedy, 
with Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, and with U Thant, the 
UN Secretary General, among others. Such a round of encounters 
in the West by a colonial premier from an island with a popUlation 
ofless than 330,000 was somewhat unusual. It was a 'first' for Malta; 
293 
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and it would not have happened without the assumption that Malta 
would soon be joining the international community of nations as an 
independent state in her own right. Perhaps Borg Olivier intended 
it as a foretaste of Independence, a grand overture to assuage the 
doubting Thomases 'back home'. 
As was reported in various sections of the press especially in Malta, 
in Washington Borg Olivier concluded a loan to Malta of$7,500,000 
(£2,680,000) from the World Bank, alias the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. This was intended mainly for the 
construction of an electric power plant and an installation for distilling 
fresh water from the sea. Consisting of25,000 kilowatts, this project 
would double Malta's electric power potential while the 
accompanying project would be able to distill 1,000,000 imperial 
gallons of water daily.! He met bankers and businessmen in different 
cities, and was feted in customary style by the Maltese migrant 
communities in New York and in Detroit, where the largest 
concentrations of Maltese-Americans were located. Photographs of 
the Maltese premier with the American president, and other 
dignitaries whom he met, were given prominence in Maltese papers. 2 
What was the real purpose of this visit? The UK Commissioner in 
Malta, Sir Edward Wakefield, reported that the signing of the 
loan "could easily have been done by an official of the British 
Embassy".3 More pointedly, the Colonial Attache' at the British 
Embassy in Washington, John Hennings, observed that "the 
signature of the loan agreement was no more than a formality and 
has upon every known occasion heretofore been undertaken by a 
member of this Embassy invested with the necessary powers by the 
I "Borg Olivier dwar il-possibilta' ta' Bazi tal-Polaris fMalta", L-Orizzont, 12 Sept. 
1963,p.1. 
2 "Prime Minister confers with President Kennedy", Times of Malta, 11 Sept. 1963, 
p.l. 
3 Int. rep., 7 Aug. 5 1963, sec., f. 1,926/1822/48655. 
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beneficiary government." To his mind, therefore, "the decision of 
the Government of Malta to send its Prime Minister to perform this 
duty suggested that signature of the loan was no more than a 
convenient peg upon which to hang a visit to this country which 
might generate some useful publicity for Dr Olivier and for 
Malta."4 
What eluded these British commentators was the simple fact that 
Borg Olivier preferred, at this stage, not to have the British embassy 
in Washington sign the loan on Malta's behalf: he wanted to do it 
himself. It was also an opportunity for him to fish in American 
waters, to find out whether any financial help in the form of overseas 
aid or investment might be forthcoming from there. There was 
potentially a growing American connection in Malta, which could be 
better tapped upon Independence. The Headquarters of Allied 
Forces Mediterranean (HAFMed) was next door to Wakefield's office 
in Floriana. There was the Hilton Hotel project in StJulian's. There 
was also vague talk of a American polaris submarine base and/or an 
American tropospheric scatter station in Malta. 
For many years Maltese harbours had headquartered the British 
Mediterranean Fleet, as well as repaired and serviced it whenever 
necessary. As British naval power declined this was increasingly 
supplanted by American clout, even in the Mediterranean, where 
there now was the significant presence of the American 6th Fleet 
countering a growing Russian naval presence. 
No refererence was made in despatches to earlier tensions in 
Maltese-American relations dating back to the 1950s under the Borg 
Olivier and Mintoff administrations. In a parliamentary debate in 
February 1958 in which the main speakers were Mintoff and Borg 
Olivier, it was asserted more than once that Maltese-American 
relations were being hampered by the fact that Malta was a colonial 
possession and no direct talks were possible between Malta and the 
4 Hennings/Kisch, conf., 4 Oct. 1963,926/1915/48583. 
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U.S.A. Although Marshall Aid was not specifically mentioned, 
Maltese leaders especially Mintoff whose party was in office in the 
later 1940s, were still sore at having had that withheld from them 
on the ground that War Damage funds would be an exclusive British 
responsibility, Malta being a British possession. 
Although in 1951 the Governor had given the MLP an assurance 
that there was no intention to establish an American base, Mr 
Mintoff claimed, on the same day he had informed the then Prime 
Minister, Dr Borg Olivier, that about 250 American airmen would 
be temporarily located in Malta for training purposes. On 19th 
October 1951 Borg Olivier had stated that this temporary 
arrangement did not imply the establishment of an American air 
base. The MLP, Mintoff added, had taken up the matter both with 
the Colonial Secretary and American Embassy in London, and 
"pressed the United States Government to aid Malta economically 
in return for their use of Malta as a base". In January 1952 the 
Borg Olivier administration had made a claim to the British 
Government for an adequate quid pro quo and for the provision of 
a special agreement governing the basing of American Forces in 
Malta. "Thus finally", Mintoff told the Assembly, "the Maltese 
Opposition and Government had de facto adhered to a common 
policy". 
When at the beginning of 1953 the Mediterranean NATO 
Command Headquarters was established in Malta, this gave rise to 
the grant of certain privileges to locally stationed members of NATO 
Forces. The Borg Olivier-Boffa Coalition Government had put up 
a stiff resistance to the grant of these privileges but no agreement 
was reached and on 2nd March 1955 the Governor enacted an 
Ordinance for the grant of these privileges which allegedly went 
beyond even those granted to British Servicemen. These privileges 
included (customary) duty free facilities for the importation of 
certain goods, including a number of cars, referred to by Mintoff as 
a financial loss to the Maltese Government. A similar facility was 
granted to members of the US Naval Air Squadron at Hal Far. Such 
a concession would have put American personnel "in a more 
advantageous position than British Servicemen whose Government 
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had finally conceded to make a substantial financial contribution 
towards Malta's economic recovery", Mintoff recalled, addressing 
the Malta Legislative Assembly. The Maltese Government could not 
therefore see their way to granting to the Americans the same 
concessions enjoyed by members of the British Forces. 
In addition to the all too evident attempt to extract an American 
financial contribution for such services as were being provided by 
Malta, the Maltese Government was also annoyed by the McCarran 
Act, which had practically closed the door to Maltese migrants and 
was preventing some 500 wives and children and 4,400 other 
relatives from joining their kinsmen in the U.S.A. 5 Three 
memoranda handed to the US Secretary of State Mr Foster Dulles 
in March, 1956, had urged the US Government to give serious 
consideration to the emigration quotas for Malta, the desirability 
that American firms establish factories to help industrial 
development, and that Malta participate in the allocation of surplus 
commodities from the U.S.A., particularely wheat, to reduce the cost 
of living. However, Mintoff said, in the course of discussions 
American representatives held that the stationing of forces was a 
matter of common necessity "and went so far as to consider that in 
basing their forces in Malta, the U.S.A. was doing Malta a favour". 
The Maltese Government wanted tripartite talks - British-American-
Maltese - to sort out all these issues, but these never materialised, 
although Malta had extended the duty free car importation licence 
(sic). When the Mintoff administration requested that copies of the 
Anglo-American correspondence be passed on to it, "the Maltese 
Government were informed that as from July, 15 the whole of the 
NavalAir Squadron, together with the American facilities concerned, 
would be leaving Malta". When, he said, the British had eventually 
proposed tripartite talks, the US Government had replied, through 
5 The McCarran Act restricted emigration from Malta to a quota of 100 per annum, 
and an attempt to have that doubled failed to make it through the American 
parliament. On Borg Olivier's concern about this matter see below; on emigration, 
see also II, 15. 
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a letter dated 2nd October 1957 which he read out, that they were 
trying to somewhat improve the Maltese emigration quota to the 
U.S.A., and as for economic assistance, "when its forces were 
stationed abroad as part of the collective defence effort, no obligation 
was created toward the host country or toward the local 
government". The US Government had granted $2,000,000 for an 
electric power station in Malta which was opened in 1953, and 
through the CARE programme it had provided foodstuffs valued at 
several million dollars: 
The current CARE program which may be continued next 
year if the British and Maltese governments so desire, 
included such agricultural products as rice, cheese and flour 
exceeding $610,000 in value. Since the U.S. Navy's arrival 
in Malta some four years ago, about $700,000 has been 
spent locally on construction work, and expenditures for 
local supplies and services have reached the total of well 
over $1,000,000. 
In the light of the above, the United States Government considered 
that no useful purpose would be served by its participation in the 
proposed tripartite talks. 
While continuing to insist on adequate compensation "in an area 
daily becoming to them strategically more important", 
commensurate with "the services our Islands have rendered to the 
survival of the Western bloc", Mintoff noted that as early as 1956 the 
US Government had made arrangements for a US air base to be set 
up in Sicily to replace their facilities in Malta.6 
Borg Olivier was of course fully au courant with this past in Maltese-
American relations. He could hardly be blamed for grasping the 
opportunity to find out some more at first hand and to see what, if 
6 See Mintoff's statement on 'American Forces in Malta' made to the Malta 
Legislative Assembly, 17 Feb.1958, and the ensuing interventions by Borg Olivier. 
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anything, he might be able to salvage from the wreckage, now that 
Malta would be less dependent on third parties. 
In New York there was not only the World Bank, for the signature 
of a loan, but also the United Nations Headquarters, where Malta 
expected to sit soon. And there were the Maltese settlers, whose 
numbers could be boosted if the American quota were liberalized. 
The assumption that Borg Olivier's mission to the U.S.A. was 
nothing but a publicity stunt is simplistic and disparaging, unless it 
implied a slight: why him and not us, as in the good old days? 
Wakefield knew better than that. Borg Olivier having asked for 
Britain's good offices in helping to set up his meetings with American 
politicians, the UK Commissioner in Malta reported to London 
supportively, saying that Borg Olivier had asked that on his first visit 
to the U.S.A. the British embassy in Washington "hold his hand". As 
the C.O. knew, Sandys had "consistently encouraged" Dr Borg 
Olivier to make "as many international contacts as he can" in 
preparation for the day when Malta becomes independent and will 
need any kind of foreign aid that she can attract: 
I hope that the British Embassy in Washington will extend 
to Dr Borg Olivier the courtesies appropriate to the Prime 
Minister of an almost-independent Commonwealth country 
and will give him all reasonable assistance for which he may 
ask.7 
But then the British embassy in Washington complained that they 
had not known in advance of Borg Olivier's meeting with U Thant: 
Dr Borg Olivier had very competently organised himself an 
interview with the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
although he had not told anyone about it, with the result 
that we only learned about it when a member of the British 
7 Wakefield/Eastwood, 19 Aug. 1963,926/1915/48583 
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Mission to the U.N. approached the Secretariat to suggest 
that one of the Secretary General's senior assistants should 
receive Dr Olivier in the course of his tour of the building. 
It made us look a little silly to be shown in this way not to 
know what one of our proteges was up to ... 8 
Borg Olivier had asked Britain to hold his hand, not his foot. The 
message was that Malta was growing out of her weaning. But Malta 
still had no official representation in Washington. Moreover, as Borg 
Oliver must have surmised, British patronage would prove to be quite 
useful, possibly decisive, especially in helping the White House make 
up its mind whether the President should see him or not. To the 
Americans and generally around the world, Borg Oliver was an 
tnconnu. 
British diplomats in Washington had put out feelers to see if a 
meeting with Kennedy would be possible. The initial response was 
lukewarm and these vibes reached London. Was it true that Malta 
would be gaining her Independence in a few months' time? Was it 
likely that Borg Olivier would continue in office? What particular 
matters did he wish to bring up? Did he think that the U.S.A. would 
be giving Malta any financial aid? The State Department was a little 
perplexed by the outcome of the Malta Independence Conference, 
and did not know whether the decision that Malta should become 
independent by May 1964 was one that the British intended "to 
make stick"? Even so, would the Maltese cooperate with the British 
in the various operations that would have to be undertaken in the 
meantime? And if they did not, did Britain intend "to thrust 
independence upon them and walk out", as she laid down the 
mandate in Palestine? The State Department also enquired whether 
the UK would wish "to urge that Olivier be received by the 
President." They just did not know whether the President would 
wish to see Olivier or, ifhe did, whether he would be available to see 
him. Since Kennedy was a Catholic, they also wondered "whether 
8 Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 4 Oct. 1963, f. 5, 926/1915/488583. 
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Olivier's desire to be photographed with the President" indicated 
any intention on Borg Olivier's part "to use the President in any way 
in his argument with Mintoff over the Church issue." The British 
embassy wished to know what exactly was going on, so that these 
questions could be parried accordingly, particularly in view of some 
double dealing which may have been going on at the same time: 
Is independence cut and dried, or is its attainment somewhat 
less straightforward than the Conference Report makes it 
appear? Naturally, lithe guidance you can give us can also 
be passed to the Americans this would be all to the good, but 
in any event it would be useful to us to have some additional 
background upon which we can draw when we are asked for 
advice on what should be done with Olivier. Secondly, the 
State Department would, I feel sure, welcome a hint as to 
whether Wakefield's view that Olivier should be treated with 
courtesy but return empty-handed means also that he should 
return empty-handed so far as his aspirations to have a 
photograph ofhimse1fwith Mr Kennedy are concerned ... 9 
This last reference places Wakefield in a bad light, and contradicts 
his earlier entreaties in an opposite direction. Why would he have 
preferred Borg Olivier to return empty-handed? Would he hold 
hands no more? Would an American interest in Malta have 
weakened Britain's negotiating hand? Or an American presence 
upstaged the British one? In any case, the Americans told the British 
fairly and squarely that they had "no intention of offering economic 
aid to Malta". This meant "they do not relish talking to Olivier about 
this subject." Furthermore, they did not want "to take any soundings 
here with Olivier about the tropospheric scatter station." 
This string of sceptical questions from Washington provoked in 
response a political appreciation of British intentions with regard to 
Malta's would-be independence that has rarely, if ever, been as 
9 Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 20 Aug. 1963, f. 2, para. 2,196/1915/48583. 
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frankly stated on file. Explicitly, pointedly and indeed sincerely, the 
Head of the Mediterranean Department at the Colonial Office put 
the whole Malta question into a nutshell for the benefit of his 
American colleagues. In so doing, he must certainly have reassured 
his counter-parts across the Atlantic, who on their part went ahead 
and made the right noises, securing for Borg Olivier his sought-for 
rendez-vous - and photograph - with J. F. Kennedy. 
Sandys was "very definitely intending to make Malta independent 
by 31 st May next", Jack Kisch began in reply: 
He reckons that Malta is going to become independent 
before long anyway and that the operation had better take 
place under Borg, who is pro-West and wishes to remain in 
the Commonwealth, than Mintoff, who, to say the least, is 
entirely unpredictable ... 
The thing is that Borg, with all his faults, is a moderate and 
therefore we are supporting him. 
What they hoped to do therefore was "to negotiate a Defence 
Agreement with Borg" for signature immediately after 
independence. Also, within the next six months, there would have 
to be financial talks, which would no doubt be "very difficult": 
The main trouble is the Church issue in Malta, which is 
reflected in the proposals which the two main parties have 
made for an independence constitution. Although the 
Maltese have been told to try to settle their differences, we 
do not expect them to be able to do so. 
What he thought would happen was that 
we will try to improve Borg's draft constitution, with his 
agreement we hope; thereafter there may well be a 
referendum, the Maltese being asked in effect whether they 
want Borg's constitution, i.e. a monarchy within the 
Commonwealth, or Mintoff's, a republican state. 
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Comparisons with Palestine and British Guiana were not well 
founded, Kisch held. The Maltese were all Catholics with the same 
racial, linguistic and historical backgrounds: 
As long as the place remains a colony they will expect us to 
sort out their problems, but if they are on their own they will 
have to learn to look after themselves. 
Admittedly they were economically in a sorry plight and "we will 
obviously have to go on helping them financially for a long time to 
come." In the U.S.A., Borg Olivier would be looking for aid, and of 
course so far as the U.K. was concerned, "we wish him luck, even 
though his chances do not appear to be very good." Pressing the 
point in relation to Borg Olivier's meeting with America's (first 
Roman Catholic) chief executive, Kisch did not think that Borg's 
wish to be photographed with the President had "any connection 
with the Church issue." Borg Olivier, he added reassuringly, would 
"behave in a dignified way" and would "not cause any public 
embarrassment". While noting politely that it was obviously "for the 
Americans to decide whether he (Borg Olivier) sees the President 
or not", he concluded by loading the dice: 
I imagine that the State Department's interest in Malta is a 
political one, i.e. that one can imagine a situation where, 
particularly if the economic situations worsens, Mintoffwill 
attempt to blackmail the Western Powers by threatening to 
sell out to the East.I° 
As the premier of a small British dependency Borg Olivier would not 
ordinarily qualify to be received at any level in protocol above that of 
Assistant Secretary of State, although as the chief minister of a 
territory which was going to receive its independence he could go 
higher. The Chief Minister of Mauritius, Ramgoolam, had just been 
10 Kisch/Hennings, conf., 28 Aug. 1963, Med/A.424, 926/1915/48583; Hennings! 
Kisch, cont:, 20 Aug. 1963, f. 1, para. 5, 926/1915/48583. 
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in Washington negotiating a loan with the IBRD: he got no higher than 
an ActingAssistant Secretary. Chief Ministers of British dependencies 
whom the President had seen, however, included Cheddi ] agan of 
British Guiana,] ulius Nyerere ofTanganyika, and Michael Manley of 
] amaica (all of them future leaders of their respective countries as 
independent states). The difference was that for such meetings the 
State Department had consulted with their own people on the spot, 
without soliciting the British embassy in Washington. Unlike Dr Borg 
Olivier, Dr Nyerere and Dr Manley had been formally invited to the 
U.S.A. by the American authorities themselves. 11 
Accompanying Borg Olivier on his U.S. tour were the Financial 
Secretary, Alfred Salomone; the Deputy Attorney General, Dr 
Maurice Caruana Curran; and his Private Secretary, Chev. A. Gatt. 
Salomone and Caruana Curran had visited Washington In 
November 1962 to negotiate the loan with the World Bank. 
During his stay in the U.S.A., the Maltese Prime Minister met with 
an impressive array of personalities, some of them big shots, like 
George Woods, President of the World Bank, who himself signed on 
behalf of the Bank and then hosted the Maltese delegation to a 
luncheon; and Laurence Rockefeller, whom Dean Rusk phoned up 
personally during his own meeting with Borg Olivier to suggest an 
appointment. Other meetings were with Willis C. Armstrong, 
Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern 
European Affairs in the State Department; and with William R. 
Tyler, Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of 
European Affairs, who hosted the delegation to lunch at the State 
Department on Monday 9th September. In the afternoon of that day 
Borg Olivier had his meeting with Kennedy at the White House, at 
5 p.m. The Maltese delegation also met, among other VIPs, L. W. 
Finlay, Head of Standard Oil's Government Relations Department 
and former Head of Esso Mediterranean, who hosted them to lunch. 
Another lunch was hosted by the senior vice-presidents of 
II Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 20 Aug. 1963, f. 1, para. 5, 926/l915/48583 
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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, while two more such 
occasions were hosted by Charles Cain Jr., Executive Vice-President 
of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Edwin Thorne, Senior Vice-
President of the First National City Bank. In the absence of the 
British ambassador to the U.S.A., Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the 
delegation were hosted to a dinner by the Charge d'Affairs, Denis 
Greenhill. On Friday 13th September the Director of British 
Information Services gave a press lunch for the delegation. This was 
the third occasion on which Borg Olivier got a chance to meet with 
newspaper correspondents. His first, with press and television, was 
during his visit to Detroit on the 7th; and the second on the morning 
following his meeting with Kennedy, when his encounter had been 
limited to the Washington correspondents of the British press. 
Before seeing U Thant at noon on the 13th, Borg Olivier called on 
the Permanent UK Representative to the UN, Sir Patrick Dean. On 
the Otto Settembre, so far the Maltese national day, Borg Olivier joined 
with the Maltese migrant community in Detroit, where he attended 
Mass and a wreath laying ceremony. On the 14th, a Saturday, he met 
and mixed with the Maltese community in New York during a 
reception they gave in his honour. He also met the Mayor of New 
York, Robert F. Wagner. His last official appointment before leaving 
for London was with the British Consul General in New York, who 
called on him on the 18th . 12 Borg Olivier's visit was a great occasion 
for meeting very important people, wining and dining, spreading 
Malta's name around, hopefully attracting some goodwill. 
On transiting in London en route to New York, Borg Olivier had 
been met by Lord Lansdowne's private secretary, J. P. Mullarky, who 
had handed him a personal and most courteous letter from the 
Minister of State for the Colonies (Sandys was away). Wishing him 
a successful visit to the U.S.A., he was glad that the (British) embassy 
had been able to help in fixing up his programme "and that you are 
going to meet the President." Lansdowne added: "I hope your visit 
12 'Visit of Malta Government Delegation - Programme', ene. 926/1915/48583. 
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will be a real contribution to putting Malta 'on the map' in America. 
We look forward to seeing you again when you get back to London 
later in the month."13 
Putting Malta on the map in America was one thing; getting some-
thing for Malta out of the Americans was quite another. What seemed 
to be on Borg Olivier's mind more than anything else in the meetings 
he had with American officials and politicians was the raising of the 
US immigration quota for Maltese. He brought this up in meetings 
at the State Department with Abba Schwarz and Bill Tyler, and again 
in his meetings with Dean Rusk and President Kennedy. According 
to one who was present for the discussions with Schwartz and Tyler, 
there were considerable pauses in the conversation at both meetings, 
and the initiative in keeping them going was assumed by the 
Americans. Rusk was apparently surprised that Borg Olivier had no 
requests to place before him and little to say, so much so that he asked 
the Prime Minister more than once if there really wasn't something 
he wanted to ask the United States to do. It was during a conversation 
about tourism that Rusk suggested that Borg Olivier might try to 
interest Laurence Rockefeller - who had done so much for the Virgin 
Islands - in the tourist possibilities of Malta. Rusk picked up the 
phone and called Rockefeller, telling him about Borg Olivier who 
would be paying him a visit, as he duly did two days later. 
During his meeting with Kennedy, Borg Olivier was introduced to 
some of the Chiefs of Staff who had been attending a meeting at the 
White House. According to the British embassy in Washington, Borg 
Olivier was "somewhat discomforted to be engaged by the President 
in a conversation about the book 'The Great Siege' and had to 
confess that though the President may have read it, he hadn't!"14 
The book in question was certainly ErnIe Bradford's The Great Siege: 
Malta 1565, which was first published by Hodder and Stoughton in 
J3 DI'aft, 3 Sept. 1963, enc. Mullarky/Lansdowne, 5 Sept. 1963,926/1915/48583. 
14 Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 4 Oct. 1963, f. 2, 926/1915/48583. 
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Dr Borg Olivier with President Kennedy at the White House and, below, 
with M r Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State. 
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1961. The first Penguin paperback edition of it came out in 1964. 
The Great Siege may not have been Kennedy's bed-side reading, he 
could very well have been briefed about this book as a fill-in or 
warming up for this meeting, but Borg Olivier was not a Melitensia 
buff. If Kennedy had an historian on his consultative committee, the 
Maltese prime minister most definitely did not. 
As a book about Malta's successful strategic and mililtary role in 
holding the fort of Western European Christendom against the 
advancing Ottoman Muslims in the 16th century, written by a Royal 
Navy man who had first gone to Malta in 1942 navigating a 
destroyer, The Great Siege would have served - and indeed it may just 
have been intended to serve - as a preamble to highlighting Malta's 
continuing importance in Mediterranean security, where NATO after 
all still kept its Mediterranean Headquarters. From that could have 
flowed naturally some discussion of any American interests or 
intentions concerning Western defences in the Mediterranean. Borg 
Olivier was a proud man, not one to go around easily with a begging 
bowl in hand, and if he had a foreign language preference it would 
have been Italian rather than English - although he delivered himself 
well in English too (notwithstanding his 'r' impediment, more 
suitable to French). Not being well briefed however, his reflexes did 
not work; ifhere Borg Olivier had a golden opportunity to take a cue, 
he completely missed it. It would not be surprising if there were some 
hidden purpose in Kennedy's mind, or perhaps in the mind of his 
advisers, for specifically bringing up such a book in conversation. If 
it was just to make social conversation, somebody must have been at 
a loss for words. It seems that no specific American strategic or 
military interest in Malta was raised during the encounter. The 
British had said in advance that the Americans did not wish to discuss 
the 'scatter station', or financial aid. They may have briefed Borg 
Olivier accordingly, leaving him with nothing of any substance to talk 
about, other than the fixed American immigration quota. 
On financial aid Borg Olivier in his encounters tried to bait the 
Americans by thanking the British for their assistance but noting, at 
the same time, that "as a country became independent it was not 
right for anyone donor country to have to occupy a monopoly 
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position." He mentioned with satisfaction the attraction to Malta of 
a Hilton hotel and a German casino "as an augury for a hopeful 
economic future", and expressed confidence in the commercial 
judgment and shipping experience of Swan Hunter. He repeatedly 
stressed his affection for the monarchy, his desire to retain the 
Commonwealth connection, and "the identification of Malta with the 
West." In reply to an enquiry from Mr Rusk, he said that he foresaw 
that upon independence Malta would negotiate a defence 
agreement with the UK under which Maltese facilities would be 
available to Britain's NATO partners. 
What was the tangible outcome of this visit? In strictly practical 
terms, Borg Oliver did leave empty-handed, as Wakefield had 
apparently anticipated with a smirk on his face. Apart from what was 
probably a useful and even fruitful familiarisation visit, with the 
publicity this afforded him and his country with what this could 
offer, he had landed no catch and had little substance to show for 
his efforts. Contacts had been made no doubt, for example 
Salomone met Thomas Street, the chief of planning and 
development in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. But there was 
no breakthrough. In British if not in American eyes, "the upshot was 
that he created a pleasant impression of a nice but somewhat wistful 
little man who did not know quite what to do with the opportunities 
that had been placed in his way." Although he had quested after 
these interviews, he seemed "somewhat overwhelmed by the reality 
of them, and avidly sought advice on how to behave and what to 
say." Still worse, he apparently did not convince his listeners that he 
had the sense of purpose, resolution, pUblic support, or command 
of the political situation "to justify them in concluding that Mr 
Mintoff would inevitably be the loser in any contest between them 
in the near future for the Premiership of Malta." Time would prove 
this impression wrong, because Borg Olivier's party was returned at 
the next elections in 1966, and only went down narrowly to Mintoff 
in 1971, yet impressions count too, even when they may be mistaken. 
The uncertain impression formed of Borg Olivier's political 
prospects had "undoubtedly encouraged the American government 
to seek more information" about British assessments of the future 
of Malta, including the question of whether Malta was in fact "likely 
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to be propelled into independence before the middle of next year." 
It led them to inform the British embassy in Washington that "they 
would now like to enter into the talks to which the Colonial Secretary 
invited Mr Rusk in a side conversation during the President's visit 
to Birch Grove inJune." 
Not even on the immigration quota had the Americans budged, unlike 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and other places. This great land of 
immigrants in the New World only provided an annual quota of 100 
for Maltese. Schwarz explained to Borg Olivier that when Malta 
became independent her present allocation, which was a sub-quota of 
the UK quota, would be replaced by a quota of her own, which would 
be calculated in accordance with the provisions of the law. That could 
offer Malta "a marginal improvement", but better hope lay in the 
enactment in the next session of Congress of the legislation proposed 
by the administration "which would raise the basic quota from 100 to 
200, and provide that those parts of the quotas of some countries 
which were not filled should be reallocated among those other 
countries which were not heavily over-subscribed." He suggested that 
Malta would be "bound to benefit by this legislation" and expressed 
modest confidence that it would pass. Schwarz also explained that the 
American contribution of about $28 per migrant for Maltese going to 
Australia had been given as an outright grant. This was "quite 
exceptional" and there was "no hope whatsoever" of Congress being 
ready to appropriate further monies for this (I.C.E.M.) scheme on that 
basis. Borg Olivier was appalled at the suggestion that henceforth 
assisted migrants should and might well be expected to repay such 
money as would have been advanced to them to emigrate, once these 
would have established themselves in the new country. 15 
Impressed and gratified though he was by the courtesy and 
attention with which he was received, by the consideration shown 
him by the President and the Secretary of State in finding time to 
15 Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 4 Oct. 1963, f[ 3-4, para. 3, and passim, 926/1915/48583. 
See below, Il, 13. 
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meet him, Borg Olivier could hardly have known that such an 
apparently ephemeral outcome to his visit had been predicted. On 
arrival at Dulles International Airport (in the afternoon of 4th 
September) the Maltese delegation was greeted by the Deputy Chief 
of Protocol and by the Director of the Office of British 
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Willis Armstrong. 
They were fortified after their journey by complimentary Martinis 
in the Pan American V.I.P. Lounge - "measures of solicitude", 
observed John Hennings, "which I do not recall having been 
extended to any of the many other dignitaries from colonial 
territories who have visited Washington during my three years 
here ... " Mr Armstrong, he added, probably explained the thought 
behind this careful courtesy in the comment: "Since we can't give 
this guy anything else we may as well give him the red carpet."16 
The meeting with U Thant may have been more productive, given 
that the UN was already providing Malta with some assistance, and 
Malta was hoping to join the organisation soon as a full member. 
Borg Olivier told the correspondent of the London Times in New 
York that Malta was "looking forward to joining the United Nations 
when the island becomes independent early next year." He added 
that Malta was in fact "a United Nations in microcosm and by virtue 
of its geographic position and historical background hoped to 
contribute 'in a small way' to the working of the organization." The 
Prime Minister also discussed with U Thant the report of Dr Stolper, 
who had been surveying Malta's economic needs and whose team 
had drawn up a comprehensive and seminal report. 17 
Stolper, an American scholar from Harvard University, was in Malta 
engaged as a consultant to the UN. Borg Olivier would no doubt 
have expressed his gratitude for that and indicated that further 
16 Ibid., ff.1-2, esp. para. 3, 926/1915/48583. 
17 See the news item from the UN Correspondent datelined New York, Sept. 13, "Dr 
Borg Olivier sees U Thant", The Times, 14 Sept. 1963, ene. 926/1915/48583. 
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bonotl.oa.T govor"""nt, tho d •• ioion of tho Govor.-nt of IlIalta to 80nd it. Pr:lmo 
ltiniot.r to l"'t'tara: th10 dllt,. ""Il'gentod that o1gnr.turo of: tho l.eo.n w •• no mor. than 
.. cOlmln1ont po, upon Ui¢ll to ""'" a ">io:lt to thiII COllntry YlIich might gonorat. 
._ uoetnl publ:icity tor 11<'. Oliva. axxl tar IlIalta. 
It thio ..." tho ol>ieavour. 1t oannot bo d.mod that tho PrhMo lI1oioter 
sue •• oded.. Tho InUrnat'!.onlll IIoulk, who ....... t the OIIto.t iml"'t:lent of tho delay 
in s1goetu.. wh10b tho hima·lI1U:Ia1;er'. d.t ..... il1lltion created, an:! unre.o"ti ... to 
th .. oIliSO"ioo that it .... 10 A1:tT -1 "" ... liary that tho Primo Minister .hould. 
att.nd the __ • in th.' .... "t "la1"d Up~. Vr. Gsorge Woods, ~ • 
• uoa .... "" to l!r. ~ne lIlaol< ao Pr.o1d""t of the Eallk. hims.lf attolldod tbs 
coremon;r IllXI sig]:led 0 .. bohalt of tho Ear.k ("hioh Vr. D.A. er.ollhill, 11.11. Charge 
D'.lttairo •• 1gDed 011 bohalt of tho Un1tod l\.:lnsll"") and atterYarde pve & lunoheon 
to "tho IIalte .. delegation. Tho 11n1tod Stat •• Gctvo ....... nt had .oon no ""oM 
purpooc tor til ... in Dr. OUvia:r'Q vioU, but, """"thOles., upon learning of h10 
dot<l1101llfltioo to ."",0, boIIod to the 1:wv1tahl. an:! .. _te<! him not onl,y 10 
h10 •• p:lntion to bo photagra;hed. With President la!lll6dl' but 01"" arranged for hili! 
to bo reoeive<! lo:r tho Saeretsry of Stat •• :.1 to bo tha guost ot honour .t a 
lunoheon givOll in the ,tate Doper"",,,t h1 Vr. Wllliam Tyler, tbe Nsiot.nt 
Soerota.T ot Stat. tor lturopoam Mtairo. 1Iar • .,...-. upon • .riving at Dulle. 
lntornatiot»l .urport tho IIalto .. d.4gatioo .... I!'"ootod h1 the Deputy Chi.t or 
Proto.ol am tho Dirootor of tho ottio. or Iritillh Commonwealth axxl ~thern 
E:"rop>an MUir_, lIr. Willie ~ong, axxl r .. t:U'iod atter tholor JOUl'no1 lo:r 
oompll.mentOl"7 II<¢tinio in tho l'a>t _ioan V.loP. l.oungo; ..... sur •• of .oll.oitudo 
whl.oh I do IlOt .. call beving boon <lXhllded to any of tho "'1:\1' other dign1tsrio. 
frClll colon:l&l hl'l'itorie. who bo.v. v!o1ted Jrachington during I:lJ' thr .. TOar. hore, 
non though ... n;r ot th ... , lllDI Mr. Juliuo l~nd I!!r. li","""" l>IanJ.oT, ..... at 
the dloreot inVitation of the U.s. authorities axxl did not impo •• themoolv •• upon 
tbe U.S.A. at th.lor ~ wt.\aU .... t I!r. Arn#trOllil prohebly oxplail>ed the thought 
behind thia .arotul ."""to.,. in the a ...... nt ·Sim. YO c&n't givo th10 guy al1)'th~ 
el ... w. llI&1 a. well give him tho rod aarpet'. Thie ind .. c1 ""'" .... ll havo be.n a 
... ll-jlldgod ...... _nt. '!'berG ie no dOllbt """'toYor that Dr. Ol1vl.or ft. impr ••• "" 
and snt1t:lod by tho oourtoq an:! att.ntioo with ..ml.oh ... ft. re.eived: and· by 
tho oonoidoration 111> .... hi1Ilo:r tho Pre.ident and tho Soar.tar .. of State :In tinding 
thMo to .... \ hi1I. It 10 • __ t "nror~ur;at. th.t, o1tl\oQgh ho bod que.ted attor 
the •• :lnt.rvion, ho ._ .-*10 ov~lmod lo:r the reality of them, and 
.. "id1)r .00000t adVl.o. on hO'l< to bohavo axxl "hat to '"'T. Th. upshot w .. th.t h. 
J .11. Xisdb. Eaq. /o.roatod .... 
The first folio of a confidential report on Borg Olivier's USA visit by John 
Hennings from the British embassy in Washington. 
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studies of this kind in other areas would be most helpful. In fact 
various other U.N. experts later came to Malta on different projects. 
As for Malta's future contribution to the U.N. 'in a small way', her 
first permanent representative after 1964, Dr Arvid Pardo, would 
not let Malta down and took Borg Olivier for his word, especially 
through the initiatives he would initiate and sponsor on Malta's 
behalf relating to the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean-floor 
as the common heritage of mankind. 
A noteworthy fall-out from Borg Olivier's visit to the U.S.A. 
concerned the rumoured American intention or interest in possibly 
using Malta as a Mediterranean base for Polaris submarines, which 
Mintoff had inveighed against during his meeting with Sandys in 
Valletta three months earlier. Mintoff later brought up the matter 
in Parliament as well,I8 while the MLP press made quite a song and 
dance of the fact that in Washington Borg Olivier had been prepared 
to consider such a prospect.19 Polaris was a solid-propellant two-
stage missile developed by Lockheed for the US Navy and first fired 
in 1958. It had a nuclear warhead and was designed to be launched 
from a submerged submarine. 
When quizzed by journalists about the prospect of a Polaris base 
during his visit to the U.S.A., Borg Olivier did not discourage it. On 
the contrary, he said that he would be prepared to consider it and 
may even have given the impression that he would actually welcome 
it. He was reported to have told President Kennedy that "an 
independent Malta would support NATO and, if called upon, would 
be ready to consider providing base facilities." If so, Kennedy had 
not taken him up on that, as one might have expected he would have 
18 See the report of his speech at the sitting of 31 st Oct. 1963, Il-Helsien, 1 Nov. 1963, 
p.2. 
19 See the front-page banner headline "Borg Olivier joffri Malta bhala Bazi tal-
Polaris", ibid., 11 Sept. 1963; but see also the report in L-Orizzont, 'II-Prim Ministru 
fuq il-Baii tal-Polaris: "L-ewwel Nikkonsiderawha mbgnad niddeciedu"', 12 Sept. 
1963, p.3. 
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done if the Americans were really interested in some new exploit. 
With regard to a Polaris submarine base, Borg Olivier said: "We are 
so exposed anyway, it would make no difference. We are going to 
welcome the U.S. 6th Fleet whenever it wishes to use Malta 
dockyards and harbours."2o In fact, the U.S Sixth Fleet would call 
and make more use of the Malta dockyards and harbours in the 
Sixties. Sandys too had told Mintoff that Malta would not be spared 
in the event of a nuclear war. 
But the key point to be noted in all the churned-up agitation 
concerning the use of Malta as a base for American Polaris 
submarines is that there never was any elaborate project for it. The 
possibility had been examined early in 1963 and ruled out on 
technical grounds by mid-May. It was a red herring. In reply to 
questions on this, Borg Olivier explicitly stated that the question of 
providing a base for Polaris submarines "was not discussed." Had 
the Americans been really serious about the matter they would 
hardly have lost the opportunity offered by a face-to-face encounter 
between the Maltese prime minister and the American president to 
at least mention it. While some such possibility was indeed 
considered at one point, it had been dropped on technical grounds 
if not for any other reasons. The idea of using Malta for this purpose 
never got very far at all. It was just another specimen of Maltese 
wishful thinking for one side, and an Aunt Sally for the other. 
The one who started the story going was Bruce Rothwell, the Daily 
Mail's Washington correspondent. As soon as it was known that Dr 
Borg Olivier was visiting the U.S.A. he had sought "to link it to the 
possibility of Malta becoming a base for Polaris submarines." In 
connection with Borg Olivier's description of the reorganisation of 
the dockyard to a civilian ship repair yard, Rothwell enquired 
whether the yard had done "any work for the U.S. Sixth Fleet." In 
what an eye-witness at this press encounter described as "an 
20 See 'Malta drops Polaris hint', by the Daily Mail's reporter in Washington, Daily 
Mail,1] Sept. 1963, enc. 926/19l5/48583. 
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unguarded moment", Borg Olivier had extended "all the proper 
sentiments about the defence of the free world and support for the 
United States ... to a readiness to accept U.S. Polaris submarines in 
Malta." Borg Olivier was "led to this unguarded remark" by 
Rothwell, in reply to whom Borg Olivier said that Malta would 
always be ready to do anything for the United States: 
Did this mean that they would accept U.S. Polaris 
submarines then? Dr Olivier replied that it did, if the 
Americans would like to send them, but he added the matter 
had not been raised with him at any time. Rothwell then 
suggested that Dr Olivier's willingness to have Malta become 
a Polaris base might create unfortunate political difficulties 
for him in Malta, to which he replied quite tellingly that in 
any nuclear war Malta could not escape involvement in a 
nuclear barrage whether she was a Polaris base or not.21 
Before leaving New York for London, Borg Olivier sent a 'thank you' 
letter from the Waldorf-Towers Hotel in New York, where he was 
staying, to Sir Edward Wakefield in Malta "for your wonderful help 
and co-operation in the planning of my visit." He hoped that he was 
not being "unduly optimistic" in saying that the visit had been a 
success. "I am particularly gratified by the knowledge", Borg Olivier 
told Wakefield, "that your efforts on my behalf were not just an act 
in the course of duty but also based on considerations of personal 
friendship which I heartily reciprocate and on your love of Malta." 
In informing him that he hoped to be back during the last week of 
the month after the conference in London (and with characteristic 
courtesy extending his personal regards also to Lady Wakefield) Dr 
Borg Olivier registered his own impressions of what this trip had 
meant: 
We have learnt much on this visit but mostly the need of 
making Malta better known and its needs in the difficult 
21 Hennings/Kisch, Conf., 4 Oct. 1963, f. 2, para. 2, f. 4, para. 2, 926/1915/48583. 
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days ahead better appreciated in this country. Malta could 
certainly do with an injection of American private 
• 99 
enterpnse.--
The Americans had been at odds and ends with the British about 
Polaris for some time, until an agreement in Nassau in 1962 whereby 
the former agreed to supply the latter with some such missiles. The 
British had been interested in the American Skybolt missle, a project 
which the Americans later scrapped. The problem for Britain was 
whether or not it could afford to have an independent nuclear 
deterrent in the vain hope that it retained a world power status 
independently of the U.S.A. and was in no way inferior to France. 
The British Defence White Paper of 1957 frankly declared that 
Britain was not in a position to defend herself against a nuclear 
attack: "the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the 
power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons." Britain 
experimented solely or jointly with various missiles during the 
Sixties - Blue Streak, Black Knight, Blue Steel, Skybolt, BlackArrow 
- but these ambitious stratagems all more or less came to grief. 
Britain was forced to drop out of the nuclear club except for Polaris 
submarines, each of which possessed the capability of firing from 
under the sea 16 missiles with nuclear warheads at enemy targets. 
But Polaris was a prized American weapon, and it was only at Nassau 
that the Americans agreed to make it available to the British - thus 
Britain got four Polaris submarines. As Russia had ground 
superiority over NATO forces, the nuclear deterrent became of 
utmost importance to the West. Britain was still hoping to produce 
its own TSR2 weapon system but this too was eventually cancelled 
due to high costs.23 Anglo-American relations were strained in the 
early 1960s because of the nuclear issue and access to nuclear power. 
In December 1962 Macmillan told Kennedy that if Britain were to 
22 Borg Olivier/Wakefield, 18 Sept. 1963,926/1915/48583. 
23 See Paul Kenendy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Fontana, 3rd ed., 
1991), pp. 391-395, 405-407. 
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be left without effective nuclear weapons as a result of the American 
decision to scrap Skybolt, the Conservative Party would probably 
decide that the alliance with the U.S.A. has been a mistake, it would 
sweep him (Macmillan) away and replace him with an anti-American 
government. It was in this way that Britain acquired American 
polaris submarines which could be used without any consultation 
with other countries in the event of "a supreme national 
emergency".24 The R.A.F. still continued to push for an 
independent nuclear deterrent. One of those against it was in fact 
Mountbatten who believed that an independent British force would 
be "neither credible as a deterrent, nor necessary as part of the 
Western deterrent."25 
Malta was stepping into more than one breach without realising it. 
The U.S.A. planned to put polaris submarines on patrol in the 
Mediterranean by April 1963. These were expected to be "placed in 
some way under NATO command", because Kennedy had offered 
that much in May, 1960. The U.S. had some difficulty identifying a 
good Polaris base in the Mediterranean, however. They were 
seeking a Mediterranean base for the three Polaris submarines 
despatched to the area earlier in 1963 to take over the strategic 
assignments of Jupiter missile bases dismantled in Turkey and 
Northern Italy. These Polaris submarines were then operating out 
of the U.S.A. and Holy Loch in Scotland.26 The Americans would 
have liked to use the naval base at Rota, Spain, but this raised 
insuperable obstacles (partly because it rested on a "mutual decision" 
agreement). For political reasons, Fanfani's government was not 
readily offering the U.S.A. facilities in Italy. The possibility could not 
be excluded, therefore, cabled the Washington correspondent of The 
Times on 12th February 1963, that 
24 T.O. Lloyd, Empire to Welfare State, op.cit., p. 382. 
25 Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten (Fontana, 1986), p. 561. 
26 "Malta and Polaris Base", Times of Malta, II Sept. 1963, p.l. 
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Mr Harrison Lewis, the American 
consul general in Malta in 1963/64, who 
later acted as ambassador. 
Britain might be asked to provide a base in Malta or 
Gibraltar. Apparently no formal proposals have yet been 
made but the idea would seem to conform with the spirit of 
the Nassau agreement. 27 
On the following day, however, the BBC and other sections of the 
press suggested that the us had run into difficulties over providing 
facilities for Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean and would 
have to depend on Holy Loch. It was also suggested, the Foreign 
Office briefed the British embassy in Washington, "that they (the 
Americans) are considering Malta as a possible site for facilities." The 
British were ready to oblige. The cyphered and secret F.O. telegram 
to Washington continued thus: 
Please speak to the State Department as a matter of urgency 
and tell them that we believe that, given a suitable safe 
location and satisfactory arrangements on the lines of those 
for the Holy Loch Memorandum of Understanding, it 
should be possible to arrange for them to operate from 
27 "Possible Use of Malta", The Times, 13 Feb. 1963. 
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Malta. Although, under the Constitution, Her Majesty's 
Government retains ultimate responsibility for defence and 
foreign affairs, we should obviously have to consult the 
Malta Government at an early stage. 
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The F.O. added that if the Americans showed interest, they would 
be willing to examine the matter further in consultation with them, 
"bringing the present Maltese Government in as soon as 
appropriate. "28 
The UK Commissioner in Malta had been informed about this 
prospect a fortnight earlier and kept au coumnt. The best approach 
was, he advised, "to mention (this) fairly casually" to the Prime 
Minister and "get approval in principle and permission to negotiate 
on safety arrangements" on a much lower level. Having recourse to 
the Consultative Council (a joint Anglo-Maltese committee which 
Dorman chaired) was not considered appropriate. As the subject of 
American polaris submarines in the Mediterranean possibly based in 
Malta was "hot news here at the moment", and it was vehemently 
opposed by the MLP and the GWU press, Wakefield considered this 
"the worst possible moment" in which to approach the Prime 
Minister. He would prefer to wait two or three weeks before doing 
so. He asked however for a safety officer on nuclear propulsion to 
visit Malta in mid-March. !fhe would not be available then, he would 
like to have the safety officer immediately rather than not at all.29 
In Malta, the Italians were very interested in what the Americans 
were up to in conjunction with the British. Dr Messina, the Italian 
Consul, saw the U.S. Consul General, Mr Ruffner, about the 
suggested Polaris scheme. According to Wakefield, Ruffner told 
Messina that "the United States Government had no plans 
28 Tel., F.O./Washington, 13 Feb. 1963, sec., 8.10 p.m., 926/2078. 
29 F.O. Malta/Admiralty, 16 Feb. 1963, conf., 926/2078. "Warning No unclassified 
reply or reference". 
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whatsoever for using Malta as a base for Polaris submarines." 
However, Ruffner also told Wakefield that he had received "a secret 
message from the State Department" which he could not 
communicate to him. Ruffner had "no doubt", Wakefield wrote to 
the C.O., that he (Wakefield) would be getting similar information 
on his own "channel". 
The next paragraph in Wakefield's letter is also revealing. It suggests 
that the Maltese government had been annoyed at British 
involvement with regard to the possibility of basing in Malta a 
tropospheric scatter station for the US Air Force. This so-called 
"scatter station" was mentioned in secret despatches, briefs and 
other correspondence a number of times, but nothing much was 
ever specified about how likely the prospect of setting it up was or 
what it would do exactly. Given the Mediterranean security context 
and East-West relations, it was almost certainly intended as a 
listening post which could intercept, code and decode messages 
from air to ground or vice-versa. In those pre-satellite days, when 
so much naval and military traffic was using the Mediterranean -
over the air space of which Malta had extensive control - the 
Americans were interested in some such facility. The British must 
already have had it, through Sigint (Signals Intelligence) at Luqa, 
and the classified messages of its DF Facility; but the Americans seem 
to have wanted one of their own, or a supplementary one, which 
could link up with the Sixth Fleet, among other things. 
"If the United States want to obtain operational facilities in Malta for 
their Polaris submarines", the UK Commissioner advised London, 
the sensible thing would be for them to secure Admiralty 
approval to the facilities they require and then enter into 
direct negotiations with the Malta Government for the grant 
to them of these facilities. After our experience with the 
Malta Government over the proposed U.S.A.F. Scatter 
Station I am sure that no other procedure is feasible. 3o 
30 Wakefield/Eastwood, 25 ]'eb. 1963, sec., 926/2078. 
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2. I all plea:H!d to int'or.a you th:lt your 
aco$ptea and tha.t tbe delegation of exocutl'f$ 
the field or exterael ati'a,l.ra b:r nel" ~{ajestyf S Goy'm"".,,' 
"the United Kingdo::a to the Govurr...ruent of tho State 
4S the de.epatches. of the 13tb July and 
Noyottloer, i.s hereby extended a3 defined in. 
paragra.ph .. 
3. The exeoutive autnority 01~ the Gover.llnl.ent ot' the State 
or 11e.ltn wi t.h l:'ospect to its u:teI'nal nfteir.s with other oountrios 
shul .. under oeoti(jn 8} of the Stat(!- or :.fnl ta Conati tlltion. 1961 
be extended to include po,ters to reoeive 0. request the ' 
Govenn . "ent tl;e United Statu of Aaerica. to an 
At'lerioan Station ir. lhlt.a. and to negotio.to th& 
oonditiona ur::der such Radio Reloy SUtion u.y be etltablbhod 
in alsO' to inolude the status, Ot'i',,,,,,,,,mMts 
perMnnel wi';;o wocid be m.tI.l:lD.ina, thG 
G"".,.",.ent is being i.nformed that powers to 
represent&%ives haVG been 
Cove'!"ruaent in thf) United Xingooo to the 
ot yo! ta .. 
5. I !!hall be g:t'lltef'ul if' you will ack. ~D,"J.odsE the reoeipt 
at thh de::rpu-teh .. 
I have the honcur t.o be:~ 
Sir, 
YOur' obedient servant~ 
.(::GD.) DUNCAN SANDY> 
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On 24th May 1963 permission was granted by Sandys to Borg Olivier for 
direct Maltese-American negotiations on a U.S.A.F. "Radio Relay Station", 
provided that Britain concurred with the terms of any agreement reached. 
The implication is clear. The Borg Olivier administration had told 
off Wakefield when they found out that the British were discussing 
with the Americans on their behalf, without their knowing, the 
possibility of basing such a station in Malta. 
Repeated references to this "tropospheric scatter station" for the 
U.S.A.F. in Malta remained somewhat nebulous. Was it just a "radio 
relay station"? The key operational area for a scatter station would 
be the troposphere, the lowest layer of the atmosphere in which 
temperature falls as height increases, which was meant to have special 
operational qualities for certain purposes. To overhear, without 
permission, communications between hostile or potentially hostile 
electronic stations, was a vital precautionary facility. Interception 
could interefere with, and possibly prevent, the arrival of a hostile 
military force at its destination. Contact could also be made, visually 
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or by radar, of a friendly aircraft with an unidentified one. By dose 
controlled interception, the interceptor was continuously controlled 
by a surface or air station. Through broadcast controlled interception, 
the interceptor was given the area of interception by a surface or air 
station but effected interception without further control. 
What was involved apparently was Malta's direct insertion into a 
NATO communications chain which ran from Norway to Libya, and 
which could relay and receive messages through high frequency 
beams. Mr G. H. Ferro, a senior civil servant who served as clerk to 
the Executive Council from 1960 to 1962 before becoming Director 
of Civil Aviation, referred to it as a "Forward Scatter Station", adding 
that this was a code name. Ferro was au courant with the project; in 
1963 he started attending the Regional Air Navigation meetings of 
the European Mediterranean and Mrica regions of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization. The Americans eventually obtained 
some such facility as was being mooted in 1962-63 at Marfa Ridge, 
in the relatively remote extreme north of the archipelago's main 
island. After independence, an official in the Office of the Prime 
Minister had suggested the Qrendi strip as a location for it, but as 
this station required a huge dish set-up and Qrendi was much too 
close to Luqa airfield itself, Marfa was selected instead. Ferro had 
seen the American ambassador about this recommendable 
alternative site. One side of the station looked towards Italy while 
the other looked towards Libya. The Qrendi strip, now built over, 
was used for aircraft dispersals during the Second World War.3i 
There are no indications that the intended Scatter Station actually 
materialised before independence; indeed Borg Olivier had 
probably been warned in advance of his meeting with Kennedy, by 
the British, that the Americans did not wan t to discuss it. 32 
Compared to the Polaris base, the U.S.A.F. Scatter Station project 
attracted hardly any public attention. 
31 Sandys/Borg Olivier, 24 May 1963, conf., ene. Wakefield/Borg Olivier, 10 June 
1963; Wakefield/Borg Olivier, 10 June 1963; Amato-Gauci/Wakefield, 14 June 1963, 
enes. in 'U.S.A. Radio Relay Station in Malta - delegation of powers i.e.w.', NAM 'G' 
Files, ser. 47/63, sec.; Ferroi.Frendo interview, 23 July 1999. 
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One article in a Maltese newpaper noted that "if the United States 
wants us to base her Polaris Submarines in our midst we must ask 
her to shoulder our adverse economic situation. The United States 
has poured millions of dollars in Western Europe ... We are 
absolutely sure ... that in considering the question of Malta-based 
Polaris submarines, the Nationalist Government of Malta will decide 
what is best for Malta ... " The article was a critique of neutralism, 
mentioning Ghana and India (then in trouble with Communist 
China) as failed examples of it, and quoted from an address just 
made by the U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara to the U.S. 
Armed Services Committee: 
The whole world is heading towards an era when it will 
become increasingly improbable that either side could 
destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic 
nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude 
a devastating retaliatory blow. This may result in mutual 
deterrence, but it is still a grim prospect. As the arms race 
continues, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by 
miscalculation or design, becomes more real. But until we 
can find a safe and sure sign to disarmament, we must 
continue to build up our defences. 33 
In May 1963 the U.S. Department of Defence informed the 
Department of State that a Polaris submarine base in Malta was not 
technically feasible. Valletta harbour, the Defence Department said, 
did not meet the U.S. safety requirements for Polaris tender 
32 Apart from the American operation at Marfa Ridge, which was stopped after 
Mintoff came to power in 1971, similar surveillance activities also took place from 
Hal Far and one or two other sites. Such monitoring and communications strategy 
fell under external affairs and so it would have normally been under direct British 
conu'o!' The Americans might have shared intelligence with the British and vice-
versa if and as appropriate, although clearly both powers preferred to be as self-
reliant as possible; both of course had their own navies with aircraft in the region. 
Malta controlled a very range of air space from Luqa. 
33 "Malta as a Polaris Base", by 'Praetor', The Bulletin, 4 Mar. 1963, ene. 926/2078. 
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operations. They thought Valletta harbour to be excellent in many 
respects, including routine visits of nuclear-powered submarines, 
but the Harbour did not have the standard conventional explosive 
safety distances for the handling of operations which a tender basing 
scheme would involve, nor did it meet the tidal flushing 
requirements for reactor safeguards. Two other harbours in Malta 
had been examined but they both fell short of the requirements for 
protection from sea and wind. The Americans therefore decided that 
upon technical grounds Malta would be unsuitable as a base for 
American Polaris Submarines.34 
While it is certain that American inspections were carried out in 
Maltese harbours to check if any of these would be suitable for what 
they had in mind, at no point was there a decision that Malta could 
or would be requested as a Polaris base. The negotiation of such a 
venture with the Americans would have given the British a 
brokerage role which, had the Americans been interested, might 
have found the ready consent of the Maltese administration, subject 
to certain conditions. But to speculate about money-in-return-for-
base with the Americans - as if it was they not the British who had 
possessed Malta for 164 years was to put the cart before the horse. 
There was no horse. In objecting to a Polaris base with Sandys in 
June 1963, Mintoffwas already fighting a windmill. The Americans 
had already technically knocked out any such possibility, and 
informed the British accordingly. As this information was relayed by 
Washington to London while Sandys was in Malta, he may not yet 
have known about it. 
The Foreign Office duly informed the Colonial Office of the 
situation. They also asked for their assessment of "the technical 
grounds" given by the Americans. As the British had felt rather left 
out of the nuclear programme, they were keen to keep a finger in 
34 Wilkinson/Rose, 13 May 1963, sec., 926/2078. The u.s. Defence Department's 
decision was conveyed by Washington tel. no. 1424, 10 May 1963, but a letter of 
explanation sent from them to the U.S. Department of State was shown to Mr P. 
Wilkinson of the British embassy in Washington on 13 May, who promptly 
communicated the news to the Foreign Office in London. 
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the pie through Malta. They were also keen to have as much NATO-
linked back-up in Malta as possible, in this case through the U.S.A., 
since they were planning to depart as a colonial power. That Malta 
had been dismissed on technical grounds came as something of a 
disappointment, at least to the F.O. Therefore, they tried again by 
re-defining the terms. 
"When we made the offer to the Americans in February to consider 
the possibility of Malta as a base we had in mind that it might be used 
by the United States submarines which were to replace the Jupiter 
missiles", they told the C.O. "We were not thinking at that time in 
terms of a base for the mixed-manned force", they held, adding: 
Now that we are discussing facilities which we might offer 
as part of our contribution to a mixed-manned force, we 
should like to examine whether Malta would be suitable for 
this purpose. The point to establish is to what extent the 
technical objections given ... would apply to the use of Malta 
for a Polaris surface ship force. 
This was primarily a matter for the Admiralty. Assuming that Malta 
was not ruled out on technical grounds, they would have to consider 
"the political and practical implications".35 The F.O. copied their 
presumed option to Mr Stephens from the Defence Ministry, who 
was monitoring Malta, for his comments as well. 
The F.O. official dealing with this matter, Mr C. M. Rose, stayed in 
contact with the Washington embassy about it until September 1963. 
He inquired about what exactly had been said on such matters during 
the meeting Borg Olivier had with Kennedy earlier that month. Mr 
J. K. E. Broadley from the embassy again saw his counter-part in the 
State Department and again reported back to London the Defence 
Department's opinion" on the unsuitability of Valletta harbour" . I twas 
in view of that, Broadly wrote, that "the question of Polaris submarines 
had not been raised at aU, nor indeed had the possible provision of 
35 Rose/Crawley, 6 June 1963, sec., 926/2078. 
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any other sort of defence facilities at Malta." The last part of this 
sentence may be presumed to refer to the suggested U.S.A.F. Scatter 
Station, which in this light could be seen to have been envisaged 
hypothetically as a possible corollary to the would-be Polaris base. 
Delving further into what views had been exchanged exactly during 
Borg Olivier's U.S.A. visit, it transpired that Dean Rusk had asked 
Borg Olivier what future connection he saw between Malta and 
NATO. The latter replied that in due course there would be a 
defence agreement with the UK and that under this agreement 
facilities would be available at Malta to the UK "and its allies". Borg 
Olivier's remarks upon which The Daily Mail's report was based had 
been made "at an informal meeting here" with representatives of the 
British press. As soon as it was known that Borg Olivier was coming, 
Bruce Rothwell of The Daily Mail started enquiring as to whether any 
defence matters, particularly those concerning the Polaris 
submarines, were to be discussed. He probed Borg Olivier on this 
at the press briefing. He first asked, in connection with the Prime 
Minister's remarks about attracting ship-repairing work to the 
dockyard, "whether they would be ready to work for the American 
Sixth Fleet". Dr Borg Olivier seemed taken aback by this twist to the 
discussion - reported Broadley, who was obviously present - and said 
that the Maltese would always be ready to help the American forces: 
Rothwell then asked if he had any comment on the possibility 
of using Malta as a Polaris submarine base, and Olivier replied 
that it was worth considering. Rothwell asked if there might not 
be political argument in Malta over a policy which, if adopted, 
might expose the island to nuclear obliteration. Dr Olivier 
replied, rather tellingly, that in the event of nuclear war, Malta 
would be in equal danger of nuclear obliteration whether or nor 
she now offered facilities to the United States Navy. 36 
36 Broadley/Rose, 19 Sept. 1963, sec., 926/2078. 
12 
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If there were two 'new' beacons which the Maltese government 
looked up to for understanding and support, these were the U.S.A. 
and Italy. The former, an ex-British territory taken in rein by 
European pioneers and migrant settlers, was the most powerful, 
prosperous and advanced, leader of the Western bloc, 'comrade-in-
arms' during two world wars. The latter, a onetime titular holder of 
the Maltese Islands through the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, was 
the closest neighbour and the first terra lerma, the land of Dante and 
seat of Christendom, a reborn democracy and Western ally whose 
spirits and fortunes had animated or affected Maltese anti-colonial 
nationalism ever since the Risorgimento. 
When Borg Olivier went to the U.S.A., Felice was in Rome. Borg 
Olivier too visited Rome more than once between 1962 and 1964, 
on one occasion meeting the Italian Prime Minister, Amintore 
Fanfani. These simultaneous visits to Washington and to Rome were 
not a simple coincidence: they were a paradigm, especially in the 
case of the latter. Before asking for the British to intervene on their 
side in 1798 against the French revolutionary regime, the Maltese 
leaders had first implored the Sicilian king's permission. When, four 
years later, it seemed that Malta would be given back to the Knights 
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under article 10 of the Treaty of Ami ens of 1802, the Maltese leaders 
had protested, saying that if the British wanted to leave, Malta would 
revert to the Maltese for them to decide about their future: the 
British had no right to dispose of Malta by handing her to another 
power without their permission. l 
Much water had passed under the bridge since then but, as Nerik 
Mizzi used to say, the geography does not change. In other words, 
from a Gozo roof-top on a clear day you could still see the Etna. 
Historically, in the twentieth century, the integration or federation 
arrangement (pactum foederis') of Malta with Italy, granting Malta 
an autonomy without isolation, a special status, was a Mizzian idea, 
dating back to his return from Italy, where he made such 'irredentist' 
proposals in Italian reviews before the First World War and his entry 
into Maltese politics.2 
For daring to express such views, Mizzi was hounded on suspicion 
of disloyalty to the British Crown practically for the rest of his life. 
Court-martialled on trumped-up charges in 1917, he was interned 
without charge in 1940, and deported without charge to Uganda in 
1942. By the time he became Prime Minister in 1950 his earlier 'anti-
Britishness' had thawed and was replaced by a new-found mantle of 
moderation, which Borg Olivier then took up and carried forward 
pragmatically. 
In the meantime, under De Gasperi's Christian Democrats, post-war 
Italy had risen like a Phoenix from the ashes. By the 1950s she also 
had, in opposition, the largest Communist Party in Western Europe. 
An outstanding figure of the Italian left, who broke off with the 
Communists in the late 1950s, was Pietro Nenni. In 1963, this 
Socialist leader became deputy to Aldo Moro, Italy's Christian 
Democratic premier, in a new centre-left four-party coalition 
1 See H. Frendo, Maltese Political Development 1798-1964, op.cit., pp. 29-30, 55-56. 
2 See H. Frendo, Party Politics in a Fortress Colony: The Maltese Experience, op.cit., pp. 
30-31,151-161,177-179. 
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government, which included social democrats and socialists. In the 
run-up to Malta's independence, Nenni was one of the maverick 
socialist leaders on Mintoff's lobby list of fellow travellers. 
In the light of Mintoff's earlier attempt to integrate Malta with Great 
Britain, for which over 67,000 Maltese electors had voted in a 
referendum in 1956, it is surprising but not astounding to discover 
that the stratagem of Malta's integration with a larger power could 
have lingered on in his psyche.3 Faced by an Independence which 
he would not have himself obtained, and by a constitution that was 
too conservative for his liking, Mintoff fished around for a 
republican alternative. And it seems that his gaze went further than 
that of Borg Olivier, who was intent on striking a deal with Britain 
and retaining the Commonwealth connection. Had these politicians 
changed sides and sympathies, or was this simply a cat-and-mouse 
game, with the good cat being the one which caught the fish? 
There were nonetheless many ironies in an MLP opening up to 
Italy, which is why the Italo-Maltese plan, such as it was, remained 
a top secret. To date, an MLP-conceived Italian constitutional option 
for Malta after independence, or indeed instead of it, has never been 
denied or confirmed by the party. At the same time that Mintoff was 
committing his party to neutrality, approaching the likes of Ben 
Bella, Nasser and Khruschev, he was also putting out feelers to Italy 
and apparently devising a special status for Malta under her aegis. 
Italy was a member of NATO, of the European Economic 
Community, and she had been, ever since the end of the War, 
governed by Christian Democrats, as she was still. At home, Mintoff 
had for decades teased and tormented the Nationalists on their 
Italian sympathies from the pre-war years, often throwing in Fascism 
with the Mafia for good measure. If politics be the art of the possible, 
however, no experiment was likely to deter a Mintoff, however 
unconventional; and even less so if he assumed that the power 
3 See Denis Austin, Malta and the End of Em/lire (Cass, London, 1971), and also his 
introduction to the first edition of H. Frendo, Parly Politics in a Fortress Colony: The 
Maltese Experience, op.cit., ix-xii. 
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equation ofItalian politics would soon be changing. Nenni, after all, 
had served under De Gasperi, even as foreign minister in the late 
1940s; in 1963 he again became a senior member of the Italian 
government. 
Stray pieces of information concerning this 'Italian option' for Malta 
have come to light in recent years, whetting the appetite for more.4 
With the help of the additional archival material now available, it 
becomes possible to add some brush strokes to the unfinished picture 
of this intriguing episode, as well as to set it in the broader context of 
unfolding Italo-Maltese relations just before Independence. 
Although in the newly-released archival material no textual evidence 
on file has come to light of the secret MLP memorandum 
despatched or conveyed to Rome in April 1963, there is mention and 
assessment of what was probably its most salient feature. That was 
the prospect of some arrangement for Malta with Italy on the lines 
existing in the case of the Republic of San Marino. In this 
connection, in fact, a brief was drawn up in London explaining in 
some detail what the exact status of San Marino was, and what was 
San Marino's relationship at law to the Republic of Italy. 
What is no less interesting is the fact that the Foreign Office got wind 
of this San Marino initiative months before the MLP's lengthy and 
elaborately formulated memorandum was sent to Italy in April 1963, 
and also before a full-scale visit which Mintoff paid to Italy in 
February 1963. This clearly suggests that the MLP plan was not a 
fall-out from meetings Mintoffhappened to have had while in Italy 
in February. On the contrary, he went to Italy to hold further 
discussions about it there, very probably at a higher level than he 
had so far done. The memorandum was thus finalised after these 
further consultations had taken place in Italy. 
4 See H. Frendo, Malta's Quest for Independence: Reflections on the Course of Maltese 
History (Valletta, 1989), pp. 248-252. 
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In a hand-written exchange of minutes and margin comments in 
January 1963, with reference to "a further letter and enclosures 
from the F.O.", a reference to San Marino was pencilled out "which 
we might include if it is likely that we might have to seek further info. 
from the F.O. on the relationship between S.M. and Italy." The 
words "a refce. to San Marino which we might include" were 
underlined in the same ink. 5 This tentative suggestion was 
approved by a more senior C.O. official through an initialled and 
dated instruction in the margin: "Yes." The draft C.O. letter to the 
Foreign Office was thus amended to take account of the San Marino 
factor, as approved.6 Meaningful too is an earlier comment about 
"the powers Malta already e~oys for seeking financial and economic 
aid from Foreign countries".7 The follow-up action undertaken 
evidently presumed that there was more to it than this. 
A brief was drawn up about San Marino. This was divided into two 
parts. The first was entitled 'General' and the second 'Relations with 
Italy'. Under the first section, San Marino was described as a tiny 
republic in Northern Italy in the hills overlooking Rimini. Founded 
in the fourth century, San Marino had an area of 38 square miles 
and a population of about 13,000. San Marino's legislative power 
was vested in the Grand Council of 60 members who were elected 
every five years by popular vote. The councillors were elected every 
six months to act as Regents. These exercised executive power 
together with the Council of State which comprised ten 
Departments. The republic had its own juridical authority. It also 
had its own militia in which all able bodied men between the age of 
16 and 60 were liable to serve. Income tax had been introduced in 
1922 and a fruitful source of revenue derived from frequent changes 
of postage stamps. 
5 Crawley/Fairclough, 23 Jan. 1963, 926/1876/48489. 
6. Ibid., Fairclough/Kisch, 23 an. 1963. 
7 Ibid., Crawley/Fairclough, 23 Jan. 1963. 
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As to San Marino's relations with I taIy, it was noted that the Republic 
entered into a treaty of relations, including a customs union, with 
Italy in 1862. A considerable part of its revenue was drawn from the 
Italian Government "in exchange for an acknowledgement of the 
Italian state monopolies in tobacco, playing cards, etc." A treaty of 
friendship with Italy was concluded in 1897 and renewed in 1953, 
with amendments in 1961. In addition to the local currency of San 
Marino, Italian and Vatican currency were also in general use there. 
Diplomas from the Republic's high school were recognized by Italian 
universities.8 
The MLP's April memorandum referred specifically to San Marino 
in its twenty-fifth paragraph, but subsequent paragraphs also bear 
on it. The text of these reads thus: 
25. The exact form of these much desired closer relations 
between Malta and Italy will be established after an 
exhaustive study of the matter, and in such a way that 
it will turn out to be the best and the most useful in the 
common interest ofItaly and Malta. One could consider 
a relationship similar to that with San Marino, or to a 
regional autonomy similar to that of Sicily. 
26. An exhaustive study could ascertain moreover whether 
it would be desirable in the common interest that Malta 
should remain a neutral territory like Singapore (a 
similar proposal was made in the treaty of Amiens) and 
would thereby be useful to Italy and the Common 
Market. 
27. I t is here to be recorded that Maltese politicians have 
recently approached Italian statesmen to discuss the 
solution of Malta's political problems on the lines 
referred to above. 
8 'San Marino', ene. 92611822/48655. 
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28. We expect now that the representatives of the 
Government and of the Italian political parties express 
their position in this regard. In particular, the Malta 
Labour Party requests this to be able to go ahead with 
this plan of theirs; and this was the purpose of its Leader 
Dom Mintoff's visit to Italy in February 1963 ... 9 
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The April memorandum twice invoked article 51 of the Italian 
Constitution which gave to "Italians not appertaining to the 
Republic" the rights of Italian citizens. IO The Italian Constitution 
provided for autonomous regions and also sovereign states with 
particular treaties of friendship and good neighbour relations, 
within the Republic. The timing of this special status proposal was 
held to be "particularly favourable" because of the excellent relations 
exisiting between Great Britain and Italy, whose support Britain was 
seeking to enter the Common Market. Nor, on the other hand, 
should Italy find difficulties to express itself favourably on such "a 
final solution". This had been implicitly said in a recent speech 
delivered in Malta by the British Governor of the Island. It was 
believed, finally, that Italy, which had given considerable economic 
aid to the various peoples of Africa - Tunisia, Somalia and Ethiopia 
were singled out as examples - "also to counter-balance the 
increasing Arab nationalism", should not hesitate to lean forward 
towards "those whom the Italian Constitution considers 'Italian 
citizens not belonging to the Republic' (Art. 51)." 
Some such plan had been hibernating in Mintoff's mind ever since 
1946 or 1947. That was before the 1947 general election which the 
MLP won decisively to form Malta's first Labour Government under 
Dr Boffa, in which Mintoffbecame a Minister for the first time. After 
the Labour Party split in 1949, as a result of which Mintoff ousted 
Boffa from party leader, there was a conversation between two Boffist 
9 H. Frendo, Malta's Quest for Independence, op. cit., esp. p. 249; but see also page 13 
of The Sunday Times, Valletta, on HAug., 21 Aug., and 28 Aug, 1988. 
10 Ibid., para 24 and 30. 
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Ministers, Dr Arthur Colombo and Dr Joseph Cassar, in the presence 
of Vivian de Gray, then a police superintendent. In the course of this 
conversation, Mintoff's idea for Malta's integration with Italy had been 
brought up. De Gray remembered Dr Colombo saying, in Cassar's 
presence, that one day while they were on a roof-top somewhere, 
Mintoff had come up with the proposal that "they should integrate 
with Italy." Colombo added that he had opposed the suggestion, de 
Gray recalled. The more wily Cassar (who, unlike Colombo, would 
later join Mintoff's party) had not expressed an opinion on the subject. 
De Gray was reacting with quick reflexes to a question posed to him 
by this writer in 1989 as to whether the suggestion that Mintoff may 
have desired an integration with Italy would surprise him: "That does 
not surprise me at alll"II In recalling Dr Colombo's words, De Gray 
commented that "probably that was when they were expecting the 
Communist Party to come to power in Italy." 
This off-the-cuff recollection of context is borne out quite well 
historically by the fact that Nenni, who had become secretary-
general of the then pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party in 1944, was 
vice-premier in the De Gasperi coalition cabinet in 1945-1946. In 
1946-47 he was Italy's foreign minister. Nenni would not assume 
high political office again until 1963, a comeback which coincided 
II De Gray/Frendo, Casino Maltese, Valletta, recorded interview, 28 June 1989. 
Vivian De Gray (1912-1995) became Acting Commissioner of Police in 1955 and was 
appointed Commissioner in 1956, during Mintoff's first premiership. A redoubtable 
police chief until 1971, he fell out with Mintoff during the rioting in April 1958, 
preferring to maintain law and order. He became a bete nair of the Mintoff party. 
Arthur (Tum) Colombo (1905·1978), a medical doctor, emerged as the second most 
popular Labour politician in Malta after Boffa in the 1947 general election, 
becoming Minister of Finance, Customs and Ports. Expelled from Mintoff's Malta 
Labour Party in 1949, he was returned for Boffa's Malta Workers Party in the 1950 
general election, but he later resigned and retired from politics altogether. Joseph 
(Cuze) Cassar (1918- ), a lawyer, served as Minister of Justice under BofIa and under 
Borg Olivier between 1949 and 1953, and again from 1955 to 1958, under Mintoff, 
whose party he had joined in 1953. He was elected first to the Council of 
Government in 1945, then served as Speaker from 1946 to 1948. He has held various 
other senior positions since 1971, including that of Acting President. 
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ELSIEN 
II.Fclld Final; ta/.Kabinett tel Aldo Moro 
NENNI U SARAGAT F'ZEWG 
MINISTERI I MPORTANTI 
Nenni with Wilson on the front page of Il·Jfelsien in 1963. 
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with the reawakening of a bee in Mintoff's bonnet. Nenni's return 
to power pleased the MLP very much. 
The alert was first sounded in a secret despatch as early as 
November 1962. During a sitting of the Legislative Assembly on 5th 
October 1962, Dr Anton Buttigieg alleged that the (Borg Olivier) 
Government only paid lip service to Independence. He knew that 
the Maltese Government had had offers of help from the Italian 
Government, which was ready to fill the gap if the British were to 
leave. Borg Olivier expressed surprise at Buttigieg's statement, 
saying that he knew absolutely nothing ofthis and denied that Italy 
had approached his Government in this connection. On 13th 
October the UK Commissioner attended a large luncheon party at 
which the Italian Consul, Dr Messina, was present: 
In front of other guests I said to him: "Hello, Dr Messina, 
how is integration with Italy going?" He was so taken aback 
by this question that he could not open his mouth for several 
seconds. Then he said: "I suppose you are referring to what 
was said in the Assembly the other day." I nodded assent, 
but his reaction to my question convinced me of the truth 
of reports which had already reached me that Dr Messina 
has been working on Mintoff, as well as on Borg Olivier, to 
secure acceptance of the idea of a closer association between 
Malta and Italy. The object is, I believe, that Malta should 
enjoy a status similar to that of Sicily or Sardinia. 
During his visit to Malta Dr Stolper was reported to have said that 
Malta was not a viable economic unit and that it must necessarily 
form part of a larger group. This observation was allegedly 
interpreted by pro-Italian elements in Maltese society as a hint that 
Malta should join Italy to secure its economic future. Borg Olivier 
was leaving for Rome shortly and, Wakefield felt sure, the possibility 
of associating Malta with Italy would be discussed. Borg Olivier had 
been at pains to inform him of the subjects which he proposed to 
discuss with the Italian Government and this "was, of course, 
excluded from the list." Wakefield had also found out about 
Mintoff's planned "three week" visit to Italy as a guest of the Italian 
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Government. As Dr Messina was "in constant touch with Mintof{" it 
could be presumed that the arrangements for Mintoff's visit had 
been made by him.12 
The UK Commissioner believed that all this was relevant to the 
forthcoming Independence talks. He speculated that Borg Olivier 
would demand of the UK "terms which are totally unacceptable", so 
he must have a position "on which to fall back" when his demands 
were refused. And Borg Olivier was probably planning "an 
association with Italy as an alternative to Independence within the 
Commonwealth." Such a project, Wakefield added less fancifully, 
might well have the support of Mintoff"if Dr Messina's blanishments 
succeed." It would, he reckoned, "also have the blessing of the 
Church, which would welcome Malta's closer association with a 
Catholic country." If the Italian Government could be persuaded by 
the Maltese to offer substantial economic and financial aid, Dr Borg 
Olivier would be in a position to direct Malta's future away from the 
British and into the Italian orbit." Borg Olivier's party, he concluded 
with an old-time flourish, "is traditionally pro-Italian." Borg Olivier 
would have the backing of the Church; "and Mintoff, he hopes, 
could be persuaded to give his support to such a demarche." 
In his covering note on the following day he defined the subject of 
this secret commucation enclosed in the same despatch as "a move 
to substitute Italy for Britain as Malta's Protecting Power." The 
implications of this required study by the Foreign Office and the 
Service Departments, he advised. The Foreign Office was perhaps 
particularly concerned "because of the possible effect on British 
influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East." 13 
From now onwards the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
consult repeatedly about the suspected goings-on between Mintoff's 
12 Ene., 27 Nov. 1962, sec., Wakefield/Eastwood, 28 Nov. 1962, sec., 472/62 on 926/ 
1876/48489. 
13 Wakefield/Eastwood, 28 Nov. 1963, sec., 472/62,926/1876/48489. 
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party and their Italian contacts. Sir John Ward told Holland Martin, 
who took him documents from Wakefield, that it would be "most 
useful if we could maintain direct contact on these affairs". It would 
be "very helpful if we could be warned whenever any Maltese V.I.P.s 
are about to visit Italy. "In the present state of relations between 
Malta and Italy", Ward wrote to Wakefield, "I think it is especially 
desirable that we should know when your people are coming here. 
We had no warning of Borg Olivier's visit and only learnt of it 
through the Italian press." It was agreed that the UK Commissioner 
in Malta, Sir Edward WakefIeld, and the British Ambassador in 
Rome, Sir John Ward, would start to exchange correspondence 
directly and to keep each other posted immediately of whatever they 
could find out about Malta-Italy relations, not only with regard to 
the MLP but also with regard to the PN. 14 These exchanges 
concerned Maltese official contacts with Italians and Italian 
economic and trade relations with Malta, especially "anything in the 
nature of economic, financial or technical aid and any large Italian 
investment projects in Malta."15 This 'early warning' arrangement 
was later extended by Wakefield being asked by the F.O., in 
consultation with the C.O., to also share his copy with the Governor 
and with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 16 
In reporting to the Foreign Office, Ward partly regurgitated what 
Wakefield had told him, adding some flavour to the story by putting 
it into his own words. Maltese politicians could be trying "to use the 
old threat of some form of link-up between Malta and Italy, as a 
means of putting pressure on H.M.G. to provide more economic 
aid." The Italian consul, backed perhaps by certain officials of the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seemed to be encouraging them. 
14 Crawley/Fairclough, min., 28 May 1963, 926/1876/48489. 
15 Ward/Wakefield, 4 Jan. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
16 Overton/Hugh-Jones, 29 Oct. 1963,926/1876/48489. Ward's reports to Douglas-
Home on the internal Italian political situation in 1963 were copied to Dorman, 
'Political Reports - Italy' encs., 'G' Files, NAM, ser. 71/63. 
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"This all sounds credible", he wrote, "and the situation needs to be 
watched carefully." On the other hand, while he had no information 
of what passed between Borg Olivier and the Italian Ministers, when 
Borg Olivier visited Rome at the end of Novervber 1962, it did seem 
to him "most unlikely that Ministers in the Italian Government, 
particularly Fanfani, would know anything about these intrigues, 
still less that they should want to encourage them." The present 
Italian Government, with all its problems, was hardly likely to want 
to take on "the virtually insoluble problem of Malta." However, the 
British ambassador thought it "just credible that in order to keep a 
finger in the Malta pie, they might respond to pressure from Maltese 
politicians by offering some form of economic or financial aid to 
Malta." He wondered how this would be viewed in London but 
supposed that the C.O. might be happy to take advantage of it to 
relieve some ofthe burden of supporting Malta's economy. Ifsome 
consortium could be set up in which the Italians could playa part, 
any aid they would be prepared to give to Malta could presumably 
be "so arranged as to carry no political strings."17 
The British embassy in Rome were requested to find out and report 
about Dr Borg Olivier's visit to Rome, which took place between 30th 
November and 3rd December 1962, just before he was due in 
London for a tete-a-tete with Sandys. The visit had been arranged for 
Borg Olivier by Dr Messina, in accordance with a proper 
authorization from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The items 
discussed during the visit were essentially economic in character. 
Italy was invited to participate in hydro-electric schemes, telephone 
communications and the tourism industry. The possibility was raised 
of unemployed Maltese workers, particularly dockyard metal-
workers, being absorbed in Italy, as was that of Italian subsidies to 
the Maltese Government. On the cultural side, it was expected that 
a number of Italian teachers would probably be sent to Malta, 
"seeing that up to the end of 1935 Italian was the official language 
on a par with English." (The Minister of Education, Dr Antonio 
17 Ward/Cheetham, 4 Jan. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
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THE UNITED KINGDOM COMMiSSIONER 
" St. Anoe Sn-eef 
Fiori ... 
Mall. G.c. 
Ttl. ClllolraL uns 
28th November. 1962. 
I enclose a note whioh I reoorded yesterd~ 
about a llIOve to subatitute Italy for Britain u 
Kalta's ProteotingPower. 
I have known ot the existence of this move 
for SOIll8 time, but have only recently been in 
a position to a8sess its real sign1fioanoe. 
As I han said in the 1811t paragraph of the 
nate. I tbilik the 1miMAp,Uonll- of this development 
require stud;y b1 the Porelp, Offioe and thG Service 
Departments. The Foreign O:t"fioe are. perhaps. 
particularly oonoerned beoause of the possible 
e:t"fect on British influence in the Kediterranean 
and the Iliddle Eut. 
-
C. G. Eastwood, Esq" CKG, 
Colonial O:t"fioa, 
~reat Smith street, 
B.W.l. 
SECRE~ 
THE ITALIAN OPTION 
CONFIDENTIAL 
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.l. 
(C lOJ.4/5(~ December 31, 1962. 
I have been asked to write to you about the brief 
~j prepared 'for the Malta discussions which examines (.-/ :possibility of association betV/eelt ~alta and Italy. 
2. You "aid on the telephone that in'vi6W of the good 
X 
progress now being made 1n the constitutional talks with 
the Malteee you d1dnot at first eignt think that there 
was much likelihood of their wa~t1ng·sny form of 
association with Italy. It.1~.also diffioult to believe 
that the Italians are serioUSly considering such a step. 
They would seem to have quite enougn on their hands already 
With the under-developed areas of Southern Italy and Sicily 
without burdening themselves with Malta aa well. Hav/ever, 
it always p09s1ble that national pride mignt outweigh 
economic and.Social ·considerations. The last thihg 
we want, particular~ in the middle of our E.E.C. 
negotiations, ~6·a row with the Italians over Malta, and 
I think we must keep a caref.ul eye on thio queet ion. 
3. It would be interest1ng to have your considered views , 
of how.far the Maltese are likely to have gone in discussing 
with the Italians the POS6ibility of Bome form ot 
~saociation with them and also what you think the likelihood 
i6 of th1S becoming a 11 'Ie ·issue. We should also of COllJ'Se 
like to have from you immediate warning' or· any further 
developments. 
4. I amsending scopy of this letter to Chanoery, Rome 
wi th .s "copy Of brief I! 10. 'We should ot course also welcomB 
any comments or intormation Which they might have. 
E.W.J. Crawley, Esq., 
Colonial Oftioe. 
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Alarm bells rang in some British circles at the prospect that an independent 
Malta might want "to substitute Italy for Britain" as her "Protecting Power". 
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Paris, who belonged to the Nationalist old-guard, was keen on 
upgrading the knowledge and somewhat restituting the place of 
Italian in Malta.) Most importantly, however, Borg Olivier was 
received by Fanfani, the Italian Prime Minister, in what was 
described as lengthy encounter. This by itself was indicative of a 
marked degree of Italian interest in Malta's fate. Among other 
things, Borg Olivier asked Fanfani for Italian help "in reaching some 
arrangement between the Common Market and Malta, 
independently of English entry into the Common Market."18 In 
addition to "a lengthy meeting with the Italian premier", according 
to the Italian press, and with other Ministers, Borg Olivier also 
visited some industrial pr~jects in northern Italy. 
Besides Borg Olivier's visit to Italy, other contacts during 1962 
included two visits by Dr Giovanni Felice, the number two man in 
the administration. The first of these was inJune, when on his way 
to Brussels for talks in connection with Malta's association with the 
E.E.C., he stopped in Rome and held talks with Dr E. Ortona, 
Director General for Economic Affairs in the Italian Foreign 
Ministry. He was apparently met on his arrival in Rome by Minister 
Emilio Colombo. The second Felice visit was in November, when he 
was on his way to Geneva for the 20th Conference of G.A.T.T. (the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade body). Dr Felice stopped 
in Milan where he had discussions "concerning applications for 
assistance under the Aids to Industries Board from important and 
potential industrialists." In between, in July, the Under-Secretary at 
the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Dr Ferdinando Storchi, visited 
Malta, where the Italian Government had a pavilion at the Malta 
Trade Fair. Storchi was accompanied by the President of the Istituto 
Nazionale per il Commercio Estero, Professor Giuseppe Dall'Oglio. 
During their stay they paid a courtesy call to Dr Felice in his capacity 
as Acting Prime Minister. 19 
18 Memo entitled 'Secret. Dr Borg Olivier's Visit to Italy - November 30 to December 
3, 1962', ene. 926/1876/48489. 
19 'Maltese/Italian Official Contacts', enc. 926/1876/48489. 
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All the indications are that the Borg Olivier administration's 
advances to Italy were primarily of an economic and particularly of 
an industrial nature, while at the same time they hoped to get some 
financial assistance under one guise or another. There were various 
projects which could be undertaken even jointly: for example, there 
was so far not even a regular car ferry linking Malta to Sicily. Borg 
Olivier was keen to see Malta associated as closely as possible with 
the Common Market as soon as possible but as Britain's entry was 
being vetoed by De Gaulle's France, he felt he could rely more on 
Italy than Britain for support in that direction. 
Asked to write to the C.O. about the brief MlO prepared "for the 
Malta discussions which examines the possibility of association 
between Malta and Italy", a Foreign Office official, Miss T. A. Solesby, 
registered the opinion that in view of the good progress now being 
made in the constitutional talks with the Maltese, it was not thought 
at first sight that there was "much likelihood of their wanting any 
form of association with Italy." It was also difficult to believe that the 
Italians were "seriously considering such a step." They seemed to 
have quite enough on their hands already with the under-developed 
areas of Southern Italy and Sicily, without burdening themselves 
with Malta as well: 
However, it is always possible that national pride might 
outweigh such economic and social considerations. The last 
thing we want, particularly in the middle of our E.E.C. 
negotiations, is a row with the Italians over Malta, and I 
think we must keep a careful eye on this question ... We 
should also of course like to have from you immediate 
warning of any further developments.2o 
In a follow-up to this, it was noted that discussions with Borg Olivier 
were proceeding on the understanding that Malta would become 
20 Solesby/CrawIey, 31 Dec. 1962, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
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independent within the Commonwealth. It was not inconceivable 
that if matters did not progress in the way Borg Olivier hoped, and 
in particular if he were dissatisfied with any financial assistance 
offered, "he might change his demand to one of independence pure 
and simple, but this would certainly be an abrupt change in his Party 
policy." It would, presumably, imply non-membership of the 
Commonwealth, and would leave open the question of association 
with any other nation. 
Independence 'without strings' is certainly the policy 
advocated by the Malta Labour Party who are the principal 
opposition in Malta; they have recently been making 
reference to the possible advantages of a political link up 
between Malta and Italy. Some reference has been made to 
the special relationship existing between Italy and San 
Marino.21 
The Colonial Office did not "at present attach much importance to 
this possibility." If things went smoothly, there would be an 
independent Malta as a full member of the Commonwealth: 
If however we run into serious difficulties as we very well 
may, then either the collapse of the independence 
discussions (the most likely possibility) or an attempt, after 
independence, to establish some form of special relationship 
with Italy, are both developments which certainly cannot be 
ruled out. ... it is relevant to remember the strong pro-
Italian sympathies expressed by the Malta Nationalist Party 
in the past, and the present policy being advocated by the 
Malta Labour Party.22 
21 Crawley/Solesby, 25 Jan. 1963, CI014/5 1962; MED 86/436/036, conf., para. 2, 
926/l876/48489. 
22 Ibid., para. 3. 
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There was however ample scope under the present constitutional 
arrangements for Malta to seek and accept aid from Italy should this 
be forthcoming. 23 
Mr Mintoff's secretive enquiries in Italy "about the prospect of an 
association between Malta and Italy" were known to Archbishop 
Gonzi as early as 19th January 1963, if not earlier, very probably 
from Italian sources. Wakefield saw Gonzi on that day and Gonzi 
told him as much. It seems he also confided to him a little more. 
Mintoff was allegedly told that the Italian authorities were not 
prepared to discuss this project with him "until he had made up his 
quarrel with the Church." Mintoff then was said to have made 
advances to the Archbishop with a view to a reconciliation. The 
Archbishop rejected these advances: 
The Archbishop told me that, knowing what the standard 
of living was in Sicily, he could see no advantage to Malta 
in any form of "integration" with Italy.24 
The British embassy in Rome was duly informed by the Foreign 
Office that on the political side, although the Malta Labour Party 
seemed "favourably inclined to some sort of tie-up with Italy," the 
present Maltese Government were "unlikely to want this unless our 
relations with them were to deteriorate seriously." On the economic 
side, there was no objection to Italian aid. "There is clearly nothing 
for us to worry about yet," John Cheetham informed the 
ambassador, "but we must keep an eye on possible 
developments .. :'25 
Malta's imports from Italy had actually decreased between 1957 and 
1961 from £3,334,000 to£2,974,000, but exports to Italy during the 
23 Ibid., para. 4. 
24 Wakefield despatch, 26 Jan. 1963,926/1876/48489. 
25 Cheetham/Ward, 22 Feb. 1963, con£., 926/1876/48489. 
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same period had more than doubled from £416,000 to £1,083,000. 
These figures have to be seen in the light of those for imports from 
Commonwealth and foreign countries, which amounted in 1961 to 
£29,433,000, and for exports, which amounted in all to £4,646,000. 
This meant that nearly one-fourth of Malta's total exports by 1961 
were starting to go to Italy. 
In July 1962 there was talk of I talian interest in establishing a large 
oil refinery at a cost of £10,000,000, of which £1,500,000 would be 
provided by the Malta Government as a grant. This never 
materialised; it was concluded that such an oil refinery project in 
Malta would be uneconomic. This view was also shared by the UK 
Government and by the Shell Oil Company. Negotiations for the 
setting up of an artificial yarn factory employing 400 workers were 
however progressing. This project had been approved by the Aids 
to Industry Board in Malta and would shortly go to the London 
Board; it was hoped that the project would be finalized and sent to 
the Colonial Office in mid-February 1963. There was also Italian 
interest in two first class hotels, for which however it was being 
proposed that the grant should be increased to 33 1/3% of capital 
outlay or £580 per bed whichever amount was less. 26 
While Britain's official line was that there was no objection to Malta 
seeking alternative routes to assistance by making contacts with 
countries other than Britain, in fact there always simmered a rather 
guarded and almost jealous disposition with regard to such 
advances, be they by Borg Olivier or Mintoff, with Italy, the U.S.A. 
or anywhere else. This applied particularly to larger projects, some 
of which could have a direct negative bearing on British interests, 
such as replacing B.E.A. by Alitalia as Malta's main carrier for 
instance; but it applied above all to any suggested displacement or 
upstaging by another country over Britain in Malta on 
independence. Although Anglo-Maltese relations had become quite 
close, especially as a result of shared life-and-death experiences and 
26 Ene., 926/1876/48489, 'Maltese-Italian Economic and Trade Relatios'. 
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intimacies during the War and the long-standing naval and maritime 
contacts not infrequently resulting in mixed marriages or life-long 
friendships, Malta was hardly sui generis in this respect. Hence the 
profound and slightly irrational importance attached by Britain to 
Commonwealth membership. 
In insisting on Malta's membership of the British Commonwealth 
and on the retention of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as the 
Queen of Malta, in much the same way as far larger ex-colonies such 
as Australia and Canada, Borg Olivier was softly softly, not 
unconsciously, nourishing the soul of a dying Empire badly in need 
of grace and salvation. Mintoff did the opposite, thereby distancing 
himself, although in truth he never formally renounced to the 
possibility of Commonwealth membership after independence. 
The Commonwealth was a continuum; it assured Britain a place in 
the world - a different one to be sure, a shadow of Empire. This 
duality in British approaches to decolonization was a cultural cringe. 
While decision-makers may have prided themselves on having 
reared and maybe 'civilized' their colonies all set to go, and here they 
were proudly letting the doves out, in fact long, delicate 
relationships, interests and assumptions had matured over time. The 
act of letting go, with the attendant risks including that of other 
powers possibly moving into the vacuum left behind, was not bereft 
of a hidden anguish. It was like a delivery. British embassies were 
thus very sensitive to what they regarded as the courteous 
observance of colonial protocol by Maltese politicians or otherwise 
when on visits abroad. They made it a point in despatches to 
mention whether these had called at the British embassy or not on 
arrival, or at some point during their stay, patting them on the head 
if they had, sneering or hissing if they had not. This applied a fortiori 
to British representation in Italy, where the Maltese felt more at 
home and could get around more easily through their knowledge 
of Italian, and for other reasons. 
What is surprising is how little the British embassy in Rome actually 
knew about Italo-Maltese goings-on, especially the MLP overtures. 
They would get the official programmes of visits, but there was not 
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much follow-up as to what actually went on, other than some 
additional information picked up here and there in conversation or 
over the telephone. An official programme could be just a cover for 
other things. They had to be prodded to produce a report on Borg 
Olivier's visit at the end of 1962 and his meeting with Fanfani. 
Wakefield seemed to know more about under-currents even in Italy 
through his informers in Malta and elsewhere, than Ward did 
through his sources in Italy, which admittedly was a much bigger 
country with many more things happening all the time. MI0, when 
engaged to look into this Italo-Maltese prospectus, did not come up 
with very much either, other than straws in the wind. 
Piecing everything together, it transpires that the lynch-pin of the 
operation in Malta was most probably Dr Onofrio Messina, the 
Italian consul. This assumption was historically a very plausible one 
and would mirror the inter-war pattern perfectly.27 Dr Messina's 
efforts could not have been unduly frowned upon by the Italian 
Government because, again in accordance with past precedent, he 
was soon raised to Consul-General while still serving in the same 
posting.28 
That however is not to exclude that Messina would have been in 
touch with Professor A. di Pietro, a Christian Democrat who was 
Professor of Italian and as such Head ofthe Department ofItalian, 
at the Royal University of Malta. Keen to restore Italo-Maltese 
relations after the rupture suffered as a result of the War, Professor 
di Pietro is known to have met Mintoff on a number of occasions. 
Wakefield never mentions him, nor does he readily give away his 
sources on this question. One of them, in January 1963, was 
27 On the role of the Italian consul, later raised to Consul General, in Malta, see H. 
Frendo, 'Italy and Britain in Maltese Colonial Nationalism', History of European Ideas, 
1992, vol. 15, pp. 733-739. 
28 See the relevant Note Verbale from the Italian Embassy, London. 9 Oct. 1963, for 
the F.O. to obtain the Queen's exequatur, ene. 926/1876/48489. 
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'!b.f!' Halie» llnbuay pru~mt their 
compliments: to the Foreign Off~ce: and have ttu 
honour to inform that tn. Italian O-ov6:'t"m)ent 
has decided to re.iee the Italian Connulate ill 
1(a1 teo to th.~ .to:t\\6 of Contiulate Gene:r-.e.l end 
to appoint Signor Onofrio M8,sllinaT at pre»tnt 
CQnBul 'in Mo.lta.. Italian Con}tUl General at Hid 
POllt. 
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"to tDrn.rd the r.4Il,&"u ....... Commiodon ot 4uoin.tlluurt 
and would be p"a~.:tu.l. it tAIt Porlt1sn Ott1"ett eoul,d 
OlluU the neoUltar1 .hP* to, b. ta.ken in ol"der to 
obtail:l lier Majeat7 toh. Queena Exeque.tur .. ~ 
A note verbale from the Italian 
embassy to the Foreign 
Office asking for The 
Queen's exequatur so that 
Signor Onofrio Messina 
could be upgraded from 
Consul to Consul General in 
Malta. 
Archbishop Gonzi; but Wakefield had been smelling a rat since the 
Autumn of the previous year. He mentions Dr Messina more than 
once, yet in quenching Wakefield's burning curiosity, Messina was, 
understandably, not very forthcoming. As an accredited diplomat 
Messina met and mixed socially with Wakefield. He was also friendly 
with his deputy, Ian Watt, sometimes inviting him to the theatre and 
soirees. In a typically condescending cheek by jowl colonial lingo, 
Watt portrayed Messina kindly and unkindly in the same breath: 
Although the Anglo/Maltese establishment out here drop 
awful hints about what they think Messina may be plotting, 
there is nothing in the least sinister about him. He is 
certainly not out to expel the British from Malta, and we get 
on very well with him. In fact, he is an awful pest, because 
he badgers us to go to entertainments with him far more 
frequently than I can bother with. He is a genial bubbling 
little man, not very bright, and a bit of a clown. However, 
he does count, as Italian Consul, with the Nationalists and 
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their supporters here, he is locally popular and we do in fact 
work in quite well with him.29 
Clown or not, in Italian diplomatic circles these MLP demarches were 
a guarded secret and remained so for a quarter-of-a-century. It is 
telling that when, at long last, an expose' appeared in an Italian 
periodical about aspects of this Italo-Maltese question in 1988, it was 
a onetime Italian diplomat who was responsible for it, Giuseppe 
Walter Macotta. This expose' also implicated the Governor, Sir 
Maurice Dorman, who indeed had his own ideas about a post-
Independence !talo-Maltese relationship, yet it would be quite 
wrong to see Dorman as having been in tow with Mintoff.3o A well-
meaning dignitary who liked Malta and who in 1967, as Governor-
General, would march 'four square' with Maltese protesters against 
British rundown discharges, Dorman was not one to stand back if 
he felt he could exercise influence or thought he knew something 
which others didn't. Being a nosy parker, while assuming a detached 
air, was his business. The reference in the MLP'sApril memorandum 
was to a hint he had dropped in his Candlemas Speech in February 
1963, but it was perhaps only natural to assume that Italo-Maltese 
relations would improve and become closer once Malta was 
independent. That fell far short of integration or federation. 
Mintoff's anticipated visit to Italy took place between the 13th and 
28th February 1963. He went to Rome soon after attending the 
29 'Maltese1Italian relations', Watt/Kisch, 8 Apr. 1963,472/63,926/1876/48489. On 
8 April Messina called Watt to tell him that he was on his way to London at the 
request of the Italian ambassador there. Watt suspected that Messina had been 
"given a free ride by B.E.A." who had just inaugurated their new Malta-London 
schedule "and have been dishing out free rides all round." It was however another 
timely coincidence, and Messina would also call at the C.O.; Watt hoped they would 
see him "and treat him nicely". 
30 H. Frendo, Malta' Quest for Independence, op.cit., p. 252, but see esp. Macotta's 
article in the J an.-J une 1988 issue of Malta Napoli, and the three already cited Sunday 
Times articles in Aug. 1988. On what might be called Dorman's Anglo-Italian special 
relationship idea for Malta, see below, pp. 362-364. 
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AAPSO conference in Tanganyika. Little was known in Malta about 
"the real purpose or scope of this visit", but the party's acting leader 
told the Legislative Assembly on 20th February that Mintoffwas "on 
an extensive tour of Italian industrial plants and he will be using the 
experience gained in the interests of the nation."31 
Wakefield wrote no less than three times (on 26th February, 8 th 
March and 12th March) to the British ambassador in Rome to find 
out what Mintoffwas up to in Italy, but Sir John Ward was away from 
Rome and he did not answer him before 7th May. They had been 
trying to get information on Mintoff's movements and contacts in 
Italy but it was "still proving extraordinarily difficult", Ward began. 
Mintoff had been invited not as Leader of the Opposition or of the 
MLP but in his capacity as a journalist, more precisely as a "special 
correspondent" of The Voice of Malta, his party's own organ in 
English. The visit was arranged, through the Italian consul in Malta, 
with the Press Section of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
According to Mintoff's official programme, which included two full 
days spent in the Republic of San Marino, he was to have had 
meetings in Rome with Confindustria, the Italian Employers 
Association, and with para-statal industrial organisations including 
E.N.1. and I.R.1. However, he was due to stay in Rome for five days. 
On 18th February he had a visit to the port of Genoa and the Ansaldo 
Shipyards there, and on the following day a visit to FIAT in Turin. 
From 20th to 22nd February he was in Milan, visiting the Corriere della 
Sera, the heavy machinery and motor manufacturers Innocenti, and 
the state petrol group E.N.I. at San Dona. He then went to San 
Marino via Bologna and Rimini. For his stay in San Marino on 2yd-
25 th February, no meetings were listed in the official programme, 
although he must certainly have had some there. Mter San Marino 
he returned to the Hotel Eliseo in Rome where he stayed for another 
31 Wakefield/Ward, 26 Feb. 1963, sec. 926/1876/48489. Wakefield was misinformed 
when in a letter to Eastwood at the C.O. on 26th January he had said that Mintoff 
had cancelled his plans for a visit to Italy. 
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three or four days without a fixed programme. "Whether or not he 
(Mintoff) followed this programme precisely we do not know", the 
British ambassador informed the UK commissioner, once again 
disappointingly.32 
On his part, Wakefield had received information, from a confidential 
source, that Mintoff, when he was in Rome, used the Czech Embassy 
there as a means of establishing contact with the Russians. He also 
found out that when the case of Malta had come up before the UN 
Committee of 24 inMay, "the Italian delegate was most helpful in 
paving the way to a relatively innocuous resolution." Mintoff had 
been hoping that the Committee would send a fact-finding mission 
to Malta to enquire into the conduct of the elections held in 
February 1962.33 
In fact, Mintoff visited Italy, and also Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
West Germany. He claimed that at the AAPSO conference in 
Tanganyika he tried to settle the quarrel between the Chinese 
Communists and the Indians; and that he reproved the Russians for 
not supporting enough the Maltese bid for Independence in the UN 
sub-committee. In Rome, Mintoff had discussions with Nenni and 
with members of the Italian Communist Party. In Vienna and in 
Bonn he discussed with Austrian and German Socialists the 
provision of printing machinery for the Freedom Press.34 In 
Prague, Mintoff described the situation in Malta and discussed the 
possibility of Czechoslovakia granting aid to an independent Malta, 
free of Western bases. Mintoff himself referred publicly to his 
32 WardlWakefield, 7 May 1963, sec. 92611876/48489. 
33 WakefieldlWard, 21 May 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
34 The Freedom Press was just being completed at Marsa, largely through voluntary 
labour after hours and in week-ends, including Sundays, which caused the local 
church to frown even publicly. (When in power later, Mintoffhad the Freedom Press 
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travels and contacts, adding that he was prepared to take delegations 
elsewhere, including Russia. It was assumed that contacts between 
Mintoff and the Czechs were first made through the Czech embassies 
in Rome and in Vienna. 35 
During a rally in Birkirkara on lOth March, barely a week after his 
return, Mintoff was translated verbatim as having uttered the 
following words in connection with his visit to Italy (where he was 
accompanied by the MLP International Secretary Zarenu Dalli): 
In Italy we met all the political parties. We told them from 
the start that we were democratic Socialists and wanted 
Malta to live in peace ... We said that if possible we wanted 
nobody's forts in Malta because forts have brought us 
hunger. We said that the Maltese had a right to be like 
others, to trade with others. They all agreed, from Fanfuni's 
party down to the Communists. They agreed, and promised 
to work hand in hand to see how Malta, with Italy's help, 
could regain her strength, and to ensure that they woud not 
have a fortress so close to them which could turn against 
them.36 
This all too familiar Mintoffian manner of address was clearly meant 
to prepare supporters for a more favourable disposition towards Italy 
than the MLP had generally tended to demonstrate in the past. It also 
implied an ideological bias. Historically, forts could be said to have 
brought Malta soldiers and sailors, ships and wars, but hardly hunger. 
Theoretically and idealistically, one could argue that thge strategic 
imperative had restricted a more homegrown and, internally, a better 
sustained and spread economic developmnent. However, the point 
Mintoff was canvassing here, in his schoolmasterly style reaching 
down to the lowest common denominator, was not such under-
35 Int .. , rep., 3 Mar.-l Apr. 1963, sec., ff. 1-2, para. 5-6,926/1822/48655. 
36 Wakefield/Ward, 12 Mar. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
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development theory: it was primarily an ideological standpoint on 
neutrality depicted as a policy for peace. In this extract the word 
'neutrality' was not mentioned; it was probably too conceptual for 
his audience to grasp so he avoided it. The confusion arises from the 
presumed Italian help so that Italians would not have fortresses (in 
Malta) which could turn against them. Ifthis was meant to be an anti-
NATO posture, then it was hardly an Italian one, for Italy was a full 
member of NATO, and HAFMed in Floriana was very much part of 
the same collective security mechanism. If that was what the Italians 
had told him, he must have been thinking of Nenni or Togliatti; or 
was it Nasser and the East Europeans? Mintoff may also have had 
in mind the provision which would be inserted in the MLP 
memorandum then being finalised - it was sent out only a few weeks 
after this public meeting. In it, the possibility was raised "that (in 
Italy) Malta should remain a neutral territory like Singapore."37 
In the last week of February 1963 the Italian Minister for Education, 
Professor Gui, visited Malta at the invitation of his Maltese counter-
part, Dr Paris. The purpose of Gui's visit was to attend the unveiling 
ceremony of the two Caravaggio frescoes at St John's Co-Cathedral 
in Valletta, which had been restored in Italy free of any charge to the 
Malta Government. Italy had also sent experts for the restoration of 
Mattia Preti's works in St John's. In recognition of this and other 
Italian assistance in the artistic, cultural and educational field, 
Minister Gui was awarded an LL.D. degree honoris causa by the Royal 
University of Malta. In his oration on this occasion, Mgr Edoardo 
Coleiro, Malta's best-known classical scholar, thanked the Italian 
nation for the contribution which it had made to the arts and culture 
of the Western world, as well as for the help afforded "to those of our 
youths who have sought to continue their studies in Italian 
univesities and academies", as well as for these important works of 
37 See para. 26 of the April memorandum, pp. 332-333. 
38 Mgr Coleiro (1914-1996) was Professor of Latin, and Head of the Department of 
Latin and Classical Studies, at the University; he was also much involved in the 
preservation of artistic works at St John's. 
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restoration.38 Shortly afterwards, an article by "Cato" (Sir Arturo 
Mercieca) recalled "the century-old bonds, recorded by history, 
which have linked together our Islands with our great continental 
neighbour." The article emphasized Malta's close links - ethnic, 
cultural, religious, political, artistic, folkloristic - with Italy, and 
especially with Sicily, throughout the ages. From the fossils of great 
vertebrates dating back to the quaternary era to megalithic temples 
of the neolithic age, "Cato" scanned the passage to "the latinity" after 
the Roman defeat of Carthage and the raising of Malta to a 
municipal status, the conversion to Christianity during St Paul's 
shipwreck on his way to Rome in the first century, the barbaric 
invasions and the conquest of Sicily by the Arabs, wherefrom they 
extended their domination over Malta: 
When their power in Sicily came to nought, Count Roger 
d'Altavilla delivered the Islands (1090), which thereafter 
actively participated in the glorious communal life, with the 
rest of Italy, by virtue of the 'Comune' (Universita') of 
Sicilian type, as an integral part of the Sicilian Crown's 
domain. The Normans, the Swedes, the Anjevins and the 
Aragonese contended with one another for the Sicilian 
throne, but did not disturb the rhythm of Maltese life, Malta 
being ever present in all salient moments of Sicilian history. 
The battle of the 'Vespri', for instance, ended in the waters 
of our Grand Harbour, when Ruggero di Lauria defeated 
the Angevins (in June 1283) ... 
Written with as much sentiment as veracity, "Cato'''s article almost 
put into question British sovereign rights over Malta, half-implying 
that these remained Italian. No wonder it made its way to London 
to sit on the C.O:s Mediterranean desk for deciphering. It was 
perfectly timed, too. Here was a noticeable shift, a seeming 'national' 
convergence, what with Antonio Paris and Edoardo Coleiro - and 
Dom Mintoff - saying how much Italy could help Malta. Quite apart 
from references to the Admiral of Frederick II's fleet, Enrico di 
Malta, or to a 'Tridentine' definition of Malta by Mgr. Royes as the 
"Antemurale d'Jtalia", or to the qualification of Malta "as an Italian 
region" in the treaties of 1814 and 1815, the learned correspondent 
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was not very academic in his opening sentences. Recent events had 
shown, he said, that the relations between Britain and Italy were 
"more cordial than what they have ever been." The Italian 
Government was "warmly advocating the entry of the British nation 
in the Common Market." The friendly exchange of visits by Mr 
Fanfani to London and of Mr Macmillan to Rome, and the 
discussions held between them, "brought to light a perfect 
unanimity of views on the chief problems of the present day." And 
finally: "we have had among us, for a couple of days, the guest of 
our Government, the Italian Minister of Education, Prof. Luigi Gui, 
who inaugurated the new premises of the local Dante Alighieri."39 
Later in the year, Dr Paris, who was in his seventies, returned Gui's 
visit and was officially decorated by an Italian gold medal in 
recognition for his services to education and culture. To Wakefield's 
unremitting chagrin, Paris had in 1962 referred in the Assembly to 
Malta's" 160 years of colonial martyrdom". He was not, therefore, 
one of his "favourite ministers". A member of the small and 
diminishing band of senior members of the Nationalist Party, he 
belonged to "the pro-Italian school of politics."4o 
The British ambassador in Rome was comforted by the news that 
Gui "did call on the Governor and did comply with the normal rules 
of conduct" during his Malta visit.41 However, when Paris went to 
Rome in October he did not get in touch with Ward - which was just 
as well because he was away.42 Italian was again made a compulsory 
subject in competitive examinations for clerical appointments in the 
39 'Malta and Italy', by Cato, The Bulletin, 25 Mar. 1963, enc. 926/1876/48489. Mr 
Justice Mercieca (1878-1969) was a long-time president of the Societa' Dante 
Alighieri in Malta, and was awarded a gold medal by the Italian Repubic in 1961. 
40 WakefieldfWard, 24 Sept. 1963, con£., 926/1876/48489. 
41 WakefieldfWard, 21 May 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
42 WardfWakefield, 17 Oct. 1963, conf., 926/1876. 
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civil service, in addition to English and Maltese.43 Replying to Gui's 
speech of welcome in Rome, Paris said the Maltese felt the need to 
develop even closer ties with the Italian people. For this reason they 
needed friends and there was no country in which they felt "more 
at home than Italy."44 The first and last time a Maltese premier had 
dared express such cordial sentiments towards Italy in Rome, not 
in an official award ceremony but in an after-dinner speech, he had 
been forced to resign on returning home. That was in 1923, forty 
years earlier, and times were slowly changing.45 
On his return, Paris gave a press conference at the airport. Professor 
Gui, he said, "intended to investigate the Nationalist Government's 
wish to improve the study of the Italian language and culture in 
Malta." Although the English tongue was "of unique necessity to 
Malta", Dr Paris added, the study of other languages was important 
and "he hoped that in a gradual manner Italian language and 
culture would once more assume the position they held in Malta 
thirty years ago, when Italian was taught as a compulsory subject in 
the schools as well as English. He hoped that the Italian Government 
would donate the necessary books." Putting the clock back in this 
way may indeed have been controversial in some quarters, but 
Wakefield put his blinkers on in reacting as he did even to the 
Minister of Education's inauguration of a major Italian 
archaeological dig starting in Malta at about the same time: 
Dr Paris gave additional evidence of his pro-Italian 
sympathies by having himself photographed swinging a pick 
43 WakefieldlWard, 28 Aug. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
44 Ward/Wakefield, 17 Oct. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
45 Chev. Joseph Howard was the first Maltese Head of Government from 1921 to 1923, 
under the internal self-government constitution of 1921. On this incident, provoked 
mainly by Sir Gerald Strickland and a Stricklandian reporter in Rome, see H. Frendo, 
'Early Italian Fascist Influences on Maltese Colonial politics'. S. Fiorini and V. Mallia 
Milanes (eds.). Malta: A Case Study in International'Cross Currents (Univ. of Malta, 1991), 
pp. 227-240. The accusation that Howard had met Mussolini was not true. 
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when an Italian team from Rome University began 
archaeological work on a site where, apparently, a Professor 
Cagiano hoped to find traces of Roman and Greek seamen's 
settlements. It was announced that the Italian Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Education had helped considerably in 
sending Dr Cagiano and his colleagues to Malta.46 
The Cagiano de Azevedo mission's seminal findings were eventually 
published in Italy in a multi-volume corpus of considerable 
importance to the existing state of knowledge on Maltese and 
Mediterranean archaeology. 
Dr Felice too kept beavering away at the Italians. In September 1963 
Felice was in Italy for UN Conference on Travel and Tourism. He was 
accompanied by John Pollacco, who chaired the Malta Government 
Tourist Board; he had also been nominated by the Maltese 
Government to represent Malta on the UK Delegation to the 
conference in question. Not being independent, Malta could only be 
attached to the UK Delegation, like representatives from Gibraltar, 
Mauritius and Hong Kong. Dr Felice had proved the exception to the 
usual rule that "Maltese Ministers avoid the British Embassy like the 
plague", but otherwise the embassy did not see much either of him or, 
even less, ofPollacco: "maybe they have been jointly engaged in some 
business with the Italian Government unknown to us, although I think 
it very unlikely that they will get many tourists from Italy (since Malta 
is so like the south of their own country) or a great deal of money for 
developing tourism or anything else, since Italy is going through a 
rather difficult patch ... "47 
Early in October Felice was also in Italy, where he was again well 
received. At the end of his visit he announced that later on in the 
year Professor Nervi, a famous architect, would be coming to Malta 
46 Wakefield/Ward, 21 Oct. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489 
47 Ward/Wakefield, 9 Sept. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
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in the interests of an Italian syndicate who would be building a hotel 
there. In London, The Times reported the news on 2nd October. "As 
you know", Wakefield told Ward in mentioning it, "the Nationalist 
Party ... is traditionally pro-Italian." 
Its attitude to Britain is ambivalent. Dr Borg Olivier 
approves the award to Maltese of Italian decorations, but 
disapproves of British awards! The younger members of the 
government, however, are less influenced by the old ties 
with pro-Italian sentiment.48 
Some top Italian politicians and industrialists were showing an 
interest in what Malta had to offer. These included the Italian 
Minister of the Budget, equivalent in Britain to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Giuseppe Medici, and Dr Furio Cigogna, who in 
addition to being President of Confindustria, headed the textiles 
division of the powerful Edison Group.49 
Maltese missions to Italy became a shuttle. No sooner had Paris and 
Felice returned that a 'Maltese Government Economic Mission' went 
out for a 12-day visit at the invitation of the Italian Government. The 
Italian Government even sent an official from the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry to Malta to travel back to Rome with the delegation. This 
included senior civil servants together with representatives of the 
Malta Federation of Industries, the Malta Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Malta Bankers Association.5o It consisted of Alfred Wirth, 
Wilfred Podesta', Charles Galea Enriquez, Joseph Portelli, Anthony 
Spiteri Mallia and Louis Vella. 
The most senior member was Wirth, the top civil servant in the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance since 1959, who had 
48 Wakefield/Ward, 12 Oct. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. 
49 WardlWakefield, 17 Oct. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
50 Wakefield/Ward, 21 Oct. 1963', conf., 926/1876/48489. 
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earlier worked as a statistician and census officer. A member of the 
Aids to Industries Board since its inception in 1959, Wirth 
participated in a number of government delegations and missions. 
He was involved in the negotiation of the first World Bank loan to 
Malta in 1962, and soon enough he would be engaged in the 
negotiations in the UK leading to the financial agreement with the 
British government on independence. Podesta' was the Director of 
Industry since 1962 but he had also served in an acting capacity as 
chairman of the Aids to Industries Board. Galea Enriquez was a 
qualified agricultural economist who had studied overseas; he 
headed the marketing section in the Department of Agriculture and 
liaised with the Rome-based Food and Agricultural Organisation. 
Portelli, Spiteri Mallia and Vella represented the three non-
governmental organisations, each of which - industry, commerce 
and banking - was absolutely crucial to any economic rebirth of the 
country in the nineteen sixties. 
Among the leading industries visited by this Economic Mission there 
were E.N.1. at San Donato, the rubber factory Pirelli, and the Mactes 
textile machinery plant in Milan; FIAT in Turin; Ansaldo and N uovo 
San Giorgio in Genoa; and the steel works and power station at Terni. 
The mission had been briefed to follow up on points which had been 
raised during Felice's visits, in particular the procuring of a sea-water 
de-salting plant, the inclusion of Malta in the Italian tourism 
programme, the setting up of a car ferry service between Italy and 
Malta, and the training of hotel industry apprentices in Italy. Other 
matters indicated for discussion comprised the prospecting for oil in 
Malta by E.N.I., the granting ofaloan to Malta for which the amount 
so far had not been specified, and the inclusion of Malta in theAlitalia 
flight network. The most hopeful of these projects seemed to be the 
start-up of an Italy-Malta car ferry service.51 
The Maltese were very keen to enlist Alitalia's interest to 
complement - or even to replace - B.E.A. Relations between the 
51 WardIWakefield, 29 Oct. 1963, sec., 926/1876/48489. See below II, 13. 
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Malta Government and B.E.A. were very strained and the Malta 
Government would like "to break B.E.A.'s present monopoly of air 
services to and from Malta." Strangely, Salvino Mizzi, Secretary for 
Industrial Development and Chairman of the Aids to Industries 
Board since 1962, was said not to have heard either of Dr Cicogna 
or the Edison group in connection with Chatillon or any other Malta 
project.52 
During a high level meeting with Confindustria which Wirth 
addressed for the Maltese side as the Acting Financial Secretary, the 
changing politico-economic position of Malta was explained in 
detail, as were the incentives which Malta was offering to attract 
industries, with a view to bringing this to the notice of Italian 
industrial concerns. The development programme envisaged for the 
period 1964-1969 provided in the main for generous assistance to 
be given to firms wishing to set up industries. The initial phase of 
the development plan provided for £3 million to be spent on such 
assistance, and later on a further £6 million would be forthcoming. 
Such firms could get from 33% to 50% of the cost of construction of 
new industrial plant in Malta, and tax exemption for a period of ten 
years. Machines imported up to a value of £3,000 would be exempt 
from customs duty, and there would be reduced rates for values 
exceeding this. The areas set aside for industrial construction were 
in the neighbourhood ofthe port and some two miles away from it. 
Among the Italian firms which had already accepted the Maltese 
invitation were Chatillon and Ignis Synthetic FibresP 
Questioned over Anglo-Maltese relations, the members of the 
mission remained unperturbed. They asserted that everything was 
going smoothly with the British government and they had every 
hope that once independence was achieved, their association with 
Britain within the Commonwealth would give "security and stability" 
52 Wakefield/\Vard, 6 Sept. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489. See below II, 13. 
53 On economic diversification see below II, 13. 
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to their economy. Wirth noted thaOt of the 12,000 men previously 
employed by the naval dockyard, 6,000 had been discharged. The 
training of this labour force, Wirth added, would be carried out by 
government through the medium of technical schools at various 
levels. He pointed out that the problem of unemployment could 
only be solved by setting up new industries. The Maltese 
government had "great hopes" of increasing its tourist trade and was 
extending and modernising facilities for tourists. Mr Wirth gave the 
meeting to understand that Malta was not expecting any aid from 
the Italian government, except perhaps "the gift of a ferry-boat."54 
Another interlocutor in Rome in this domain, later on in the year, 
was Dorman, who had gone to Rome mainly for his audience with 
the Pope. 55 However, he also called on Signor Fornari, the 
Director-General of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, at which a number of other Italian officials were also present. 
In this meeting, Dorman was accompanied by Mr D. S. Laskey from 
the British embassy. 
Mter explaining the serious balance of trade problem Malta had and 
how unemployment would be rising as a result of the rundown of 
the British services, he flew his kite about should-be Italo-Maltese 
relations in the near future. In his view, Malta should have "a special 
relationship both with the U.K. and with Italy." This would be "a 
natural arrangement" and he saw no difficulty arising on the part 
of H.M.G. about the establishment of "such a relationship between 
Malta and Italy." 
Malta had now lost lost much of its strategic importance but 
it was in the interest of NATO, and particularly of our two 
countries, that the island should be reasonably content and 
not a source of disturbance. 
54 WardAVakefield, 21 Nov. 1063, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
55 On this see above, l, 10. 
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As regards the role which Italy could play, Dorman said that he 
hoped the Italian authorities would make clear to visiting Maltese 
Ministers the sort of aid which Italy might be able to provide and 
also the limits to what Italy could do. The Maltese had, he told the 
Italians, "a very exaggerated idea about the readiness of foreign 
countries to provide all sorts of assistance as soon as the island 
became independent." He also hoped that Italy could take a share 
in Malta's industrial development. A start was being made by the 
factories under construction - Chatillon was mentioned yet again -
and there were three Italian groups interested in hotel 
development. 
Fornari thanked Dorman for his explanation and said that Italy was 
certainly sympathetic to Malta's needs: 
In present circumstances Italy could not contemplate cash 
grants and there were difficulties about meeting Maltese 
requests for loans at very low rates of interest. There was 
however a project for running a car and passenger ferry 
from Siracusa to Malta and he hoped that this would be 
approved by the new Italian Government. 
Fornari thought there were prospects for developing tourism and 
that Italians might well be able to help over this. It might well be 
possible, too, for some unemployed Maltese to go and work in Italy. 
As the shortage of trained workers in Italy increased, there might 
well be openings for Maltese. Asked about the political situation, 
Dorman said that the present Prime Minister, Mr Borg Olivier, was 
pro-Western and this was also true of the majority of Maltese. Mr 
Mintoffwas not, he thought, a Communist "but he was certainly an 
opportunist and would not refuse Russian help if it was offered." 
Dorman also used his visit in Rome to meet with the Italian Chief of 
Army Staff, General Alcia, and the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral 
Giuriati, at a reception held at the British embassy, and spoke in 
similar terms about maintaining Malta's connection with the West. He 
considered it very important that the NATO command should remain 
in Malta. He was not concerned with the NATO command structure 
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or the nationality of the Commander, but he thought that if the 
Command were ever moved from Malta, for example to Naples, "this 
would be taken by the Maltese to mean that they had been abandoned 
by NATO." General Alcia said that he personally strongly endorsed 
these views and was sure that all responsible people in Italian 
government and Service circles were of the same opinion. He was 
delighted to hear such views from Sir Maurice himself. Admiral 
Giuriati on the other hand was a good deal less receptive.56 
Before Christmas, Sir John Ward visited Malta and held meetings 
with leading personalities on the Island, with Dorman's assistance. 
I t was agreed that he should also call on the Leader of the 
Opposition. From the descriptions given it would seem that Lorry 
Sant and Attard Kingswell also sat in during the meeting. Mr Mintoff 
received Sir John in a friendly way albeit with a certain reserve, but 
was at pains not to embarrass him in any way throughout the 
conversation: 
He did not mention by name Archbishop Gonzi, but he said 
that the whole political and social situation in Malta was false 
and out-of-date, based on a tyranny by the Church which 
was bound soon to come to an end as it had done long ago 
in most other countries. He implied that it was only the 
Church and its interference in political affairs that stood 
between the Labour Party and victory. 
When Ward said that in touring around he had been quite 
impressed by the development of both tourism and light industry, 
Mintoff said it was all "quite uncoordinated and inadequate." A 
really proper plan was needed for the industrial development of the 
island and this should be put through with the utmost energy and 
speed since the situation was becoming desperate. Malta could not 
compete for mass tourism, he held, but should go for the better 
56 Laskey/Cheetham, 25 Nov. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489. On Malta-NATO 
relations, see esp. below, II, 15; and III, 16. 
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educated middle-class tourists who anyway brought in most money. 
Emigration he condemned as "bleeding the island to death by taking 
away its best people." 
Ward was greatly taken aback when Mintoff said that independent 
Malta in future should have five diplomatic missions: London, 
Rome, Washington-New York, Moscow and Peking: 
When he mentioned Peking, I commented that it seemed an 
awful long way from Malta; but he replied that these days 
it was essential to be represented in Peking. Although he did 
not repeat to me his alleged remark that he would turn to 
the Communists if he could not get the economic help that 
Malta needed from Britain or the United States, it was fairly 
obvious what was on his mind .... 
With regard to Italy, Ward said that he had seen the site of the new 
Chatillon factory and hoped that there might be more similar 
initiatives from Italy, which was now suffering from a labour 
shortage. Mintoff replied that Italian interest in Malta had so far 
been "disappointing" and "they had failed to come forward as he 
had hoped." He mentioned in particular that since the death of "his 
friend' Enrico Mattei, the KN.1. had been elusive. Ward thought 
that the Italians were understandably cautious about their relations 
with Malta "since they did not wish to give the impression that they 
were returning to Fascist policies." 
Mr Mintoff disagreed and said that the reason why Italy was 
not showing more interest in Malta was that she did not wish 
to get foul of the British Government. While he did not say 
so in so many words, it was clear that he was implying that 
H.M.G. were holding Italy back from helping Malta.57 
57 'Note on Conversation with the Leader of the Opposition of the Malta Labour 
Party in his room at the Parliament Buildings in Malta, December 14,1963', conf., 
enc. Collings/Kisch, 23 Jan. 1964, conf., 926/1876/48489. Ward's minutes of his 
meeting with Mintoff were dated 31 Dec. 1963. 
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Ward did not agree with Mintoff's assessment which, however, could 
well have been the more sensory. Mintoffwas disappointed by Italy. 
It was as if he felt let down. . 
Did those who had been keen to put !talo-Maltese relations on an 
integral footing been dissuaded or nudged into a standing or cooling 
off? What had become of that April memorandum? The Republic of 
San Marino? And the autonomous regional government alternative? 
Neither Ward nor Mintoff said anything about it. Had the whole 
project been stopped in its tracks by someone? Had the party itself 
thought better of it? The British certainly were not pleased with it: it 
put them on alert, they started enquiring, watching out, warning one 
another. Even the Nationalists came under suspicion through 
occasional and dated skeleton-in-the-cupboard allusions. Perhaps the 
higher echelons in the Italian Government did not go along with it 
when they found out about it, or saw it as premature. Contrary to what 
Sir Edward Wakefield had conjectured behind his back, Archbishop 
Gonzi had told him fortrightly that he knew about it and disagreed 
with it. He saw no advantage to Malta in it; Sicily was worse off. (He 
may also have been less sure of "Catholic Italy" than Wakefield had 
readily assumed.) If Gonzi knew about this, Borg Olivier must have 
known about it too, although, if so, he certainly did not play it up. If 
the Independence negotiations were stalling it was largely because the 
church would not give way on any count. It would have been highly 
impolitic to introd uce an additional irritant, extraneous to the matters 
at hand. Had "the tyranny of the Church" intercepted this volley as 
well, thereby preventing the Maltese from becoming (in the stinging 
words of one correspondent) "Sicilians of the South"?58 (And 
simultaneously in that eventuality, one might add, full members ofthe 
EEC.) But that MLPvolley was itself hypothetical, it was a side show, 
and an exploratory one at thaLAny fear by the British of such a Maltese 
fall-back position, real or imagined, could once more have served as 
grist to Borg Olivier's mill. As no doubt did Mintoff's adventureous 
neutralist stance, the hob-knobbing with dubious leftists and 
58 H. Frendo, Malta's Quest for Independence, op.cit., p. 251. 
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revolutionaries. The Antonio Paris 'pro-Italian' posture was tangential 
in post-war Malta: to read too much into it would be misleading. In 
any case, colonialism was coming to an end. 
Towards the conclusion of his meeting with Ward, Mintoff became 
a bit worked up about the alleged injustices to his party and said that 
the British government were "making a big mistake by thinking that 
they could fix with Dr Borg Olivier, and his Church-dominated 
Government, the future relations between the U.K. and Malta." 
He asserted that he had during his recent visit to London 
told Mr Duncan Sandys to his face that when the Labour 
Party came into power in Malta they would repudiate the 
Defence Agreement and any other Anglo-Maltese 
agreements that were being negotiated with the present 
Government of Malta and that these agreements would then 
have to be negotiated all over again. 59 
Symptomatic of this and simultaneous with it was the Italian concern 
that Malta should join the Council of Europe immediately upon 
becoming independent. The Deputy U.K. representative in the 
Council of Europe, jasper Leadbitter, reported to the Foreign Office 
a conversation he had had with his Italian colleague about relations 
between the Council of Europe and Malta after Malta became 
independent in 1964. The Italian government were "anxious that 
Malta should be brought into the Council of Europe as soon as 
possible after independence." 
The Italians fear that Yugoslavia, or possibly one of the East 
bloc countries, will try to bring Malta into the Communist 
orbit, and they therefore consider it important that the 
island should come under the influence of a Western 
organisation as soon as possible.5o 
59 'Note on Conversation with Leader of the Opposition .. .', op.cit., f. 3, para. 9. 
60 Sprague/Vaughan, 26 Nov. 1963, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
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In deliberating on how to reply to the Foreign Office about this 
advance, the Mediterranean desk would have given "a more 
fortright reply" had they been certain "that no elections will take 
place before independence", since Dr Borg Olivier had already 
indicated his intention to align with the West: 
N ow that there is the possibility of elections we cannot 
disregard the possibility of Mr Mintoff being returned 
however slight this may be. On balance, the prospects of 
Malta remaining with the West are infinitely better than her 
falling to the Communist bloc if only because of the 
influence of the Church.61 
The Strasbourg approach was being considered in the wake of the 
just failed second round of Maltese all-party consultations in 
London, in the course of which the Mintoff, Pellegrini and Ganado 
parties seemed to team up in favour of fresh elections, if only to force 
a referendum in the end. But there was also Borg Olivier's threat, 
made to Sandys, that if the dockyard workers were sacked 
indiscriminately or arbitrarily, without consultation with the Maltese 
government, he would "resign at once".62 
As to "the likely relations between the Council of Europe and an 
independent Malta", therefore, the Colonial Office couched their 
response in the following terms. The present Government of Malta 
had openly proclaimed itself as favouring closer relations with the 
West. This attitude was shared by the three smaller Opposition 
parties. The main opposition party, the Malta Labour Party, 
however, "publicly favours a neutralist policy and is apparently 
prepared to deal wherever it can obtain the best terms." It was not 
yet clear whether or not independence would be preceded by 
elections but in any case it seemed "unlikely that the Malta Labour 
61 Min., Crawley/Jenkins, 11 Dec. 1963,926/1876/48489. 
62 See above, I, 8. 
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Party could win a clear majority in the Legislature in the immediate 
future." Moreover, they added, one must take into account the fact 
that the Roman Catholic Church exercised a very strong influence 
in Malta "so that it is difficult to foresee the country ever coming 
wholly under the influence of the Communist bloc." 
On balance, we would therefore expect Malta to continue to 
align itself with the West after independence and to seek 
membership of or association with Western organisations.63 
The Foreign Office delved further into the matter, following it up 
with despatches and telegrams to their diplomatic staff in Rome. A 
meeting on Malta, which was also attended by Bernard Ledwidge 
from the Foreign Office's Western Department in London, was 
therefore held with Signor Gaja and other officials of the Italian 
Foreign Ministry as Malta's Independence approached. The Italians 
were keen to be informed and updated on how Malta's approaching 
independence was proceeding and of the exact date for which it was 
now earmarked. 
Precious little Italian economic help had materialised so far. Even 
the Siracusa-Valletta ferry service had been turned down by the 
Italian financial ministries for the time being, in spite ofthe backing 
it had from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and indeed from the 
British, who argued that even a small measure of aid could help "in 
maintaining a Western orientation in Malta." 
On the question of the NATO base, the British side explained that 
it had some economic importance for the Maltese, 
but was even more important psychologically, as its removal 
might give the Maltese the impression that they were being 
abandoned by the West. Gaja said that while the Italians 
would prefer on practical grounds to have only one NATO 
63 Jenkins/Sprague, 24 Dec. 1963, MED.86/8/073, conf., 926/1876/48489. 
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headquarters, i.e. the headquarters at Naples, they 
recognised the arguments for continuing a headquarters in 
Malta, and would agree provided that the question of 
command could be settled in a way satisfactory to Italy. 
Mr Ledwidge said that the Italian position was understood in 
London and was being taken into account "in current studies of 
future defence arrangements in the island."6<1 
64 Laskey/Ledwidge, 10 June 1964, sec., 926/l876/48489. 
13 
The Push to DiversifY the Economy 
INDUSTRY, TOURISM, 
EMIGRATION 
Given her dependence on British and Imperial naval, maritime and 
instrastructural priorities for so long, the forecasts for successful 
economic diversification in the early Sixties were glum if not 
catastrophic. Both the Stolper and Joint Study investigations 
concluded that the multiplier effect of the British Services Rundown 
in drastically reducing jobs and expenditure within a few years, 
could only be counter-balanced by a major injection of capital 
investment in manufacturing industry, tourism and to a lesser 
extent in agriculture. In addition, however, tens of thousnds of 
people would be expected to emigrate from the Maltese Islands over 
a decade, thereby negativing population growth, and indeed 
depopulating. As the projections set by the first five year 
development plan starting in 1959 had not materialised, the Borg 
Olivier administratrion, with British assistance, tried hard to make 
good for the losses being incurred by the Rundown through a steady 
push for diversification. The worst scenario sometimes contemplated 
in British circles was that in decolonizing the Maltese would suffer 
great economic hardship: in spite of mass emigration, there would 
be a marked drop in lving standards and even rampant poverty. 
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Unsustainable economic hardship would in turn cause internecine 
fighting and political instability, thereby necessitating British 
intervention to restore order and to sort things out. 
While little if any progress was being registered among the Maltese 
parties on the political front, efforts to revamp and redirect the 
Maltese economy were moving ahead. This push for economic 
diversification was urgently necessary in the short-term to combat 
the rundown, but it was also necessary in the long-term to render 
future development less dependent on British spending and 
shrinking Imperial needs in a world that was fast changing, making 
new demands. Malta had to get out of her colonial cocoon, and 
quickly. While fluctuations, external and internal, could not be 
excluded from any economic plan, it was clear that development had 
to be more 'home-grown' and 'rationalized' on a sounder footing. 
The hope was that such a diversification could be accomplished in 
substance and in time, thereby permitting further generation of 
investment and restructuring to create new employment openings. 
With doom and gloom being preached all round - from Stolper to 
the Joint Report to Dorman's Candlemas speech of February 1963 
- the task ahead was indeed an arduous one requiring as much 
ingenuity as faith.l The smaller parties, among others, did not think 
this task was achievable, certainly not before quite some time and 
with a heavy helping hand from Britain. Stolper's estimate that 
10,000 Maltese would have to emigrate every year might have 
served as a temporary safety valve, difficult though it was to realise 
in practice. Were such a sustained export of native souls to 
materialise, it would gradually empty Malta of her people, losing to 
her also many residual skills and human resources. That need not 
have meant a greater resourcefulness, productivity or success in 
rising to such challenges as were now facing the country, survival 
obviously being one of them. Emigration was necessary, but by itself 
I Specimen multiplier calculations and projections are being published here to give 
an idea of pre-Independence diffidence (see the adjoining tables). 
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it would serve no profitable purpose other than to deplete and to 
depopulate. It was at best only a temporary expedient, a safety valve 
until the economy could be productively and creatively restructured. 
Although there had been noteworthy reports outlining economic 
development needs by experts such as Woods, Schuster, Balogh and 
Seers, economic planning in Malta only began seriously in the late 
1950s by means of the first five-year Development Plan. Safe and 
assured employment had to be replaced, it held, by "employment 
in the world of competition"; which meant that Malta's still largely 
traditional economy had to transform itself in a short time. Some of 
the projects earmarked for tackling during the span covered by that 
Development Plan, from 1959 to 1964, showed how basic some of 
Malta's infrastructural needs were: pumping water; generating 
electricity; bottling gas; extending telephones; a grain silo; a deep-
water quay; a new power station; machinery and equipment; 
adequate roads to cater for the increasing traffic; technical and 
vocational education to supplement the academic and professional; 
and not least of all, the modernisation of the dockyard to build as 
well as to repair ships and to cater for oil tankers - and somehow to 
start doing so commercially and competitiVely. 
Malta-made goods had to be as good as any others, or better and 
the Maltese themselves had better believe it. Local prejudice against 
local produce had to cease, but that could only happen if the quality 
was good. The capital investment intended for this plan to work, 
most ofit to be forked out by Britain, amounted in all by mid-1961 
to some Lm32,000,000, the largest single chunk of Lm19,250,000 
being from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.2 
There was much 'institutional' infrastructure to be put into place too, 
starting perhaps with the mission assigned to the Aids to Industries 
Board, which started operating successfully under the Aids to 
2 See above, 1. 
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SllMMARY Of REPORT 
a) :The i'robleln~of~ Malta,';. in.some" ... a:ys like that',oftlie 
",Uni·J;ed .Kingdo",· depres.ed ."rea&'~in the .. lQ30 ~ S; ·but.1:het'e 
"are' gra.vei'Y'·l'sgrnating "i ieumstances' ~(par.agraphs ~l-A').. 
b) F.xpendi tur. by the Uni ted Kinadom Servic"";'in Mal t. 
provides employment directly for 23 per cent. of the 
gai,!fu\lY.:I>cGup},:~~ populaJ.ion, , abQl!.t ~athix:d of, the 
~.Malte~" .. nat~ona,l. in.cpme,.56.per, ,ent.of. Maita:,s ~ar.ning. 
of for~i!l; -e~c~!J-ng~-h and .2.. sub~~~ntial ·P.~l:~ of Vover~­
ment, revenue. 1bere are further indirect effects on 
all of these (paragraphs 5-11\. 
cl Direct Service. e"pend; ture in Mal tll. i. expected to fall 
by £10 million by 1'16' r paragraph 15). 
d} This reduction in expenditure, taken in isolation, might 
lead to a fall in the national income of a third, to a 
drop in Mal tat s. overseas earnings equi -..alent to :iO per 
cent. of Malta' 5 current imports, to a drop in employ-
ment of some lQIOnO and to great difficultie.s in balanc-
ing the Government's budget rparagraphs 16-2'll. 
e} As ft result of other factors operating during the same 
period, Some 1.47 fl new jobs would have to be provided by 
lQi)7. Furthermore, the lQ61 level of unemployment will 
have 10 fall by some 1. 500 workers to reduce unemployment 
to 3 per cent. of the ·labour force (paragraphs 31-361. 
f) New developments in the rest of the economy miaht be 
expected to provide solne 5,500 additional jobs by 1967, 
and £3.4 million in additional net output. These 
figures are very small in relation to the needs of the 
economy (paragraphs 37-54). 
g) Emigration up ta.~1'l67"might,alDOunt to' 20,2~00 net~~ot 
~turned .... igrant.' of"h"", 10,100 "ill be peuon .... seeking 
gainful employment·, ,. In· addition there lllight> by 1961: be· 
outl eta far 1. SOO workers going abroad on contract 
(paragraph.o, 56-69). 
h) tn '"U;"'unemployment in 1967. is "xpected to total __ 
"20,OOO~ on {.irly· favourable assumption's and 29,000 
~ on less faVourable a"sWIi'tians (paragrapha 72-73), 
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VI. CONCLtlSION 
79. Our analysis shows that, even on fairly favourable assumpt~ 
iOhs, tl,ere will!,. j,n'~ri~mpioYme';t -le'l01 of nbi-i{2Q;ooa in 1967 and 
possibl y s~me 29,000 "ort' less f;i:Vourable~ssUmpti;'ns'( paragraph 72); 'thiit 
the national income will probably £.11 by rather more than 15 per c'.int: 
(paragraph 76) "n.d that Covernment will be in severe financial di fficul-
ties. In other words, the favourable' deve~lopments which we forsee by 
1967 and the'measures that Mal to can 'take' 'over this period will in no 
way make good the loss of jobs' brought about by the Services rundown, 
If unemployment is to be "reduced'-to 3 p'er'c'mt. of the labour force in 
1967, the balance, of ne~ joh~'which'would have to be provided would ,be 
10,640 on our more Iavourable assumption (paragraph 711 and appreciablY 
more on our less favourable a5sumption~ Thus, even on our mOre 
favourable a'ssump'tion. the rate'of provision 'of new jobs would have to 
be trebl~ that assumed 'in 'Table '0 unles" the rate of emigration exceeds 
the nunib~r~' as..-ume.f iri pa;agr'aph 66, 
. '! T, 
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80, In Mal taO $ c':se the~e is' t~e additional difficul ty tl'!!'~ 
jobs which need to be created must be predominantly in export industries/. 
producing goods which otherwise would 'have to be imported, Projects 
which do little to increase Malta' 5 exports (or to replace imports) 
would, if adoptea 'on ~ny appreciabi'e sc~l .. ," rapidfy' p~ovoke balance of 
payments ~r, fi'nandal 'diHicult1es, "(Our'calculation in paragraph 78 
implies tl".t 'a'profe';:t dii-i,ctly provid;:ili 000 of additional income 
leads to an increase in imports of no less than £44), 
,,;. 
aI'.' 'II'. understand' that the Malte;'e Covernment, with the technical 
assista~ce of the {inited' Nati~ns, 'will sh,;-rtl y be preparing .. develop-
ment programme for tIle period" beginning 'in 1964. The Uni ted Nations 
T.:A.O. mission will doubtle:!!s wish to exarr:ine the speci fie points We 
have~ not;ci"'{n 'Section'V or' our rep~rt an'd to reconsider our general 
apprais'ai of the situation. 
Part of the summary in the Joint Study Report based on a multiplier 
approach, 
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The Minister responsible for industrial development, Dr Giovanni Felice, 
inspecting some of the new manufacturing industry developments (left) 
which were being built or just coming into operation during the early 1960s 
in Marsa, Mosta and elsewhere in sites earmarked as "industrial estates"; 
and (right) hotels in the process of construction such as the Hilton, Preluna 
and Dragonara, with novel leisure and entertainment facilities, especially 
in the SliemalStJulian's area and along the northern bays. 
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Industries Ordinance, 1959. In the early Sixties the promotion of 
Maltese commerce and industry had a London manager in the 
person of Commander John B. Mattei, a Cambridge graduate and 
mechanical engineer who was attached to Malta Government House 
in Haymarket, London, S.W.1.3 He worked from a separate office 
but in liaison as necessary with Malta's 'Commissioner General' in 
Lodon, John Axisa (who later became Malta's first High 
Commissioner there).4 A Tourist Board was also set up in the late 
fifties, complementing Aids to Industries. Led by John Pollacco, 
George Fabri and others in the Sixties, this Board started to develop 
and package the very concept of Malta as a tourist destination. 
Whether by grant, soft loan or other inducements, including labour 
which was available and trainable, factories and hotels started being 
attracted to set up shop in Malta. Attempts were also made to 
modernize agriculture and fisheries. 
By the first quarter of 1963, new industries for which grants had 
been approved included production areas such as knitwear, two 
firms would manufacture spring interior mattresses, and another 
rubber seals. Projects were taking off in specialized horticultural 
processes. Two firms went into plastics, another two were producing 
detergents, yet another two concentrated on frozen foods. There 
were firms making iron and steel bars and rods, silver-plated 
tableware, wrought iron goods, and jewellery, thus to some extent 
drawing on traditional craftsmanship and expertise. There was also 
diamond cutting. Five factories concentrated on textiles, the largest 
of them being Chatillon, which received a grant of over £600, 000. 
3 See his exchanges with Edgar Cuschieri, Administrative Secretary in the Office 
of the Prime Minister, and Dr Victor Ragonesi, Borg Olivier's public relations 
secretary, e.g. Mattei/Cuschieri, 6 May 1963, Mattei/Ragonesi, 23 Apr. 1963, 
RagonesilMattei, 6 May 1963, as well as the comments by the Financial Secretary, 
Alfred Salomone, on Major Patrick Wall's paper 'Malta 1961-1963' enc. in Salomonel 
Ragonesi, 29 Apr. 1963, Archives in the Office of the Prime Minister, Auberge de 
Castille, Valletta. 
4 AxisaiFrendo, 2 July, 1999; and see below, III, 17. 
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Modernization plans employing greater mechanization and technology 
comprised energy, particularly the new water and power station project, as 
well as agriculture and fisheries. 
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In addition, others started producing gloves, underwear, children's 
clothing.s Fibreglass production commenced. Bacon and pork 
products started being made more professionally and on a larger 
scale locally, which necessitated pig-breeding farms. Model hobbies, 
marble cutting, type-setting, freight and passenger services featured 
in a row - the altogether new with the not-so-new. 
There was an upgrading or reorientation of existing industry, such 
as the production of Maltese wines "for export". Cottage industries 
or production only for local consumption, such as matches and 
candles, had to change gear altogether if they wanted to expand or 
indeed to survive.6 For most of these products export was the key, 
the Maltese market being too small to sustain their growth, if not 
their existence. They would thus become important sources of 
foreign earnings and exchange, in a country which had always relied 
very much on imports. 
Since December 1959 industrial grants had amounted to £1.5 
million, including the Chatillon grant. By mid-1963 Malta had 24 
new industries in operation employing 1,300 persons, soon expected 
to become 2,000. Thirteen factories were built by the Government 
and a further eight were earmarked for completion by December 
1963. While it was just impossible, without emigration, for 
employment to aspire to somehow keep up with the pace with 
discharges from the Services, new and differently tailored jobs were 
nonetheless becoming available on the market, new skills were also 
being learnt. To increase the tempo, Dr Stolper recommended the 
5 For a study of Malta's textile industry as this developed, see John C. Grech, Threads 
of Dependence, (Univ. of Malta, 1978). 
6 For a surprisingly long list of local products see the insightful chapter 39 in 
Ganado, ap.cit., 'Industrijalizazzjoni', pp. 431-442. The list included mortadella, 
salami, pasta, bacon and ham, sweets, tinned fruits and vegetables, olive oil, candles, 
matches, flour, paper bags, shoes by Cardona, paint and plastics, Guillaumier's glass 
and mirrors, shirts, nails, Gozitano tomato paste, clothes, Marsovin wines, Farsons 
beer ... 
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setting up of a Development Corporation, which was indeed set up 
afterwards. Of major importance eventually would be the Free Port 
project at Kalafrana, which was already envisaged during the 
Independence negotiations.7 
Services too had always been important for Malta, even if these were 
now a-changing. For generations, much 'invisible export' had 
derived from services - from bunkering to chandling, entrepot to 
entertainment. In the 19th century there were several small hotels, 
inns and guest houses in Valletta, as well as bars and night spots, but 
it was not until the construction of the Phoenicia Hotel was 
embarked upon by the Strickland family and completed after the 
war, that Malta could boast of a proper first class hotel, within 
walking distance of the capital. An international table comparing 
tourist traffic flow in the Mediterranean in 1960 showed Malta 
practically at the bottom of it, after Cyprus, Tunisia, Gibraltar, 
Monaco, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Greece, San Marino. The 
leading tourist countries were Italy and Spain, followed by France, 
Egypt and Yugoslavia.s 
Before Independence, tourism was slowly but surely becoming the 
most promising of the 'services' offered by Malta, as other hotels 
sprouted in the 1950s along the Sliema frontY Thus by mid-1963 
grants had been approved for hotel projects in Sliema, at Dragonara 
7 See below, III, 16. 
8 E. J. Spiteri. An Island in Transition, op.cit., p.56. 
9 For period enquiries outling the situation in industry see e.g. Halt-Arnold et, An 
Industrialisation Study of the Maltese Islands (Battelle Institute. Geneva, 1964) which 
advised soft loans rather than outright grants. On tourism one of the first seminal 
studies is Lino Spiteri's in 1968 which underlined the need for a master plan for 
tourist development. For a brief historical overview see H. Frendo. "Tourism: 
Neocolonialism?" (mimeographed, Univ. of Malta, 1977); other more comprehensive 
studies have since been conducted by J. Boissevain. an anthropologist; J. Inguanez, 
a sociologist; E. Delia, an economist; and some others. 
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The first 'patriotic' page of the Annual Abstract of Statistics for 1965, 
published by the Department of Information, gave a bird's eye view of 
Malta's general condition as she embarked upon an independent existence. 
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Point in StJulians and on the island ofComino. For the Dragonara 
a Kursaal project was making progress, with German interests and 
including the British M.P. Sir Victor Raikes. Malta's oldest-established 
quality hotel, The Phoenicia, put in for an extension, as did the C6te 
d'Or Hotel in Golden Bay. Other hotels sprouting by the seaside in 
the early sixties were at Paradise Bay, Cirkewwa and St George's Bay. 
The most ambitious and alluring touristic project of all, at this time, 
was that for a Malta Hilton, an American-related initiative. Of the 
£700,000 approved for hotel projects so far, £375,000 went to the 
Hilton project. Also important was the plan for a yacht marina, and 
the liaison being established with the UN technical assistance 
programme, including the assignment of Italian experts. Assistance 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund was being sought 
for the marina as well. IO Other projects in the pipeline often 
involved Maltese entrepreneurs and capital, including loan capital, 
especially through the National Bank of Malta. Many of these dreams 
later materialised, thrived and even expanded as Malta gradually 
became established in the tourist market - the Corinthia Hotel in 
Attard which began at this time and in this way would later pioneer 
the first and so far the only international Maltese-owned hotel chain 
- but the early Sixties were still a tentative beginning. Few could have 
been too sure of what the risks at stake were or not. 
A roll call of existing hotels which in 1963 asked for aid to upgrade, 
refurbish, extend or otherwise improve their premises and services 
mainly during 1964, gives an idea of the progress being registered 
in Malta's tourist industry and its onward movement. It gives a better 
idea of how much more still needed to be done. The largest amounts 
ranging from over £10,000 to less than £30, 000 were requested by 
the Phoenicia in Floriana, the Solemar at Marfa, the International 
Students' Centre at Bugibba, the Duke of Edinburgh in Victoria, 
Gozo, the Imperial and the Sea Cliff in Sliema. Smaller amounts 
were applied for by some of the smaller Valletta hotels the 
10 See the notes and the lists enclosed under 'Industrial and Tourist Development', 
29 May 1963, 926/2080/48543. 
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Coronation, the Crown, the Cumberland, and the Midland. Sliema 
and the island of Gozo featured prominently, an indication of things 
to come. In Sliema, there were the Metropole, the Plevna, the Savoy 
and Tigne'; while two more were existing Gozitan enterprises, the 
Royal Lady Hotel in Mgarr, and the Marsalforn Hotel. Out in the 
Maltese countryside on a hill was Selmun Palace dating back to the 
Knights; transformed into a hotel, this had 20 rooms and sought 
£7,702 to provide additional furniture and fittings.l1 
A charactreristic feature of all these existing Maltese-owned hotels, 
possibly excepting the Phoenicia, was the relatively very small 
number of guest rooms available. The Phoenicia Hotel had 120 
rooms in 1963; the Imperial had 75. They were the largest. The 
Marsalforn Hotel and the Royal Lady had only 9 and 5 rooms 
respectively, with the former planning to construct additional ones, 
and the latter increasing its bathrooms. They hardly deserved to be 
recognised as hotels. Only the student complex in Bugibba 
mentioned beach facilities, while another, at Tigne', mentioned a 
swimming pool. 
The very names of most of these hotels in the early Sixties told a story, 
usually a colonial one. The bars and coffee shops told even more 
stories, as some surviving ones still do ranging from "The Army and 
Navy" to "The Glory of England". In July 1963 the Malta 
Government Tourist Board said in a press release that in his budget 
speech in March the Prime Minister had announced "improved 
conditions of grant for hotel developers undertaking to construct 
first-class hotels with resort amenities". Grants or loans could go up 
to one-third of capital outlay. One of the first projects to benefit under 
the enhanced conditions was a 300-bed, 13-storey hotel being built 
in Tower Road, Sliema: the Preluna Hotel. 12 This sea-front hotel in 
a fashionable promenade became by far Malta's highest building. 
11 'Aid to Existing Hotels', App. A, Med.123/8/010/C.D.W.(D) No. 7395,926/2058. 
12 'Malta Hotel Development Enhanced Conditions of Granf, Valletta, 17 July 
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Domestic exports between 
1961 and 1964 were 
increasing, but not nearly 
enough to keep up with the 
increasing rate of imports . 
In 1963 Gross National 
Product per head rose to 
£152.7 and was the highest 
since 1954. 
(Source: Annual Abstract of 
'-___ '''_ .. ''''_ .... _'_' """,, __._....L_._'_.,., __ -'-_._."'_-'-_'_. __ -.4._4~ Statistics
l 
1964.) 
Felice with Maltese entrepreneurs, including (next to him) Mr Joseph 
Cassar of Marsovin, Chairman of the Federation of Industry. 
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A tour d'horizon of Malta's incipient tourist industry was given by John 
A. Mizzi in an article published in London in 1964. He described the 
opening of the Dragonara Palace Casino, an Anglo-German venture 
which had already cost £350,000 and would cost one million by the 
time its 400-bed hotel was completed. The contract between Hilton 
Hotels International and the Malta Government had been signed 
and the hotel would be operational by 1966. A cash grant equivalent 
to 50% of the capital outlay was given to Wyncorr Ltd. of Dallas, 
Texas, who were financing the project costing nearly one and a half 
million pounds, of which as much as £450, 000 originated from the 
Colonial Developent and Welfare Fund. Other hotels opening in 
1964 or soon thereafter were the Comino Hotel on the island of 
Comino, with a restaurant, chalets and villas. At least three British 
firms moving into hotel construction in Malta in the early Sixties 
were Hubbalit Developments Ltd. of London, with a holiday centre 
accomodating 600 guests; Shaw (High Storrs) Ltd. of Sheffield were 
building a 440-bed hotel opposite Comino; and Beauport 
Development Corporation of Jersey in the Channel Islands, who 
were erecting a 21O-double bedroom hotel in Mellieha Bay, similarly 
to the north of the main island. Italian investors were also interested. 
A yacht marina was being developed at Ta' Xbiex. A catering school 
was now required to train much-needed staff, and the upkeep of 
beaches, which were in a bad state, had to be seen to. By 1966-67 
no less than seven million pounds would have been invested in new 
hotels and 5,700 new beds would have become available. The 
Tourist Board hoped that by then an income of £4,400,000 annually 
would be derived from tourist spending. 13 
In addition to spinning and even heating up the economy in the course 
of the 1960s, the diversification drive through export-oriented 
factories and up-market hotels would revolutionize Maltese society. It 
was already starting to provide many different kinds of jobs , not least 
for young women; it also ushered in different mores, from the roulette 
to the bikini. It was an adventurous but perilous exercise, with grave 
13 J .A.Mizzi, "Malta intensifies the tourist drive and builds new luxury hotels", New 
Commonwealth, Sept. 1964, ene. 926/2058. 
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Publicity brochures marketing Malta as a Mediterranean resort throughout 
Europe (above) became a prime responsibility of the Malta Government 
Tourist Board, while the first training courses in cooking and catering 
began attracting young recruits. 
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5M1-oJclll" _k ..... 204 2.27 
UnoJcllled _ ... 896 9.99 
FeN"., agrloulturaJ ... k .... 357 M11 
Of ... gol."..1 _patlon 4,!155 55.14 
TOTAl 8.91!7 100.co 
Emigration eased population growth. Net decreases, always below 2%, were 
highest in 1954, 1956 and 1964. Most of those going to the UK in 1964 
were single, but of those going to Australia, Canada and the U.S.A. most 
were married. Most emigrants in 1964 had no gainful occupation, but a 
good percentage were skilled and qualified. 
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implications for urban, landscape and coastal planning. Diversification 
was open to the dangers of neocolonialism as foreign 'sharks' moved 
in, sometimes not delivering on the aid grants received. Much more 
frequently, these acquired land and property on the cheap and 
exploited it, upmarking prices to the disadvantage of native buyers 
whose earnings were disproportionate to those of newer clients from 
Britain and elsewhere. Soon these could not keep up with the housing 
market and pleaded for the provision oflow-cost government housing. 
In manufacturing industry there was an over-reliance on textiles, 
which later necessitated further diversification. All told, however, this 
decade proved to be a take-off period for the Maltese economy, as 
Metwally, Briguglio, Spiteri and others have shown. 14 
The other project, on which Borg Olivier's administration was 
working hard, with British help, was emigration. It was absolutely 
necessary to tap new avenues, to increase if possible the existing 
country immigration quotas for Maltese islanders. This was not easy: 
either because quotas were strict and rigid, as were those of the 
U.S.A. after the McCurran-Walter Act; or because Britain for moral 
or racial reasons would not advise emigration by Maltese to certain 
countries, such as the Republic of South Africa (or, for different 
reasons, Latin America); or because Maltese unskilled workers, or 
indeed Maltese nationals, were not particularly needed or 
particularly desired. One such case was New Zealand, where Maoris 
were making their presence increasingly felt and Anglo-Saxons 
would have been much preferred to Maltese or other immigrants 
from southern Europe or the Mediterranean region.15 
As it turned out, Borg Olivier was lucky to have in his Minister of 
Labour and Emigration, Dr Alexander Cachia Zammit, a good 
14 M.M.Metwally, Structure and Performance of the Maltese Economy (Malta, 1977); L. 
Briguglio, The Maltese Economy; A Macroeconomic Analysis (Malta, 1988); and 
E.J.Spiteri,op.cit. 
15 There were mixed views as to whether the prospect of Maltese emigration to South 
Africa, which had been brought up by Stolper, should be encouraged or not, 
especially if that country were offering to pay 50% of the fares. The Foreign Office 
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emissary. This doctor from one of the oldest-established Maltese 
political families seems to have exercised a charm on those whom he 
met in his inter-continental travels, albeit he was also trying to 
accomodate their needs - such as the provision of single women - as 
best he could. On impact, the host country's tone changed. In one 
country after another which the Minister visited, what had 
previously been dismissed as difficult, unlikely or impossible, turned 
out after all to be possible, feasible and imminent. The change of 
mood was remarkable, not only in Australia, where after Cachia 
Zammit's meetings there the quota which had been raised to 3,000 
was now raised from 3,000 to over 4,000 annually (and later raised 
again). "With his many personal qualities", the Australian Minister 
for Immigration wrote to the Secretary of State, "it was natural that 
Dr Cachia-Zammit's visit to Australia should prove most valuable to 
the cause of Maltese migration to this country. My colleagues and I 
were delighted to have him as our guest."16 
In New Zealand, a quota for 100 single men aged between 20 and 
35 which in 1954 had seemed excessive, was put up to 250. Would-
be Maltese migrants there tended to be seen negatively, placed in 
the same category as Greeks and Yugoslavs, who were said to have 
adopted "a thoroughly moral attitude in this matter" Fairclough minuted to Kisch 
and Eastwood. 16 May 19632. In Malta, Wakefield was very much against it, minuted 
Eastwood on 24 May, adding "and (having seen the Maltese en masse) so am 1. They 
will certainly face embarrassment. I hope that the idea can be dropped." Different 
views however were also expressed in the same correspondence between March and 
May 1964,926/1957/48655. 
l6 Downer/Sandys, 17 Sept. 1963, C0926/1953/48655. The long history of Maltese 
emigration to and settlement in Australia is a well-tested research ground and has 
occupied the attention of a number of authors, more recently including sociologists 
and socio-linguists. For a comprehensive historical account see B. York, Race and 
Empire (Sydney, 1990), as well as the 'Malta' entries in J. JupP (Ed): l11e Australian 
People (Canberra, 1988). For a general historical overview of Maltese emigration see 
Lawrence Attard's three volume work, but see also an unpublished Canadian M.A. 
thesis by John Crawford, available in the Melitensia Section of the University of Malta 
Library. A short general history is provided by L. Attard's chapter on Maltese 
emigration in H. Frendo and O. Friggieri (eds), Malta: Culture and Identiry (Ministry 
for the Arts, Valletta, 1994), pp. 253-269. 
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19s:l 1,038 5,565 a65 8 \ 7,472 1,022 9 1,031 8,503 
1951 1,234 4 J OO6 1,007 9 6,856 831 5 836 7,692 
1952 1,200 2, f61 600 I 4 1Q42 1,29S 10 1,303 5,36$ 
1953 1,702 1,376 770 I 3,849 003 003 4,532 
1954 1,690 8,470 963 24 l.,147 299 I :'/Xl 11,447 
1953 1,872 6,442 425 2 8,741 266 - 266 9,':1;]7 
1956 1,161 2,724 383 4 4,272 217 3 2:ilj 4,492 
1957 960 1,206 739 B 2,993 292 - 292 3,285 
1958 &)5 1,643 s:l5 3 2,956 196 196 3,152 
1959 744 1,875 472 3,091 174 - 174 3,265 
1960 878 2.304 509 4 3,695 142 4 146 3,841 
1961 I, \[2 2,140 213 3 3,468 106 4 \[2 3,56) 
1962 1,129 2,051 371 13 3,564 76 I 77 3,641 
1963 1,332 4,152 905 3 6,392 92 95 187 6,579 
I 
1964 1,5g'? 5,923 I,ISI :lO B,73! 87 ,69 256 e~9a7 
TOTAl 18,454 52,1 t6 10,586 113 81,269 5,778 301 6,079 87.348 
These figures giving Maltese emigration trends between 1950 and 1964 
show that nearly 90,000 Maltese emigrated during those fifteen years, with 
emigration picking up again in 1963. During the same period some 9,000 
emigrants returned, by far the largest number coming back in 1957 during 
the first Mintoff administration. 
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difficulty integrating. In response to a typical Commonwealth 
Relations Office endeavour in this regard dated 4th March 1963, the 
British High Commissioner Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce (whose 
brother was stationed in Malta) saw New Zealand's Minister of 
Immigration, Tom Shand. The New Zealand outlook towards 
Europeans from the Mediterranean "is quite unreasonable", 
Cumming-Bruce replied from Wellington, 
and the prejudice has its roots deep in public opinion. 
Consequently the authorities have a very reserved 
appropach to immigration from the Mediterranean area. 
They were not sorry when, on the last occasion that a small 
quota was fixed eight years ago for Maltese entry, only half 
a dozen or so families eventually took advantage of it. 
The 'Kiwi' Minister emphasised that the Government was not keen 
on immigration of people from Southern Europe as they tended to 
fall into the bottom tier both socially and for labour purposes, which 
was being rapidly swollen by the massive increase of Maori 
population. This was being aggravated by immigration from the 
Cook Islands and Samoa which were anxious to increase their 
migration; as the years passed the pressure from the Islands would 
be increasingly difficult to resist: and this would further weight the 
population against the Anglo-Saxons. This "Polynesian problem" 
made the prospect of migration in New Zealand "totally different 
from that in Australia, and he (Shand) was not prepared to accept 
that there was any justifiable basis of comparison in relation to 
Maltese."17 In a meeting with Sandys in London in June 1963, 
Cumming-Bruce commented privately that "the people in New 
Zealand have a rather narrow and selfish outlook" and he had "little 
hope that they would prove able to help over Malta's 
17 Cumming-Bruce/Sandys, conf., 24 May 1963, C0926/1955/48655. 
18 T.]. Lennard (C.R.O.)/A.].FaircIough (C.O.), 18 June 1963. C0926/1955/48655. 
The C.KO. was also asked "to find out for the information of the New Zealand 
authorities about a proposed visit to Australia and New Zealand this year by Mr. 
Cachia Zammit from Malta." 
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immigration."lS Less than four months later Sandys (whose mother 
was born in New Zealand, his father having emigrated there) sent a 
personal note to Cumming-Bruce which read as follows: 
Dear Francis, 
I was pleased to learn that Dr Cachia Zammit, the Maltese 
Minister of Labour and Emigration, made such a good 
impression during his visit to New Zealand. 
I am very glad that the New Zealanders have decided to 
admit initially 250 Maltese immigrants this year. This is most 
helpful and I would be grateful if you would convey my 




North America was more difficult, especially the U.S.A., with an 
annual quota for Maltese of still only 100, but some headway was 
made there too. Between 1962 and 1963 the number of Maltese 
taken by Canada trebled to nearly one thousand. 2o According to a 
survey report by the University of Windsor, Maltese families were 
settling and mixing rather well there, mostly in Toronto and the 
metropolitan area of Ontario: 60% of migrants in the early sixties 
found employment within one week of arrival, and 75% changed 
their jobs more than once.21 Following Cachia Zammit's visit to 
Canada in September 1963, and approaches made by the British 
High Commission in Ottawa, educational and other criteria were 
relaxed, while possibilities of family sponsorship of prospective 
migrants - what is known in migration studies as 'chain migration' 
19 Sandys/Cumming-Bruce, 4 Oct. 1963, C0926/l955/48655. 
20 Eastwood min., 'Emigration from Malta to Canada', 17 June 1964, C0926/l956/ 
48655. The figures given were 371 for 1962 and 905 for 1963. 
21 For a synopsis of this report, presented to Cachia Zammit by George Bonavia of 
Windsor, Ontario, see "Maltese Immigrants to Canada: Survey Report by University 
of Windsor", The Bulletin, 31 Mar. 1964, enc. C0926/1956/48655. 
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Australia was responsive to Malta's emigration drive, as may be seen from 
this letter of Minister Downer to the Secretary of State, which also spoke 
highly of Dr Cachia Zammit. 
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- would increase with the growing number of Maltese-Canadian 
settlers. In addition, up to 300 Maltese workers and their families 
could be nominated annually by the Canadian Government "for 
open placement." "The Canadians", noted Christopher Eastwood in 
June 1964 basing himself also on meetings held with Mr Pickersgill 
and Mr Isbister from the Canadian Ministry of Citizenship and 
Immigration, "are clearly willing to do all they can within practicable 
limits to encourage Maltese immigrants, and selection teams will be 
visiting Malta at least twice this year and expect to increase the 
number of acceptances still further."22 
Prospects also opened up in Germany (where as many as 2,000 
apparently could get jobs); in Belgium; and, through the Admiralty, 
in Gibraltar (where there was a large Maltese-descended 
presence).23 The main problem in Gibraltar was space, especially 
housing, but Maltese migration there was also seen as possibly 
having the merit of rendering labour on the Rock less dependent 
on border-crossers from Spain. The Admiralty took the initiative to 
follow this up even before Lord Lansdowne, the Minister of State for 
the Colonies, had written about it to Lord Carrington.24 
22 Eastwood min., 17 June 1964, 'Emigration from Malta to Canada', C0926/l956/ 
48655. 
23 Extract Minute from a meeting in Valletta on 4June 1963, i.e. during Sandys' visit, 
at which Christopher Eastwood from the C.O.'s Mediterranean desk was also 
present, C0926!l95748655. 
24 See i.a. Med 114/8/02, conf., 10 June 1963, to J.E.Gale at the War Office; Dudley 
Ward/Eastwood, 6 June 1963, wherein the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at 
Gibraltar, General Sir Dudley Ward, says he had discussed the prospect with the Chief 
Member of Gibraltar's Executive Council (Sir Joshua Hassan); and the discussions held 
by the Gibraltarian Department of Labour and Social Security with the CYBARCO 
company who were ready to recruit and train Maltese; they also asked if reduced 
migrant fares could be offered by B.E.A. to Maltese travelling to Gib. E.Howard Davis/ 
T.M.Jenkins, 2Jan. 1964. See also min. Eastwood/Lansdowne, 10 May 1963, Foggon/ 
Fairclough, 16 May 1963, and internal correspondence thereon. A good deal of 
Government-sponsored construction was th.~n under way in Gibraltar. 
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As for emigration to the UK, the. British Government took this 
matter firmly in hand from 1962 onwards, so much so that a 
representative from the Ministry of Labour was attached to the UK 
side of the Joint Study. This was Miss Grainger, that department's 
Assistant Secretary, who was regarded as "exceedingly competent". 
It was planned to have three categories of Maltese migrants for the 
UK: those who would already have employment to go to there; those 
with special skills; and those still seeking employment. A 'Barbados-
type' scheme was suggested whereby people would get booked up 
for jobs in England before they left Malta so that they would come 
in under the first category.25 A grade 1 officer from the Rome 
embassy K. J. Hird, who had served as Labour Attache' in Lebanon, 
was indicated as another possible assistant. 26 The UK was only 
running second to Australia as a host country for Maltese migrants, 
with 1,129 going there in 1962 and 1,332 in 1963.27 
The organisation of mass emigration also meant money, however. 
For Borg Olivier's administration, it was a budgetary concern. His 
position was that emigration would indeed be promoted to 
wherever, funds permitting. In a memorandum transmitted by 
Wakefield, Stolper proposed a reallocation to emigration of some of 
the British aid to Malta. This provoked quite a discussion in London 
as to how and how much could Britain assist financially. It was 
suggested that the offer of £100, 000 made by Sandys and roundly 
dismissed by Borg Olivier in August 1962 be somehow revived. Now 
described in C.O. jargon as the 'silver collection' offer, which is what 
Borg Olivier had called it, it was feared that having thus turned it 
down he could not now accept it without loss of face, ifit were to be 
offered again in connection with emigration expenses. 
25 Eastwood/Wakefield,.5 Nov. 1962, C0926/1183/48.583. 
26 Rossetti/Martin, 24 Aug. 1962, C0926/1183/48.583. 
27 Min., Jenkins/Huijsman, 14 Feb. 1964,926/1951. 
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Cachia Zammit had suggested that if the £100, 000 could be made 
available, it should be provided in the form of an additional UK 
contribution to I.C.E.M., the Geneva-based Inter-Continental 
Committee for European Migration. He thought it might be a more 
face-saving way for Dr Borg Olivier than an outright grant from the 
UK to Malta. Another reason for this recommendation was that he 
hoped that, through I.C.E.M., it would also attract American 
money. The Americans might be persuaded to put up a 
contribution, which would be specifically earmarked for Malta.28 
Given the rising unemployment in Malta - from 3,772 in 1960 to 
4,367 in 1961 to about 7,000 in 1962, and the impending Dockyard 
discharges, talks started in earnest on this prospect in which 
employment officials as well as LC.E.M. were involved. At the Malta 
end their main counterparts, apart from the Minister, were the 
Director of Emigration, Labour and Social Welfare, J. M. 
Rossignaud, and the Assistant Director, J. Lungaro Mifsud. A lunch 
hosted by a visiting delegation in April 1963 was also attended, 
however, by the Australian Migration Officer, C. Hendy, and the 
Director of the Emigrants' Commission of Catholic Action; the Rev. 
Philip Calleja.29 
Contacts with LC.E.M. were C{)nducted mainly through the UK 
Mission in Geneva, while those with the Americans were being seen 
to by the LC.E.M. Secretariat. In the end, the Treasury did not 
object to a total amount of £200,000 being paid to LC.E.M. in the 
hope that it would attract an American contribution. In other words, 
the Maltese Government would still obtain much of that worth in 
assistance through Her Majesty's Government via LC.E.M.'s 
28 A. N. Galsworthy/Fairciough min., 12 Mar. 1963, on his discussion with Cachia 
Zammit during one of his visits to Malta in February 1963, 926/1951. 
29 'Report on Mr Maselli's and Mr Emerton's Visit to Malta (2-3 April 1963)', enc. 
926/2064. It was noted in the report that whereas unemployment was rising, 
emigration was not. The figures given for 1959-1961 were 3,265, 3,841 and 3,580 
respectively. Moreover, emigration was "well below the natural population growth, 
which averages 5,845 persons per year." 
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operational budget. Britain had also just increased her subscription 
to the programme of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.3o 
The Americans were being pressed on this too and effectively 
accused of stinginess. By June 1963, finally, the Americans 
responded. A cable arrived from Washington on 24th June saying 
that the U.S. Government was prepared "to contribute £10 per 
capita for all Maltese migrants to Australia from the 1't July, 1963 
to the 31't December, 1963, if the United Kingdom Government 
contributes at least £20 per capita." J. D. Miller in Geneva promptly 
phoned up Rossignaud in Valletta to break the news. Not much, but 
it was "the very best we can expect", he told him.31 
Without these various demarches, ably assisted and canvassed 
throughout by the Commonwealth Relations Office in London,32 
it would not have been possible for so many Maltese to be accepted 
as migrants in 1963, 1964 and 1965. Ironically but understandably, 
Malta's year of Independence would show one of the highest rates 
of emigration ever recorded. The statistics speak for themselves, 
showing that the highest marginal net decreases in population, 
notwithstanding the continuing natural increases, occurred in the 
mid-1950s and then again in the mid-1960s. Malta's emigration 
peaks were 1954 (11,147), 1955 (8,741) and 1964 (8, 731). Of these 
total numbers, most went to Australia (8,470 in 1954,6,442 in 1955 
and 5,923 in 1964 respectively), followed by the UK (1,690, 1,872 
and 1,597 respectively), and Canada (963, 425 and 1,181 
respectively). 33 Emigration in 1963 and in 1965 was also very 
much on the high side, with 6,579 leaving in the former year and 
30 See the explanation from the UK Mission in Geneva dated 8 June 1963 to G. T. 
P. Marshall in the United Nations Department at the Foreign Office, 926/2064. 
31 Miller/Marshall, 24 June 1963,926/2064. 
32 On this see for example the exchanges between Eastwood, Kisch and Fairclough, 
among others, during February 1963, 926/1953/48655. 
33 See the comparative breakdowns given above in the table 'Emigration Movement: 
1950-1964'. 
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as many as 8,090 in the latter, on much the same host country 
pattern.34 
It should also be mentioned however that in 1964 there were 495 
returned emigrants, of whom 263 repatriated from Australia, 160 
from the UK, and 319 from other countries, those countries not 
being Canada or the U.S.A. Hardly anyone went back from there.35 
In the following year - 1965 - 530 returned, the highest number 
since 1958.36 The 1964 figure of nearly 9,000 emigrants would 
never again be matched, let alone surpassed. In the course of the 
decade emigration dropped and returnees increased; but who was 
to know that in 1964? 
Jobs don't wait. Dole queues are painful. Beyond, another future 
beckoned; the grass looked greener on the other side, and so it may 
well have been indeed for countless Maltese who made a new home 
and a new future seeking greater opportunity, security and often 
better living standards. And yet, with the advantage of hindsight, it 
is pertinent to ask if there was not a panic 'save your skin' reaction 
in 1963-1964 - the Maltese saying is 'dabbar rasek' . To wonder, that 
is, whether this rush to the life-boats would have been induced not 
simply by the actual discharges, given or impending, but by the very 
uncertainty hanging over Independence itself: the fear that so small, 
so dependent, so colonized a place as Malta just could not go it 
alone, just could not make it. The dark night, the rough seas, and 
all that. 
31 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1965, Central Office of Statistics, n. 19, Dept of 
Information, Valletta, 1966, pp. 10-11. 
35 'Statement showing number of Returned Emigrants by Country and Sex: 1964', 
Table 10, Section D, p. 30, Annual Ahstract of Statistics 1964, n. 18, Central Office of 
Statistics, Dept of Information, Valletta, 1965. 
36 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1965, n. 19, Central Office of Statistics, Dept of 
Information, Valletta, 1966, p.10. 
400 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
As may be gauged from a bird's eye view of Malta in the mid-sixties 
through the data, the Island was struggling but still surviving.37 In 
spite of an evidently huge import-export imbalance and the pressing 
infrastructural needs for which so much capital investment was 
required, between 1959 and 1964 the Gross National Product at 
constant prices slightly increased by over one million pounds to 
£42,000,000, while the GNP per capita of the Maltese population 
increased by £6 to£141.2. There would have been some inflation 
but, on current account, the balance of payments held. 38 
Economic diversification was an enormous challenge. Malta was 
forced to jump in at the deep end. But, perhaps surprisingly, she 
pulled through, drawing on her own resources and on a will to 
succeed. The past had taught Maltese how to survive, somehow or 
other, as it had done in much the same way to other island 
communities which had been island outposts and fortress colonies, 
even slave plantations, from the Caribbean to South East Asia. They 
survived too and made their own way in the world. 
Malta was not one of the first colonies to become independent. At least 
two other once strategically important colonial possessions, Cyprus 
and Singapore, took their leave of Britain before Malta did, the latter 
more stridently and decisively than the former, albeit a little later. 
Malta, with its European heritage, was one of the first British non-
settled possessions to presume or to demand a large measure of 
independence, between 1802 and 1932, well before the final fling of 
decolonization lasting from the late 1950s to the mid-sixties. It was 
also one of the first to get representative and later responsible 
government and to keep and regain this for stretches of time; but it 
was one of the very last of the 'outposts of empire' to be set free. 
A comparative study of how outposts of empire fared in the 
disengagement-decolonization process, in and beyond the 
37 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1965, n. 19, Dept of Information, Valletta, 1966, ii. 
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER V 
ElCPLANA!rION OF MlSllME'TIONS FOR PROJECTIONS OF THE MALTESE ECONOMY 
A. Notes for table 50: Prospects for the Ma.ltese economy 
~ulation 
1. Assumption (a): The birth-rate and death-rate are assumed to remain 
at the annual average level of 1959-1961 for each age and sex. Emigration is 
assumed to be M follows: 1965 as in 1959-1961, net of 10 per cent returnees; 
1964-1966, 10,000 per a.nnum, net of 10 per cent returnees; and 1967 and there-
a,1ter" :;,000 per annum", net of 10 :per cent returnees. 
2. Assumption (b): The birth-rate and death-rate are assumed to be the 
oeme as in 1961. Emigration is assumed to be as follows; 5,000 in 1963; 
'1,500 in 1964; and 10,000 per annum during the period 1965-1969. The rate 
of return migration is assumed to be 5 per cent. Diminution of United 
Kingdom servicemen' s f!Ul!11ies is assumed to be two-thirds, spread evenly 
wer the period 1962-1969. 
Labour force 
3. The population assumptions are as given before. The labour force 
w1ll be made up of 1"'rsoo.5 aged fourteen to sixty-three years, assuming that 
they will be subject to the swne actiVity rates as those revealed in the 
1957 censuS. The Princ1pal Government Statietici8.t> projected the population 
aged fifteen to fifty-nine years and advised that this figure should be 
401 
raised 105-106 per cent to arrive at a labour force aged fourteen to Sixty-three 
years. The Mis.ion has raised 'the figure. by 105.5 per cent. 
ConsUllJPtion 
4. It is assumed arbitrarily that the average consumption of 1961 will 
continue to be maintained. The population assumptions are as given above. 
In 1961 the consumption ;pe:i: capita was estimated at £108.79 before taxes. 
Consumer expenditure refers to the Maltese population only. Purchases by 
servicemen I s f!Ul!1lies are considered re-exports • 
. !!!p._ere.l government consumption 
5. Normal growth - (a): This ie as implied in the incre,,"e in the ordinary 
Some of the assumptions and projections summarized in the Stolper report. 
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Dr Stolper (centre) being seen off at the airport by Dr Ragonesi and 
colleagues in 1964. 
Mediterranean region, would reveal various interesting points of 
comparison, political and economic, to which the very visits to Malta 
by Lee Kwan Yew and later Makarios could point. There were 
notable points of difference with both Cyprus and Singapore, in that 
Malta, although prone to be litigious and fanatical, was 
incomparably more homogeneous than either one or the other. It 
had also enjoyed a longer span of internal autonomy, however 
interrupted and disrupted, generally however with a free press and 
a secret ballot, for generations.39 
39 For passing comparisons with other parts of the British Empire see above, I, 5, 
and passim. 
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With some exceptions, until the late 1950s and early 1960s Maltese 
nationalism had been more culturally than economically inspired. 
Malta had no oil like Nigeria, no rubber like Malaya, no yarn like 
India; her native cotton and tobacco crops were largely destroyed 
by the mid-19th century, partly due to new colonial-linked pressures 
on the labour market coupled with a demographic displacement, 
partly as a result of increasing competition from such countries as 
Egypt and the U.S.A. Malta had good harbours for use by ships 
crossing the Mediterranean in any direction; she had docks, wharves 
and wharehouses, and later airfields. To a large extent, the ruler 
became the employer. As Braudel would say, "he who gives, 
dominates"; although there was no less giving than taking. Malta 
however also had a Latin soul, a long, colourful and 'multi-cultural' 
history totally disproportionate to her actual size. There were 
transmitted memories of valour bearing on values; survival against 
the odds; a peculiar mix oflanguage, literature and religion; a well-
versed, cosmopolitan bourgeoisie; an open air gregariousness 
caressed by a blue sea and a warm sun making for a strong native 
in-group feeling. Insular and insulated, this had been transformed 
into a national identity in relation to a usually influential but always 
different "other": the foreign overlord - and the world outside Cbarra 
minn Malta, barra minn hawn). Diversification meant greater dealings 
with more foreigners of all kinds to do business, more or less sur le 
pied de l'egaliti. 
Even among the comparatively well catered for dockyard work-force 
when the times were good, there was bitter resentment at the higher 
pay for equal work performed by British nationals who were 
expatriates; but this was regarded as racial discrimination; upper 
ranks there, as in the Royal Navy, were or seemed beyond the reach 
of Maltese on grounds of nationality. These resentments could flare 
up when the going became rough, particularly as until the early 
Sixties the Cottonera dockyard district had the only urban-
proletarian concentration existing in the Maltese Islands. Mintoff, 
the Oxford-educated son of a Royal Navy cook and a pawn-broking 
mother, belonged here as in a nest: it was his home ground as well 
as his main electoral district and constituency. Speaking the 
language of class and place, for half-a-century he had sufficient 
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organizational and charismatic grip to make it seem like a personal 
fief. The dockyard was livelihood. Borg Olivier's party by contrast 
had always been more of a Valletta-based caucus, replete with 
lawyer-politicians, using the informal networks of court and cloister, 
town and gown, sack and cloth, farm and stead, together with an 
array of village notables, often including the parish priests. They 
tended to see themselves as the natural party of government, Mintoff 
as an upstart and trouble-shooter. They in turn were depicted as a 
privileged class, aloof from the workers and toiling masses in their 
prediliction for linguistic niceties, legal and constitutional norms. 
These versions were of course stereotypes: the reality was far more 
complex: but publicized perceptions were also indicative of ongoing 
tendencies. In the meantime, society changed as did technology, at 
an increasingly faster pace, and especially so in the nineteen sixties. 
On the whole, in spite of the inevitable tensions and disagreements, 
Malta's path to statehood as it turned out, and evolved, was a more 
politically democratic and peaceful one than that being experienced 
by most other colonies and ex-colonies around the globe, be they 
British, French, Italian or Portugese. This stability helped economic 
diversification by facilitating investment, enterprise and industry. It 
may have been in part a constraint of space and size; ethnic 
homogeneity, as well as of an intimidating military presence all-
round. Many Maltese had a religiously-influenced passively 
conformist aptitude, with mass emigration acting as a safety valve 
particularly in the decade 1954-1964. Economic progress must also 
have had something to do with the persevering yet relatively easy-
going adminstration led by Borg Olivier. Together with his colleagues 
and advisers, he was as unrelenting as he could afford to be but 
generally bent on defusing rather than inciting strife. He had faith. 
He accepted advice. He got aid. Thus adopting a posture at one time 
astute and calculating, calm and tenacious, he showed himself 
cautiously responsive to circumstantial needs, to the limitations and 
the possibilities - in an unfolding situation which was no less trying 
socially and economically, than it was politically and constitutionally. 
Time would tell if the colonized, in seeking emancipation, wanted 
to take the colonizer's place and be like him, or not. If the faces were 
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painted or hidden behind masks, with a rhetoric that did not match 
the reality. If new bursts of energy and inspiration, education and 
training, organization and planning, production, management and 
outreach would be released combined with changed insights and 
approaches towards self, Europe and the world. If bureaucracy, 
officialdom and functionality would subdue meritocracy, initiative 
and enterprise, vying with political power for control over minds 
and status. If the servile, scrounging, accomodating, top-down 
mentality to which so many people had grown conveniently 
accustomed, would persist. If the wealth created would spread and 
opportunities flourish, or not. 
That, however, is not the story of how a onetime fortress colony 
succeeded in staving off a potential socio-economic disaster, 
becoming independent, sovereign and viable in a fast changing 
world, but one about the extent to which it truly could, or did, 
realize such independence after the appointed day. In strict 
economic and survivalist terms, the rapid growth of tourism, 
industry and other services would prove the soothsayers wrong, with 
emigration declining to a trickle by the late 1960s. 
14 
The Mintoff Factor 
/' 
A COUP D'ETAT 
IN THE OFFING? 
Mintoff's Labour Party exclaimed to the high heavens that the May 
1964 referendum had been inconclusive. More stridently than ever 
they demanded that fresh elections should be held, after their 
religious human rights provisions would have been brought into 
effect directly by Order-in-Council from London. Their earlier 
appeals to the UN's Committee of 24 (which dealt mainly with 
decolonization questions) were published in an MLP pamphlet. In 
the foreword to this, Mintoff denounced "the crooked referendum" 
and listed four considerations which, he held, militated against the 
British government's desire "to hand over Malta to the politically-
minded clergy", inveighing against "the arrogance of the puppet 
Prime Minister in refusing facilities to United Nations 
investigators ... " Among his four considerations, Mintoff included 
public opinion in Britain, as expressed in the national (British) 
press; and "the opposition of the British Labour Party" (to the draft 
Constution). "Whether the British Conservative Government, now 
standing on its last legs, would fly in the face of all these obstacles 
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in order to keep its base in Malta", he wrote, "will be decided in the 
next few weeks."l 
In an appendix, the MLP pamphlet also included the text of a letter 
of protest which Borg Olivier had sent to the UN Committee of24 on 
29th April 1964, just before the referendum was held. Borg Olivier 
stressed that the MLP had only 16 out of the 50 seats in Parliament 
and were "solely a political minority" as in Malta "there are no racial, 
religious, ethnical or other minorities." In granting independence to 
Malta, the British government would "endeavour to be guided by the 
wishes of the People of Malta as expressed through their vote in the 
Referendum." On the eve of Malta's independence and her 
membership ofthe UN, "the United Nations should expect that the 
views of its legally constituted Government should be upheld ... " He 
also mentioned the smaller parties controlling eight seats in the 
legislature who did not support the MLP's "so called 'Human Rights' 
provisions in the Malta Constitution."2 
Concurrently, other very important issues were being discussed in 
great detail within the Ministry of Defence, and also increasingly with 
the Maltese government. Similar discussions were under way in the 
Treasury with regard to future financial assistance arrangements 
(from which the fate of the money-losing dockyard could not be 
extricated). Borg Olivier preferred these two aspects to '!:>e treated 
separately, not made to depend one on the other. In real life, 
however, the two were seen to be related and to some extent mutually 
dependent, not only because the extent of financial assistance needed 
depended in part on the extent of Defence reductions. 
Considerations in the related areas of defence and security stood on 
this tripod: actual British defence needs; the changing 
1 See United Nations Debate Independence for Malta, Freedom Press, Marsa, 28 May 
1964; pp. 7-8. 
2 Ibid., 65-66. 
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Mediterranean situation; and uncertainty as to Malta's political 
future. 
First of all, there were Britain's actual needs, in terms of air space, 
communications and Malta as 'a forward base'. Skinned of the heftier 
navy and army operations, defence strategists sought to determine 
what cut closest to the bone. What remained of Malta's use to Britain 
and, to a lesser extent, her NATO partners? This was a primary 
consideration, worked out time and again, with tables and counter-
tables of logistics, placements, deployments, relativities and costs. 
There was a second consideration, which ironically became more 
pressing as the date of Malta's independence approached. This 
related to the changing for Britain, unfavourably - of the strategic 
and military position in the Mediterranean. Apart from Gibraltar 
and Malta, Britain also had a military presence and a strategic 
interest in Libya and in Cyprus. By 1956 Egypt had well and truly 
gone. In both Libya and Cyprus, the situation was deteriorating 
during the Malta Independence negotiations. Britain's access to 
defence and operational facilities in both these countries was 
becoming more uncertain. Contingency plans were laboriously 
being drawn up to assess and re-assess how Malta might after all still 
be needed, not simply as a forward base but for the stationing of 
troops and military hardware transferred from other bases where 
Britain's presence would have declined or ceased due to difficultuies 
arising there. 
The tripod's third leg was Mintoff. As already noted, Mintoffhad lost 
much of the aura he had enjoyed during the Integration era in the 
mid-fifties. Sympathy for his position emanated mainly from the 
widespread perception that he and his party were being demonized 
and held hostage by devious and reactionary priests of the Roman 
Church and one prince archbishop. Foaming at the mouth like 
dinosaurs from a mediaeval inquisitorial age, these held poor little 
Dom in between their rows of big sharp teeth as he with bare fists 
kept the jaws from closing and swallowing him, damned as he 
already was. Rather more seriously, his fidgeting with powers 
unfriendly to Britain and to the West was understandably suspect, 
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and indeed resented. Intelligence reports about contacts Mintoff 
and other members of his party were beginning to have after 1961, 
which intensified as the years wore on, were sometimes seen as 
alarming. Intelligence about internal goings-on within his own party 
and in rapport with other powers - taken together with some of his 
wild talk in meetings and editorials about 'civil war', 'arming the 
people' and suchlike - could hardly be taken lightly. Even if there 
may have been an element of bluff in it all, who was to know where 
the bluff began and where it ended. Briefly, Mintoff had come to 
be seen as a security risk. Nor was the British Labour Party as 
unreserved in its regard for him and his party as he may have 
wished to think or to imply, as events unfolding in the coming 
months would show. 
British concerns about security in Malta after Independence did not 
relate solely to defence and strategy in a narrow sense. As has already 
been suggested, they were also concerned with internal security, and 
that not just to safeguard directly Britain's own installations. At the 
same time that the British were becoming worried by the prospect 
of a destabilising unrest arising from growing unemployment, they 
were increasingly concerned about Mintoff. Industrial unrest 
combined with political unrest could be lethal. Mintoff was an 
unsurpassed master of the podium, a political Plautus who could 
turn such a situation to his party's advantage in a big way. 
The spectre ofa Mintoff-engineered coup d'etat in Malta shortly after 
Independence, possibly in league with other powers such as Nasser's 
Egypt, was repeatedly raised. It was a fear which several thoughtful 
Maltese also shared, although Borg Olivier himself seems not to have 
lost any sleep over it. In British circles, this fear was fuelled by 
reports from different quarters as to what Mintoff's party were 
saying or doing, locally and overseas, and the company they kept. 
Defence considerations and contingency planning in relation to 
securing the base and maintaining public order must be read 
together with the proceedings of the Consultative Council in Malta, 
which met a number of times between 1962 and 1964 as provided 
for by the Blood Constitution of 1961, under the chairmanship of 
Governor Dorman. 
410 THE ORIGINS OF MAI;fESE STATEHOOD 
Dorman himself was much preoccupied with security, including this 
coup d'etat prospect. "There is one new item which is now causing 
many people grave concern internal security, security in face of 
violence, civil commotion, or an attempt to overthrow the constituted 
government by coup or by force", the Governor told the assembled 
parish priests on 4th February 1 964. "It is sad", Dorman added, "that 
in such a small Island, where all are brothers, such issues should have 
to be faced", but experience, particularly recent experience 
elsewhere, showed that nothing could be taken for granted: 
Our whole future, investment in industry, work in the Yard, 
and visitors in hotels, depends upon internal stability 
political, industrial and financial. This is an occasion when 
it is my duty to warn. The Government is reviewing all 
arrangements for maintaining law and order in face of any 
threat. Both before or after Independence it will maintain 
the closest cooperation with Her Majesty's Government in 
the United Kingdom. Having said this, I devoutly hope, and 
enjoin upon you, Reverend Gentlemen, to pray, and all to 
conduct themselves, so the plans made shall never be put 
into force. Let us have no more rattling of this sword in its 
scabbard; let it rest there and ultimately rust there. 3 
A few months later L-Orizzont splashed a story across its front page 
announcing that preparations were being made for a state of 
emergency in Malta. These included hospital logistics especially with 
regard to better-coordinated and faster treatment of cases in the 
casualty section, and the calling of medical doctors and of St Luke's 
Hospital personnel on special action duty. The transfer of patients 
from the Central Hospital in Floriana (next door to Police 
Headquarters) to St Luke's Hospital in Guardamangia had been 
undertaken so that the Central Hospital's halls could be turned into 
police dormitories, thus to make space for (evidently a full round-
3 "Governor on Malta's Future - The Opportunities and the Risks", Times of Malta, 
5 Feb. 1964, pp. 4-5, 11. 
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the-clock) police complement required on duty at Police 
Headquarters in an emergency. In referring to Dorman's warning, 
the report mentioned the importation of arms by the police, the 
holding of intensive riot drills and other precautions being 
undertaken in consultation with the armed forces. 4 
In a top secret precautionary measure known only to security chiefs 
and Cabinet, Dr Borg Olivier and some of his Ministers were taken 
down to the underground operations room at Targa Gap and 
briefed on how, in the event of trouble, this could be used as a 
temporary headquarters for the Malta Government. 5 The 
presumption was, obviously, that Targa Gap could serve such a 
purpose until control were re-established over Valletta, which had 
been Malta's administrative capital since the 16th century. The 
underground operations room at Targa Gap was fully equipped with 
communication facilities. While serving as a bunker for the 
administration it could still be operationally effective, not just a hide-
out. Intelligence reports that the MLP could rely on outside military 
help, together with 55 armed partisans of its own, must certainly 
have been behind such an on-the-spot inspection of the 
underground Targa Gap premises by the Prime Minister and 
members of his Cabinet.6 
4 "Preparamenti ghal xi Stat ta' Emergenza fMalta", L-orizzont, 17 June 1964, p.l. 
A 'Government Statment' issued by the Dept. ofInformation, n. 192, Sat., 27 June 
1964, held that these measures had long been established to meet disasters and had 
"no connection with any fictitious state of emergency". Ene., NAM, Internal Security, 
ser. 4/64, sec. 
5 Information confided to the author in San Pawl tat-Targa, Malta, on 15th July 1999, 
by one who was present, and who preferred to remain anonymous. Asked to recall 
when exactly this inspection ofTarga Gap had taken place he said it was "some time 
before Independence" (flit qabell-Indipendenza). The initiative did not come from the 
Cabinet: they had been advised by those in charge of security to undertake the 
inspection and be briefed accordingly as a precaution ("Kienu qalulna ... "). See below 
esp., pp. 490-491. 
6 Formore Intelligence details bearing on this grave possibility and other disquieting 
reports, see below, II, 15, and III, 17. 
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Colonel J. Abela, Commandant of the Malta Civil Defence Corps, presents 
the coat-of-arms of the corps to the Prime Minister. His Adjutant, Mr E. 
Tonna, is on the left. Below: after Independence, the Prime Minister 
inspects a Maltese regiment. 
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Such fears and fall-back positions have also to be taken in 
conjunction with intelligence reports compiled from various 
sources, internal and external, and transmitted from the UK 
Commission in Floriana. From 1962 onwards these became a 
regular, sometimes striking, sometimes startling monthly feature, 
linking up a tiny British elite of highly-placed decision-makers in 
civilian, military and diplomatic quarters, in Malta, London and 
Rome. Add to this the Mediterranean turbulence, from Libya to 
Cyprus. Matters were really coming to a head; here was the worst 
possible scenario for Independence, perhaps a point of no return. 
While distancing herself from Malta, Britain still wished to secure 
the future, but there was a limit to what she could actually do once 
the bird would have flown out of the nest. Ever since the restitution 
of Responsible Government and the general election of February 
1962, there was a slow build-up of intelligence on Mintoff and his 
party, on the their ally the General Workers Union, and more 
generally. Themes and topics recurred, but some aspects assumed 
more gravitas as time went on. Apart from the ongoing Mintoff-
Gonzi 'politico-religious' conflict, which was not a security concern 
in itself, there was the problem of the rundown, ensuing discharges, 
and fears of the unrest which growing unemployment would cause. 
This included the dockyard problem and the question of Baileys, as 
the GWU was most militant in this area where Lorry Sant was 
becoming prominent (although Attard Kingswell was still firmly in 
the saddle by 1964). 
Another and perhaps more serious area of concern was the lurch to 
the left which Mintoff's party was seen to be experiencing, evident 
in the affiliation with AAPSO and, through it or otherwise, contacts 
with powers considered unfriendly or hostile to the West. The 
'neutralist' stance was generally seen to be a cover for pro-Socialist 
or rather pro-Communist inclinations; this belief was further 
strengthened by some meetings Mintoff and his aides were having. 
Speaking in June 1964 after a visit to Moscow, for example, Mintoff 
explicitly declared that the MLP wanted to have "allies", as others 
had. The MLP's "allies", he explained, were "those who did not want 
to have nuclear bases in the Mediterranean and those Arab states 
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The civil defence and territorial 
regiments in Malta had two 
underground 'operations' rooms, 
one at Attard near the Governor's 
palace, and a larger, deeper one at 
Targa Gap. The latter was equipped 
with communication facilities as 
well as radiological monitoring and 
nuclear detection instruments, in 
addition to having the means 
required for activities such as 
search and rescue, fire-fighting or 
other emergencies. 
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and the new states of Africa and all those who were against the 
British and the Americans in the struggle against imperialism".7 
Although Mintoff said more than once that he did not want a 
dictatorship, Communist or Fascist, there was the not infrequent 
arousing discourse employed by the MLP and especially by Mintoff 
himself: hypothetical talk of civil war, arming the people, resistance 
by all means, the shedding of blood, friendly powers who would help 
them, and so on. 
At the same time the MLP, backed by the GWU, was consistently 
opposed to any DefenceAgreement with Britain before Independence 
- even though there was an ambivalence as to whether they would 
actually want one, depending on the terms, once Malta became 
independent. They were adamantly opposed to any 'sovereign base 
areas' arrangement, which had been the case with Cyprus; this 
opposition was shared less vociferously by the Nationalists, who at no 
point advocated any permanent sovereign bases. But in any case, the 
'Mintoffian' side also wanted fresh elections and their constitutional 
changes before Independence. Behind the scenes, Mintoff was a 
consideration in the arguments and calculations made by the Ministry 
of Defence as well as by the Colonial Office throughout the 
deliberations on an Anglo-Maltese Defence Agreement, and 
unavoidably also on a Financial Agreement. 
On the question of Defence as such, it was thought probable that 
Mintoff was "not completely opposed to a Defence Treaty, on the 
Libyan pattern," provided the rent was high enough. It was believed 
however that this too was what the Nationalist Government really 
wanted.8 Discussions about the Defence Agreement had been kept 
7 "II-Perit Mintoff qalli I-par tit irid ikollu I-allejati kif ghandhorn l-ohrajn. Huwa 
fisser Ii I-allejati tal-partit hurna dawk Ii fIl-Mediterran rna jridux bazijiet nukleari u 
dawk il-pajjizi Gharab u I-pajjizi I-godda ta' I-Afrika u dawk kollha Ii hurna kontra 
I-Inglizi u I-Amerikani fiI-glieda kontra I-irnperjalizrnu." See "Ir-RUSSJA Lesta 
Tindahal - Mintoff Ibassar Tixrid ta' Dernrn J ekk ... ", L-Orizzont, 22 June 1964. 
8 Int. rep., 4 Dec. 1962 2 Jan. 1963, sec., para. 1,926/1822/48655. 
.2 
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under wraps. When the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office, Sir John Martin, visited Malta between 24th and 28 th 
November 1963, it was announced that he had come to deal further 
with a number of matters connected with independence, following 
the prime minister's visit to London. In fact, Martin was 
accompanied by Mr Stephens, a senior official from the Ministry of 
Defence. They devoted nearly all their time to "intensive discussions 
with the Prime Minister about the draft Anglo-Maltese Defence 
Agreement." These provisions, which were similar to those 
contained in other agreements between the UK and independent 
countries, "came as something of a cold shock to the Prime 
Minister", according to the local Intelligence Committee. "He had 
probably expected a draft which would allow Malta to have her 
independence cake and eat it." However, it added, the discussions 
were amicable, and paved the way for more thorough examination 
of the draft in the near future. The fact that Martin's discussions had 
been almost wholly concerned with the Defence Agreement, and the 
presence of an official from the Ministry of Defence, "were 
successfully concealed; and the main effect on the public was to 
suggest that the Colonial Secretary was screwing the Prime Minister 
up to the mark."g 
Whatever that snide remark was supposed to mean, there is no 
doubt that defence assessments and negotiations were being held 
secretively on an inter-governmental and inter-departmental basis. 
In the meantime, worries about Malta's internal security and 
Britain's ability to hang on or otherwise, increased. Ongoing 
developments about which intelligence was available referred to four 
main areas of concern. These were: 
1. the organizational consolidation and increasing 
militancy of what was Malta's only general workers 
union, which was pro-Labour; 
9 Int. rep., 6 Nov.-5 Dec. 1963, sec., para. 4, 926/1822/48655. 
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2. the fear that industrial unrest would escalate because of 
the rundown and that it would erupt chaotically taking 
an overtly political form; 
3. the shifting leftwards of the MLP's ideological leanings 
coupled with growing contacts and dealings with 
neutralist or hostile parties and powers; and 
4. very real fears about Malta's internal security and the 
prospect of a foreign-aided MLP-Ied coup d'etat in Malta 
soon after Independence. 
The steadily improving state of organization and mobilisation of 
both the MLP and the GWU was kept under surveillance. Apart 
from the GWU pro-Labour mass circulation daily in Maltese started 
in 1962 (L-Orizzont), both organisations were strengthening their 
operational bases. The Vicar General was even irked by the fact that 
MLP volunteers were working on the construction of the Freedom 
Press and MLP party headquarters on Sunday, a holy day of 
obligation, leading Mintoff to condemn this "interference" and 
promising to have the premises opened by May Day 1963.10 
The GWU was completing the building of its new Headquarters, on 
which £54,000 had already been spent; a further £68,000 were being 
collected. The GWU levy on its present scale had produced £6,000; 
they hoped to get most of the rest of the money they needed from 
abroad. As a result of a circular sent out recently to all LC.F.T. U. 
affiliates, they expected to receive £1,250 from the Transport and 
General Workers Union of the UK and £1,000 from the ISTADRUT 
ofIsraeL It was hoped that 75% ofthe premises would be ready for 
occupation by the end of 1963. Attard Kingswell meanwhile was very 
active in I.C.F.T.U. affairs, frequently travelling to their meetings or 
10 For a picture of the Freedom Press in an advanced stage of construction, while 
the fund-raising campaign continued, see "Bix-xelin xelin tinbena s-sala", Il·Heisien, 
17 Mar. 1964, p.l. 
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on their behalf to Europe, the Near East, even central and southern 
Africa. ll On a month-long assignment for I. C.F.T. U. in Cyprus, 
Attard Kingswell was instrumental in a general reorganization of the 
free trade unions there. 12 
The GWU were busy forming a subsidiary association to include 
professional, scientific, technical, administrative, clerical and 
supervisory grades, to be known as National Association of Clerical 
and Supervisory Grades. Hitherto the GWU had been regarded as 
mainly for industrial employees. By spreading their influence to 
include these other grades, the GWU hoped to increase their strength 
considerably.13 This also meant a challenge to the existing unions 
representing civil servants and other professional and clerical related 
employees, as well as teachers, which were not MLP-oriented; it would 
reinforce the GWU's challenge to all smaller professional and 
technical unions, such as the one at the Dockyard, which represented 
non-industrials, by offering an alternative work-specific union 
membership largely controlled from the same central source. A near-
monopoly of both industrals and non-industrials nationally would 
further strengthen the pro-Labour GWU when threatening, for 
example, to declare a 'sympathy' strike or even a general strike in 
support of pay claims to any particular section, such as the small, 
pivotal band of port auxiliaries, or otherwise. This unrivalled stealth 
would make it all the more necessary to have a professional and 
responsible trade union leadership accountable to a genuinely 
representative membership, particularly in such sensitive arteries 
such as the Grand Harbour and the Malta Dockyard. In the absence 
of that, any gross disruptions of the work force and general 
administration, which could be politically-motivated at such a 
11 Int. rep., 3 Mar.-l Apr. 1963, sec., para. 12, 10,926/1822/48655. 
12 See "Kingswell lura rMalta", L-Orizzont, 4 Apr. 1963, p.1, showing Kingswell with 
Makarios. 
13 Int. rep., 7 Aug. 5 Sept. 1963, sec., para. 11,926/1822/48655. 
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Mr Attard Kingswell confers with Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia during 
his Cyprus assignment for the ICFTU in 1963, in a front-page report from 
l-orizzont. 
delicate politico-economic hiatus for the country - would indeed give 
rise to considerations of internal security and public order under the 
provisions of the Emergency Powers Act, 1963. Mintoff's premonition 
about a "civil war" breaking out would thus become correspondingly 
nearer. It seemed nonetheless that there was a tacit understanding, 
at least between Attard Kingswell and Borg Olivier, that neither side 
would look forward to such a confrontation. 
In May 1963 the MLP opened its new Headquarters in Marsa, where 
the weekly party organ The Voice of Malta now started being printed. 
In a tongue-in-cheek report on this, it was noted by British 
intelligence that the festive opening ceremony was largely attended, 
if the number of cars were anything to go by, "by a prosperous lot 
of Labour supporters."14 
14 Int. rep., 7 Aug. - 5 Sept. 1963, sec., para. 10; 926/1822/48655. On the Emergency 
Powers Act, 1963, see below, pp. 457-460. 
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Whether its supporters had nicer cars or not, the PN in terms of 
organizational clout had nothing with which to rival either the 
GWU's or the MLP's apparata, let alone the two of them combined, 
Without a proper Headquarters or a full-time staff, or even a proper 
newspaper, it had to rely on institutional supports such as the 
church, the information department, the Strickland papers, public 
broadcasting, the police force, and, as was customary, on a degree 
of patronage. The party machinery itself was largely inexistent or 
non-functional, loosely rallied around the figure of Borg Olivier as 
party leader and prime minister. Tradition and sobriety were rather 
on the PN side, especially with someone like Mintoff around; but it 
was competing against increasingly superior material odds: more 
alert, with a cultivated sense of hurt, and better mobilized than ever. 
As a party, the PN captured the sweep oflocal mood at the time and 
had a long-established nationwide pedigree and informal network; 
but otherwise, it was truly a miracle how this party won general 
elections, perhaps that is what it was. 
While Borg Olivier's PN languished in a haphazard fashion, on 8th 
April 1964, in time for the referendum campaign, the GWU 
produced the first number of an English weekly newspaper (which 
later on became a daily), called Malta News. The GWU press board 
recommended to the general council that additional printing 
machinery should be bought without delay to cope with the ever 
increasing volume of work. The GWU also examined and approved 
plans for the formation of its own travel agency business: Untours 
Ltd. IS 
Weeks later, the GWU took what was seen as "an openly political 
step" when it sent a resolution to the British government reserving 
the position of "the trade union movement in Malta" with regard to 
any Defence Treaty negotiated by the British and Maltese 
governments. The purpose of these activities appreared to be to 
embarrass Borg Olivier in his dealings with the British government, 
15 Int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., pa'ra. 12-13,926/1822/48655. 
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in which, they probably apprehended, an agreement might be 
reached at their expense. They were thus taking first steps towards 
creating an atmosphere of "industrial uneasiness" in which, if 
political reasons so required, more serious industrial unrest could 
be started Up.16 
The increasing organizational expansion and mass mobilisation of 
both the GWU and the MLP, operating from their new twin 
Headquarters in Valletta and Marsa, with steadying mass media 
exposure and a diversification of interests and incomes - for 
example, in the jobbing and travel business now - accompanied an 
accomodation of convenience with Malta's two leading production 
firms. Farsons, the brewers, came to some form of agreement with 
the MLP and started advertising in their newspapers again. 
Marsovin, still known as Cassar Brothers, the wine manufacturers, 
contributed £400 to MLP funds rather than advertise in MLP 
newspapers.I7 This reluctance by Farsons and Marsovin to be seen 
as indirectly 'financing' the MLP was caused partly by the ever-
present shadow of church censure and some earlier tiffs. It was also 
a reflection, probably, of the language, policies and suspicious 
contacts of Mintoff himself, to which they demurred. At the same 
time, these firms risked facing industrial trouble if the GWU made 
claims on them which they could not meet or if they were put on its 
black book and/or that of the MLP, especially if the latter were to 
gain power. To some extent they could thus be held ransom by their 
own employees if these joined the GWU, which the MLP could then 
influence. 
As the weeks rolled by, with Borg Olivier and his delegation 
ensconced in London trying exasperatingly to clinch a final deal with 
the British on outstanding matters including defence and finance, 
the GWU involved itself in politics more directly, echoing if not 
16 Int. rep., 7 May 4 June 1964, sec., para. 17, 926/1822/48655.} 
17 Ibid., para. 21,92611822/48655. 
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parroting the MLP position. On 28th June its General Conference 
passed a resolution against the Malta Government's method of 
conducting negotiations on the future of Malta behind the people's 
back in London, particularly with regard to the Defence Treaty. The 
General Conference also condemned those who "oppress the 
workers and are trying to set up a Fascist dictatorship." In almost 
the same breath, the G WU welcomed the details of an 
apprenticeship scheme, which it had requested, at the dockyard. 
This was "a living example of co-operation between Union and 
Management." But the GWU drydocks section were believed to be 
actively considering an overtime ban in an attempt to secure an 8% 
pay rise. Mintoff himself started a series of articles in The Voice of 
Malta criticising the dockyard management. Government and 
British circles realised of course that a ban on overtime could 
immediately lose the Malta Drydocks the confidence of foreign ship 
owners, which the management had been successful in obtaining. 
The UK Government Employees Section, a newly amalgamated 
section to which all GWU members working for UK government 
departments in Malta belonged, were considering taking industrial 
action over a dispute with SASO - RN, the Superintending 
Armament Supply Officer. This industrial action would be called if 
about sixty Maltese workers in the naval base became redundant in 
September. 
The MLP's tendency over the years to boycott or challenge state 
broadcasting on grounds of discrimination was not, in the early Sixties, 
a security concern so much; it was more related to the 'religious 
human rights' campaign mounted by the party nationally and 
internationally. And it could have had an adverse effect on MLP clubs, 
which much preferred to have TV sets in their bars. 18 However, this 
nurtured grievance later led the party to organise broadcasts from 
Egypt by arrangement with President Nasser's regime. The MLP also 
sought to broadcast to Malta from Ben Bella's Algeria. 
18 Int. rep., 4 Dec. 1962 - 2 Jan. 1963, sec., para. 7, 926/1822/48655. 
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Broadcasting facilities were in fact granted to the MLP by Nasser in 
April 1964. Cairo Radio started broadcasting in Maltese in support 
of the MLP.19 The MLP broadcasts on Cairo Radio were for half-
an-hour every day. Launched on 19th April 1964, they ended on 5th 
May 1964 (just after the referendum on the Independence 
constitution). However, Cairo Radio promised that they would be 
resumed in future. The broadcasts included recordings made by 
Mintoff and Lorry Sant, but seemed to contain nothing new by way 
ofMLP propaganda. Their transmission being necessarily on short-
wave band, it was assumed that few people could receive them in 
Malta20 (forgetting perhaps that wireless transmission had hit Malta 
decades earlier, and that such morale-boosting broadcasts could be 
recorded and relayed through the many MLP clubs, transmission 
quality permitting). 
A stricter political regime might have considered the beaming of 
such broadcasts to Malta from Egypt as somehow seditious, and 
banned or jammed them on grounds of foreign interference. The 
evening broadcasts commenced by an announcer saying every time: 
"This is the voice of Malta" . At a meeting in Siggiewi, Mintoff said 
that although the Broadcasting Authority was denying the party the 
right to speak on Rediffusion and Television, "we are broadcasting 
just the same ... Open the radio in the evening and from Cairo you 
will hear the voice of the Labourites". 21 The MLP programmes were 
actually called Din hija I-vuci ta' Malta. 22 Mintoff's speeches at mass 
meetings were a favourite item on Cairo Radio's 'Malta' agenda. 
When in mid-May 1964 the Labour MP Lorry Sant returned to 
Malta after a month in Cairo, the Secretary of the GWU Dockyard 
19 Annex, into rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., para. 1 (iv), 926/1823/48655. 
20 Int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., para. 9, 926/1822/48655. 
21 "L-M.L.P. Qiegned Ixandar mir.Radjo tal-Kajr", L-Orizzont, 27 Apr. 1964, p.8. 
22 "Ix-Xandiriet mill-Kajr", Il-Helsien, 27 Apr. 1964, p.l. 
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Metalworkers Section was said to have been "on a month's trip 
overseas". He had left Malta together with an MLP delegation, which 
included Buttigieg and the MP Philip Muscat. "Dr Buttigieg and Dr 
Muscat had gone to New York to present a petition to the Special 
Committee on Colonialism at the UN", the report concluded, not 
once mentioning what Sant himself had actually been up to or where 
he had really been.23 
Tied to greater organization and mobilisation, including these 
foreign contacts and dealings, a wave of strikes or even industrial 
'sympathy' actions, while the Services rundown gathered 
momentum, could have the gravest consequences. In the 
circumstances such an escalation of industrial unrest was 
preoccupying. In anticipation of discharges the GWU directed that 
Christmas parties at the workplace in December 1962 should be 
boycotted, even if children's parties were spared. A one-day national 
strike in protest was being rumoured and dates in January 1963 
bandied about for it.24 Baileys tried hard to improve their public 
image, for example through widely-distributed glossy brochures 
about their achievements; there was a vain hope that another 
company, Bethlehem Steel, would step in; the critical Muirie Report 
on the dockyard hung over the future; and there still was much 
uneasiness in the dockyard generally.25 The first discharges took 
place on 4th January 1963,just as the dispute between Baileys and 
the British government was coming to a head. Following several 
strikes, the Baileys' management adopted a new and tougher 
attitude towards the GWU. 
A dispute about the status of clerical workers produced a ban on 
overtime by the unions, and as a result commercial work ceased. 
This was essentially an inter-union conflict, with the GWU trying to 
23 "Lorry Sant Lura Malta", L-Orizzont, 15 May 1954. 
24 Int. rep., 4 Dec. 1962 -2 Jan. 1963, sec., para. 2, 926/1822/48655. 
25 Ibid., f. 4, para. 10. 
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obtain the right to represent non-industrials (as well as industrials) 
instead of the Malta Technical and Clerical Association. Two strikes 
by non-industrials were called by the GWU; subsequently this union 
held a yard gate meeting during which it called all dockyard workers 
out on strike for an hour. Baileys were then blamed for retaliating 
by discharging certain of the striking clerks, this leading to another 
GWU strike of all workers on 17th January at very short notice, with 
GWU pickets informing workers about the strike on their way to 
work. Although the matter had been submitted to arbitration, an 
indefinite clerical strike and an indefinite overtime ban were called 
by the same union. When, on 1 st February, 26 mostly militant 
chargemen were ordered to report for overtime work and they 
refused, they were immediately handed notices of dismissal; but 24 
hours later they were reinstated. Finally, "interim joint recognition" 
was agreed to, after an arbitration tribunal had found in favour of 
the M.T.C.A.26 The agreement was reached with Attard Kingswell 
by the Chairman of Swan Hunters on 24th July 1963, naturally to 
continuing protests from the M.T.C.A.27 
But industrially and tactically, the dispute was moving beyond that, 
with decisions being taken on the spot by Attard Kingswell and 
Lorry Sant. 28 On 13th January 1963 the National Front Against 
Discharges, which included the church-associated Moviment Azzjoni 
Socjali (M.A.S.), held a day of protest, in which some 9,000 workers 
demonstrated; the MLP opposed this activity while the GWU hardly 
participated in it.29 
26 Int. rep., 4 Feb.-3 Mar. 1963, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
27 Int. rep., 1 July - 6 Aug., 1963, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
28 Int. rep., 3 Jan.-3 Feb. 1963, sec., para. 2-4,926/1822/48655. 
29 Int. rep., 3 Jan-3 Feb. 1963, sec., para. 1-2, 926/1822/48655; but see also the 
criticism in Il-ltaddiem, organ of the Zghazagh ltaddiema Nsara (Young Christian 
Workers). On the National Front Against Discharges, see above, I, 5 and 6. 
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A lockout by Baileys was being rumoured, but in the last week of 
February the discharged employees were reinstated and the 
overtime ban was lifted,30 No organization for action beyond normal 
trade union limits was known to exist, but the GWU and the MLP 
encouraged their members who worked in telephone exchanges "to 
pass on anything they hear", and there had been more than one 
instance of that recently.3! Mintoff's solution to the Bailey problem 
was nationalisation or at least a 51 % holding in the company by the 
Government of Malta.32 
In mid-February the Legislative Assembly passed the Malta 
Dockyard (Temporary Provision) Act 1963, entrusting the 
administration of Bailey (Malta) Ltd., to a Council of Administration 
appointed by the Prime Minister. Bailey instituted an action against 
Borg Olivier holding this Act to be ultra vires. In fact the Prime 
Minister had appointed to the Council of Administration the 
eminent British names proposed by Sandys himself.33 Mintoffwas 
reported to have remarked that the Baileys legislation was a good 
thing but he was glad that the MLP did not have the responsibility 
for it.34 In "a critical and sour mood", the MLP, instead of greeting 
with relief the appointment of Swan, Hunter and Wigham 
Richardson as Managing Agents of the Dockyard, concentrated on 
grumbling about the time taken in making this appointment, and 
lack of information about the contract. The announcement at Easter 
of plans for building new hotels, including a Hilton Hotel, and for 
a synthetic yarn factory, were criticized by the MLP on the grounds 
30 Int. rep., 4 Feb.-3 Mar. 1963, sec., para. 8, 92611822/48655. On Borg Olivier's 
threat to resign if the dockyard workers were locked out or discharged en masse, see 
above, I, 8. 
31 Int. rep., 3 Jan.-3 Feb. 1963, sec., f. 4, para. 9, 926/1822/48655. 
32 Ibid., para. 6. 
33 Int. rep., 4 Feb.-3 Mar. 1963, sec., para. 1, 926/1822/48655. 
34 Ibid., para. 4, 926/1822/48655. 
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that these projects would "give employment mainly to women." 
They also criticized the long time being taken in building new hotels. 
While the fear of discharges remained, the announcement that the 
Garrison was to be increased by the 1st Batallion The Royal Sussex 
Regiment passed almost without any public comment.35 
In a report prepared by Kenneth Dallas of the LC.F.T.U. at the 
request of the GWU, published as The Economic Situation of Malta, 
Dallas held that the British government should extend the period 
of the Services rundown until 1972. Whilst the G WU rather 
supported this recommendation, it seems the MLP did not, as it ran 
counter to Mintoff's exhortations to the British to "get out."36 
While work in the Malta Drydocks was increasing, various other strikes 
were ordered by the GWU. Between 4th and 9th May there was a strike 
of cooks at the R.N. Hospital in Bighi about their hours and conditions 
of work. On 12th May there was a 24 hour strike of all Port Auxiliary 
Service personnel about the delay in the settlement of a pay claim, as 
a result of which the tourist passenger liner Caronia cancelled a one 
day visit to Malta. Port Auxiliary Service tugs, manned by naval 
ratings, berthed three ships, including a tanker for Malta Drydocks. 
(The number of employees engaged to man these tugs was very small, 
but they were GWU members and they could paralyse port activity.) 
On 8th May the GWU ordered a ban on overtime for Port Auxiliary 
Services, which remained in force for months. The GWU leadership 
was apparently resisting militant pressure to bring about widespread 
industrial action in connection with the Services rundown to 
embarrass the Maltese government and re-assert their power. GWU 
officials were appointed to work with the MLP on a Joint Economic 
Committee intended to promote industrial and commercial 
enterprises for alternative employment to discharged workers.37 
35 Int. rep., 1 Apr.-2 May 1963, sec., para. 1,926/1822/48655. 
36 Ibid., para. 8. A copy of the Dallas report was forwarded by the GWU. to theT.U.C. 
in Britain and circulated to LC.F.T.U. members. 
37 Int. rep., 3 May - 31 May 1963, sec., para. 8-11,926/1822/48655. 
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The GWU allegedly prevailed on the MLP to give priority to 
economic considerations over political ones. On the Defence Treaty, 
the two said that if "unfortunately" they had to accept a British base, 
Malta should receive financial aid on a large enough scale for her 
to be economically viable when the Defence Treaty expired. They 
were apparently given to understand by Sandys that a Defence 
Treaty and the details of economic aid would be negotiated with an 
independent Malta, and that the question of economic aid would not 
be tied to a Defence Treaty. In his reactions to a statement by Borg 
Olivier in parliament about the draft constitution, Mintoff was said 
to have shown "unusual moderation": welcoming the assurances 
about the Defence Treaty and economic aid; he criticised the 
monarchical system and proportional representation, and insisted 
that Commonwealth membership should be decided after 
Independence. He criticised the plans being made to create "a 
theocratic rather than a secular State" and complained about 
procedural restrictions and lack of information. At the opening of 
the all-party talks with the Prime Minister about the draft 
constitution, the MLP sent observers but Mintoff did not attend.38 
In the meantime MLP lawyers were instructed to study the Italian 
constitution on civil marriage and other aspects, just as the Curia 
warned of "the plague and threat of laicism" while the Diocesan 
Junta issued a leaflet called What Mintoff Wants.39 
At Malta Drydocks the new management succeeded in establishing 
good industrial relationships, but active GWU leaders complained 
to Borg Oliver that there was still a shortage of work and criticised 
the absence of any apprenticeship training scheme. They pressed for 
the immediate appointment of a Maltese to the Council of 
38 The leaders of the Centre Parties met Borg Olivier at the time, but they had earlier 
joined forces with the MLP voting an amendment to the Speech from the Throne 
requesting that public opinion be consulted before Independence. 'The Stand 
Against Immediate Independence', Times of Malta, 28 Nov. 1963, p.I. On these 
Government-Opposition hiccups, see above I, 4-8. 
39 Int. rep., 1 June - 30 June 1963, para. 2-8, 926/1822/48655. 
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Administration and complained that the policy of employing Maltese 
in responsible posts followed by Baileys had to some extent been 
reversed. While the overtime ban for port auxiliary employees 
remained in force, the GWU threatened to hold "a general strike" 
if their pay claim was not met. Another short strike was 
contemplated to coincide with the visit of another tourist passenger 
liner, but in that case naval ratings were expected to man the tug-
boat to see it in, unless it cancelled the visit.4o Dissatisfaction over 
salaries also led to a 'work to rule' by the Malta Civil Service 
Association from 5th August "due to the indifferent attitude of the 
official side on salary negotiations"; this was in addition to the 
continuing overtime ban at the port.41 
On 20th February 1964 the GWU's General Council authorised its 
sections to claim an 8% increase in wages. They said that a general 
wage increase of 5% had been made but not conceded in 1961 
(under the colonial administration) and that since then the cost of 
living had increased by a further 3%. The GWU leadership criticised 
the government's inertia in economic and industrial matters, 
blaming it for failing to consult the trade unions who were ready to 
co-operate. The 8% wage rise claim was lodged after close 
consultation between the economic sub-committees of the GWU and 
the MLP. As it was clear that the government would be finishing the 
financial year with a large deficit of some £600,000, and had asked 
for urgent financial talks with the British government, some GWU 
members were saying that their 8% claim "will be the death blow of 
the Government."42 
The GWU liked to think of itself as the only union really worth 
considering in Malta, because it was the largest. When the Minister 
of Labour wrote to ask for two GWU nominations for representation 
40 Int. rep., 1 June - 30 June, 1963, sec., para. 9-10, 92611822/48655. 
4J Int. rep., 1 July 6Aug. 1963, sec., para. 6-7,92611822/48655. 
42 Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 13, 926/1822/48655. 
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on the Malta Labour Board and on the Malta delegation to the 
I.L.O. in Geneva, Attard Kingswell told the union's general council 
that as the Minister had not yet accepted the union's view about the 
basis of representation, the union should not nominate anybody, but 
should continue to press the Minister to allow "all four members on 
the Labour Board to be G.W.V. representatiyes."43 There was also 
a question mark over the completion of work on No.5 dock, as there 
would then no longer be a need to use the floating dock.44 
In addition to these mounting industrial disputes and the fear that 
the GWV could make a political issue of unemployment, Mintoff 
party's ideological leanings, contacts and dealings with other parties 
and powers political and occasionally also military - were a seriouis 
cause of disquiet to Britain. Flirting with dictatorially inclined so-called 
neutral and non-aligned states, as well as with Communist ones, was 
invariably ferreted out and followed up so far as possible. Not satisfied 
with their association with the Socialist International, the MLP had 
gravitated towards the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation 
whose conferences and executive meetings it was attending. 
The MLP having been invited to attend the AAPSO conference in 
Tanganyika, due at the end of January 1963, the Local Intelligence 
Committee took care to find out such seemingly petty things as to 
who issued the ticket, to whom, who paid for it, etc. In this case, a 
free ticket for one delegate - Mintoff informed his executive 
committee - was being provided; he obviously intended to go 
himself. He took with him one Joe Scerri, a businessman from 
Naxxar. In his onward travel from Tanganyika to Italy and 
elsewhere, Mintoffwas acompanied by another businessman, Zaren 
Dalli, who had received a ticket, paid for by the Italian 
government.45 During this MLP executive committee meeting, 
43 Add. annex, into rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 9,926/1823/48655. 
44 Int, rep" 5 June-3 July 1964, sec., para. 10-12,926/1822/48655. 
45 Int. rep., 3 Jan.-3 Feb 1963, para. 7, 9261 
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Mintoff also disclosed a promise of an unspecified amount of 
financial help for the Freedom Press from German Social 
Democrats.46 Before leaving for Dar-es-Salaam, Mintoff informed 
his close associates that in a talk prior to his departure, Dr Borg 
Olivier had enquired what would be his views on a National or 
Coalition Government to which - Mintoff said - he did not reactY 
If so, it is most unclear how the PN, or the MLP would have come 
round to such an understanding; perhaps Borg Olivier meant it as 
a sign of goodwill to permit greater cooperation on the 
independence issue. 
After his visit to I taly in February 1963 Mintoff also went to Austria, 
West Germany and Czechoslovakia. In Prague, he was said to have 
described the situation in Malta and discussed "the possibility of 
Czechoslovakia granting aid to an independent Malta, free of 
Western bases." In considering a visit to Russia, he hoped, as he put 
it, "to obtain a lever" which he could use at the forthcoming 'All 
Party' conference in London. It was thought that contacts between 
Mintoff and the Czechs had first been made through their embassies 
in Rome and Vienna. The statement that Mintoff made on his return 
about having visited Czechoslovakia and about being prepared to 
take delegations elsewhere, including Russia, had led to 
"surprisingly little comment by his opponents." This report 
continued thus: 
The Nationalist Party probably considers that there is 
something to be gained if H.M.G. becomes alarmed at 
Mintoff's references to contacts with Iron Curtain countries. 
Both the Nationalists and the Church probably welcome 
these developments, believing that Mintoff is now getting 
into deep waters. Mintoff's speech also contained threats 
46 Int. rep., 4 Dec.-2 Jan. 1963, sec., para. 9, 926/1822/48655. 
47 Int. rep., 3 Jan.-3 Feb. 1963, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
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that in certain circumstances the M.L.P. might have to resort 
to violence and that "civil war" might break out. 
433 
Although these threats did not perhaps need to be taken too 
seriously, they did seem to show some justification for the 
Emergency Powers Act.48 
Among the agenda items intended for the MLP's annual 
general conference in April 1963, one concerned the broad-
casting boycott, another the setting up of a fitting monument 
in the so-called mizbla at the Addolarata cemetery where those 
suffering church disapproval were being buried; and a third 
upholding a policy of "neutrality", the opposition to "propaganda 
favouring wars between one country and another", and that the 
party should wherever possible contribute to the achievement of 
"disarmament". The party should take advantage of every possible 
opportunity to prevent the use of Malta "as a base for destructive 
weapons."49 
Dealings with other parties and powers were intimately linked to 
ideological leanings. In assessing the MLP's annual general 
conference of April 1963, it was reported to London that there was 
"increasing evidence" that the MLP was "swinging further left, in 
keeping with Mintoff's efforts to obtain promises of aid from Eastern 
Europe." Mintoff was reported to have said at the annual general 
conference of his party that "in an independent Malta a Communist 
system and a Capitalist system could survive alongside each other." 
He had allegedly encouraged the editor of Il-lfelsien, the MLP's 
daily, to reproduce news from Moscow broadcasts. Two out of six 
new members of the MLP National Executive were believed to be 
Communist sympathisers. This "move to the left" seemed likely to 
48 Int. rep., 3 Mar.-l Apr. 1963, sec., para. 5-7, 926/1822/48655. On the Emergency 
Powers Act, see below, pp. 457-460. 
49 Int. rep., 3 Mar.-l Apr. 1963, sec., para. 8, 92611822/48655. 
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gain encouragement from the success of the Communists in the 
Italian general election just held. 50 
The MLP's 'neutralist' and 'no bases' posture was underlined during 
the visits by Duncan Sandys to Malta in May through mass meetings 
and resolutions, at the same time as approaches were being made to 
the UN's Committee of 24. At one such meeting on 26th May, it was 
noted that the UK representative at this UN committee had given a 
false picture of the economic and political situation of Malta and that 
the Nationalist government was acting as "an accomplice" of the 
British government in hindering the anti-colonial movement. It was 
also decided that the Committee of 24 should be notified that the 
Nationalist government "was already making a Defence Treaty" with 
Her Majesty's Government "so that British and NATO forces should 
remain in Malta after independence". The UN were also to be told 
the Maltese prime minister, allegedly with British support, had 
alread y declared that his government would remain in office withou t 
elections until 1 966 (in other words, it would be serving the four year 
term of office for which it was elected). Finally, the UN were urged 
not to be misled by the fact that the British representative had voted 
in favour of their resolution and to find means to enable the people 
to attain "full independence" and to elect a government "under free 
and democratic elections." To stir the pot a little further, during the 
mass meeting on 26th May Mintoffread out a letter from a cousin of 
the prime minister, one Joseph Borg Olivier, wherein it was stated 
that in July 1961 Dr Borg Olivier had told him that he was not 
worrying about the general election as the Archbishop was going to 
declare it a mortal sin for anyone to vote for the MLP. Through the 
Department of Information, Dr Borg Olivier publicly and 
categorically denied the whole story. Two days later the MLP and the 
GWU announced joint plans for a demonstration, to coincide with 
the visit of Mr Sandys, about Independence "without ties", the 
economic situation, and widespread unemployment as a result of the 
50 Int. rep., 1 Apr. - 2 May 1963, sec., para. 5,926/1822/48655. 
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Services discharges.5l At about the same time, Mintoff spoke of 
possibly arranging for members of the MLP delegation (at the 
forthcoming Malta Independence Conference) to visit the Soviet 
embassy in London: "in order to show Mr Sandys that we can do 
without British aid."52 During their visit to the Soviet embassy in 
London, the MLP delegation were said to have received a promise 
of support at the UN if and when their letter to the Committee of 24 
came up. They were also promised economic aid for Malta after 
independence. 53 Typically, this particular paragraph in the 
intelligence report on Malta was marked by a black vertical line in ink 
in the margin by those seeing it at the London end - the Russian bear 
was poking his nose around. 
By the Autumn of1963 both the MLPand the GWU were inclined to 
prefer that Britain pronounce herself on the outstanding 
constitutional issues, with a suggestion from the GWU side that the 
major parties should "follow the example of the political parties in 
British Guiana and leave it to H. M.G. to decide." The centre parties 
cabled Douglas-Home asking him to reappraise the Maltese position 
regarding Independence. Mintoff, more drastically, said thatifH.M.G. 
did not shoulder its responsibility by the end of May 1964 (ensuring 
human rights, holding fresh elections) the MLP would "appeal to the 
United Nations to take Malta over and make Britain quit."54 Mintoff 
envisaged a UN force administering and protecting Malta as "coming 
from both East and West and from the neutral countries." He intended 
to exert pressure on the UN to bring this about.55 
The concern with financial aid was of course not restricted to the 
51 Int. rep., 3 May - 31 May 1963, sec., para. 2-5, 926/1822/48655. 
52 Int. rep., 1 June - 30 June, 1963, sec., para. 6, 926/1822/48655. 
53 Int. rep., 5 Sept.-4 Oct. 1963, sec., para. 9, 926/1822/48655. 
54 Int. rep., 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., para. 1-3, 926/1822/48655. 
55 Ibid., 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
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MLP, nor was it seen as unrelated to defence. Unemployment itself 
tended to be viewed in a context of internal security. The P.C.P., for 
example, gave prominence to a statement by Dr Hastings Banda that 
he hoped to sign a Financial Agreement with Britain before the 
independence of Nyasaland (Malawi).56 The most interested of all 
in this matter was undoubtedly the Nationalist government, but for 
the Opposition money was a regular stick, with Mintoff intent to 
show that he could do better by tapping other sources whoever these 
were. Whether Soviet financial aid could match the British aid, as 
Mintoffimagined, was a very moot point. 
Closer to home, it had been reliably reported that Mintoffhad been 
trying to contact Mr Harold Wilson, through Mrs Barbara Castle or 
Mr Fenner Brockway, "to see if they can work out a 'common policy' 
on independence before the Constitutional Conference in London". 
He also wanted to discuss with Mr Wilson "a plan which he has 
prepared on the Dockyard and on industry in general."57 A case in 
point was the Socialist International meeting in Amsterdam on 8th 
September 1963, to which the MLP were invited to send two 
delegates. The intention was to barrack for fresh elections under UN 
supervision before independence but, at the same time, to avoid the 
subject of neutrality for Malta "for fear that if it were mentioned they 
might not receive the support of the Socialist Parties of N.A.T.O. 
countries." While the MLP wrote again to the UN insisting on an 
Order-in-Council from London to change the Malta constitution in 
accordance with their human rights principles, they now lifted the 
ban which had been imposed in 1958 on contact between party 
officials and British officials as it was felt that this ban was no longer 
serving a useful purpose; efforts should be made to win the 
confidence of the British government, or what they hoped would be 
the next British government. Almost overnight, anti-British graffiti 
were removed from many MLP club premises.58 
56 Ibid., para. 1. 
57 Int. rep., 1 Apr.-2 May 1963, sec., para. 7, 926/1822/48655. 
58 Int. rep., 7 Aug. - 5 Sept. 1963, sec., para. 7-9, 926/1822/18655. 
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British socialists at the Socialist International meeting in Amsterdam 
were not as accomodating as the MLP had anticipated. The 
Congress adopted a resolution on Malta requesting the British 
government to hold an impartial inquiry into the last elections and 
to order fresh elections if appropriate, to safeguard human rights 
in the constitution and not to allow undue religious interference in 
future elections. The Maltese delegation appeared to have been 
disappointed by the attitude of the British Labour Party delegation 
which, so it was reported, would not move the resolution on Malta, 
but agreed to back it if it were moved by the Malta delegation. 
Furthermore, Dr Buttigieg, who led this delegation, said that the 
left-wing British MP Tom Driberg had told him that "the British 
Labour Party does not entirely agree with the M.L.P.'s Human 
Rights proposals or with its demand for fresh elections." Mintoff's 
comment was that the British Labour Party must have two faces, 
because they had not disagreed with the MLP's views on these 
matters when the MLP delegation was in London for the 
constitutional conference. Mintoff further commented that if the 
British Labour Party wished to break off relations with the MLP he 
would not be afraid, because "as we have fought them once we will 
fight them again."59 
That Wilson and his colleagues in the British Labour Party had 
reservations about what Mr Mintoffwas up to may be substantiated 
from another source. There was at that time a Malta University 
Commission on which sat four English academics who came to Malta 
twice a year or so. Before coming out to Malta, one of this 
Commission's members had been talking to Harold Wilson. Wilson 
had said that "the British Labour Party did not intend to give 
Mintoff all-out support." Sir Maurice Dorman, who would have 
chaired the University Commission or been in the know in other 
ways, was told this directly by the scholar friend of Wilson (who had 
himself been a lecturer at Oxford before he went into politics). 
Dorman duly informed "the Security Service man here", the 
59 Int. rep., 5 Sept. - 4 Oct. 1963, sec., para. 8,926/1822/48655. 
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number two man at the UK Commission reported back to London 
in turn. "Here is a Christmas titbit", Ian Watt began his letter to 
Christopher Eastwood on 23rd December 1963. Further on, he 
noted that support for Mintoff in the British press seemed to be 
confined to The New Statesman and The Tribune (both left-wing 
reviews). "I should not be surprised", he concluded, "if the report 
of Harold Wilson's attitude was correct. "60 
In another move, Mintoff now claimed a promise of help from 
Algeria. Algeria had become independent on 3rd July 1962 after a 
very bloody civil war which almost caused another civil war in France 
and led to the inauguration of de Gaulle's Fifth French Republic in 
1958, which has been haunted by the spectre of Algeria ever since. 
On returning to Malta from a visit to London, MintoH' was reported 
to have said that when he had been in London recently "the Algerian 
Ambassador there had offered him all help, including arms, if 
necessary." The Algerian ambassador in London had also told 
MintoH'that "without violence nothing could be achieved."61 
In March, the MLP received from the Secretary of AAPSO an 
invitation to send one delegate to the AAPSO Council meeting in 
Algiers from 22nd to 26th March. The one free ticket offered by 
AAPSO was given to Joseph Camilleri, Assistant International 
Secretary of the MLP, who agreed to undertake the responsibility of 
speaking strongly against NATO, the Archbishop and the British 
Government. He was accompanied by the Hon. Dr Vincent Moran. 
At the Algiers meeting, a resolution was passed which pledged 
AAPSO to support the MLP against the "fascist dictatorship" of the 
Catholic hierarchy in Malta, and warned the British government 
60 Watt/Eastwood, 23 Dec. 1963,432/62, conf., 926/1817/48655. The British 
members of the R.U.M. Commission in 1963 were]. S. Fulton, an Oxonian who was 
Vice-Chancellor of Sussex Univ., as Chairman; Prof. G. H. Bell, a physiologist from 
St Andrew's Univ., Prof. C, H. Hassal, a chemist from Swansea Univ., and T. C. 
Thomas, Senior Bursar at StJohn'S, Cambridge. 
61 Annex, int. rep., 6 Dec.-6 Jan. 1964, sec., f. 2, para. 3, 926/1823/48655. 
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against granting Independence to Malta under the conditions 
sought by the Borg Olivier Government.52 The MLP's Algerian 
connection continued, and evoked suspicions comparable to those 
regarding their Egyptian or Russian connections. At the end of May 
1964, a stateless press correspondent of Turkish origin named 
Arslan Humbaraci visited Malta. He was reported to have been sent 
by the Algerian Government to give "a secret message to Mintofl" 
and to obtain information about the situation in Malta. He was to 
enquire about "the possibility of a civil war being started" in the 
Island. He was also to obtain "information about arms and airfields" 
and about the number of British troops stationed in Malta. 
Humbaraci was met and looked after by leading MLP officials and 
spent some time in private discussions with Mintoff. 53 
Some months later we find MintofI writing to Ben Bella about the 
talks he had had with Nasser, and suggesting that they should meet 
in the near future. When, in early July, Dr Moran and Joe Zerafa, 
the MLP general secretary, attended a conference on 
denudearisation of the Mediterranean in Algiers, to which they had 
been invited by the Algerian Peace Committee with travelling 
expenses paid for by the Algerian regime, Mintoffhad hoped to go 
and meet Ben Bella, but he did not go to Algiers when told by the 
Algerian ambassador in Rome that such a meeting could not be 
guaranteed. Moran and Zerafa had instructions to try and arrange 
a meeting with Ben Bella: Mintoff wished to discuss with him, among 
other things, MLP broadcasts from Algiers on the Cairo modeL 
Apparently Mintoff was a bit touchy about not having met 
Khruschev (when he visited Moscow in June), although it seems he 
had been promised this by the Russians in London.54 He would not 
have wanted the same to happen to him in Algiers with Ben Bella. 
62 Int. rep., draft, 7 Mar.-7 Apr. 1964, sec., para. 16,92611822/48655. 
63 Annex, into rep., 7 May-4June 1964, sec., para. 2, 926/1823/48655. See Humbaraci's 
book, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed, published in London by Pall Mall in 1966. 
64 Annex, into rep., 5 June-3 July 1964, sec., para. 4, 926/1823/48655. On Mintoffs 
Moscow visit see below. 
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In the end, a meeting with Ben Bella did take place but Mintoff was 
not present for it. Moran and Zerafa met Ben Bella during the 
denuclearisation conference in Algiers from 5th to 9th July 1964 and 
discussed with him the possibility of arranging a meeting with 
Mintoff. Ben Bella told them that it was impossible to arrange this 
at present because of the tension in Algeria. However, he promised 
them diplomatic help in the MLP's struggle against the British 
Government; broadcasting facilities; financial help for "diplomatic 
missions" abroad, and "other means" of help in the event of a Fascist 
dictatorship being established in Malta and a Defence Treaty being 
signed between Malta and Britain.65 
Ahmed Ben Bella, the historic para-military leader of the Front de 
Liberation Nationale who was jailed by the French for several years, 
became premier of the new Algerian government in 1962-1963 and 
was elected Algeria's first president in September 1963. Little did 
Mintoff know, when he asked repeatedly for a meeting with Ben 
Bella in 1964, that Ben Bella would soon be deposed in a coup d'etat 
by Houari Boumedienne and sent back to prison, this time by a 
fraternal Algerian regime, for fifteen years. There was another 
attempted coup in independent Algeria in 1967. 
Apart from their ideological revolutionary connotations, once again 
such foreign contacts and dealings over-lapped directly with 
questions of internal security and the maintenance oflaw and order, 
especially after Independence. 
After the AAPSO meeting in Algiers held in March, Mintoff was next 
expected to go to Israel, as the Isreali Labour Party and Malta's were 
on good terms; but from there he was expected to go to Moscow. It 
appeared that Mintoff was pressing the Russians to give a clear 
indication of support if they were interested in not having a "hostile 
missile base" in the Mediterranean: 
65 Annex, int. rep., 4 July-6 Aug. 1964, sec., para. 3, 926/1823/48655. 
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He has said that it was important for the M.L.P. to obtain a 
guarantee from a foreign power that it would assist in the 
establishment of new factories, and only Russia could give this 
guarantee. Furthermore, on independence, Malta needed to 
have the backing of a foreign power, otherwise 
a coup d'etat might overthrow it. In this connection he pointed 
to the fact that the U.S.A. had been unable to overthrow 
Castro because of the support he had had from Russia.66 
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Reports on MLP contacts with the U.S.S.R. continued unabated. On 
Mintoff's instructions a prominent member of the MLP executive, 
Dr Albert V. Hyzler, called on the Soviet delegation to the U.N. in 
New York and reported to them on the situation in Malta in 
September 1963. On his return to Europe from the U.S.A., where 
Hyzler, a medical doctor, was on medical business, he was said to 
have also visited the Soviet embassy in London, giving them 
information and documents which Mintoffhad told him to pass on 
to them, receiving in return a promise of financial aid from the 
Russians. 67 It was later found out that while in the U.S.A., Hyzler 
visited the Soviet embassy in Washington. Hyzler also visited Cuba.68 
During a mass meeting in Birkirkara on 2yd February 1964, Mintoff 
announced that in reply to his telegram the Soviet leader Nikita 
Khruschev had invited him and his MLP colleagues to visit Russia 
in the near future. 69 
At the same time, however, Mintoff wrote privately to Sir George 
Schuster, who had advised governments on economic problems in 
66 Annex, Int. rep., 6 Dec. 1963 - 6 Jan. 1964, f. 2, para. 7, 926/1823/48655. 
67 Int. rep., 7 Jan.-7 Feb. 1964, f. 2, para. 1, Hyzler then went to Rome where he 
met Archbisop Gonzi and Cardinal Cicogniani. 
68 Annex, into rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar., sec., para. 1,926/1823/48655. Hyzler could simply 
have gone to Cuba on holiday or to have a look around and see what it was like; there 
was no suggestion that he had met Fidel Castro or any of his aides. 
69 Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 9, 926/1822/48655. 
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the past, indicating that Malta should cease to be a base and instead 
become "the Switzerland of the Mediterranean." In this letter to 
Schuster, Mintoff added that he would be ready to tolerate the 
presence of British forces in Malta for four to five years after 
Independence, for economic reasons. In a further twist, Schuster 
wrote to The Times in London saying that although on many issues 
he differed with Mintoff, he had found him the only Maltese public 
figure with energy and administrative ability. There being no 
possibility of economic viability for Malta in the forseeable future, 
Schuster suggested that the political parties should agree to put 
Independence into cold storage for five years. Meanwhile, they 
should combine to form a National Government.70 
Just as this was going on, Archbishop Gonzi was invested with a 
Spanish decoration from the claudilo Francisco Franco, who was 'a 
contemporary' of Gonzi. In his speech of thanks, Gonzi made a 
favourable reference to General Franco as having helped to save 
Europe from Communism. The occasion actually was a ceremony 
for the return of a relic of St Paul which had been on loan to the 
Archdiocese of Tarragona in Spain; this was brought back by the 
Cardinal Archbishop of Tarragona who took part in a number of 
events during a three-day stay in the Island. It was he who invested 
Gonzi with the decoration. 71 Franco's decoration to Gonzi was 
presented by the Governor of Tarragona, Senor Rafael Martinez. 
This was the Grand Cross of the Order of St Raimond de 
Penafort. 72 
70 Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964. para. 3, 926/1822148655.Amauled version of Schuster's 
letter to The Times appeared in Tile Times of Malta: "The Times of Malta, typically, printed 
Sir George Schuster's letter with only brief and inadequate mention of this reference 
to Mintoff, and quoted those parts of the letter which suit its arguments to support the 
P.C.P. case against Indepedence", the British intelligence report remarked. 
71 Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 5, 926/1822/48655. 
72 Tonna and Galea, L-Arci5qof Gonzi, op.cit., p. 159. His Grace and the claudilo were 
both in their seventies: Franco having been born in 1892 was 72; Gonzi born in 1885, 
was 79. Franco's Falangist victory over the Republican, Communist and Anarchist 
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Archbishop Gonzi holds the relic of St Paul in the company of the Cardinal 
ofTarragona, Minister Paolo Borg Olivier and other dignitaries. 
Although Gonzi was a collector of decorations, such a gesture, in the 
midst of a nationwide campaign led by the Diocesan Junta against 
any interference with the church's position and privileges, did the 
Nationalist Party of Malta no good at all, seemingly granting 
legitimacy to Mintoff's calls for an all-out resistance to Fascist 
dictatorship.73 Franco's regime had a defence agreement with the 
U.S.A. in return for economic aid. The MLP raised a hue and cry 
movement in Spain in 1939 had reverberated throughout the Roman Catholic 
world, with most Catholics automatically siding with the nationalist Franco who 
unfurled the Catholic and anti-Communist banner over a four year struggle, hence 
Herbert Ganado's celebrated journalistic headline at the time: "Dhalna Madrid" (We 
have entered Madrid). 
73 Apart from holding this Spanish Grand Cross, Gonzi was a Knight Commander 
of the British Assistant at the Papal Throne (Assistens ad Solium Pontificium; 
LL.D. (Honoris Causa) from the Royal Univ. of Malta; and Bailiff Grand Cross of 
the Sovereign Military Order of StJohn. In 1965 he also became a Commander of 
the Order of the Holy Sepulchre. 
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about Gonzi's comment. Workers collected signatures against a 
Fascist dictatorship and disassociated themselves from Gonzi's 
comments about Franco's Spain. Prominence was given to a plea 
made to Franco to grant an amnesty to thousands of political 
prisoners, including mine workers who had taken part in a strike.74 
The fossilized Fascist-Communist terminology of the Spanish Civil 
War revisited Maltese politics in 1964 with a misplaced Garcia Lorca 
passion for drawing blood. 
In mid-February 1964 Mintoff and Arthur Scerri, the MLP's 
representative in the UK, visited the Soviet embassy in London. 
They were urged to arrange for an MLP delegation to visit Moscow 
soon, preferably setting off on 5th March. Mintoff told the Soviet 
embassy officials that in view of his many heavy commitments, he 
might not be able to go himself if they insisted on an early date. The 
Russians were keen that the first delegation should be led by him, 
adding that other delegations could be led by other prominent 
members of the MLP. It seemed likely that he would be 
accompanied by an MP, Dr Vincent Moran, who was also an 
executive member of the party. 
While Mintoff was in London from 9th to 15th February he told 
Harold Wilson of his contact with the Soviet embassy and of his plans 
for an MLP delegation to go to Moscow. Wilson advised Mintoff that 
he should balance his contact with the Russians by a similar contact 
with the Americans. In reply to this, Mintoff said that the U.S. 
embassy in London had refused to receive an MLP delegation as 
they did not want to do anything behind the back of Her Majesty's 
Government. Similarly the American consul-general in Malta had 
told him (Mintoff) that with regard to his recent telegram to 
President Lyndon Johnson, no steps could be taken which might 
prejudice Anglo-American relations. 
74 See e.g. 'Dekorazzjoni ta' Franco Iii Mons. Gonzi', Il-lfelsien, 18 Feb. 1964, p.l; 
'Il-Grazzi ta' I-ArcisqofGonzi Iii Franco - MaddiemaJipprotestaw', ibid., 21 Feb. 1964, 
p.l; 'Franco Mlieggeg Minn Niesu Stess BiexJuri Mniena - Il-25 Anniversarju tar-
Reblia Tiegliu', ibid., 30 Mar. 1964, p.l. 
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In another context, Mintoff was reported to have said that the Israeli 
Foreign Minister (Golda Meir) had warned him not to trust the 
British Labour Party. Commenting on this, Mintoff said that for 
some time now he had not trusted them fully, largely because they 
had not fully supported the MLP in the latter's demands for 
elections and human rights. 75 
Towards the end of March, Mintoff told leading members of the MLP 
that they should go to Moscow by not later than April, irrespective 
of whether the constitution was being discussed in parliament or not 
at that time. On the way back, he said he would visit Yugoslavia. 
Speaking of the difficulties with which the British and American 
governments were faced in Libya, Mintoff said that those two 
governments had "their backs to the wall", and the situation in the 
Mediterranean should be exploited as much as possible. 76 
This long-mentioned and twice postponed Moscow meeting was now 
being scheduled for May, with Arthur Scerri from London now 
expected to accompany Mintoff.77 In fact, it took place in early June. 
Speaking to reporters on 2nd June, Mintoff said that he would go on 
from London to Moscow, at the invitation of the Soviet government, 
to discuss possible arrangements for economic and financial aid to 
Malta if an MLP government were to achieve power after 
Independence. Some evidence suggested that it was only when 
Sandys told Mintoffthat he could not have talks with him about Malta 
right then, that Mintoff decided to embark on the Moscow mission -
as if he had kept that as a trump-card. Mintoff indicated that a visit 
to Moscow would be particularly timely, because of the presence there 
of Wilson and his colleagues from the British Labour Party.78 
75 Annex, into rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar., para. 4, 926/1823/48655. 
76 Int. rep., draft, 7 Mar.-7 Apr. 1964, sec., para.2-3, 926/1823/48655. 
77 Annex, int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, para. 5, 926/1823/48655. 
78 Int. rep., 7 May-4 June 1964, sec., para. 16, 926/1822/48655. 
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Accompanied by Moran, Mintoffwas in the Soviet Union for a whole 
week from 4th to 11 th June. As guests of the Supreme Soviet, they 
met officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Department 
of External Trade. From the outset Mintoff and the MLP press 
maintained that there was nothing that was not respectable in a visit 
to Russia: Mintoff, it was said, was following in the footsteps of 
several celebrated statesmen who had been to Moscow and had 
survived. The morale of many MLP members was raised with 
expectancy about what Mintoffhad achieved by this visit. Others too 
probably would have contrasted Mintoff's initiative and his readiness 
to tell the public about his travels, with the silence that the prime 
minister had kept for so prolonged a stay in London.79 
The very fact that Mintoffhad gone to Russia provoked the Diocesan 
Junta into public condemnation, issuing, on 6th June, a statement 
to the press condemning what they described as "this dangerous 
step" as "an insult to Catholic Malta and one which no Catholic had 
as yet taken." In a vigorous reaction to this Buttigieg issued a 
statement exposing the wealth possessed by the church, ridiculing 
the assertion that no Catholics visited Russia, and describing the 
Junta's attack as nothing but a smokescreen to cover up for Borg 
Olivier's failures in London. In a counter-statement, the MLP said 
that other Catholics had visited Moscow, mentioning two leading 
Italian politicians, Gronchi and Fanfani.8o 
In a public meeting on his return, Mintoff painted his visit in 
respectable terms and as consistent with his party's declared policy 
of neutralism. He said he had told the Russians that he did not want 
to introduce Communism into Malta, but he spoke with admiration 
of what he had seen in Russia. He attacked Borg Olivier for 
collaborating with the British in their desire to rent bases in Malta. 
79 On Dr Borg Olivier's departure for London soon after the referendum result and 
its aftermath, see above, I, 9-10. 
80 'Il-M.L.P. Iwiegeb lill-Gunta', l-orizzont, 12 June 1964, p.2. 
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The Russians, by contrast, were not interested in having a base in 
Malta but were only concerned with the elimination of the British 
one. Implying that Russia was a force for peace in the 
Mediterranean, Mintoff said that in conditions of peace there would 
be work and prosperity for all in Malta.81 
It was in this meeting in N axxar on 21 st June that Mintoff said that 
his party were "ready to bring arms from abroad and to arm the 
people". Indicating that Russia would move in to assist if a Fascist 
dictatorship were to be set up in Malta, Mintoff promised to arm every 
Labourite "to the teeth". And if there was "a moral country" in the 
world, he told his listeners, "this was Russia." He again defined his 
party's allies as those Arab and African and any other states who 
opposed British and American "imperialism", adding that all those 
who were anti-Fascists were the MLP's friends. He also asserted that 
the British store at Hal Far (the NavalAir Station in Malta) contained 
nuclear warheads for torpedoes. It was reported that Mintoff could 
have been receiving unintentionally misleading reports about recent 
activities at the Torpedo Proving Plant near Hal Far. The MLP were 
also alleging that theAmerican Catholic Relief Services (C.R.S.) were 
not giving goods to needy Mintoffian families. As the distribution of 
these goods was in the hands of the parish priests, some of whom 
seemed only too likely to discriminate against M.L.P. supporters, it 
was believed that these rerports could well have been trne. 
Outreach to the Soviet bloc paid dividends in more immediate ways. 
The United States Government now invited Mintoff, together with 
Felice, to visit the U.S.A. for a six weeks 'leadership' trip arranged 
by the State Department. Outwardly, Mintoff said that for him to 
visit the U.S.A. he would first have to obtain permission from his 
party.82 Behind the scenes, Mintoff took pains to explain to the U.S. 
81 Int. rep., 5 June 3 July 1964, sec., para. 3,926/1822/48655. 
82 "X'Tghallimna minn Moscow - Nahdmu, Nirsistu ghall-Paci - Stedina mill-
Amerika", Il-Helsien, 22 June 1964, p.l, pA. See also the banner headlines 'Mintoff 
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consul general that, in talking about the use of violence, he had 
been most careful to indicate that he only contemplated force in 
particular circumstances, namely those where a Malta Government 
would, after independence, have amended the constitution in such 
a way as to deny to the MLP any prospects of obtaining power by 
constitutional means. In passing this information to British officials, 
the U.S. consul general indicated that Mintoff had seemed anxious 
that this explanation should reach British ears. Mintoff had also 
indicated to the U.S. consul general that he no longer demanded 
that there should be elections before independence. There were 
indeed signs that Mintoff would be pleased if Independence could 
be deferred until after there had been a general election in the UK 
when, so he expected, he would have an accomodating Labour 
government in the UK to deal with. This tete-a.-tete with the U.S. 
consul general could also have had something to do with indications 
that the Russians in fact had made no special promises of help to 
Malta.83 Perhaps the Americans knew that. 
Resort to force, however - even mention of "tribunals of the people" 
had been part of Mintoff's discourse for years; as Independence 
approached, fuelled by the ecclesiastical sanctions, and as the MLP 
came to be seen as potentially the alternative government of an 
independent state, it increased. In November 1963 during a speech 
at Msida shortly after an Msida woman had been refused religious 
burial, for example, Mintoff had declared that the MLP would not 
go to the courts to contest their rights. They would fight for their 
rights "as others have fought for them ... It was not afraid to do so at 
the time of Laycock, when he had Commandoes and warships at his 
Jiltaq ghal Moscow - Tahdidiet fuq Ko-operazzjoni Ekonomika u Kummercjali', 'Ir-
RUSSJA Lesta Tindahal", l-orizzont, 22 June 1964, p.l, p.8. There were similar 
sensational reports in Malta News, and less prominently in the Times of Malta, 22June 
1964, p.2, with a sub-heading entitled "Arming Partisans". 
83 Int. rep., 5 June - 3 July 1964, para. 4, sec., 926/1822/48655. 
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command. The Party was not afraid today and if justice is not done 
by it, it will resort to force ... "84 
On 5th April Mintoff and Zarenu Dalli, the MLP international 
secretary, left Malta suddenly for Rome and thence to Cairo. The 
invitation to visit Cairo, together with the offer of two tickets, was 
brought by the MLP delegates who atttended the AAPSO meeting 
in Algiers, where they met the Egyptian delegation. It was 
discovered that the invitation to Egypt was a personal one from 
GamalAbdel Nasser; it came in reply to a request which Mintoffhad 
made to meet Nasser in January. It was reported that Mintoff and 
Nasser would discuss "independence and the Base." Meanwhile, 
certain MLP extremists were reported to be pressing for the party 
to resort to violence without further delay, but Mintoff told them 
that while the question of taking action was under consideration, 
they should remember that at the present time it was important not 
to take any hasty action which might spoil their relations with the 
British Labour Party. 85 
Mintoff's visit to Cairo lasted four days. According to press reports, 
he was received at the airport by the chamberlain of the presidential 
palace. Mintoff was quoted as saying that he was in Cairo to discuss 
with Egyptian officials the means of" consolidating friendly relations 
between the two countries and reviewing the problems facing 
Malta." Mintoffwas further reported in the Egyptian press that he 
condemned British aggression in the Yemen, supported the 
evacuation of British forces from Aden, and advocated the 
liquidation of Imperialistic bases which threatened surrounding 
Arab countries. 
The MLP press gave much prominence to Mintoff's meeting with 
Nasser, pointing out that it was unusual for any "statesman" to visit 
84 "'Religious War" in Last Elections', Times of Malta, 28 Nov. 1963, p.2. 
85 Add. annex, into rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 2-5, 926/1823/48655. 
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President Nasser greeting Mr Mintoff in Cairo in April 1964. 
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Egypt so soon after a visit to Israel. It seemed probable, the British 
figured, that one reason for Mintoff's visit to Cairo was the belief in 
Malta that the collapse of the Anglo-American position in Libya was 
imminent, and that this would give added importance to Malta as a 
base, This, in turn, was seen to affect the issue of Independence and 
the Anglo-Maltese Defence Treaty.86 
During Mintoff's Cairo visit in April, it was reliably reported, 
President Nasser promised to support the MLP with financial aid, 
broadcasting facilities and naval work for the drydocks. In addition, 
he would help them stage a coup d'etat after independence. Apart 
from the invitation to Cairo, the Egyptian regime paid the expenses 
of an MLP delegation to the UN. A secret pact was made by Mintoff 
and Nasser guaranteeing that any Defence Treaty signed by the 
present Malta Government and the British Government "will be 
annulled by an M.L.P. Government."87 
At the UN, the Egyptian-financed MLP delegates were impressed by 
the knowledge and understanding of the situation in Malta shown 
by the Communist delegates, who were particularly interested in the 
86 lnt. rep., 7 Mar. - 7 Apr. 1964, sec., para. 17, 926/1822/48655. Mintoff went to 
Israel for a fortnight'S visit at the invitation of Map ai, the Israeli Democratic Socialist 
Party, whose printing establishment were offering some machinery for the MLP's 
Freedom Press; he met with the Prime Minister, ;\1r Levi Eshkol, and the Foreign 
Minister, Mrs Golda Meir, the Israeli General Federation of Labour Histadrut, as 
well as visited the Weizmann Institute and the Hebrew University. MintoI!', who was 
accompanied by his English wife Moyra nee de Vere Bentinck, also met hoteliers, 
including Kurt Levy of the Mlonot Company, who would be operating Malta's new 
Preluna Hotel in Sliema. (See "li:-Zjara ta' Mintofff'Israel", ll-Helsien, 4 Feb. 1964, 
p. 5, but on the hotel construction aspect see also "A Visitor to Israel", Times of Malta, 
10 Feb. 1964, p. 3. Mintoffwas the consultant architect of a number of the sprouting 
hotel enterprises, including the Dragonara complex.) 
87 Annex, into rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., para. 1-3,926/1823/48655. On Egyptian 
and other foreign offers for help with a coup d'etat see the discussion on internal 
security, below, passim. On the Egyptian radio broadcast facility for the MLP, see the 
references to the broadcasting issue, above. 
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Defence Treaty and were anxious to obtain information about it.88 
Despite protests by Borg Olivier, the Committee had decided to put 
Malta on the agenda; debates took place on 28th and 30d1 April. Mter 
a brief discussion the chairman had read out a wishy-washy 
'consensual' text with however did not really meet the MLP's 
demands. A third member of the delegation, whose first stop was 
Rome, had gone from there to Cairo. This was Lorry Santo 
Mintoff said privately that Nasser described Malta to him as "pointed 
at Egypt". 89 At a public meeting in Malta Mintoff indicated the nature 
of his support for Nasser by saying that Malta was no longer a threat 
to Russia, but that, in the wrong hands, it would constitute a threat 
to other countries.9o 
Sant must have had an important mission to attend to in Cairo because 
he stayed there for nearly one month: from 17th April to 14th May 
1964. Sant was a man to watch, a defiant, energetic firebrand. Destined 
to become one of the most controversial and powerful politicians in 
Malta before being suspended from the 'new' MLP in 1990, he entered 
politics in his teens, became secretary general of the Labour League 
of Youth and, in 1959, editor of its newspaper The Struggle. The first 
MLP official to incure Gonzi's wrath and an interdict with it on 9th April 
1960 as editor of The Struggle, after an article insulting to the 
Archbishop was published under a pseudonym, Sant kept one foot in 
the MLP and another in the GWU for many years. Now what exactly 
was Sant doing in Cairo, while the referendum campaign raged in 
Malta? That was the time when the MLPwere broadcasting through 
Radio Cairo. With Danny Cremona, joe Zerafa and some others, he 
would not have felt out of place in the MLP's Action Committee for 
"other methods" which had been set up. 
88 Annex, int. rep., 8 Apr.·6 May 1964. para. 7, 926/1823/48655. 
89 See 'Nasser Jiftakar fl-Attakki minn Malta', quoting The Observer's interview with 
Nasser, 6 July 1964, p.l. 
90 lnt. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. 
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Sant was reported to have said privately that the Egyptians were 
prepared to give military training to 1,000 Maltese to prepare them 
to take over the government by force. The Egyptians proposed that, 
in view of the difficulty of getting so many people from Malta to 
Egypt for this purpose, the trainees should be recruited from 
amongst Maltese who were living abroad. Having been trained, they 
could come to Malta as tourists or as if to visit their families. The 
Egyptians asked Lorry Sant whether, as Secretary of the Malta 
Drydocks Section of the GWU, he could arrange for the receipt and 
concealment in Malta of boxes of arms and ammunition which might 
be brought on Egyptian ships coming to Malta Drydocks for repair. 
The Egyptians also wanted to know how many "forts" there were in 
Malta and whether the Royal Malta Artillery could be trusted to take 
part in any action with the workers. 
To the compilers of this intelligence survey of Lorry Sant's Egyptian 
exploits, it seemed "very unlikely that the Egyptians would find many 
Maltese living abroad who would be willing to undergo military 
training in Egypt." What they found more serious was "the readiness 
of the Egyptians to assist with the smuggling of arms" into Malta: 
It might be difficult for them to do this successfully through 
Malta Drydocks but it would be easy for arms to be 
smuggled in with the assistance of Maltese fishermen, many 
of whom already indulge in smuggling of other 
commodities. A high percentage of them, particularly in the 
south of the Island, are strong supporters of the MLP. 
The General Manager of Malta Drydocks was told, in strict 
confidence, about this story. He promised to keep British officials 
informed of any enquiries made by Egyptian shipowners.91 
Two MLP members were again invited to visit Cairo, at Egyptian 
expense, after the Lorry Sant sojourn there, in order to take part 
9[ Annex, int. rep., 7 May-4 June 1964, sec., f. 1, para. 1, 926/1823/48655. 
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A synopsis of an annex to the British intelligence report on Malta for the 
period 7'h May to 4th June 1964. These reports were compiled from various 
sources, which must certainly have included one or two MLP moles. In a 
small society like Malta it was difficult to keep secrets, especially in cocktail 
parties, where there may have been a tendency to exaggerate and conjecture. 
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in the Revolution Day celebrations. The two who went up were 
Joseph Camilleri from the party's international secretariat, and 
Saviour (Salvu) Sant (Lorry Sanl's brother).92 Camilleri and Sant 
left for Cairo on 18th July and returned to Malta on pt August. 
Tickets for their journey were sent to Malta by Assad Rageh, General 
Secretary of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions. 93 
The cumulus of references from different sources about a would-be 
coup d'etat was of particular concern, because in that way Malta could 
become an enemy asset. Such a Malta would be a destabilising factor 
in the Central Mediterranean, with its airfields, harbours and 
communications network possibly in enemy hands. Anglo-Maltese 
'investment' in Malta over the best part of two centuries could be 
handed to a silver platter to a revolutionary-minded, Arab-linked 
'neutralist' bloc, or even to the Soviet one. Fears of such an 
eventuality could not have helped Mintoff and his party - at least not 
in the short-term - in his bid for power, although he may have seen 
them as arm-twisting tactics to get fresh elections and the religious 
human rights clauses inserted into the constitution. Such fears made 
it more necessary to ensure that the Maltese government would have 
recourse to British assistance if needed to suppress any attempted 
overthrow, or in the event where disturbances proved too much for 
the Maltese forces to handle. All this was taking place while a 
Defence Treaty was being negotiated between the Maltese and 
British governments, when no hard-and-fast decision had been 
taken; nor did a consensus exist as to whether Malta should be 
granted full independence, when or how. 
Mintoff's grand plan for an integrated Italo-Maltese entente, federal, 
regional or other, was a different story although Britain had no 
desire to play second fiddle to Italy in Malta which was considered 
to belong to the British sphere of influence. The British in Malta 
92 Annex, into rep., 5 June-3 July 1964, para. 5, 926/1823/48655. 
93 Annex, into rep., 4 July-6 Aug. 1964, para. 4, 926/1823/48655. 
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must have had at least one mole inside or very close to the MLP's 
executive committee. It was thus a matter for report that, at the end 
of December 1962, during an MLP executive committee meeting, 
Mintoff revealed to those around him, in confidence, that he had 
received a fresh invitation to visit Italy, and that there was important 
business to deal with, including a visit to San Marino.94 While the 
details of the MLP's Italo-Maltese plan may not have been divulged 
or discussed in detail, the party executive came to know that Mintoff 
had struck a rapport with Nenni's Partito Socialista Italiano. Months 
after Mintoff's Italian tour, the P.S.l. invited the MLP to send a 
delegate to the P.S.l. congress in Rome. Nenni's party however was 
not a member of the Socialist International. According to the statutes 
of the Socialist International, members of democratic socialist parties 
affiliated to it were not allowed to attend meetings of non-member 
parties (such as Nenni's). The MLP therefore decided to decline the 
invitation and to send Nenni a cable of greetings.95 Malta under the 
ageis of a neighbouring NATO member such as Italy, would still 
have been incomparably preferable to any deviation to the East or 
to the South.96 
Discussions concerning the use of Malta as a U.S. base for Polaris 
submarines and/or for a tropospheric scatter station for the U.S. Air 
Force, had the blessing of the British government, who waived its 
objection to direct consultations, if appropriate, between the Maltese 
and American governments. The British would still have known 
exactly what went on. Moreover, as Carrington announced, Britain 
was not thinking of basing her polaris submarines in Malta, so she 
had no direct interest in the prospect. Some discussion of these 
Western-linked defence possibilities surfaced in the Maltese press in 
94 Int. rep., 4 Dec.-2Jan. 1963, sec., para. 8, 926/1822/48655. On the Italian option, 
see above, II, 12. 
95 1m. rep., 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., para. 9, 926/1822/48655. On Nenni, see above, 
II, 12. 
96 On Maltese-Italian relations prior to Independence, see above, esp., II, 12. 
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February 1963 and again in September after the Borg Olivier-
Kennedy meeting. Nobody opposed the idea "outright", but neither 
was there any well-informed examination of the political problems 
involved;97 in fact the MLP was hostile to the idea. What most 
influenced British thinking in this domain was the prospect of a non-
Western or anti-Western departure after independence, rather than 
any close links which an independent Malta could develop with Italy 
or the U.S.A. 
Closely tied to defence was internal security. When the Emergency 
Powers Order-in-Council 1939, under section 4(2) of the Malta 
Order-in-Council 1961, was due to cease to have effect after 2nd 
March 1963, that is after the expiration of the 12 month period 
indicated, the Borg Olivier administration passed through 
parliament an Emergency Powers Bill. The coming into action of the 
Act before 3rd March 1963 was authorised by section 4(2) of the 
constitution. 98 The new Act excluded deportation and the death 
penalty, but made provision for an emergency situation arising and 
the powers needed to control it. The Labour Opposition savaged the 
legislation, saying that Borg Olivier was assuming "dictatorial 
powers". He was giving himself very wide powers and including an 
enabling law which provided for "the most undemocratic 
regulations imaginable." The Prime Minister now had the right on 
his own initiative to advise the Head of State to declare that a public 
emergency existed and to issue the relevant proclamation. This law 
made no distinction between an emergency in time of war and in 
time of peace. It resembled "acts passed by undemocratic African 
governments." According to the MLP, it made provision for the 
detention of persons in time of peace; it could make strikes illegal; 
there was no limit to the punishment which could be incorporated 
in the regulations, other than deportation and death; the procedure 
our courts normally followed could be altered; and there was no 
97 Int. rep., 4 Feb.-3 Mar. 1963, sec., para. 11, 926/1822/48655. On Malta as an 
American base see above, II, 11. 
98 Min., Crawley/Cruchley, 22 Feb. 1963,926/1881 
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provision against conscription and forced labour. This "enabling 
law" was "too wide open" and gave the Prime Minister "dictatorial 
powers." Before being brought to the House it ought to have been 
presented to a select committee of the House, and it ought not to 
have been hurried through. The MLP condemned it "most 
vehemently ... We do not and will never tolerate acts that could easily 
suppress Human Rights."gg 
Winding up the debate on the second reading, Borg Olivier 
categorically denied that the British government had intervened in 
this bill: there had been no consultation between the two 
governments about it. It could be said that the British government 
had washed its hands completely in this matter, after having 
provided in the constitution that certain emergency powers would 
lapse within a certain time; it then became the resonsibility of the 
Maltese government to legislate in order to meet any emergency. 
"The British Government was allowed to intervene, at the time of 
the last Labour Government, when the struggle for Malta's 
independence was blocked by an attempt to take Malta into the blind 
alley of integration", the Prime Minister said. 
The bill clearly provided that regulations issued after the 
proclamation of an emergency would be subject to the provisions of 
the constitution. Even the 1961 constitution, which Dr Ganado had 
welcomed as "the most liberal ever granted to Malta", provided for 
the detention of persons in certain circumstances. Continuing after 
an intervention by Dr Ganado who r:ose to say that he wanted him 
to abide by the constitution, Dr Borg Olivier noted that nowhere was 
it said that a two-thirds majority in parliament would be required 
in all cases to declare a state of emergency. Where the constitution 
required a two-thirds majority he assured the House that he would 
abide by it. In other cases, this would not be required. The Prime 
Minister asked Members 
99 'Prime Minister Takes on Dictatorial Powers', The Voice of Malta, 3 Mar. 1963, enc. 
926/1881. 
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to contemplate the possibility of having an Opposition 
inciting to disorder and causing an emergency. In such a 
case the Government might well find it impossible to obtain 
the support of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament to 
take over emergency powers ... it was not possible to draw 
comparisons with the House of Commons at Westminster. 
The House of Commons had no written Constitution and 
acted on common sense. All Opposition Members had 
agreed that the Government should have a reserve of 
powers to meet an emergency. 
459 
The Nationalist Party, Dr Borg Olivier went on, had protested against 
deportations at the time of the last war, because they were illegal. 
Internment had been accepted in principle, although one had to go 
into the circumstances leading to the internment of particular persons: 
In certain cases photos taken at Nationalist meetings were 
enlarged, certain individuals picked out, and the Strickland 
family then went to the Governor of the day and told him: 
"These must go." God forbid that there should be another 
period of emergency, but ... he did not want to be accused 
of allowing emergency regulations to lapse without taking 
steps to meet the situation. 
In debating this highly charged issue Borg Olivier was on solid 
ground because he had been the only elected member to vote 
against deportations in 1942; the Stricklandian and Labour parties 
had supported them. Mabel herself had not been involved and she 
protested at such mention of her family name. The Prime Minister's 
discourse was also politically charged when he stressed that his party 
had promised to maintain law and order - a jibe at Mintoff's 
handling of the situation in 1958. Continuing, Borg Olivier observed 
that the power to suppress strikes in an emergency was already 
provided for under the 1924 Act; but he was not legislating in order 
to suppress the right to strike: 
Now that Malta was approaching independence, the people 
must elect to power people who would use, not abuse, 
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power. The people of Malta must learn to have confidence 
in themselves ... So long as strikes were not illegal, and so 
long as they were not meant to cause disorder during a 
period of emergency, strikes would be allowed to take place. 
But strikes aimed at disrupting the life of the community 
would not be allowed because the present Government had 
promised the electorate that they would maintain law and 
order in these Islands ... If an irresponsible Government was 
possible so was it possible to have an irresponsible 
Opposition ... 100 
Another perspective of this legislation was that many were worried 
lest Mintoff could find himself vested with these emergency powers: 
... although the Emergency Powers ofthe Constitution were 
due to expire on 3rd March, the Prime Minister waited until 
the last minute before taking action - typically. This 
legislation has attracted widespread criticism as giving the 
executive too much power at the expense of the legislature, 
and as out of keeping with democratic self-government ... 
Many people are worried lest one day Mintoff should obtain 
power, and find himself with these Emergency Powers in his 
hand. lol 
100 See the detailed parliamentary reports in The Times of Malta, 4 Mar. 1963: 
"Emergency Powers Bill passed with amendments Deportation and Death Penalty 
excluded", enc. 926/1881. Dorman assented to the bill on 2 March, the same day 
that it was passed, and took offence at the suggestion that he should have first 
referred it for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure, as suggested by the legal 
advisers, because amendments had been made to it after instructions to assent had 
been received. Dorman insisted that the bill was urgent, that the amendments were 
liberalising measures, and that he had the power under section 76 of the constitution 
to assent to it on his own authority. He said the legal advisers' proposal was "rather 
like baby sitting." Dorman/Sandys, 5 Mar. 1963; Dorman/Gorell Barnes, 19 Apr. 
1963; 926/1881. 
101 lnt. rep., 4 Feb.-3 Mar. 1963, sec., para. 2; 926/1822/48655. The Local 
Intelligence Committee's report said, imprecisely, that the Emergency Powers Act 
was passed by the Legislative Assembly "at the end of February." 
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No sooner had 3pt May 1964 been set by Sandys as the date for 
Malta's independence after the Marlborough House conference that 
in a meeting in St Paul's Bay Mintoff declared that: after 
independence the MLP would "fight in the streets" for human 
rights, and "then there will be no Commandos to protect them." In 
demanding fresh elections under UN suprervision he mentioned as 
a precedent the UN investigation conducted in North Borneo and 
Sarawak.102 On another occasion Mintoff had already mentioned 
violence and stated that "civil war" could break out. 103 
In mid-October 1963 Mintoff was toying with the idea of telling the 
workers that the Nationalists and the priests wanted Independence 
"in order to set up a Fascist dictatorship", that the MLP did not want 
Independence of that kind and would boycott discussions about it. 
He claimed that it would be easy to swing the workers against 
Independence just as he had swung them against Integration. He 
thought that the MLP and the Centre parties should co-operate on 
this issue and "together they could wreck the plans for 
Independence ... " [04 But he seems to have thought better of it and 
continued to demand Independence under his conditions. A few 
weeks later he told a mass meeting that the MLP was prepared to 
fight for the human rights which they were demanding and that 
"what they are not given by justice they will take by force." He was 
reported to have told his immediate associates that "the MLP might 
have to take over the Government by a coup d'etat and that the Party 
must be well prepared for this possibility." According to this 
intelligence finding. 
He (Mintofl) has secured the Party's agreement to the use 
of 'anti-democratic' methods if Mr Sandys does not ensure 
102 Int. rep., 7 5 Sept. 1963, sec., para. 4-5, 926/1822/48655. 
103 See above and, e.g., the editorial "Civil War Threat", Malta News, 24 June 1964, 
p.4. 
104 Int. rep., 5 Oct.-6 Nov. 1963, sec., para. 6-7,926/1822/48655. 
462 THE ORIGINS OF MAJ.:f'ESE STATEHOOD 
that a 'democratic' Constitution is introduced. Thoughtful 
people do indeed fear some such attempt by Mintoff; and 
are apprehensive lest the Police Force is inadequate to 
maintain law and order. 
The MLP would not be bound by any decision which Sandys 
reached, Mintoff said. He referred Sandys to his treatment of Dr 
Jagan as evidence that Sandys could not be trusted. lOS 
There was nothing very original about recourse to violence by the 
MLP if necessary. Not only did it feature regularly in Mintoff's 
parlance, it was often quoted as the sixth of the MLP's 'six points'. 
It was not a discovery by a British secret agent. In other words, it 
was the party's official policy, openly and publicly. As such, it was 
camouflaged in vagueness, it could mean anything: it could be elastic 
enough to include a coup d'etat if Mintoff felt that was the course to 
pursue and found enough support for it, perhaps as a 'fall-back' 
position. It could even be loosely interpreted as legitimate self-
defence against moral abuse. Choice of language was a message in 
itself, however. Pertinent to this scenario was the fact that (as to a far 
larger extent had been the case in 1919) there were some signs of 
dissatisfaction in the police force towards the end of 1963. A number 
of constables and sergeants were complaining oflong hours of work 
and split duties without overtime pay. The Commissioner of Police, 
who was a bachelor, was seen as somewhat detached from the 
problems of married men with family. Dissatisfaction among senior 
officers seemed to arise from a belief that the Commissioner was 
unduly remote. There had also been a delay in filling vacancies. lOG 
As events would show, however, Commissioner De Gray was a 'no 
nonsense' officer and he very largely commanded the respect of the 
police force, though certainly not of the MLP, having defied 
Mintoff's orders to hold back in 1958. 
105 Int. rep., 6 Nov.-5 Dec. 1963, sec., f. 3, para.7-8, 926/1822/48655. 
\06 Int. rep., 6 Nov.-5 Dec. 1963, sec., para. 16,926/1822/48655. 
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Mintoff ended a letter to Sandys dated 26th December 1963 with a 
threat that if the human rights demanded by the MLP were not 
gained through "peaceful representations", they would be "sorely 
tempted to adopt other methods." He made it clear to his MLP 
associates that by "other methods" he meant violence. At least one 
leading MLP member was against any threat of violence and urged 
that the whole matter should be brought to the attention of the UN. 
Mintoff angrily rejected this, mainly on the grounds that "they could 
only expect the U.N. to intervene in Malta after violence had 
occurred." Mintoffurged that action should be taken as soon as the 
situation was ripe for it. On a vote being taken, Mintoff's reference 
to "other methods" was unanimously approved. It was decided that 
an Action Committee should be set up to plan for such "other 
methods" as might be necessary. This was to consist of three 
volunteers from among the party leaders. 
Attard Kingswell attended this discussion and was asked whether the 
GWU would support this threat of violence. He said that as a party 
member he was in favour of it, but added that he could not commit 
the GWU without first discussing it with them. He subsequently 
reported to the GWU that he had been asked to associate the union 
with a letter from the MLP to the Secretary of State, in which a threat 
was made that unless the MLP's demands were met, the Maltese 
people would have no other choice but to take "the necessary 
action." He said that he had been unable to endorse this threatening 
letter on behalf of the G WU because of insufficient time having been 
given to them to consider it, and because it might lead the GWU into 
legal trouble as it implied "unlawful action for a political purpose." 
He said that he had told the MLP that when the time came for GWU 
assistance in any action, he would seek the union's support, subject 
to its legal position in the matter and provided that details were 
given of the action proposed. There was no "official" discussion 
within the GWU on the line taken by Kingswell. In "unofficial" 
discussion, members had noted Kingswell's caution, but they also 
noted that the way had been left open for the GWU to be associated 
with any action that the MLP may take. There were strong doubts 
as to whether many GWU members would be willing to become 
involved in violent action. It was generally felt that workers were not 
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in a mood for serious trouble and bloodshed, unless they were very 
much provoked. Apart from a few hotheads, mainly youths, those 
who were still employed were very anxious not to compromise 
themselves in any way. 107 
Several deep-rooted GWU members, led by Indri Cilia, Secretary of 
the Port and Industry Section, and a leading founder-member of the 
GWU in 1943, took a stand against supporting the MLP in its 
intended recourse to violence. 108 The GWU General Council 
therefore wrote to the MLP executive purportedly to ask for a 
clarification of Mintoff's intentions. l09 Attard Kingswell almost 
certainly sided with (and may have been behind) Indri Cilia, a 
humane, highly-respected trade union orator. 
Attard Kingswell, a dockyard ship fitter from Senglea, had served 
as the MLP's general secretary from 1949 to 1952, and twice 
contested general elections as an MLP parliamentary candidate in 
the early 1950s. He was thus on Mintoff's side in the heyday of the 
acrimonious Mintoff-Boffa party split, when divided loyalties led to 
considerable 'blood-letting'. He became general secretary of the 
GWU in the turbulent but seminal year 1958. With such pedigree, 
Attard Kingswell, Cilia and other GWU stalwarts exercised a 
moderating influence on the union and prevented it from being 
swallowed whole by Mintoff's demagogic theatrics and power drive. 
The GWU was primarily a trade union, however pro-Labour it 
pronounced and showed itself to be, and however great were the 
party pressures on its leadership. In the ultimate analysis, the GWU 
had to evaluate what was in the best interest of its members 
(hundreds of its paid-up workers actually supported the Nationalist 
Party), and of the country. Were would a bloody fight in the streets 
107 Annex, into rep., 6 Dec. 1963 6 Jan. 1964, sec., f. 1, para. 1-2,926/1823/48655. 
108 Others GWU figures who joined ranks against MLP violence were Salvu Privitera 
and George Pace. 
109 lnt. rep., 6 Jan. - 7 Feb. 1964, sec., ff. 1-2.926/1823/48655. 
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have left Malta's already hard-pressed socio-economic situation? 11 0 
In an interview with this writer many years later, Attard Kingswell 
described Mintoff as a spoiler (jew jilghab jew ihassar), but also as "the 
greatest fighter for Independence" (l-akbar gellied ghall-
Indipendenza ).lll 
Among those who were seriously concerned about internal security 
after independence was Archbishop Gonzi. Events in Cyprus and 
East Africa were exploited by those opposed to Independence 
especially the Strickland press, to support their opposition to early 
Independence, with particular emphasis on internal security. On his 
part, Archbishop Gonzi was said to lose no opportunity of 
emphasising, when he could catch an important British ear, 
that it is vital that British troops shall be available to a Malta 
Government after Independence, to assist in preserving law 
and order - and the Archbishop makes it clear that he means 
British troops intervening to oppose any attempts by the 
MLP to provoke violence or seize power by unconstitutional 
means. 
Gonzi stressed this argument to Sir Thomas Pike, an RA.F. Marshal 
and the deputy at SACEUR, as well as to the Under-Secretary of 
State for War, when they visited Malta. 112 Once again, this Gonzi 
stand could be dated back to the mid-1950s. In 1956 he had 
reportedly told Eugene Melville, an assistant under secretary of state 
at the C.O., that peace could be kept in Malta "with two machine 
110 Some years later, after Independence, Mintoff would out-manoevure Attard 
Kingswell in the GWU's national executive through his famous character 
assassination campaign "min ghajja jwarrab" (he who tired clears out); and later, 
when in power, he had the G.W. U. 'amalgamated' with the M.LP. After 1987, 
Attard Kingswell became special advisor on the dockyard to a Nationalist prime 
minister. 
III Attard KingsweIVFrendo interview, Auberge de Castille, Valletta, 1 June 1989. 
Il2 Int. rep., 6 Jan.-7 Feb. 1964, sec., f. I, para. I, 926/1822/48655. 
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guns in Garrison Square"; and that the best time in Malta's history 
was the time of Crown Colony Government. The British 
Government had 
given way to Mintoff's threats ... Mr Mintoff had stirred up 
trouble and has misled and brownbeaten the British 
Government. .. who, because of a wrong analogy with 
Cyprus, had exaggerated fears of trouble in Malta ... He 
would regard the removal of proportional representation as 
yielding to pressure from Mr Mintoff and as a further sign 
of partiality.ll3 
Pellegrini, in his meeting with Lord Lansdowne in London on 24th 
January, warned that Mintoff intended to stage a coup d'etat 
immediately after Independence, and that the MLP were supplied 
with sufficient weapons. 114 Toni Pellegrini was another former 
general secretary of the MLP. He had resigned in February 1961 as 
the 'politico-religious' battle was hotting up, and set up his own 
Christian Workers Party. The break with Mintoff's party by one who 
had been its chief executive was still very fresh. Pellegrini, an 
information man himself, would no doubt have retained some 
sources of information within his former party (to which, years later, 
he would crawl back). 
On the initiative of Governor Dorman, the Joint Consultative 
Council met to discuss internal security, and the future of the Royal 
Malta Artillery. This meeting was attended by the Commissioner of 
Police. Discussion showed general recognition by both the Maltese 
and British representatives in the Council that the police force was 
under-armed and under-manned, and that if sustained violence 
were provoked, the police force would be fully stretched in trying 
113 'Report of Discussions in Rome and Malta on Religious Assurances', 6-16 May 
1956, FO 371/124260, quoted after lM.Pirotta, Fortress Colony:The Final Act, vol.lI, 
1955-1958 (Malta, 1991), p. 192. 
111 Int. rep., 6 Jan. 7 Febr. 1964, para. 2; sec., 926/1822/48655. 
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to contain mobs. It would be unable therefore to guard such key 
points as Cable and Wireless, and Rediffusion, and it would lack a 
mobile reserve. There was also general agreement that the rank and 
file of the R.M.A. were largely pro-Mintoff, and were therefore 
unreliable in an active internal security role. 
Although the Prime Minister appeared to remain complacent about 
the threat to security after Independence, he had promised the 
Commissioner of Police additional funds. He had permitted the 
purchase of 300 revolvers from England for the police, which the 
R.A.F. were arranging to transport to Malta. Police instructors were 
being trained by the Services. To drive the point home, the police 
were practising anti-riot drill in a public place. 1I5 Reports of the 
secret importation of ammunition had already been leaked to the 
Maltese press but in July the Daily Telegraph carried a news story by 
Anthony Mann about the arming of the Malta Police Force with rifles, 
and the practice of anti-riot drill. The rifles were flown into Luqa 
airport at night and the Force was being trained in the use of them 
"in case oflarge disturbances or an attemnpted insurrection". The 
police, who had only carried truncheons at most, were being trained 
in anti-riot drill with steel helmets, batons and shields. As anti-riot 
drill was being carried out in public, for instance at the Floriana 
parade ground, on purpose. Pictures of these squad exercises were 
carried in at least three newspapers.1l6 The Malta police reported 
to the Prime Minister whereas the R.M.A. came under the British 
defence ministry; another Maltese regiment was based in Germany 
serving with the British Army's overseas regiments there. 
In his cable to Khruschev, Johnson and U Thant of 7th February 
1964, it was to this public anti-riot training that Mintoff was 
115 "The significance of this has sunk in generally." Int. rep., 6 Jan.-7 :Feb. 1964, 
para. 3, 92611822/48655. 
116 See e.g. 'Malta Tarma Lill-Pulizija BI-Azzarini L-Armi Dahlu bil-Lejl', ll-flelsien, 
18 July 1964, p.l; 'Increased Security Training', Times of Malta, 3 Feb. 1964; 'Riot 
Drill', ll-flelsien, 2 Feb. 1964. 
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Riot squad training at the Floriana parade ground. 
referring: "Police Force and British detachments have been turned 
into Fascist-style anti-riot squads and are training in full public view. 
Entreat you raise matter in Security Council before situation gets out 
of controL"1l7 
It was reported that Mintoff had sent instructions to MLP branches 
that young party members should join the Malta Territorial Forces. 
The military authorities were suspending recruiting (which in any 
case was no more than six men per month), giving as a reason the 
uncertain future of the Territorials. 1l8 
While Mintoff prided himself on the effect which his threats of 
violence were having on the growing British readiness that he sensed 
to give in to his demands, Dorman in his 'State of Union' message 
117 lnt. rep., 6 Jan.-7 Feb. 1964, sec., f. 4, para. 11,926/1822/48655. 
118 Ibid., para. 4, 926/1822/48655. 
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during the Candlemas Speech in February 1964 was warning that any 
attempt to overthrow the constituted Government of Malta by 
violence would only do harm to Malta's economic and political 
prospects. In suggesting further that Malta's independence had to be 
in some way limited, Dorman implied that such limitations would be 
those relating to Britain for financial help and for security.119 
More ominously, it was being reported in some detail that the 
promised MLP Action Commiteee had now been formed. It was 
believed to consist of Danny Cremona, Joseph Zerafa and Dr Joseph 
Abela, 
with Mintoff controlling it from a back seat. Joseph Zerafa 
has been carrying out a check on the number of MLP 
members who own revolvers and shot guns. 120 
In April it became known that, in addition to financial aid and 
broadcasting facilities, Nasser had offered Mintoff technical and 
military aid for a coup d'etat, after Malta would have become 
independent. Assurances of moral support for a coup d'etat had also 
been given by Poles, Tunisians and Algerians. It was reported that 
Nasser had suggested that a revolutionary Maltese Government 
formed ofMLP members could live in exile, preferably in Egypt or 
some other North Mrican country from which hostile propaganda 
and incitement to revolt could be carried on. The Egyptian 
Government was prepared to finance such an MLP "Government in 
exile." 121 
Such antics were not new to the likes of Colonel GamalAbdel Nasser, 
a former army officer who in 1954 had himself come to power in a 
119Int. rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 7, 2. 926/1822/48655. On this address, 
see above. 
120 Annex, into rep., 7 Feb.-6 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 5, 926/1823/48655. 
121 Annex, into rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., para. 1 (iii), para. 2, 926/1823/48655. 
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coup d'etat, deposing his onetime colleague and mentor General 
Mohammed Neguib, who had also come to power in a coup d'etat 
overthrowing the monarchy in 1952. A pan-Arab visionary and a 
dictator in his own right, Nasser in 1964 had his United Arab 
Republic form joint presidency councils with Iraq and the Yemen, 
after earlier and still more ambitious federalist plans had failed. Nor 
had Nasser forgotten that in 1956, in the wake of his expropriation 
of the Suez Canal, a second Arab-Israeli war, and an attempted 
Anglo-French invasion, Malta had been partly used by British forces 
in mounting attacks on Egypt. A British base in Malta after 
independence would not have been in his interest. In the hope of 
obtaining benefits in return, Mintoff could obviously pluck away at 
that Egyptian interest, which is what he was doing. 
British left-wing militants also entered the fray on behalf of the MLP. 
Patrick Pottle, describing himself as Secretary to Bertrand Russell, 
and Peter Moule, Secretary of the Committee of One Hundred in 
the U.K., arrived in Malta on the 28 th April 1964 (the sixth 
anniversary of the 1958 riots). They announced that their purpose 
was to study the possibility of founding a committee that would 
organize demonstrations and civil disobedience in favour of a 
neutral Malta after Independence. It was believed that they had 
come on the MLP's invitation, and during their visit they were 
looked after by the MLP League of Youth. The Maltese government 
was given advance notice of their probable arrival, but they decided 
against declaring them prohibited immigrants. Two days after their 
arrival, however, the Malta government obtained a court order for 
their expulsion, and they were deported on 1 st May. 122 Interestingly, 
the Labour League of Youth later issued a denial that there was any 
truth in a statement made by the government that Pottle and Moule, 
of the Committee of 100, who were in Malta from 28th April to pt 
May, had come at the invitation of the L.L.Y. However, from secret 
sources it was known that their visit was arranged by leading 
members of the MLP. It was hard to see why the L.L.Y. should be 
122 Int. rep., 8 Apr.-6 May 1964, sec., ff. 6-7, para. 12,926/1822/48655. 
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at such pains to deny responsibility for their visit, particularly in view 
of the fact that they were looked after in Malta by Patrick Holland, 
President of the L.L.Y. Following the visit of these radicals, it was 
reliably reported that efforts were being made by certain active 
members of the MLP to form a branch of the Committee of 100 in 
Malta. 123 
The Egyptian connection was not an isolated affair; it has to be read 
together with other goings-on - not to say plots - unfolding with 
Algeria; and on a somewhat more political-diplomatic front, with the 
U.S.S.R.All these dealings, with their presumed ideological leanings, 
were hardly the stuff of which a democratic party's international 
relations consisted in any routine sense: they bore directly or 
indirectly on Malta's defence and internal security in the event of an 
anticipated historic turning-point in her destiny.124 
The MLP leaders were considering whether to organise some form 
of underground movement to operate either in the event of a 
lengthy postponement of Independence, or of the Constitution as 
proposed by the Nationalists being brought into force. It was 
reported that there was a strong body of opinion in the MLP 
hierarchy in favour of the formation of an underground movement 
but no formal decision had been made about it. Mintoff expressed 
himself as being in favour but advised that secrecy was of the utmost 
importance and said that it should be left entirely in his hands to 
initiate plans for it. He gave instructions for certain rearrangements 
to be made in the MLP "in order to achieve greater efficiency and 
secrecy" and to deal with the party's growing overseas interests. 
A commission was set up in June to prepare a draft plan for this 
reorganisation. It was likely that a 'Foreign Affairs Department' 
woud be established consisting of four branches dealing with 
123 Int. rep., 7 May-4June, sec., para. 20, 926/1822/48655. 
124 On Algerian, Russian and Egyptian contacts, see esp. above, pp. 438-455 and p. 
469 sq. 
472 THE ORIGINS OF MAI.:fESE STATEHOOD 
AAPSO, the Socialist International, the U.S.S.R., trade and 
commerce. It was also expected that a 'Personnel Section' would be 
set up "to deal with secret reports on the activities of Party 
members." Tarcisio Ellul, a young party member who had recently 
returned from studies of the cooperative movement and of German 
in Germany, was appointed as full-time Administrative Secretary. A 
small 'Bureau' was to be set up to help Mintoff settle matters of 
particular urgency and importance. Once this was established, the 
national executive would probably meet only once a month and the 
general conference every three months. "A time is now 
approaching", said Mintoff, "when the Party should act swiftly and 
in all secrecy."125 
On returning from his official visit to the U.S.S.R. in June, Mintoff 
again threatened violence. He warned that the MLP should be on 
their guard against a settlement between Sandys and Borg Olivier 
which would contain only a token number of concessions to the 
MLP's constitutional demands; these concessions would be small in 
extent, and Borg Olivier would be permitted to undo them as soon 
as Independence had been obtained. "If this happens", Mintoff was 
reported as saying, "we shall say to Mr Sandys that in Malta there 
will be bloodshed and for this he will be to blame. We do not want 
any dictatorship, neither red nor black. We are ready to bring arms 
from abroad and to arm the people ... the party must perforce find 
its allies from abroad."126 
Since Mintoff's "bloodshed" speech on 2 pt June, a number of MLP 
members were reported to have approached the party's general 
secretary, Joe Zerafa, "asking him for arms to be used against the 
police." Within the party, plans were afoot to call a major 
demonstration but extremist and moderate factions were arguing 
about what form that should take. Mintoff was reported to have 
125 Annex, into rep., 7 May-4 June 1964, sec., para. 3~4, 926/1823/48655. 
126 Int. rep., 5 June 1964 - 3 July 1964, sec., para. 4, 926/1822/48655. 
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Mintoff's warning that there would be bloodshed if the MLP's constitutional 
amendments were tampered with. 
decided in favour of a demonstration in Valletta but, if police 
permission for it were refused, there should be several simultaneous 
demonstrations in different parts of Malta, which would surprise the 
police and, by causing them to disperse their forces, reduce their 
effectiveness. Mintoff recalled how such tactics had paid off in 1958. 
Mintoff also lay down that the demonstrations should be held as 
soon as the Prime Minister returned from London. Particular care 
was being taken to keep this discussion secret. 127 
In the short space of a few weeks, reported editorially the pro-
Labour GWU organ Malta News in May 1964, t>v0 plane-loads of 
12i Annex, into rep., 5 June - 3 July 1964, sec., para. 1-3, 926/1823/48655. 
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arms and ammunition had been landed and handled by policemen 
at Luqa airport. Later the stuff was delivered at an undisclosed 
address, it announced. 128 A Labour MP, Notary Joseph Abela, who 
formed part of the Action Committee, told an MLP meeting that on 
2yd April four policemen, two of them in plain clothes, had 
unloaded crates of ammunition onto a police Bedford truck from 
Luqa airfield. A few weeks later there was another report of 
ammunition on board another plane which landed at Luqa airfield 
at 0345 hours.129 Police Commissioner de Gray would neither deny 
nor confirm that his Force was "being armed." Nor had any 
statement been forthcoming from Government. As in many other 
things, the editorial added, the public was once again being left in 
the dark. It was all "very dangerous." The public had a right to know 
who was ordering what, by whom, and for what purpose. It was all 
the more dangerous to leave the public uninformed of what exactly 
was going on, when "these arms and ammunition are imported to 
wound and even kill if needs be." The editorial, entitled "Fools are 
warned", then continued as follows: 
Let there be provision for internal security by all means. But 
one hopes and prays that armed security men will not be 
used instead to silence the voice of the advocates and 
champions of human rights. 
Let's get this straight: the Maltese Workers' Movement 
NEVER took blows lying down. This very strong and 
powerful Movement would not hesitate for one minute to 
take up arms in self-defence. 
April 28th , 1958 was still too fresh to be forgotten by anyone getting 
trigger-happy. On that day, an unarmed Workers' Movement "just 
thrown out of Government by the foreigner, made a token coup in 
128 Other news reports of the same ilk appeared in February and in July 1964. 
129 'Ajruplan 19-ib Munizzjon ghall-Pulizija', l-orizzont, 16 May 1964. 
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defence of the people's rights", the paper held, adding, in bold 
capital letters: 
THAT DAY SHOULD SERVE AS A STARK REMINDER 
TO POTENTIAL BLOOD-SPILLERS BENT ON 
TURNING THESE ISLANDS INTO A FASCIST STATE 
RULED AT GUN-POINT. 
The Maltese Workers' Movement was all out for peace, law and 
order. But it was only the embodiment of human rights in the new 
Constitution which could guarantee them. The editorial then 
concluded with some quite unrestrained words of "warning", which 
could be read as threatening if not as inciting - and which seemed 
to confirm reports that the MLP's 'arsenal' was indeed well stocked. 
Here was a warning, it said: 
Any attempts to deprive our people of such rights by the law 
of the gun will be answered by the gun. For every single 
round fired to suppress legitimate damour, there will be ten 
rounds fired to silence the suppressor. FOOLS ARE 
WARNED.I30 
In early July the anti-Mintoff daily Il-Haddiem (The Worker) carried 
a lead story claiming that a suicide squad had been formed within 
the MLP during a meeting behind closed doors following Mintoff's 
return from Russia. The paper's 'Labour Correspondent' said that 
his main purpose in disclosing this new development was to make 
things clear to the authorities, so that there would be no repetition 
of the disturbances seen in 1958. The Maltese workers, he said, truly 
believed in Malta first and foremost: for them Malta came before 
Mintoff. 131 
130 Malta News, 20 May 1964, enc. 926/2076. 
131 'Giet iffurmata F'MALTA Skwadra tas-SuwiCidju Wara I-Mawra ta' Mintoff fir-
Russja', Il-Haddiem, 3 July 1964, p.l, p.8. 
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Such discourse further confirmed the British in the tabs they had 
been keeping, in their strong suspicion that a coup d'etat in Malta was 
indeed in the offing. A so-called "Coup paper" detailed the relevant 
scenarios in anticipation of it. On this, a "Civil Internal Security Plan" 
was based. A draft of it was forwarded to the Commissioner of Police 
by Major-General]. D. Frost already in April 1964. One paragraph 
indicated as '26A' has survived in the records, as an extract to what 
were clearly top secret 'Internal Security' papers. This shows that a 
British Defence Committee (Malta) had been meeting many times to 
consider the available intelligence and to ensure that operational 
responses were devised, at the ready. According to minute 4 of this 
committee's twenty-third meeting, Army reconnaissances were being 
carried out of Rediffusion House and the Central Telephone 
Exchange: "as a result of which plans would be prepared for the 
protection of both." The Committee "took note" of this state of 
affairs. 132 While the British had a direct interest in defending 
installations, which were directly British or British-related, they could 
not have been acting to the exclusion of Maltese security interests. On 
the contrary, internal evidence from the scanty documentation at 
hand suggests that they were sharing intelligence with at least the top 
man in the Malta police force, and to some extent working jointly out 
of mutual interest. The "Commissioner of Police" referred to by 
Major-General Frost was the Malta one, de Gray. 
These deductions may be confirmed from a secret paper on internal 
security, submitted by Sir Maurice Dorman to a meeting of Malta's 
Consultative Council held at the palace, Valletta, in early 1964. 
Those present for this meeting included Borg Olivier and Felice 
132 'Extract from British Defence Committee Malta (26A)" dated 14 April 1964, is 
written in ink above the a typed paragraph which followed, and which had been 
glued on to an otherwise blank folio (marked 18 in ink). This was described in ink 
in the margin as 'Extract to "Internal Security" pps.' The relevant paragraph was 
(d) of what was evidently a more extensive submission, and it is marked secret, with 
'secret' underlined. Ene., 926/2076. A few pages away, on a folio maked '22', similarly 
in hand, was attached to this batch, which was no doubt doctored, the Malta News 
editorial "Fools are warned". 
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from the Cabinet, the attorney general Cremona, and the 
administrative secretary Cuschieri. On the British side, apart from 
Dorman who was chairing, there was the UK Commissioner 
Wakefield, the C-in-C Holland-Martin, Air Vice-Marshal D. C. Mc 
Kinley, Air Officer Commanding R.A.F. Malta, and Brigadier B. 
Kingzett, General Officer Commanding Malta and Libya. In 
attendance was Mr V. de Gray, Commissioner of Police. 
The opening paragraph of Dorman's paper set and incapsulated the 
scene: 
In my view, and on the information I have, Malta is faced 
with 
I. a short term threat to law and order, and 
II. with long term problems of internal security. 
These are the direct responsibility of the Malta Government, 
but these responsibilities cannot be discharged without help 
from Her Majesty's Government. What may happen affects 
and reflects on H.M.G. as well as on the Malta Government. 
There is an obvious community of interest but there is at 
present a risk of disunity in meeting these problems. 
The nature of the short term threat could take either one or all of 
the following forms: 
A general strike accompanied by violence in the traditional form; 
An attempt to capture key persons; 
An attempt to occupy key positions or places. 
Dorman's 'coup' paper continued on these lines: 
The object would be more than a demonstration; it could be 
a coup intended to lead to the downfall of the Government 
by unconstitutional means. The knowledge, the men, the 
ability and possibly the intention are available. If it looked 
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as though it was being successful, there could be a marked 
swing of popular support to the apparently winning side. 
Public opinion, experience and common sense require that 
this threat should now be taken seriously. 
Timing, intelligence, forces available and deficiencies were then 
examined in turn. 
The first occasion on which a serious build-up might begin was after 
the announcement of decisions on the Constitution, but it was more 
likely that trouble would arise "immediately before or immediately 
after Independence ... " A general warning ought to be available 
particularly in the case of trouble starting with a strike, but "a 
sudden attempt on key persons and key positions could be launched 
without much warning." 
The Malta Government, which was directly responsible, had only the 
Malta Police available - total strength under 1,200. They were fully 
stretched on normal police duties, they could not undertake static 
guard duties nor handle groups using firearms. They would find it 
difficult to maintain full efficiency over a period lasting a week. They 
could not contain planned violence on a major scale "without help". 
UK Forces, if available, included the R.M.A., D.E.R.R., Royal Sussex, 
R.N. and R.A.F., and were ample for support of the Malta police and 
the restoration of law and order if necessary. 
However, there were a number of deficiencies. Since the 
introduction of the new Constitution and with the imminence of 
Independence, there had been a complete change in responsibilities 
for internal security that had not been fully appreciated. Whereas 
in the past the initiative and responsibility lay primarily with the 
Governor and the Fortress Commander or General Officer 
Commanding, now it lay with the Prime Minister and the 
Commissioner of Police. The UK Forces were responsible for their 
own security and to come to the Government's aid if asked. 
Due to diffIculties over indemnification, UK Forces were not 
immediately available to the Malta Government. No Malta 
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Government Plan had been drawn up for dealing with internal 
security. The ideas of a coup, capturing key persons or occupying key 
installations, required "radical new thinking". The plans of UK 
Forces now provided primarily for the security of H.M.G.'s 
installations and for holding themselves available to come to the aid 
of the civil government if asked and if approved; but they contained 
no provisions for safeguarding civilian personnel or installations or 
for restoring them if occupied. The Police Force, in its new role, was 
not strong enough in numbers, weapons and equipment, 
communications or transport. In other words, noted Dorman, 
if serious civil commotion broke out tomorrow, we should 
be unprepared in vital respects and there might well be 
muddle and delay in handling it. If I exaggerate I hope that 
this will be shown to me. If I do not exaggerate, then means 
must be found of putting internal security on a stronger and 
sounder basis. 
A government or a people faced with threats could only meet them 
with strength and confidence if it had measured the worst, made 
plans to meet it, and was satisfied that it had available the means to 
do so: 
I believe, within reason, in being prepared for the worst, 
letting others see that you are - then the worst does not 
happen. 
In the longer term, with the approach ofIndependence, the British 
government would wish to consider the future of the Royal Malta 
Artillery and the Territorial Regiments, both of which so far formed 
part of the British Army. The future of other Maltese in the UK 
Armed Forces also had to be considered. 133 
133 First raised in 1800 to man Malta's coastal defences, the R.M.A. had more recently 
manned the anti-aircraft defences. In 1964 it consisted of two regiments supported 
by a HQ, a depot, training establishment and a band. There were 20 officers and 
430 other ranks in B.A.O.R., and 50 officers and 370 other ranks in Malta, a total 
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One of the recommendations made by the Governor was that a small 
ad hoc committee of military and police officers be set up "to draw 
up a civil internal security plan", to be approved by the Prime 
Minister after consultation with the Consultative Council if 
necessary. Others were that a decision be taken concerning police 
requirements, that one Minister would be responsible informally to 
the Prime Minister for urgent actions on these issues, and to see that 
the British Government be "fully aware of the serious and urgent 
nature of these problems and the proposed solutions."134 
In the ensuing discussions, Dorman stressed that recent events in 
other parts of the Commonwealth had shown that possibilities of a 
coup could not be dismissed lightly. Wakefield noted that after 
independence if a coup took place and was successfully accomplished, 
Her Majesty's Government could not intervene. In Zanzibar no 
attempt had been made to restore the position. Dorman and Borg 
Olivier thought that in Malta there should be nothing to stop a 
prime minister, who felt his government threatened with removal 
by illegal, subversive or revolutionary means, from making 
arrangements with H.M.G. to assist him in safeguarding his position 
if he so wished. Wakefield agreed that if assistance were sought 
before a coup had taken place, it could be given. But he re-
emphasized that in face of a coup accompli British Forces could not 
of70 officers and 800 other ranks. Its first regiment had been converted into a transport 
unit and was stationed in BA.O.R.; it was likely to be required until April 1965. Short 
service soldiers on a 3 year engagement did a 21/2 year tour in Germany, the N.C.O:s 
being found from the personnel of the R.M.A. who served a circle of one year in Malta 
and two years in Germany. So long as the first regiment was in Germany, the second 
regiment was required in Malta. The Territorials were a volunteer force, comprising 
two light anti-aircraft regiments (the 3,d and 11 th), and one infantry unit (fhe King's 
Own Malta Regiment). In 1964 the Maltese Territorial Force had 78 officers and 1,426 
other ranks. There were also 7 regular officers and 25 regular other ranks on the 
permanent staff. They had no military role in U.K. plans. 
134 'Internal Security Note by the Governor', sec., paper no. CC.5(G.l), ene. 
Minutes of the 4th meeting, Consultative Council, Malta, 27 Jan. 1964, sec., OPM/ 
535/62, OPM Arch., Castille. 
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intervene. Holland-Martin was also of this view, pointing out that in 
the draft Defence Agreement there was no provision for the use of 
H.M.Forces in such a contingency. 
If a coup were attempted, the Council concluded that the most likely 
targets for seizure would be among others the Prime Minister and 
Ministers, and the Commissioner of Police. De Gray said that 
advance warning concerning capture of key persons would be 
possible but much depended on the number of people who knew the 
plans. He did not feel it was necessary at the present moment to 
provide armed plain clothes escorts to Ministers. Trouble before 
independence was more likely to take the shape of strikes, 
demonstrations or general civil disturbance. Immediately after 
Independence, the Council agreed, was the time when a coup was 
most likely. While a general intention to attempt a coup might be 
known, it would probably be difficult to establish the exact date of 
any such attempt. This would create problems for the police - the 
plan could be kept simmering waiting a good opportunity, but it was 
not easy to maintain counter-measures over a long period. 
In reply to Borg Olivier's enquiries regarding the present 
intelligence machinery in Malta, Dorman stated that it was usual for 
a government to have a special branch in the Police whose main aim 
was to watch for subversive activities. A link-up normally existed 
between the various special branches in the Commonwealth through 
liaison officers. The duty of the local organization would be to seek 
to collect information and advise the Prime Minister of any 
"dangerous situations". Dorman regarded such an organization as 
"a vital one." The Heads of the Services agreed with him that "an 
intelligence service" was essential. De Gray said that he had a small 
intelligence set-up but it was badly hampered by lack of funds. He 
had no funds for normal intelligence work. The Prime Minister 
agreed that the necessary funds should be put at the disposal of the 
Commissioner. 
As to Forces, the C-in-C said that in any situation where there was 
widespread sabotage of Service installations or British lives were 
endangered, UK Forces available at present were "not sufficient." 
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Police Commissioner Vivian de Gray, seen here in mess dress. 
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It might also be the case that "a successful coup" were accompanied 
or followed by "general rioting" when British Forces would be 
required to protect first UK citizens and British property. De Gray 
was confident that the police would be capable of dealing with all 
ordinary violence and rioting, as in the past, provided that they did 
not have to undertake guard duties at static points. "They relied on 
the military forces to take care of this." However, no such forces were 
available for these duties. Mter Independence, the situation would 
be covered by the Defence Agreement or Visiting Forces legislation. 
There was disagreement as to whether British forces were at all 
obliged to respond to an official Maltese call for assistance. Professor 
Cremona maintained that under the laws of Malta the Services were 
bound to go to the assistance of the police, if called. This view, he 
said, was contained in two memoranda drawn up at different times 
by British legal advisers to the Governor during periods of colonial 
administration. The UK Commissioner pointed out that "this view 
was not now agreed to by other British legal advisers." The Courts 
had never decided it and; if anything, it was a question of 
interpretation. As matters stood, H.M.G. "could not make U.K. 
Forces available." The General Officer Commanding explained that 
prior to the present constitution (that of 1961 as amended in 1962), 
the Governor was respopnsible for calling out the troops and he was 
consequently regarded as responsible for indemnification. The 
position was different now. 
Dr Borg Olivier felt that safety could be ensured as before, that is 
as had been the case over so many years and without the need of 
indemnification. The grant of extra powers to the police and the 
Services, he added, would not receive popular support. His view was 
that the presence of British Forces in the Island was enough to 
ensure order, and that no incidents which could not be contained 
were likely to occur between now and Independence. Professor 
Cremona reiterated his views adding that the Maltese Government 
was being put "in an unfair position." Nothing had changed in the 
law. It was quite inconceivable, for obvious reasons, that the Maltese 
Government would open Court proceedings against H.M.G. 
Admiral Holland-Martin suggested that the necessary legislation 
484 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
should be drafted and kept ready in case the question of help from 
the Services arose. It was of vital importance that the legal argument 
be resolved, Governor Dorman concluded. Legislation in 
parliament, he agreed, would be difficult and undesirable, but it was 
possible and usual to draft an emergency regulation which would 
only be published or come into effect on the declaration of a state 
of emergency. The Prime Minister asked for time to consult his 
Cabinet colleagues, adding that any planning between now and 
Independence Day should assume that British Forces and the 
R.M.A. would be available. 
The Council then discussed "The Internal Security Plan". In 
Dorman's view, the the Services plan for internal security provided 
only for Service establishments, there was an area of responsibility 
which had not been covered by any arrangements. There ought to 
be a Civil Government plan for dealing with the varuious risks under 
consideration, "indicating what action had to be taken and who was 
to be responsible." This should cover the maintenance of essential 
supplies, the protection of key or vulnerable points, the provision 
of safe communications, the site of government and of the control 
centre. All who needed to know in the Government or the Services 
should have a copy of such a plan. Holland-Martin agreed that there 
should be co-ordinated planning and suggested that the fewer the 
number of people involved in the preparation of the plan the better. 
Discussions should be undertaken between the G.O.C. and the 
Police Commissioner at this stage. The plan should be based on 
three eventualities, the C-in-C held, as follows: 
1. Use of Malta Police alone; 
2. Malta Police supported by the R.M.A.; 
3. Malta Police supported by both the R.M.A. and U.K. 
Anned Forces. 
In the case of 1 before Independence and in the case of 1 and 2 after 
independence, no difficulties would arise, as the Prime Minister 
would be responsible for general policy and controL However, if it 
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came to the use of British troops as at 3, then command and control 
of all internal security forces, including the police, would pass into 
the hands of the G.O.C. At stages 1 and 2 after Independence, the 
Commissioner of Police would decide what was required from the 
G.O.C., at stage 3, the G.O.C. would be responsible but would 
consult the Police Commissioner. The Prime Minister agreed that it 
might be useful if the G.O.C. could have a talk with him or the 
Cabinet about internal security. In the meantime, the Police 
Commissioner, with assistance from the G.O.c., would put in hand 
the preparation of a Malta Government Internal Security plan. 135 
By 7th July 1964 the detailed and specific internal security 
reinforcement plans for Malta, in the event of an attempted coup 
d'etat or a breakdown oflaw and order, were finalized and approved. 
These plans were essentially those laid down in an informed special 
paper by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral 
Holland-Martin; they were then examined by the chiefs of staff and 
forwarded with their recommendations to the Secretary of State for 
Defence. The general plan referred back to earlier meetings held in 
1962 and in 1963. As a result of various changes a revised plan, 
known as 'Operation Competent', had come into effect on 23rd 
March 1964. 'Operation Competent' now provided for the 
reinforcement of Malta from the UK by one infantry battalion, one 
field squadron R.A.F. Regiment, and a "psychological operations 
staff and unit." An earlier contingency survey in April 1963 had 
stated a requirement of eight infantry battalions in the worst case. 
This report had been overtaken by events because of consultation 
with the UK Commissioner in Malta and because of subsequent 
developments in the negotiations for independence. The revised 
assessment in July 1964 of the internal security threat up to mid-
1965 was on the basis of a fresh appreciation of the forces required 
which Holland-Martin had been asked draw up two months earlier. 
135 See the minutes of the fourth meeting of the Consultative Council on 27 Jan. 
1964, OPM/535/62, ff. 1-10, signed by E. Firman, secretary to the Council, OPM 
Arch. Castille. Other matters were discussed at some length, particularly about the 
R.M.A.'s role. 
486 THE ORIGINS OF MAlTESE STATEHOOD 
The Holland-Martin plan first set out in 22 paragraphs the various 
factors affecting the threat to internal security and made the 
following points: 
1. It was difficult to foresee any constitution which would 
not offend a large section of the population; 
2. Mintoffhad spoken openly of violence "and of gaining 
power by unconstitutional methods if necessary". He 
could "call on a nucleus of some 55 members of the 
Malta Labour Party, supported by a hooligan element 
which is becoming increasingly unemployed"; 
3. There was no shortage of sporting guns and explosives 
in the island; 
4. The civil dockyard area would be the likely centre of any 
industrial trouble; 
5. The 1,200-strong police force could be expected to 
operate loyally and with reasonable efficiency under the 
present Commissioner in the initial stages of an internal 
security situation, but its efficiency might deteriorate 
after about a week's engagement and would probably be 
drastically impaired without the present Commissioner. 
De Gray was unlikely to remain in power should the 
M.L.P. come to power; 
6. The 380-strong Admiralty Constabulary would 
generally remain loyal but would not be available in any 
strength for internal security duties outside the 
Admiralty installations; 
7. The dispersion of Service installations and families and 
the intermixing of Service and civilian interests greatly 
increased the vulnerability of both installations and 
families. 
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Five internal situations were envisaged: 
Situation A: Disorderly political demonstrations and rallies; 
Situation B: Industrial action probably centred in dockyard areas, 
disturbances in the highly-populated Three Cities area south-east of 
Grand Harbour, and island-wide strikes of up to about one week's 
duration; 
Situation C: Situation B extending to Valletta and to the risk of 
malicious damage to Service installations and threats to Servicemen 
in the area affected; 
Situation D: Situation C but with continuous and sustained 
disturbances in the Three CitiesNalletta areas, outbreaks in adjacent 
villages, scattered attacks on Service installations throughout the 
island probably involving explosives, and probably some attacks on 
Servicemen and some intimidation of Service families; 
Situation E: An attempted coup d'etat by the Malta Labour Party after 
Independence involving rapid action by night of a small body of 
armed resolute men. 
As for force requirements, the plan had a five-point policy action 
programme. First, the aim would be to safeguard defence interests 
to allow the Services to fulfil their operational tasks; and to assist the 
civil authorities in maintaining law and order. Second, the use of 
force should as far as possible be left to the Malta Police and 
Admiralty Constabulary; initially, troops should be employed in 
relieving the police on key points. Third, the safeguarding of the 
more important key points would be based on: maximum use of 
guard dogs; guards on high priority key points; the use of 
Servicemen as watchmen; small centre mobile reserves; and mobile 
patrols. Fourth, Service and U.K.-based families would be 
safeguarded by military police mobile patrols and a home 
guard organisation employing heads of families in the areas where 
families live, together with the routing of key point mobile patrols 
through these areas. Fifth, the early deployment of adequate 
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psychological operations support to gain full effect from the use of 
security forces. 
The chiefs of staff considered five main operational possibilities in 
the assessment of the working of this five-pronged action, on the 
assumption that members of the Royal Malta Artillery, although 
some of them were trained in riot control, would not open fire on 
their own kith and kin. If the Malta Police contained Situation A, 
that would be it. In Situation B, one infantry company with some 
specialist support to maintain essential services would be required. 
For Situation C, one infantry battalion plus 480 men, i.e. 
approximately one battallion, would be needed, together with 64 
guard dogs and handlers for key point guards. The psychological 
operations staff and unit would be deployed. In Situation D, the 
following forces would swing into action: the 'Ferrets' squadron 
armoured reconnaissance regiment; two infantry battalions, plus 
780 men (including a third infantry battalion and one field squadron 
RAF Regiment); plus 82 guard dogs and handlers for key point 
guards and assistance to the police; together with the psychological 
staff and unit, and one flight of helicopters. As for Situation E, the 
current military garrison would be fully deployed. In the unlikely 
event of a general strike taking place as part of any of the situations 
and lasting more than a week, there would be a requirement 
additional to the forces listed in order to replace local essential 
labour, particularly for the Royal Air Force. 
The forces already available in Malta as of July 1964 for internal 
security duties belonged mainly to the Army Garrison. This 
comprised two infantry battalions, one of 630 all ranks, the other of 
375 all ranks; 350 Maltese in the R.M.A.; the R.E. Fortress Squadron 
of 170 Maltese with U.K. officers; with twelve guard dogs and 
handlers. In addition, there were the Royal Navy and the RoyalAir 
Force. These had personnel to provide static guards and patrols on 
a limited scale for the first 48 hours only. They also had 20 guard 
dogs and handlers. 
As for the reinforcements required for situations C and D, it was 
recommended that the psychological operations staff and unit 
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should be established in Malta immediately, and that some of the 50 
additional guard dogs required some should be made available 
immediately to work with handlers provided by the garrison. 
The chiefs of staff were advised that the UK would not accept a 
positive commitment for maintaining peace in Malta after 
independence: 
We would, however, almost certainly intervene in the event 
of an attempted coup d'etat by Mintoff. In the case of lesser, 
through serious, disturbances we would probably accede to 
a request by the Maltese Government to provide troops in 
support of the civil power. 
These commitments would not be embodied in a formal agreement 
although it was intended that the necessary prerequisites for our 
forces, including indemnity, would be laid down by exchange of 
letters in advance of independence. After independence, in the 
absence of a request by the Maltese Government to provide military 
assistance, we shall only be entitled to defend British lives and 
property: 
Although we are advised that it is unlikely that a friendly 
Maltese Government would refrain from asking for our 
help, it must be recognised that, even without such a request 
by the Maltese Government, military intervention on a scale 
necessary to safeguard the operational viability of our 
installations might have to be undertaken. This would have 
widespread political repercussions. 
The chiefs of staff therefore agreed with the five possible situations 
postulated and with the need to be able to counter such situations 
"before and after independence." They then went into considerable 
detail outlining the specifics of the operations that would have to be 
resorted to in case of serious trouble, thus giving the 'go ahead' 
almost in all respects to Operation Competent. While agreeing that 
a "Ferret" squadron was particularly suitable for the task envisaged, 
this was to be provided by the armoured reconnaissance regiment 
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Excerpts from a document submitted by the C-in-C, Mediterranean, on 
the internal security reinforcement of Malta, which was discussed by 
the Defence Chiefs of Staff during their meeting of 8th July 1964. According 
to this information, if a coup were staged Mintoff could count on a 
hard-core nucleus of 55 armed party supporters, apart from several 
hooligans. LS. Instruction 1963 foresaw" a surprise move", about 4 to 8 
weeks after Independence, "to overthrow the Government and for the 
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MLP to take over". VIPs would be surrounded, key points cut off and 
insurgents assemble in Hamrun, Paola, Cospicua and Zabbar. I.S. HQ 
would move from Police Depot to Castille if a request for military assistance 
were made, and all roads to Valletta would be blocked. An alternative 
venue should be selected for Cabinet as it could not assemble in the P.M.'s 
office. (Enc., Frost/Dorman, 7 July 1964, sec., Dorman/Frost, 30 June 1964, 
sec., 'Internal Security', NAM ser. 4/64.) 
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in Libya. The best helicopters for Malta's topography would be SRTs, 
acting together with the Army Air Corps flight of helicopters. Guard 
dogs would have to be provided with their own handlers so their 
provision would depend on availability at the time. Some more 
detailed contingency plans were requested in the unlikely event of 
a prolonged general strike, particularly for the replacement oflocal 
skilled labour. As to Intelligence, it was concluded that: 
To assist Dr Borg Olivier in countering subversion we 
should give him as much information as possible on 
treasonable activities by his opponents. It is also in our own 
interests to give him every encouragement and assistance in 
building up the Special Branch of the Malta Police Force. 
Military intervention on a scale necessary to safeguard the 
operational viability of British installations might have to be 
taken without a Maltese Government request for assistance, 
for example in the event of a coup d'itat. 
In a separate set of recommendations to the Minister for Defence to 
be forwarded to him by Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence Staff, the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee invited the Army Department in 
consultation with the Air Force Department to investigate the best 
method of providing guard dogs and their handlers. They invited the 
Army Department to investigate the best method of providing a 
psychological operations staff for Malta. They instructed the 
Commanders-in-Chief Committee (West of Suez) to revise Plan 
Competent on the basis ofHolland-Martin's paper, taking their views 
into account. And finally, as already mentioned, they invited Holland-
Martin to submit a detailed estimate of the reinforceements required 
to replace local skilled labour in the event of a prolonged general 
strike, so that a separate plan to meet this contingency could be 
prepared by the Commanders-in-Chief Committee (West of Suez).136 
136 See the doc., sec., UK Eyes Only, 'Internal Security Reinforcement of Malta', 
Annex to COS 202/64, ff. 1-8, ene. Lapsley memo., 8 July 1964,926/2076. Air Viee-
Marshal J. H. Lapsley was Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
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Earl Mountbatten during a visit to Malta in the mid-Sixties. 
While these plots and counter-plots were being hatched well into the 
year, in London Borg Olivier and his negotiating team were trying 
to finalize agreements and a general settlement so that this could 
pass through the British parliament, before it adjourned indefinitely 
for the general election which was due to be held in the early 
Autumn. However, the Chiefs of Staff in the Ministry of Defence, 
and the Heads of Services in Malta were continuing carefully to 
weigh the Malta question in the light of Britain's presence and 
prospects if Independence were to be granted; and of the 
implications, for British and Western security in the Mediterranean, 




AND THE SOUTHERN FLANK 
As the date set for Independence approached some very senior 
defence-minded personnel and politicians began to have second 
thoughts about the course of action intended. The sinking feeling 
that Malta could be lost,just at a time when its usefulness to Britain 
could be increasing, led to qualms, queries and a renewed caution. 
This reserve had always been present in certain quarters, but some 
now seemed to be having cold feet. The referendum was, well, 
inconclusive; the main parties seemed not to be able to agree on 
anything except getting Independence; there were three parties 
who didn't want it; the Constitution as it stood was unacceptable; 
and Malta's democratic political future in the Western fold seemed 
to be seriously at risk. Had an opportunity been provided, especially 
in May 1964, such elements would have jumped at it, pressing 
perhaps successfully for a stay of execution. One such opportunity 
would have been large-scale industrial and political unrest with a 
dose of violence. That could well have served to delay matters, 
perhaps indefinitely, justifying a 1958/59-style reassumption of 
gubernatorial control for security reasons and in the public (and the 
British) interest. 
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Borg Olivier left Malta for London soon after the referendum result 
and he stayed there, on the spot, until July, when the clouds finally 
lifted. 
What Britain would be willing to offer and for how long was seen 
to be linked to the facilities that would continue to be available to 
her after Malta's Independence. This was the moderate view. A more 
hard-line view sometimes expressed in joint meetings of the defence 
chiefs of staff and heads of the Services in Malta was whether Britain 
should let go of Malta completely, so soon, or at all, unless defence 
and security were assured. But how could you do that after giving 
Independence? The British prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
was not only conscious of this dilemma: he was himself wary, hoping 
as late as April 1964 that a way could still be found to stall the grant 
of independence to Malta. 
The debate going on in defence and security circles was not quite 
on the same wavelength as that being pursued in the Colonial and 
Commonwealth relations offices. The former were more sceptical, 
concerned and worried. The latter were more liberal-minded, 
rather eager to bring the Malta independence question to a 
conclusion through a compromise constitution of some kind (with 
an accompanying defence cum finance package) before the Tory 
administration's own term of office ended: to settle it and to be done 
with it - another bead around the neck. 
The head-scratching about a post-independence Defence 
arrangement with Malta began immediately after Dr Borg Olivier's 
request for Independence was made in August 1962, and it lasted 
right until the very end of the Anglo-Maltese negotiations in July 
1964. Although these negotiations were kept under lock and key, by 
November 1962 Borg Olivier had already made known to the 
British government what his administration sought to achieve in this 
domain. He did this in his embryonic memorandum of 24th 
November 1962, which was dignified, self-willed and far-reaching: 
In principle my Government will seek to negotiate a defence 
agreement under which in peace time facilities are made 
available to British forces on broadly the same basis as at 
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present. Both for political and practical reasons this would 
not be an exclusive Agreement and Malta would reserve the 
right to make such other arrangements with other powers 
as from time to time appeared to be in her interest. 
Not only would facilities be made available to Britain "in peace 
time", Malta would retain the right to make arrangements with 
"other powers" as she thought fit. In this resolute statement of intent 
as early as November 1962, prior to his first independence talks in 
London in the following month, Borg Olivier held that practically 
"all Service lands and buildings in these Islands" should be handed 
over to the Government of Malta on Independence. Subject to 
certain conditions, the Government of Malta would be "prepared to 
consider some exceptions to" this rule whereby "lands and buildings 
including fixed assets held by the Services on independence and 
required by them thereafter should be retained on lease at a nominal 
rent" provided that: 
(i) between now and independence no disposals of lands 
and buildings other than to the Government of Malta 
should take place; 
(ii) contracts for the holding of lands and buildings will 
require all War Damage of national monuments to be 
made good without delay; all temporary buildings and 
unsightly objects would be removed before land is 
returned when no longer required. l 
The ready presumption of Maltese sovereignty clearly evident in 
Borg Olivier's memorandum rather unsettled the defence chiefs. 
These had known a different era and were accustomed to a more 
pliant manner of dealing in their onetime 'fortress'. It was their very 
first brush in a very long time with a Maltese leader who was telling 
lAcomplete copy of Borg Olivier's memorandum addressed to Sandys, 24 Nov. 1962, 
was enclosed by Admiral D. E. Holland-Martin, C-in-C, Mediterranean, 3 Dec. 1962, 
with his comments, to the Chief of the Defence Staff in the Ministry of Defence 
(Mountbatten), 'Maltese Demand for Independence" sec., 926/1342. See above, I, 5. 
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them just what he now expected them to do in matters reJating to 
the defence of that 'fortress'. Admiral Holland-Martin was the first 
one to swallow hard on seeing Borg Olivier's memorandum, which 
was examined by the Heads of Services Committee. They believed 
it was important that their observations on certain points in the 
memorandum should be available to the Ministry of Defence and to 
Service Ministries before "any BRITISH position" was adopted with 
regard to defence matters. 
The British heads of Services took strong exception to Borg Olivier's 
foray on a number of counts. In the first place, they felt "most 
strongly" that any agreement "must safeguard our own Defence 
interests." That would not be so if Malta were entitled to make other 
arrangements with other powers "as from time to time appeared to 
be in her interest." In the second place, they were 
convinced that it will continue to be necessary for some form 
of reserve power in the field of defence to remain in the 
hands of HMG if we are to obtain our minimum strategic 
requirements and if, amongst other things, we are still 
responsible for the defence of Malta ... Nothing less will 
ensure, in the last resort, that our unfettered use of our 
facilities will not be prejudiced by the action of some future 
MALTESE Government." 
While finding it difficult to reconcile Borg Olivier's expectation that 
they would still be responsible for Malta's defence if asked to, they 
used that to strengthen their hand in lobbying for 'reserved powers' 
under the new constitution. 
In addition to the future of the RMAand the Territorial Regiments, 
which, according t~ the Borg Olivier memorandum, should be 
included in a Defence Agreement, they mentioned the future of the 
Royal Navy's locally entered personnel and of the Royal Air Force 
(Malta), which had equally to be taken into account. 
Their third main objection related to the use of land already held 
by the Services. They considered it "quite unacceptable" that the 
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continued use of some land already held by the Services "should be 
dependent on the consent of the MALTESE Government" as was 
implied by the words "subject to a few exceptions" (in Borg Olivier's 
memorandum). On the question of the terms on which surplus 
property was to be disposed of, irrespective of the outcome of 
negotiations on independence, they were awaiting a ruling from 
Service Ministries: 
We think it quite unreasonable that these terms should make 
provision for the removal of 'all temporary buildings and 
unsighly objects' before land is returned, as is suggested in 
the memorandum. 
In this 'counter-memorandum', signed by the Fortress Commander 
of Malta, Air Vice-MarshalJ. G. Davis, the Heads of Services asked 
the C-in-C to forward these views to the Ministry of Defence "as a 
matter of urgency."2 
Holland-Martin agreed with them. Moreover he mentioned three 
further points which he believed should be borne in mind in any 
defence discussions for an independent Malta. First, he said, 
Indepedence did not become a live issue in Malta again "until Borg 
Olivier felt that politically he could not return empty handed from 
his discussions in London last summer." Despite "the artificial 
respiration that he then applied", the admiral added, the majority 
of Maltese had shown "little enthusiasm for immediate 
independence" feeling that there were more pressing problems. 
Second, for most Maltese, "but not for Mintoff and his more ardent 
supporters", the "status" of independence was "much more 
important than the substance." And thirdly: 
We will let ourselves in for endless trouble later, if any 
defence agreement is not in detail. Even then it will not 
prove workable unless we retain goodwill in this island.3 
2 Davis/Holland-Martin, 3 Dec. 1962, sec., ene. Holland-Martin, 3 Dec. 1962, op.cit. 
3 Holland-Martin/Mountbatten, 3 Dec. 1962, op.cit. 
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In discussing with his advisers the suggested title heads for a Defence 
Agreement prepared by the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies felt, at this stage, that agreement on defence 
matters should, if possible, be dealt with in two parts. First, there 
should be a 'Treaty of Protection' under which Britain would agree 
to protect Malta, and Malta would undertake not to grant rights to 
other powers without Britain's consent. Second, there should be a 
more detailed Defence Agreement covering all the other matters of 
defence interest as necessary. The Treaty and Defence Agreement 
should be signed at the same time as any agreement on financial 
assistance; and all should be signed after independence, "Le. in no 
circumstances should we be committed to an aid agreement without 
having secured our defence requirements". 
Facilities made available to Britain, Sandys noted further, "should 
be equally available in peace and war." The Defence Agreement 
should specify the conceding of "overflying rights", while the 
meaning of "communications facilities" had to be spelled out in more 
detail. Any guarantees to employ Maltese labour "should be 
avoided." Another provision was to concern a Status of Forces 
Agreement. In deciding on this from existing models, it was thought 
that possibly that applicable to U.S. forces in Britain would be the 
best, in so far as this provided probably the most beneficial 
arrangements amongst the agreements applicable either to foreign 
forces in Britain or to British forces overseas.4 
Another response to the Ministry of Defence on their draft for a 
Defence Agreement with Malta came from the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, as a revised draft was being prepared for the 
Oversea Co-Ordinating Committee and other inter-departmental 
meetings on the subject. In view of their experience in relation to 
Ceylon, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the C.R.O. was not too keen on 
a defence agreement with an independent Malta, unless that were 
generally agreed to among the Maltese parties. They accepted such 
4 Min., M.2A, sec., entitled 'Malta Discussions - Defence Agreement', 926/1342. 
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an agreement but with misgivings. "We think - again from past 
experience - that the main lines of any such agreement must 
be clearly seen to be accepted by an All Party Delegation." 
While the detailed drafting and the preparation of technical 
annexes could be left for negotiation between the British and 
Maltese governments before Independence Day, "we shall, I am 
sure, have to concede that the whole document must be subject 
to ratification by the Maltese Legislature after Independence." 
The point being made here clearly was that such an agreement would 
not be worth the paper it was written on if after Independence the 
same party or some other party were to simply disregard its 
provisions, as had already happened to Britain in other ex-colonies. 
That too was the point Holland-Martin was making when he spoke 
of the importance of retaining" goodwill" in relations between Britain 
and the Maltese after Independence. Independence was the greatest 
variable of all: nothing any longer could be determined or decreed 
in London as was the case before it; that also applied to 'agreements'. 
On the other hand, goodwill depended on many factors: moods and 
circumstances were known to change. 
The second important point of a general nature made by the C.R.O. 
from Downing Street, and one which would recur, was that 
no final decision should be taken about a Defence 
Agreement until we are clearer in our own minds whether 
or not Malta is likely to be accepted as a Member or 
Associate in some way of NATO. It would surely suit our 
book both economically and Defence-wise if our 
requirements in Malta could be brought under some NATO 
umbrella rather than standing out as a target for anti-
Imperialist propaganda. 
This point had come up in discussion on the morning of the same 
day during which Borg Olivier's memorandum was written 28 th 
November 1962. It had been raised by John Kisch from the Colonial 
Office, apparently on the assumption that Malta had a pro-Western 
government and therefore could be relied upon. The C.R.O. was 
more cautious: 
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However much we may believe today that a Maltese 
Government of the future will positively ask us to retain our 
Defence posture in the Island what may happen tomorrow, 
particularly with a Mintoff regime, is frankly quite 
unpredictable ... experience has all too often shown that the 
atmosphere changes to a quite unexpected extent once the 
heady perfume of Independence has been sniffed.5 
The Malayan model was chosen for the draft of the Malta 
agreement. Malaya was a special case involving the fight against the 
Communists and the complexity of S.E.A.T.O. obligations, but the 
British undertaking in respect of Malaya was a one-sided one. Some 
analysts felt that the Nigerian model, which provided for reciprocal 
arrangements for mutual defence, would be more advantageous to 
Britain, although that Nigerian agreement was already defunct. 
The provision of specific training facilities in Britain was relegated 
to annex I of the draft, whereas it could perhaps have been 
integrated into the main text. On the other hand, there could have 
been a political reason for under-playing that possibility. This could 
be seen to be linked to the maintenance of British units to help 
maintain internal security in Malta, one of the most controversial 
provisions in the Defence Agreement as now proposed. In principle, 
it was arguable how British troops could operate for internal 
purposes in another independent country, although the actual size 
of the force or forces to be retained after Independence was still 
unclear. This was no doubt being put in as a precautionary measure, 
in the event that the Maltese authorities would be unable to maintain 
order in a crisis situation, and as much to protect British as Maltese 
interests. It was not known, however, what forces other NATO 
countries might wish to retain and what these would need as regards 
facilities for the movement and visits of aircraft or naval ships. 
One provision which went against Maltese intentions was that not 
even NATO allies could obtain defence facilities except with the 
5 Chadwick/Benwell, 28 Nov. 1962, conI'., 56/33/1, 926/1342. 
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prior agreement of Her Majesty's Government. Unlike the 
agreements with Cyprus, the Malta draft specifically provided for 
consultation with the Maltese side regarding the level of the Forces.6 
In drafting a Defence Agreement for Malta, Cyprus was very much 
on British minds. There was some disagreement as to what had 
caused the trouhles experienced over the Cyprus agreement, 
whether that was because of its "complication", or rather whether 
that was because of the use of "generalities", or where NATO Status 
Agreement had been followed "without sufficient regard to the 
particular circumstances of Cyprus." According to the Treasury 
Solicitor in his intervention with the Ministry of Defence about the 
Malta draft, the Cyprus agreement had lacked clear statements that 
the Republic and Local Authorities were "not entitled to control the 
use to which Service land is put", and that the Republic was not 
entitled "to prohibit imports for use in Service land or the passage 
of goods through its territory en route to the United Kingdom 
territory of the Sovereign Base Areas." Generalities were inadequate 
and due regard should be taken of that in formulating the Malta 
Defence Agreeement, even if that could be done succinctly. It was 
better to work ahead, and that the Service Departments should 
proceed to produce "at this stage" drafts of the provisions thought 
to he necessary, which should then be forwarded to the political 
Departments for comment. "We do not want a last-minute rush."7 
In all this discussion, the most threatening proposal from the point 
of view of the pro-independence parties in Malta was the one 
insisting that reserved power should be retained hy the Crown in the 
area of defence. That would seriously curtail the sovereignty of a 
future Maltese government, and it could even imperil it politically. 
On the civilian side, both Wakefield and his deputy Watt at the UK 
Commission in Malta did not agree with this lobby for reserved 
6 Ibid., ff. 1-4. 
7 HaIVStephens, 14 Dec. 1962, sec., 926/1342. 
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powers. One of them, Ian Watt, said so explicitly to the Colonial 
Office. Probably without realising it, he was stepping on the toes of 
a very old tension and controversy, which had bedevilled Anglo-
Maltese relations from their very genesis in the Napoleonic era: the 
difference in approach and in mentality between the civilian and the 
military authority in administering the government: 
I think that Wakefield, like myself, has reservations about 
accepting, in terms, the arguments of the Heads of Services 
that some 'form of reserved power' must be retained to protect 
British defence interests in Malta after Independence. I 
personally do not see how Independence is compatible with 
anything which I understand could be called 'reserved power' 
- but perhaps I spent too long in General Department and 
have a purist's approach to these things. 
Watt was stepping on the toes of another underlying tension: that 
between the Ministry of Defence and the Colonial Office, in their 
tendency to see things differently. He said he agreed however with 
Admiral Holland-Martin that most Maltese were unenthusiastic 
about independence, that for most of them status was more 
important than substance, and that a detailed defence agreement 
was as necessary as was the retention of goodwill in this island.s 
At the same time that this debate on defence was picking up, London 
was also looking carefully at the advantages and disadvantages of a 
Malta-E.E.C. customs union and at Malta becoming a member of the 
E.E.C., a membership which had so far eluded Britain herself. It was 
concluded however that at that stage no complete assessment could 
be made: "this will depend to a significant extent on the terms which 
she can obtain in negotiations with the Community."g While EEC 
membership was not strictly a defence matter, it would have had the 
advantage of integrating Malta within a Western European politico-
8 Watt/Kisch, 7 Dec. 1962, sec., 92611342. The C-in-C sent copies of his exchanges 
with the Defence ministry to the UK Commission. 
9 Aide Memoire, 26 Nov. 1962, enc. 926/1342. 
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economic structure, thereby ensuring a degree of overall political 
stability and some built-in assistance in the generation of economic 
activity and prosperity. It would help anchor Malta in the Western 
European family of nations, and such anchorage was a security 
concern. 10 
Although unemployment is usually seen in social and economic 
terms, in formulating a defence agreement the Chiefs of Staff were 
concerned with its military implications and repercussions. Scared by 
the projections of unemployment reaching up to 30% of the Maltese 
working population by 1967, emanating from the findings of Dr 
Stolper and of the Joint Study Group, the Chiefs of Staff assumed 
that labour unrest would destabilise not only the economy but also 
the political situation. As a result, they envisaged a situation where 
it would be necessary for British forces to intervene, if only to protect 
British defence interests on the Island but, possibly, generally to 
assist the Maltese forces in maintaining order. 
By September 1962 the Chiefs of Staff Committee, comprising Lord 
Mountbatten as Chief of the Defence Staff and Lord Carrington as 
First Sea Lord, among other senior military officers, had already 
approved an initial report examining a Colonial Office paper on the 
subject of Malta. Prompted by Malta's demand for independence 
only weeks earlier, the C.O. had drawn up a confidential internal 
report setting out political, defence, financial and economic 
considerations arising from it. Considering that Malta's demand had 
only been made on 20th August 1962, the alacrity of the Colonial 
Office's response was indicative. 
Mid-February 1963 was set as a target date for the Ministry of 
Defence to hand over a first draft of the Defence Agreement for 
Malta. By 18th September the chiefs of staff had already examined 
an elaborate C.O. paper and approved a report about it. 11 Between 
10 On financial discussions, see below, III, 16. 
11 HallettlMountbatten, 31 Dec. 1962, sec., 926/1872/48489. 
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then and March they met several times, sometimes inviting the 
Heads of Services from Malta as well as representatives from other 
ministries or departments apart from Defence, such as the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. 
In these meetings they went through with a tooth comb the facilities 
which Malta offered, contemplating various scenarios which could 
arise as a way of knowing what would be needed militarily to react 
to these in turn. Hypothetical responses such as those code-named 
'Operation Cartwheel' and 'Operation Lear' were dreamt up to 
counter any unrest, insurgency or other emergency from what 
strength would still be available in Malta or, if necessary, with 
additional help from the UK or elsewhere in the region. One central 
question was whether it would still be necessary or advisable to retain 
a 'garrison' in Malta after Independence. 
The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wrote to the Chief of the 
Defence Staff in December 1962 alerting him to the disquieting 
conclusions of the Joint Study Group as to the effect of the Services 
rundown. Unemployment in 1967, they estimated, was expected to 
total some 21,500 on fairly favourable assumptions, and over 28,500 
on less favourable assumptions. That was out of a working 
population which in 1962 was about 90,000. The financial forecast 
was correspondingly depressing. Admiral Holland-Martin was not 
aware of any plans by Her Majesty's Government to alleviate this 
situation: "certainly independence for Malta will not help." 
He added: 
Obviously if unemployment builds up to anything near even 
the lower figure Malta will be faced with major Internal 
Security problems and there will be an abundance of ill will 
towards the British. 
A report on Baileys, known as the Muirie Report, which had just 
been undertaken, made the Dockyard "a tender spot": 
I am told by the United Kingdom Commissioner that it is 
possible that Baileys might, within the next month, dismiss 
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a considerable number of employees or even close the 
dockyard gates. This would face us with an explosive 
situation with little or no notice. 
He did not know if the Colonial Office were keeping the Chief of the 
Defence Staff informed of these developments, but it was important 
that they should do SO.12 
What was being considered, clearly, was not simply the staggered 
discharge of small numbers of Dockyard workers. Borg Olivier's 
resignation threat may well have stopped in its tracks any intention 
to just close down the Dockyard - as a non-commercial proposition, 
a write-off causing social havoc among thousands of families who 
had traditionally worked for the British there, but for whom it was 
impossible to create new openings at the twitch of a thumb. The 
security implications of the social unrest thus provoked at a stroke 
would evidently be high. 
Holland-Martin's warning was on the agenda of a special meeting 
of the Vice Chiefs of Staff on 17th January 1963, which Mountbatten 
wanted to chair himself.1 3 In the meantime the Joint Planning 
Committee were similarly instructed to take this matter into account 
in their examination of the question ofthe garrison in Malta, while 
the Ministry of Defence were invited to seek the views of the Colonial 
Office about it. 
The planners concluded that for reasons of security of British 
defence facilities it would be necessary to keep one battalion in Malta 
12 Holland-Martin/Mountbatten, 19 Dec. 1962, sec., 'Effect of Services Rundown on 
the Employment in and the Economy of Malta', annex to COS. 1023/4/1/63, 926/ 
1872/48489. On Dr Borg Olivier's threat that he would resign if workers were 
discharged from the Dockyard without prior consultation with the Maltese 
government, see above on his meeting with Sandys in February 1963, ch. 1,8. Borg 
Olivier's resignation threat added to the panic, necessitating quite a discussion about 
what to do if that happened. 
13 Stephens/Cumming-Bruce, 8 Jan. 1963, conf., 926/1872/48489. 
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after independence. Given the Services rundown, the probable 
reductions in employment at the ockyard and a continuing high 
birthrate, and the fact that unemployment could amount to as much 
as 30% in the coming five years, it was doubtful if whatever was done 
these consequences could be made tolerable. Nor could Malta, it was 
felt, stand another blow of the scale which would be involved if the 
battalion forming the garrison were withdrawn. 
The C.O. wondered whether it was appropriate for the planners to 
refer to a "garrison" after independence. Their statement on the 
retention and possible use of certain British forces, could be toned 
down to read that they were advised that "we might be asked by the 
Malta Government to assist if it became clear ... "14 
Mountbatten opened the full-scale meeting of the 17th January, 1963 
by welcoming to it the C-in-C, Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Deric 
Holland-Martin; the General-Officer-Commanding, Malta and 
Libya, Major General the Lord Thurlow; and the Air Officer 
Commanding, Malta, Air Vice-Marshal J. G. Davis. Part of the 
meeting was also attended by Captain M. Hodges, Controller, 
Government Signals Service Planning Staff; and Major General 
A.M.W. Whistler, Director, Joint Communications Electronics Staff, 
among several other officials and officers. 
The first to address this meeting, Holland-Martin elaborated on the 
points he had made in his earlier letter, which those present around 
the table had before them. The economy of Malta was very much 
dependent on the presence of the Services; its standard of living was 
much higher than elsewhere in the Southern Mediterranean, "and 
through our efforts the Maltese people had enjoyed a secure 
existence in the past." There was still a fund of goodwill for the UK 
in Malta but there were signs that this goodwill was being lost in the 
face of the expected consequences of the rundown. As seen from 
Malta, the British government's aims appeared to be to run down 
14 Min., Fairclough/Cumming-Bruce, 10 Jan. 1963,92611872/48489. 
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as much and as quickly as possible while preserving the goodwill of 
the local population. Plans had been drawn up for the first two of 
these aims, but not for the third. 
He then detailed the findings of the Joint Study Group noting that 
until then the presence of the Services in Malta provided 23% of the 
employment, 33% of the national income, and 56% of the foreign 
exchange earnings. The unemployment figures for November 1962 
showed 6,200 unemployed out of a working population of 90,000 
but, according to the Joint Study Group's findings, by 1967 this 
would go up to between 20,000 or 19% to 29,000 or 28% of the 
working population. It was clear from the Joint Study Group 
assessment that the goodwill of the population could not be 
preserved even if unemployment reached the 20,000 figure. The 
effects of the rundown would be felt at all points in the economy; the 
Island would hold no attraction and capital would be driven out: 
In fact when Dr Borg Olivier made his demand for 
independence, £7 m. was immediately reinvested outside 
Malta. Tourists would be most unlikely to visit an unfriendly 
Island, and it might well be that SACEUR would be 
unwilling to maintain CINCAFMED Headquarters in Malta. 
Although it was recognised that Malta had been fortunate in 
achieving a high standard of living for comparatively little effort, 
"the people had not yet been taught to govern themselves" and the 
shock which their economy was expected to face would be beyond 
the capacity of their government to withstand. A cut in the standard 
of living to that of Sicily or Southern Italy would certainly have 
serious repercussions on the goodwill of the people. It would be 
extremely difficult in the period of four years to the end of the 
Services' rundown to overcome employment problems and achieve 
economic stability. As an example, he noted how under the five year 
plan (under the colonial government) 4,000 new jobs were to be 
available by 1964 but to date only 900 had been created. 
Holland-Martin then brought up, inevitably, the dockyard question. 
Present problems were resulting in much uncertainty. There had 
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already been a one-day strike, and an overtime ban (by the GWU) 
was currently in force: 
The situation could well become explosive iflarge numbers 
of the workers became unemployed. The Vice Chairman of 
Bailey (Malta) Limited had given a television interview this 
week and had put the onus for any unemployment in the 
dockyard on H.M. Government. At the present time, 60% 
of the work in the dockyard was for the Royal Navy, as 
against a former figure of 80%. 
The independence of Malta "would not help the United Kingdom 
and might in fact hinder our enjoyment of the facilities which we 
wished to use." The preservation of the goodwill of the population, 
he stressed again, was essential "if we were to retain our 
requirements there." Furthermore, he concluded, "we had a moral 
responsibility for ensuring the economic stability of Malta."15 
The Air Officer Commanding, Malta, Air Vice Marshal Davis, said 
that it was difficult to imagine the effects that the Services' rundown 
might have in Malta. In the present 'business as usual' atmosphere 
there was no internal security problem and no requirement for 
guarding installations - "there was not one armed sentry in Malta". 
With one-fifth to one-third of the working population unemployed, 
however, it might well be necessary "to retain the use of our facilities 
by force." 
Lord Thurlow, the General Officer Commanding, Malta and Libya, 
said that the protection of military installations and Service 
personnel and their families "would be extremely difficult if the 
Maltese population became hostile." Installations and living 
accomodation were so closely integrated with the Maltese 
community that it would require "a force of six battalions" to handle 
isolated outbreaks of sabotage, and more units would be needed "if 
15 'The Military Implications of Unemployment in Malta', COS 4th Meeting/63, 17 
Jan. 1963, sec., ff. 1-2,926/1872/48489. 
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full cover was to be given to all our installations." Thurlow 
mentioned as just one exmaple, the fuel pipe-line to the airfield 
which ran for three miles above ground. 
Lord Mountbatten shared the feelings of the C-in-C and the Heads 
of Services in Malta on "the disasterous future that faced the Maltese 
people." He felt that "people who had supported the United 
Kingdom for generations would be turned against us." While fully 
appreciating the effects on Malta, he was nevertheless convinced that 
militarily they were taking the right action: 
Our strategy required no more than forward operating 
facilities in Malta, and this inevitably led to a rundown of the 
Services in the Island with its consequent effect upon the 
Maltese economy. A further delay in the rundown would 
mean that Services would be expected to keep personnel 
misemployed in order to provide employment for the 
Maltese population. 16 
For the Colonial Office, Mr John Kisch noted that now that Malta was 
self-governing it was no longer the task of the British government to 
make long-term economic plans for her; indeed the Malta 
Government had engaged a UN expert to assist in formulating an 
economic programme. In recent discussions Dr Borg Olivier had not 
been ready to discuss what help would be required "after 
independence". Nevertheless, the UK had been intimated that 
financial assistance would not necessarily be a "once for all" payment. 
"When Malta became independent a different state of affairs would 
of course prevail, and Colonal Office responsibility would cease." 
Kisch did not think that the present difficulties in the running of the 
dockyard would provoke an internal security problem. 
The Chiefs of Staff Committee was of the view that Britain's use of 
facilities in Malta was essential. Much of their current contingency 
16 Ibid., ff. 3-4. 
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planning depended on the use of staging facilities at Luqa. Naval 
communications and SIGINT requirements had also to be 
considered. It was decided that the Joint Planning Staff should now 
carry out a study of the effect on British strategy of a decision to 
withdraw completely from the Island. The effect on current 
contingency plans had to be clearly shown. The naval rundown in 
Malta had already been extended as much as possible, and the best 
practicable arrangements had been made for giving naval work to 
the dockyard. It was important that 
the Defence Agreement should give us authority to reinforce 
Malta for the protection of British lives and property. Plans 
to cover more internal security problems of varying intensity 
should be formulated and forwarded for consideration. 
If Britain withdrew or was forced to withdraw from Malta, there was 
"the danger that another country might attempt to take our place 
and to our disadvantage." The UN economic expert (Stolper) 
believed that economic stability could only be achieved by reducing 
the rate of the rundown of the Services. Although emigration 
appeared to offer a means of alleviating unemployment, it was 
usually the more enterprising people who emigrated, leaving the 
unskilled population as a continuing problem. 
Summing up, Mountbatten held that the three Service Commanders 
in Malta had shown that "a potentially very dangerous situation 
existed." The moral issues apart, if the Maltese population became 
actively hostile, 
not only might we lose facilities which had in past 
evaluations been considered militarily essential to us in the 
long term, but we might in the near future find it necessary 
to provide six or more major units which we could ill spare. 
Mountbatten believed that "the unpalatable truths should be given 
the widest possible circulation." He would draw the attention of the 
Minister of Defence to the situation and would forward to him the 
study by the Joint Planning Staff as soon as it was available. Holland-
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Martin as well as the Joint Planning Staff were instructed to take 
action on the proposed study about a "complete withdrawal" from 
Malta scenario. 17 
The defence chiefs of staff then proceeded to consider the report they 
had before them from the Joint Planning Staff about the retention of 
the Malta garrison. Recapitulating decisions reached in earlier 
enquiries about British defence requirements in Malta in the 1960s, 
it was noted in the Joint Planning Staff's report that Malta would only 
be required in future to provide forward operating facilities for the 
Royal Navy; operating, staging, and air reinforcement facilities for the 
Royal Air Force; accomodation, training areas and communications 
for Headquarters Troops Malta and Libya and for one major unit; and 
the Special Wireless Station. Although their facilities would be 
reduced, they would still require maintaining a number of dispersed 
installations throughout the Island. In this connection, at a meeting 
on 8th May 1962, Wakefield had informed them that, in the event of a 
breakdown in internal security and without the support of the police, 
six battalions would be required to guard static installations. With 
regard to land forces, it had been agreed that the present requirement 
for one major unit was dictated by the need to provide an immediately 
available force for the preservation of law and order while Britain 
retained sovereignty over the Island. 
In September 1962 the Colonial Office had concluded that Britain 
should aim to secure the continued and unhampered use of the 
defence facilities required but they had also suggested that, if Malta 
were independent, the purpose for which the army garrison was 
primarily required would disappear. The Colonial Office were now 
stating that they wished the battalion to stay "for economic reasons" 
and that Sandys would wish to be consulted before any other 
decision was taken. A decision on whether or not a garrison would 
be needed after independence had been deferred. Provided that the 
Maltese government was willing, it should at least be retained "until 
the situation in Malta itself, and in the area generally, had clarified." 
17 Ibid., ff. 4-5. 
3 
I 
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Mter independence, when Britain would no longer be responsible for 
internal security, it would be more difficult to safeguard the dispersed 
installations containing the military facilities required. They must, 
however, be "in a position to safeguard Luqa airfield, thus ensuring 
our point of entry." They then considered the military implications 
of escalating unemployment, to which Holland-Martin's warning to 
Mountbatten had drawn attention. They were advised that in the 
negotiations leading up to the Defence Agreement "there is a 
possibility that we will be asked by the Maltese Government to provide 
assistance in the maintenance oflaw and order after independence." 
Independence and reliance on the forces of an external power for the 
maintenance of law and order were incompatible. Furthermore, 
under independence, the protection of foreign lives and property 
became the responsibility of the local government. The principal 
reason behind the Maltese wish to retain a major unit was probably 
the spending power of the men but, whatever the reason, 
we should meet such a request at this difficult period as a 
means both of paving the way to acceptance of our defence 
requirements and of safeguarding our defence facilities ... 
although Malta should not be considered as a mounting 
base for operations in the Mediterranean, this major unit, 
or part of it, could be used for operations in Libya in an 
emergency. 
The situation in North Mrica and the Levant was far from stable and 
this would seem to be no time to reduce Britain's already exiguous 
forces in this area. They therefore concluded that an army garrison 
of one major unit would be required in Malta after independence 
"to secure and ensure the unhampered use of our essential defence 
installations and our main point of entry and to provide a stabilising 
influence in the Island and the area as a whole." 18 
18 'Retention of the Malta Garrison', Annex to COS. 29/63, para. 1-7, IT. 1-2, and 
para. 7, f. 3, 'Annex (Concluded)', 926/1872/48489. In another version of these 
minutes it was concluded that "a land force of one major unit should be stationed 
in Malta after independence if requested by the Malta Government..." 
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In opening the discussion on this report, Mountbatten recalled that 
a decision about keeping a garrison in Malta or not had been 
deferred. They had appreciated, however, that current events in the 
area indicated that "a somewhat fluid and possibly dangerous 
period lay ahead," and that "this situation would not stabilise with 
the grant of independence to Malta, particularly if this should occur 
in the immediate future." Now that Malta had applied to be granted 
independence, the Committee had to decide whether or not land 
forces were required to remain there in order that the Ministry of 
Defence could complete the first draft of the defence agreement for 
Malta. 
In supporting what the Joint Planning Staff had recommended, Sir 
William Pike substantiated his argument by reference to an 
increasingly volatile situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. To start with, he mentioned in particular the recent 
assassination of the Deputy Army Chief of Staff in Libya. Apart from 
that fatal incident, there was the dispute in Cyprus "between the 
Turks and Greeks" over the municipalities, the internal situation in 
Syria and the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen. All that pointed 
to the need to retain a battalion in Malta "as a stabilising factor in 
the area." To implement their strategy, it was necessary to retain a 
number of facilities in Malta, in particular the use of the airfields, 
the Naval forward operating base, and the wireless station. In order 
to secure these, it was necessary f'Or a battalion to be stationed in the 
Island for their protection: 
After independence the primary responsibility for internal 
security would devolve on the Maltese Government. If the 
Maltese Government requested assistance, it would of 
course be given, but in order to prevent adverse publicity, 
initial action should certainly be carried out by Maltese 
forces. 19 
19 'Retention of the Malta Garrison', C.O.S. 4th Meeting/63, 17 Jan. 1963, f. 6, 926/ 
1872/48489. 
MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AND THE SOUTHERN FLANK 515 
In confirming this decision, the Chiefs of Staff considered that the 
Maltese police had been adequate to deal with trouble arising from 
limited industrial unrest, but they would not be capable of dealing 
with greater disorders. The army in Malta had recently been asked 
to assist in the event of trouble arising from the dockyard dispute. 
Another factor in the decision was that the retention of a battalion 
would assist the Island's economy, with the Colonial Office being 
strongly in favour of that. The terms under which a battalion could 
be stationed in Malta after independence would need to be dearly 
defined in the defence agreement. 20 
In reply to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Minister of Defence 
in a minute suggested that "we should plan to establish some of our 
NATO forces there." Current developments in Europe may facilitate 
"the running down of BAOR and accelerate the possibility of our 
taking over roles on the outposts and flanks of NATO." The Minister 
of Defence therefore asked the Chiefs of Staff to provide an 
additional study and to report to him on what barrack accomodation 
existed in Malta and what units could be accomodated there. 21 
In a separate investigation, the Joint Administrative Planning Staff 
therefore detailed the availability of barrack accomodation in Malta, 
vacant or occupied, noting also the downgrading ofTa' Qali airfield 
in Attard to a care and main ten ace basis by 1st April 1963. For the 
Royal Navy, naval accomodation could be made available, for 
example, at Hal Far, including Kalafrana, and at the Royal Marine 
Training Centre in Ghajn Tuffieha. Other accomodation was at 
Manoel Island (HMS Phoenicia). For the army, there were the 
barracks at St George's Bay and at St Andrew's (both of these 
classified as being in St Julian's), Ghadira in Mellieha, and Ghajn 
Tuffieha. For the Royal Air Force, there was Ta' Qali.22 Most of this 
20 Ibid., f. 7. 
21 Watkins/Mountbatten, 24Jan. 1963, sec., 926/1872/48489. 
22 Invariably spelt as 'Takali' or, at best, 'Ta Kati'. 
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barrack accmodation would be vacated on 31 st March 1964 or 31 st 
March 1965.23 
By the end of February the Chiefs of Staff had discussed at length 
what the effect on British strategy would be if it was decided to 
withdraw from Malta. Such a study necessarily involved looking into 
what facilities Malta offered or could offer, to set these pluses against 
the minuses resulting from a complete withdrawal. In this sense, 
here was an interesting exercise to take stock of the place's worth or 
otherwise: what would we miss if we left. It was a hypothetical 
exercise because Britain had no intention of withdrawing completely 
from Malta in the early 1960s. In fact, an earlier assessment on 
British strategy in the Sixties had stated that British military 
commitments in the Mediterranean would be the support of NATO 
and CENTO, the preservation of British air and sea routes in the 
area, and the discharge of any remaining treaty and other 
obligations. "We decided that whether or not Malta became 
independent, the minimum facilities required there would be ... " 
What would the effects of a British withdrawal from Malta in 1963-
1964 have been on British strategy in the Mediterranean? 
In so far as NATO was concerned, it was felt that Malta was not vital 
to NATO in the discharge of its responsibilities. They were advised, 
however, that NATO would be "deeply disturbed by the prospect of 
an independent Malta, particularly if, in seeking to fill the vacuum 
created by our withdrawal, Malta became involved with the Soviet 
bloc." Britain was expected to do her best "to ensure Malta's 
continued alignment with the West." In any case, it was of the utmost 
importance "both to NATO and to ourselves" that Communist bloc 
bases were not established in Malta. 
In the event of a withdrawal from Malta, special arrangements 
would have to be negotiated by NATO for the retention of 
23 'Barrack Accomodation in Malta', 4 Feb. 1963, sec., annex to COS 64/63, 926/ 
1872/48489. 
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CINCAFMED's Headquarters, the air squadrons, and other facilities 
at present on the Island. Alternatively, they would have to be located 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Although that would not present 
any great physical difficulties, Britain would be obliged, as a member 
of NATO, to contribute towards the re-establishment of these units 
and facilities. The Chiefs of Staff were aware also of "suggestions that 
Malta might be used as a base for certain of the Polaris submarines 
assigned to NATO", and that "the United States Government is 
negotiating for a site for a tropospheric scatter station." Britain's 
withdrawal could jeopardise these arrangements.24 
The loss of defence facilities in Malta would have no direct bearing 
on Britain's ability to meet her present commitments in the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO). 
As for air routes, the story was different. Until there were established 
routes to the Middle and the Far East around Africa, it was essential 
to many of Britain's reinforcement plans and to strategic air 
movement generally, for Britain to retain at least one British 
controlled airfield in the Mediterranean. Such airfields existed in 
Malta, Libya and Cyprus. The principal LRT airfield in the area, 
because of its geographical position, was El Adem in Libya. The 
Idris, Akrotiri and Luqa airfields in Libya, Cyprus and Malta 
respectively were employed in a subsidiary role. If in certain 
circumstances Britain did not have complete freedom of action in 
the use of the Libyan airfields, and as Akrotiri was the least 
conveniently situated for staging, Luqa would assume considerable 
importance. Staging facilities in Malta were, the Chiefs of Staff 
established, 
essential for deployment to Cyprus and beyond of medium 
and short range transport, fighter, and dose support 
aircraft, at least until the 1970s. If we did not have these 
facilities, we would have either to employ NATO airfields or 
24 On the possibility of using Malta as an American base for polaris submarines and 
a tropospheric scatter station, see above, II, 11. 
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to provide flight-refuelling facilities; to each of these courses, 
however, there are major practical, political, or financial 
objections. 
The loss of Malta therefore would greatly reduce flexibility, and 
force Britain to rely on airfield facilities in France, Italy and possibly 
Greece, as well as to plan for flight refuelling where practicable. 
Sea routes were not any less important. Malta was "in a position to 
command the main sea route through the Mediterranean." If Britain 
withdrew and her influence were to be replaced by that of the 
Communist bloc, this important route would be "seriously 
threatened." Naval facilities as such were of secondary importance to 
Britain because she could make more use of Gibraltar. Malta provided 
forward naval operating facilities, but these could be replaced by the 
provision of additional fuel storage at Gibraltar at a cost of £2 m. and 
with the afloat support, which was already planned. 
Then there were communications and the so-called 'Sigint' facilities. 
Malta provided wireless communications to and from ships in the 
Mediterranean and northern Red Sea, for the conduct of air 
operations from and staging through Malta herself, and for military 
operations in Libya. This was "an essential part of the Royal Navy's 
strategic communication network to the Far East and of the naval 
world-wide ship/shore network." The loss of these facilities would 
involve an expensive replacement programme costing some £3 m. 
for the UK and about £4.5 m. for NATO. The strategic and ship/ 
shore communications system would be less efficient. 
The Sigint Station in Malta was important but most facilities could 
be incorporated with those of the station in Cyprus. This did not 
apply to the Malta's station's 'DF facility', the loss of which would 
be serious. Some reduction in overall British signals intelligence 
capabilities would be inevitable and, if Cyprus were subsequently 
to prove unavailable, the implications would be "very serious 
indeed." 
Taken regionally over a wide expanse, the loss of Malta would 
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considerably hamper if not handicap British - and even Anglo-
American - emergency operations, all the way from Libya to Kuwait. 
The use of the military facilities which Malta provided in 1963 was 
specifically included in "our intervention plan for Libya, the US/UK 
plan for the same area, the air reinforcement plans for the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, and in several evacuation plans." 
Furthermore, some peacetime command, administrative control and 
support for the Army, was based in Malta. Use might also be made 
of Malta, as an alternative to either Cyprus or Libya, in the Anglo-
American plans and studies for the Lebanon, Jordan and possible 
Arab-Israeli conflicts, the internal security reinforcement of Cyprus, 
and in certain other evacuation plans. 
On the military drawing board, Malta was intimately tied to Libya. 
In the then existing plan, Malta played a fundamental part, 
providing command, communications and administrative 
arrangements, in addition to general staging and operating 
facilities. Without Malta, the concept of the reinforcement operation 
would have to be recast and the resultant command, 
communications, and administrative arrangements would be less 
satisfactory and more expensive. Britain feared that in that case she 
could lose access to 75% of the TUXEDO POL stockpile, which was 
held by civil contract in Malta. Moreover, there would be a timing 
penalty particularly in the provision oflogistical support. Britain 
would have to rely on the use of NATO airfields for part of the air 
reinforcement, which would undoubtedly lead to practical and 
political difficulties, and the same would apply to an Anglo-
American intervention in Libya. 
The Royal Air Force planned to use Malta as a base for medium 
bombers, fighters, and perhaps light bombers, to meet possible 
commitments in the Near or Middle East, either in support of 
intervention plans, for example in Libya or Kuwait, or for deterrent 
purposes. In the event of Malta being lost to Britain, such forces 
could only be deployed to Cyprus. That would be militarily less 
desirable because the aircraft would be more vulnerable to attack, 
particularly from Egypt. Alternative arrangements however could be 
made for evacuation plans. 
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Mter engaging in this exhaustive survey, the Chiefs of Staff basically 
concluded that that although no longer of overriding strategic 
importance to Britain or NATO, Malta was so sited geographically 
that it could be a strategic asset "of the greatest value" to the 
Communists. Any relocation of national or NATO facilities in Malta 
would directly affect the efficiency of maritime and air operations 
and would involve both Britain and her allies in considerable 
expense, greatly reducing the flexibility of air reinforcement at least 
until the 1970s, and costing some £2 m. to have forward operating 
facilities replaced. The loss of strategic and ship/shore wireless 
facilities in Malta would involve a replacement programme of some 
£7.5 m. for Britain and NATO for a less efficient system. The loss of 
Sigint facilities would inevitably reduce Britain's communications 
intelligence potential and that would be very serious indeed if 
Cyprus were to prove unavailable. The most serious aspect of the 
loss of facilities in Malta to Britain's intervention and evacuation 
plans in the Mediterranean would concern intervention in Libya, 
since Malta played a fundamental part in the operational plan, 
command, communications and administration.25 
The Chiefs of Staff approved this secret report at their seventeenth 
meeting so far in 1963, on 28th February, and asked theActing Chief 
of Defence Staff to forward it to the Minister of Defence as an 
expression of their views. 26 
25 See 'The Effect on British of a Decision to Withdraw from Malta', annex, 
COS 94/63, sec., ff. 1-5,926/1872/48489. A more elaborate examination is outside 
the scope of this book but military historians interested in a regional study may refer 
to specific more detailed surveys and plans, e.g. COS (62) 358 on the British 
intervention plan for Libya; COS (62) 332 on thejointAnglo-American plan for the 
same area; COS (62) 340 Appendix 'N, Ser. 1,3,4 and 16, on the air reinforcement 
plans for the Mediterranean and the Middle East; COS (62) 340 Appendix 'N, 
Section 'B' on evacuation plans; COS (62) 339 on the contingencies for Lebanon; 
COS (60) 201 for Jordan, etc. 
26 Enc., Watkins/Chiefs of Staff Committee, 28 Feb. 1963, sec., 926/1872/48489. No 
copy of the document could be made without the authority of its secretary, J. K. 
Watkins. 
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In a follow-up to it, the Air Ministry sent a note covering the 
requirement for a Royal Air Force Regiment squadron to be made 
available from Cyprus to secure Luqa airfield and guard the 
dispersed and vulnerable R.A.F. installations on the Island. In view 
of a reduction in the air transport forces available to the Near East 
Air Force Headquarters, with the consequent difficulty in providing 
the necessary airlift to transport an R.A.F. squadron from Cyprus to 
Malta, the Air Ministry recommended that 'Operation Lear' (for the 
internal security reinforcement of Malta from the UK) be amended. 
Afield squadron from the R.A.F. Regiment Strategic Reserve could 
be sent to Malta from the UK, should the Near East Air Force be 
unable to meet this commitment.27 
In addition to the amended version of this contingency plan to secure 
the evidently all-important Luqa airfield by means of a 'field' 
squadron from the Strategic Reserve sent 'at light scale', and perhaps 
otherwise as well, reference was made to an 'Operation Cartwheel'. 
This concerned internal security in Malta generally, presumably in 
the event of unrest, which the Maltese forces could not cope with. 
There had been some talk of this in more than one venue. In their 
letter to the Ministry of Defence some weeks later, the Foreign Office 
referred to the plan on 'I.S. Reinforcement of Malta' (l.S. in military 
jargon meaning 'internal security') and they wrote thus: 
While we see no reason for asking that the Foreign Office 
should be consulted before operation 'Cartwheel' is put into 
effect, we have enough of an interest in developments in 
Malta to ask that we should be promptly informed. I should 
be grateful, therefore, if at the same time as the Chief of 
Defence Staff authorises the implementation of the plan ... , 
information could be passed to the Foreign Office.28 
27 Watkins/Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1 Mar. 1963, sec., 926/2076. 
28 Arthur/Wright, 8 May 1963, sec., 926/2976. 
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Borg Olivier and his advisers were quite secretive about the more 
potentially controversial goings-on in their negotiations on defence 
matters with the British until the contents of the Defence Agreement 
were finally made public. Indeed, there was no final agreement 
between the two sides until the last minute. There is every reason 
to suppose that Borg Olivier would himself not have known of the 
more secret plans and discussions being held, especially in relation 
to defence, security and strategy. In May the Maltese public got an 
inkling of what was going on from a different source, a press 
conference called by Lord Carrington, the First Sea Lord, at Villa 
Portelli in Kalkara. 
The Royal Navy, Carrington announced, had no intention of setting 
up a base for British polaris submarines in Malta. 29 The fact that 
Malta was now used as a forward operating base did not mean that 
it was no longer strategically important. There were theatres which 
were more important than others; hence the cutting down on 
one particular area to reinforce the other. It did not mean that 
the Mediterranean was less important; it meant, so he said, that 
the Mediterranean was less likely to be a trouble spot than the 
others. Carrington also announced that the frigate H.M.S. 
Troubridge would be going to Malta for an overhaul but he did not 
foresee another ship of that class being sent to Malta for such 
extensive refits. He mentioned that the rundown had been 
extended from four years to five following representations by the 
Prime Minister of Malta, and that the question of handing over 
29 It is not clear why Carrington said this because in so far as the polaris sub-
marine base was concerned it was the Americans, not the British, who had 
been mentioned. It is possible that the British individually or in conjunction with 
NATO might also have considered, and dismissed, that prospect, as the Americans 
certainly did. It is possible that he only made the statement in answer to a 
question from the floor, and it was then highlighted in the press report; but what 
actually had he called the press conference for? It was probably just a public 
relations stunt. 
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lands which were no longer required for defence purposes was 
under discussion. 3o 
Whatever Carrington had told the press in Malta the previous May, 
in February 1964 the Chief of the Defence Staff wrote to the Minister 
of Defence to say that: "it is clear that Malta is becoming much more 
important to our future strategy than we had previously believed." 
The Defence Planning Staff had been instructed to report "as a 
matter of urgency." In a previous minute, Mountbatten had already 
told him that they had set in hand a study "to re-examine the future 
strategic importance of Malta in the light of the new circumstances 
in the Mediterranean," The Colonial Office representative at a 
meeting of the chiefs of staff on 25 th February 1964 was informing 
the Colonial Secretary "of the importance we now attach to ensuring 
our security of tenure in Malta." 
What were these new circumstances? Mountbatten summed them 
up in one paragraph for the Minister's benefit. A new situation had 
developed in Cyprus as a result of which there was "a strong 
possibility of our present facilities on the Island being denied to us 
in the future." If that happened, it would be unlikely "that we would 
be able to obtain new base facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean to 
off-set the loss of facilities in Cyprus." Moreover, although the 
existing Anglo-Libyan Treaty did not expire until 1973, it was feared 
that the death of the elderly King would jeopardise the security of 
tenure of British facilities in Libya. In that case, "we would be denied 
the use of the airfield at EI Adem which is a major link in our air 
staging routes to the Middle and Far East,"31 
30 'First Lord on Island's Strategic Importance', Times of Malta, 4 May 1963, enc. 926/ 
1872/48489. Present at the conference, attended by Maltese and foreign journalists, 
were: Holland-Martin; the Flag Officer, Malta, Rear-Admiral Lord Kelburn; 
together with Sir Clifford Jarret, Secretary of the Admiralty; Rear-Admiral J,O.C 
Hayes, Naval and W. 1. Tupman, Carrington's Principal Private Secretary. 
3l Chief of the Defence Staff7Minister of Defence, 25 Feb. 1964, top sec., annex B to 
min. 4, Part I to COS, 17th meeting/64, £.30, 926/1873/48489. 
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Mter fighting against Italian occupation led mainly by the Senussi 
of Cyrenaica and the subsequent defeat of the Axis in the Second 
World War, and a stint of British military administration, Libya had 
become an independent state in 1951 under Sayed Mohamed Idris 
of Senussi. Idris, the Sunni emir of Cyrenaica and head of the 
Islamic revivalist Senussi order, became King of Libya. The creation 
of a Libyan army as soon as possible was, he told an interviewer in 
1952, "the dearest wish of our heart."32 To create a representative 
body of Libyans out of an untutored, inexperienced, and widely 
scattered people, deprived over the centuries of any first hand 
knowledge of parliamentary or political precepts, was something of 
a tour de force, noted the same interviewer.33 Libya had earned the 
goodwill of Western powers, which helped her to achieve 
independence and provided the substantial economic aid necessary 
for economic reconstruction. While advocating a good neighbour 
policy with all neighbouring Arab states, the King and his leading 
Ministers were agreed that this continued goodwill was absolutely 
essential for the maintenance of Libya's independence and her social 
and economic development. Opposed to this realistic school, there 
were pan-Arab groups who insisted on an aggressive foreign policy. 
Economic assistance extended to Libya by Britain and the U.S.A. was 
given partly as a quid pro quo for rights granted by Libya to these 
powers for military purposes and partly for economic 
development. 34 In the early 1950s, after controlling a palace crisis, 
Libya had signed a 20 year treaty of friendship and alliance with 
Britain under which the latter received military bases in exchange 
for financial and military assistance. Libya then signed an agreement 
with the U.S.A. under which the latter also secured military base 
rights, subject to renewal in 1970, in return for economic aid. The 
32 H. Serrano Villard, Libya: A New Kingdom of North Africa (Cornell Unlv. Press, New 
York, 1956), p. 50. 
33 Ibid., p. 53. 
34 Majid Khadduri, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development Gohn Hopkins 
Univ., Baltimore, 1963), pp. 323, 335. 
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most important of the U.S. installations in Libya was Wheelus Air 
Base, near Tripoli. Reservations set aside in the desert were used by 
British and American military aircraft: based in Europe as practice 
firing ranges. 
Libya'S dependence on foreign aid changed suddenly in June 1959 
when research prospectors from Esso confirmed the location of 
major petroleum deposits at Zaltan in Cyrenaica. Further discoveries 
followed and commercial development was quickly initiated by 
concession holders who returned 50% of their profits to the Libyan 
government in taxes. As development of petroleum resources 
progressed in the early 1960s, Libya launched her first five-year plan 
for 1963-1968.35 
As Khadduri noted in 1963: "The freer the Libyan government 
becomes from foreign powers, the more dependent it will be on 
popular support." When President Nasser adopted the policy of 
Arab unity, calling for the establishment of an empire extending 
from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, the imagination of many 
Libyans was fired and an increasing number of them aspired to join 
such a union. Like many young Arab nationalists to the East, Libyan 
nationalists regarded the regime established under the federal union 
as an artificial structure imposed upon them by foreign powers: the 
only truly national regime would be that in which Libya would be 
part of a larger Arab empire including North Africa and the Middle 
East. The ideology of this school of thought from a different 
generation, to which King Idris had somehow to respond, was 
derived from Egyptian and Syrian pan-Arabism reorganized on a 
socialist basis as "a non-aligned force - in fact, a policy of positive 
neutralism - in foreign affairs." The most outspoken advocates ofthis 
school were the Ba'thist 'Resurrectionist' group who combined Pan-
Arab ideas with socialist reforms and were opposed to any alignment 
35 H. D. Nelson (Ed), Libya, A Country Study (The American Univ., Washington, 1979), 
pp.40-41. 
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with the West. 36 Conscious of these mounting pressures, the Idris 
government began considering foreign base evacuation as early as 
1964.37 
The deteriorating situation in Cyprus by early 1964 was much 
graver and indeed desperate, although in the end British defence 
placements there survived, whereas in Libya they did not. Cyprus 
had become an independent republic on 16th August 1960. The 
provisions of the 1960 independence constitution were meant to 
ensure a unitary bicommunal government, with a Greek Cypriot 
President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, assured 'ethnic' 
representation in terms of percentages in different spheres, and so 
on. There was moreover a tripartite agreement of guarantee 
involving Britain, Greece and Turkey. These provisions broke down 
completely between December 1963 and August 1964, necessitating 
British troops to move out of their sovereign military bases in 
Cyprus to provide a buffer between the warring communities. 
Although the Turks were on the receiving end, atrocities, including 
the killing of children, took place on both sides and there were some 
ghastly inter-ethnic massacres. 
Sandys had to rush out to Nicosia just after the Malta talks in 
December 1963, but the turmoil continued with the real risk of a 
Graeco-Turkish war. On l't January 1964 Archbishop Makarios 
announced that he had unilaterally abrogated the treaties of Alliance 
and Guarantee. On 18th February 1964, just as the chiefs ofstaffand 
36 M. Khadduri, op.cit., pp. 330-331. Idris was the first and last King of Libya: the 
army he created deposed him in a coup d'etat in 1969. According to the colonel who 
led it, Muammar Qathaafi, he and other members of the Free Officers Movement 
began in 1959 to study the Libyan situation within the context of the broader Arab 
situation. Their studies, influenced by Syrian Baathism and especially by Egyptian 
Nasserism, resulted in the decision to overthrow the Libyan monarchy and to install 
a revolutionary regime committed to freedom, socialism and unity. 
37 The issue became more important after the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. British 
forces evacuation day (25 th March) and American forces evacuation day (ll th June) 
became national holidays in Libya. H. D. Nelson, op.cit., p. 202. 
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the British defence ministry were scratching their heads about 
Malta's future in this milieu, British troops were evacuating Cypriot 
Turks from Vitsadha village after repeated Greek attacks. A 
conspicuous protagonist on the Greek Cypriot side in 1964 was the 
fanatic Nicos Sampson, a trained irregular: a decade later it was 'his' 
attempted coup which simply provoked a Turkish invasion. In 
August 1964,Turkish jets intervened to drop napalm on Greek 
villages, destroying a hospital. Events had been boiling up but it was 
mainly the insistence of Makarios to change thirteen points in the 
independence constitution, which was resisted by the Turkish 
Cypriot minority, that led to a passionate eruption of bloody street 
fighting of the worst kind. Sadly, that blew the lid off any pretence 
that Cyprus was a nation or even a unitary or a bicommunal state. 
Equally that put paid to the majority principle, as the Greek-
Cypriots would have seen it. Could stability be restored soon? The 
Republic of Cyprus was a stitched affair: on Christmas Eve 1963 the 
stitches betrayed an open wound which showed no signs of healing. 
In the winter of 1964 Britain's future in Cyprus, after all the EOKA 
fighting before independence, looked more bleak and wobbly than 
ever. 38 
It was with such occurrences on their minds that the chiefs of staff 
were wondering about Malta, Mediterranean security and NATO's 
38 On the 1963-1964 Cyprus crisis, see e.g. the period accounts by British historians, 
H. D. Purcell, Cyprus (Ernest Benn, London, 1969), esp. chap. 7, 'Cyprus since 
Independence', pp. 300-402; Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms (Pall Mall, 
London, 1966), esp. chap. 13-17, pp. 168-219; Cypriot accounts, such as Costas 
Kyrris, History of Cyprus (Nicocles, Nicosia, 1985), esp. pp. 373-405, part of which is 
aptly titled 'Vivere Pericolosamente'; Stavros Panteli, The Making of Modern Cyprus, 
(Interworld, London, 1990), esp. chap. 4, pp. 189-229; Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus: 
The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State (Univ. of Alabama, 1978), which contains 
useful texts as documentary history in the appendices. For a legal-constitutional 
appraisal, see e.g. Thomas Erlich, Cyprus 1958-1967 (OUP, 1974), esp. chap. 3, 'The 
Cypriot Government's decision in 1963 to propose revisions of the Zurich-London 
settlement', and chap. 4, 'The Turkish Government's decision in 1964 to bomb 
Cyprus'. For background see also Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 
1954-1959 (OUP, 1998). 
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southern flank. Malta itself did not appear too secure, hence all the 
contingency plans.39 
The Libyan Government had (so far) shown no intention of 
unilaterally abrogating the Anglo-Libyan Treaty or the Wheelus 
Agreement. Their main concern at that moment was to play for 
time. But they would need to make at least some apparent change 
for "presentational purposes". It was the bases that attracted popular 
criticism. This was directed more at the American base at Wheelus 
near Tripoli, which was very large and obvious, than against the 
R.A.F. airfield at EI Adem. Large-scale training exercises in Libya 
were also beginning to draw criticism. The British had received "an 
indirect message" suggesting that military exercises planned for the 
immediate future might be postponed. The present British garrison 
in Libya was not an issue. Indeed its presence was still welcomed by 
the King and Government. The King had indicated that "it has 
never been as necessary as now." 
Britain had already been committed to reviewing the Treaty, and the 
defence chiefs had no strong feelings as to when that review should 
take place. They need not object if the Libyans now wanted to bring 
it forward. It was clear that the Libyans wanted to discuss with them 
"some revision at least for presentational purposes." In order to 
decide what could be done to meet them, the Foreign Office intended 
soon to prepare a paper, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, 
for circulation to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (usually 
referred to by its acronym DOPC). Since it was the 'base' in Libya that 
was under criticism, the defence chiefs would see what they could do 
"to present this in a new light." At this stage there was no apparent 
threat to their overflying or to staging rights as such. 
Admiral Holland-Martin, who had just relinquished his post as C-
in-C, Mediterranean, said he would prefer to see "greater emphasis 
placed on our need to retain our present position in Malta", which 
39 On British fears of a coup d'fftat in Malta, see above, II, 14. 
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was "the keystone of our military presence in the Mediterranean". 
Britain had already lost much prestige in the area, which the then 
situation in Cyprus was doing nothing to regain. "If in tum we were 
to lose, or withdraw completely from Malta," Holland-Martin 
insisted, "then we should undoubtedly also lose Libya and cease to 
be a Mediterranean power." He doubted whether it would be 
possible to retain their present position in Malta for very long once 
the Island became independent, and 
with this point in mind we should relax the pressure which 
we are now applying for the achievement of early 
independence. Opinion in Malta is hardening against early 
independence. It would be foolish not to take full advantage 
of this trend.4o 
Sir John Frewen, representing the First Sea Lord, emphasised the 
importance of aircraft carriers, which were flexible enough to be re-
deployed from East of Suez. Unless Egypt was itself directly 
threatened, the Suez Canal would remain available for this purpose. 
Sir Charles Elworthy reiterated that Malta would be no substitute for 
Cyprus for many purposes. 
It was felt that the main outcome of the situation in Libya was that 
whilst the King lived, Britain would not lose its over-flying and 
staging rights, and the garrison would still be welcome. There would 
probably be some erosion of Britain's position, particularly of their 
right to conduct large-scale exercises. There was now practically no 
chance of adhering to the original date of 31 st May for Maltese 
independence, they held, and further "it appeared most unlikely 
that it could be achieved in 1964." Recent events had shown the 
questionable value of defence agreements negotiated with colonial 
territories at the time of independence. However, since Malta would, 
after independence, still be financially dependent on the UK, there 
were" grounds for hope" that in this case a defence agreement might 
40 • Pan I to COS.21st Meeting/54', f. 4, enc. Chief of Defence StafilMinister, 25 Feb. 
1964,926/1873/48489. 
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be "a more lasting one." Although it was the present policy of Her 
Majesty's Government to grant independence to Malta as soon as 
negotiations could be satisfactorily completed, they concluded, 
The increased importance of our defence requirements 
there should be taken into account in any policy re-
examination. This point should be brought to the attention 
of the Minister in the covering minute. The more bases we 
gave up, the more important the remainder became, and 
the more our world position and the retention of the 
remainder became eroded.41 
To further strengthen this line of argument, in a subsequent meeting 
in March 1964 the defence chiefs sought to impress upon the British 
government the increased strategic importance of Malta on the 
assumption that Britain would be denied the facilities she still 
enjoyed in both Libya and Cyprus. 
"The situation in the Mediterranean has changed considerably over 
the past year," they began. Malta was due to become independent 
shortly and discussions on a Defence Treaty were taking place. Recent 
events in Cyprus and possible developments in Libya, that could affect 
British rights under the present AnglO-Libyan Treaty, might have "a 
profound effect on our position in the Mediterranean." It was 
therefore necessary to re-appraise the significance of Malta to British 
strategy. If the Cyprus base were no longer available, and facilities in 
Libya were curtailed or lost, Malta could meet British requirements 
to a large extent. In the case of total denial of facilities in Libya, 
however, the defence chiefs assumed that there would no longer be 
a requirement "to intervene in Libya's defence." 
After considering intervention contingencies in Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and elsewhere, without some or all of the facilities of Cyprus 
or Libya or both, they looked again at the use of Malta as a naval 
41 Ibid., f. 5. 
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forward operating base - now seen as a minimum requirement. As 
for using Malta for communications, the loss of Cyprus facilities 
would comprise the primary Army relay station to the Far East and 
an important R.A.F. relay station to ElAdem, Aden and the Far East. 
These could to a limited extent be offset by increased dependence 
on communication facilities in Malta. That would entail providing 
a direct circuit from Malta to El Adem, if possible, and a new circuit 
from either Malta or El Adem to Aden. That would depend on 
Malta's use as a relay station; and the establishment in Malta of 
additional relay facilities between the UK, Bahrein and Aden. It 
might also be necessary to increase the scale of facilities in Malta to 
replace those facilities in Cyprus which were specifically required for 
contingency plans in the area. Related to all this was SIGINT: with 
Cyprus would go an irretrievable loss of intelligence through 
Britain's inability to obtain the then level of SIGINT or carry out 
special reconnaissance flights. SIGINT resources would have to be 
dispersed to other SIGINT sites in the Near and Middle East. Malta 
therefore had considerable potential value as a fallback position, and 
existing facilities there could be expanded to cover some of those 
then undertaken by Cyprus. 
For stockpiles, especially the TUXEDO Stockpile, Malta was seen as 
"the only practicable Mediterranean alternative to Cyprus for the 
location of a stockpile" from which to support Britain's then 
commitment to intervene in Libya, whether on a UK or U.S.-U.K. 
basis, as well as for U.S.-U.K. plans for an intervention in the 
Lebanon and in Jordan. Cyprus holdings of reserves were based on 
the use of up to a brigade group, with certain supporting and 
administrative units, for intervention operations. Some surpluses 
and additional stores held were special to Cyprus projects, internal 
security or training requirements. The TUXEDO stockpile, which 
was being re-organized and updated, could be smaller than that 
planned for Cyprus mainly because aircraft could carry more on the 
U.K.-Malta journey than on the U.K.-Cyprus journey. A Malta 
stockpile would still have to contain some 1,500 vehicles, 1,000 or 
more tons of ammunition, some 500 tons of supplies, and 4,000 tons 
of stores. Without Cyprus, the projected Malta stockpile would be 
indispensable to British intervention in Libya, reinforcing the 
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existing garrison by infantry, tanks and supporrting air forces. For 
interventions in Lebanon and in Jordan, the stockpile in Malta 
would take longer to move but could still be used. It would take 
some two years to build up a stockpile in Malta, by which time the 
Libyan commitment might have changed. 
On the strength of these projections, the defence chiefs concluded 
that: "Malta could again become the focus of British military 
influence in the Mediterranean." Attention had already been drawn 
to the importance of preventing the Soviets from establishing bases 
in Malta: "If we left Cyprus and in due course Communist influence 
was established there, the importance of denying Malta to the Soviets 
would be greatly increased." 
Although Malta was too far to the West to be considered as an 
alternative to Cyprus for an air base from which to provide nuclear 
support for CENTO; to ensure, until the TSR2 was in service, the 
necessary favourable air situation for national intervention 
operations to the East; or for use, even when the TSR2 was in 
service, as an air base in support of operations in Kuwait; 
nevertheless Malta could provide an important air base if Britain 
wished to support an American intervention operation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean or to mount a national intervention 
operation into Western Libya. Malta's importance as a staging post 
for long range aircraft would be increased if Libya staging rights 
were lost. Although Malta would no longer be required as a base for 
intervention operations in Libya if Libya abrogated the 1953 Treaty 
with Britain, she would still be needed for U.S.-U.K. intervention 
operations and as an air staging post. To the extent that Malta 
would provide support for an increased naval presence in the 
Mediterranean, that could in some degree compensate for the loss 
of Cyprus airfields; just as she could offset to a limited extent the 
loss of important communications and SIGINT facilities. Malta 
would be "the only practicable alteruative for a stockpile in the 
Mediterranean and would thus become the main base for the 
mounting of operations in the Mediterranean." While for many 
purposes Malta would be no substitute for Cyprus, if British facilities 
in Cyprus were denied, Malta would be likely to become "the focus 
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of British military influence in the Mediterranean", thereby 
increasing the importance of British defence requirements 
there. 42 
The British defence appraisal of Malta's strategic importance by 
mid-1964 was thus markedly different to what it had been just two 
years earlier. Before a definite date had been set for Malta's 
independence, the Ministry of Defence had viewed Malta as vitally 
important primarily as an airfield and communications centre. The 
Navy's requirements for forward operations facilities were not 
irreplaceable. The Army only needed to keep a garrison there for 
internal security purposes. To the Air Force, at least one British-
controlled airfield in the Mediterranean was essential in order to 
provide staging between Britain and the Middle East for both 
strategic transport aircraft and V-bombers. The service wireless 
stations were essential to the Navy and, as an alternative to Cyprus, 
to the Amry and Air Force. By January 1963, however, we already 
find the Ministry of Defence taking a slightly graver view of the 
possibility of Britain losing her defence facilities in Malta. They 
repeated Malta's importance for British air reinforcement, at least 
until the 1970s, as well as the cost and loss of efficiency in re-siting 
wireless communications elsewhere. They also emphasisied the 
importance of denying Malta strategically to the Communists and 
that if Cyprus were not available the loss of special wireless facilities 
would be very serious indeed. By March 1964, British defence 
perceptions and assessments of Malta's importance had changed 
further, as may be seen from the above detailed projections in the 
light of developments in both Cyprus and Libya. Malta was now seen 
as quite possibly, once again, "the focus of British military influence 
in the Mediterranean".43 
42 Ibid., fr. 5-8. 
43 See the top secret note for the Minister of State at the Colonial Office by A. P. 
Cumming-Bruce from the Defence and Intelligence Department, 12 June 1964, on 
the changing notions of Malta's strategic importance, 926/1873/48489. 
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Had that been the situation in the summer of 1962, it is not at all sure 
that Britain would have moved as willingly to consider Malta's 
demand for Independence, or been as stingy. It is almost certain that 
she would not, or at least not without staking an indispensable claim, 
as a sine qua non, for a sovereign military base area, as in Cyprus, or 
alternatively being more generous in the financial aid negotiations. 
Even now - still in time before any fait accompli - there was a 
resurgence of doubt as to the advisability of such a course of events, 
given changed British needs in the context of Mediterranean 
security. Two years may seem like a short time but as observed in 
the introductory remarks, in terms of historical' duration', these 
were very long years; rudimentary transformations were under way. 
Only a few years earlier, such a thorough metamorphosis for a place 
like Malta would have been inconceivable. Much water had passed 
under the bridge since the first half of 1962. To apply the brakes, 
or to change from top to reverse gear at this stage, was 
problematical, unless ... a justifiable pretext could be found for it. In 
the absence of a good excuse for somehow legitimizing such a 
round-about-turn, other precautions might have to be taken. So far, 
that is, as it was at all possible to insure or ensure anything once a 
British colony would have become an independent state - crossing 
the Rubicon and riding into the sunset. The question is: did such a 
pretext exist in the first months of 1964? Could such a justification 
for slowing down, or turning tail, be made out? 
There was still the possibility of a disagreement serious enough to 
cause Borg Olivier's resignation, a threat he had made more than 
once, perhaps employing it as a bargaining ploy rather than fully 
meaning it. That reaction would have come as a boon to the sceptics 
and obstructors because in that eventuality - perhaps unknown to 
Borg Olivier by March 1964 plans were afoot to have Malta revert 
back immediately to gubernatorial rule as in 1958, if necessary. In 
this context the main difference of opinion in London concerned 
the role, if any, that could still be assigned to Wakefield, because in 
a crown colony it was the governor alone who spoke for the Crown, 
not any 'commissioner', or he jointly with another UK 
representative. It also became clear, at this point, that some tension 
was building up between Wakefield and Dorman as these jockeyed 
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for position and status in Malta, with Wakefield trying to side-step 
Dorman, while the latter played his cards dose to his chest. "If Dr 
Borg Olivier and his ministers were to resign and if, out of dudgeon, 
they declined to remain in office pending a General Election," 
Wakefield alerted London, "swift action would be needed." As the 
Malta (Constitution) (Temporary Provisions) Order in Council for 
the governor to have the necessary powers to carryon the 
administration, would have to be brought into operation in two 
stages, first by Her Majesty and subsequently by proclamation in the 
Malta Government Gazette, it was suggested that, unless that had 
already been done, such an Order should be "made now and remain 
dormant." That would eliminate delay "at a time when it might be 
necessary for the Governor to act swiftly in appointing his Executive 
Council and, in the worst contingency, proclaiming an Emergency 
and making the Regulations connected therewith."44 In fact, with 
the help of legal advisers such as Basil Smith, preliminary and 
precautionary steps had already been taken. 45 
A draft Order in Council was prepared. The Maltese officials who 
would be appointed by the Governor to run the new colonial 
administration of Malta were earmarked, and their names 
communicated to London. Although there was some disagreement 
on this point, Dorman thought that Maltese civil servants could be 
relied upon to continue doing their work. If the senior official in each 
department were made a member of the executive council, "they 
would find no difficulty in accepting the appointments."46 Recourse 
would be had to these Maltese civil service 'heads' to report to the 
British governor and to serve him as required by are-deployed 
colonialist system. The administration would thus be entrusted to two 
44 Wakefield/Kisch, 29 Feb. 1964, sec., 926/1875. 
45 KischlWakefield, 9 Sept. 1963, sec., 926/1875, enc. rev. draft of Order-in-Council. 
Ragonesi recalls that in 1963 Sandys had asked him "if they could not delay 
Independence by two years, there were so many problems". Ragonesi/Frendo. 
interviews, 1989, 1999. 
46 Wakefield/Eastwood, 14 Mar. 1964, sec., 926/1875. 
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officials appointed from what was then the Prime Minister's Office, the 
Hon. Edgar Cuschieri, C.B.E., and the Hon.Alfred Salomone, C.B.E. 
The highly-qualified attorney-general Prof. John J. Cremona would 
be appointed to the Ministry ofJ ustice, together with six other officials. 
The other would-be members of Malta's executive power who were 
earmarked, each representing their respective departments or 
'ministries' were these: Joseph M. Rossignaud (Labour, Emigration 
and Social Welfare); Major Victor J. Castillo (Agriculture and 
Fisheries); Salvino J. Mangion, O.B.E., an architect and civil engineer 
(Public Works); Chev.Joseph P. Vassallo, O.B.E. (Education); Salvino 
Mizzi (Industry); and Prof. Carmel Coleiro, a medical doctor 
(Health).47 What this meant too was that Dorman was against the 
principle of "sending out officers from this country (Britain) as was 
done in 1959 ... "48 
In the absence of Maltese Cabinet Government, Wakefield thought 
it "essential" that the UK Commissioner's Office should remain in 
being. He was ill at ease with the draft Order-in-Council because it 
removed from the UK Commissioner "any legal status". 
Constitutionally it was difficult to justify the continuance of the UK 
Commissioner; certainly he could not retain the functions given to 
him by the present Constitution ... 49 The C.O. staff were concerned 
that from the political and administrative point of view the propspect 
of two representatives each with access to the Secretary of State could 
lead to friction locally, and embarrassment to him (the Secrretary of 
State). Sir Edward Wakefield's reasons did not appear to be 
compelling ones. There was concern too "that the views of the 
Governor on a matter of such importance have only been conveyed 
47 The list of administrators supposedly waiting in the wings to run the government 
as necessary once Borg Olivier and his Cabinet would have resigned - was enclosed 
with Wakefield's despatch, and given in the 'hierarchical' order of priority indicated: 
Cuschieri, Salomone, Cremona, Rossignaud, Castillo, Mangion, Vassallo, Mizzi and 
Coleiro. Ene, ibid. 
48 Min., Kisch/Eastwood, 9 Mar.1964, 926/1875. 
49 Wakefield/Eastwood, 14 Mar. 1964, sec., para. 3. 
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to us in such a cursory fashion and at second-hand through the U.K. 
Commissioner." It was suggested that it might be "a wise 
precaution" when communicating with Sir Maurice Dorman to write 
'Secret & Personal' to the Governor "for his eyes only ... " The legal 
adviser A. R. Rushford was particularly dismissive of Wakefield's 
suggestion that the office of a UK Commissioner be retained once 
Malta would no longer be a self-governing colony: 
In my view it would be quite inappropriate to retain any 
references to the U.K. Commissioner in the draft Order, 
since he would have no functions to perform. Any views 
H.M.G. might have would be communicated direct to the 
Governor, whose duty it would be of course to direct himself 
to H.M.G.'s interest. It is unusual enough to have a U.K. 
Commissioner in a colony with internal self-government - to 
have one in a colony that was under 'Crown Colony 
Government' would be absurd.50 
50 Min.,A.R.R., 24 Mar. 1964; but see the various exchanges on this 'Dormant Order' 
and its consequences between Kisch, Martin, Eastwood, Crawley, Rushford, Fairclough 
and others during the month of March 1964, but these discussions go back to 1963 on 
926/1875. Thus, for example, in Crawley to Fairclough, 26Aug. 1963: "It is conceivable 
that there might be a breakdown in Government between now and independence 
although unlikely ... we would presumably need to act speedily ... " Again, in Fairclough 
to Cruchley and Kisch, 3Apr. 1963: "The situation which was earlier envisaged, i.e. that 
the Constitution might never 'get off the ground' is clearly different from any situation 
in which now, more than a year after the introduction of the Constitution, we might be 
compelled to bring the dormant Order in Council into effect and resume direct rule. 
We would only do so with a situation of pretty desperate crisis when no conceivable 
alternative was in view. In these circumstances we should be bound to plan for a fairly 
lengthy period of direct rule in which case, as Mr Crawley says, there would be no 
functions for the U.K. Commissioner or his staff to perform. I am accordingly inclined 
to disagree with Sir E. Wakefield and if you agree I will draft accordingly." It was 
originally envisaged that if the Constitution never got off the ground, or was 
prematurely suspended, that the U.K. Commissioner's staff would provide "the 
superstructure for the new Administration, i.e. Mr Watt as Chief Secretary, Mr Hobden 
and Mr Smith taking on the administrative and legal functions ... If this were still the 
intention and the U.K. Commissioner'S post were kept in being he would be without 
senior staff ... " Min., Crawley/Fairclough, 13 Mar. 1963, ibid. 
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More important for Malta was the assumption that, if Borg Olivier 
resigned, Malta in 1964 would immediately revert to crown colony 
rule, at least until such time as a general election could be held. What 
seemed to be at stake here was more than a temporary hiccup between 
one election and another, possibly on the assumption that there would 
be a 'repeat' of April 1958, or worse. Given the most peculiar 'snakes-
and-ladders' colonial constitutional history of this Southern European 
fortress colony - her representative government granted in 1887 
withdrawn in 1903, her internal-self-government granted in 1921 and 
again in 1932 suspended or withdrawn in 1930, in 1933 and again in 
1958 - one more reversal in 1964 would have been singularly 
unoriginal. In an elaborate secret minute addressed to both Sandys 
and Lansdowne in mid-March, Sir John Martin stated as follows: 
It is on the cards that Dr Borg Olivier might throw his hand 
in and that no other government could be formed to carry 
on till a general election. In that event it would be necessary 
to give the Governor powers to conduct the administration 
himself ... 
The Order would suspend the operation of certain parts of the Con-
stitution ... Executive and legislative power would then rest with the 
Governor. He would have an Executive Council of not less than five 
members (they were asking him whom he would appoint) and he would 
have to consult them but he would not have to follow their advice ... 
If Dr Borg Olivier resigns within the course of the next few 
days and refuses to carryon pending the appointment of a 
successor (irresponsible though this would be and 
inconsistent with the claim that Malta is qualified for 
independence), we will have to seek approval for the 
passage of the Order as a matter of urgency. If, while not 
immediately resigning, he indicates that he is likely to do so 
in the near future, we may have to arrange for the Order 
to be passed as a "Dormant Order", so that it can be brought 
into effect immediately if required. 51 
51 Min., 1. M. Martin, 13 Mar. 1964, entitled 'Malta', sec., 926/1875. 
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The Minister of State saw Martin's minute, putting down his initial 
with a date but without any comment. Mr Sandys, on the other 
hand, wondered whether they wanted to proceed with this, "in view 
of the agreement reached with Dr B.O. on the next step."52 
Apart from the resignation card scenario, there was another possible 
and still more crucial turning-point which the doubters and the 
stoppers could tag on to; and didn't they try. That was the 
independence referendum, due to be held in early May 1964. If an 
inconclusive result could be somehow assured, that would justify 
giving pause to the rush into Independence for Malta, delaying it 
or postponing it outright. The Maltese people themselves would 
thus have democratically opted for a British change in policy by 
showing how unsure they really were of Independence, or 
hopelessly divided about it anyway. Nor is the real possibility of this 
behind-the-scenes alternative course for Malta one to be taken 
lightly and leisurely. The 'sceptics' - Maltese nationalists might have 
said the 'spoilers', had they known about it - were not just the heads 
of services, the chiefs of staff, the commanders-in-chief or their big 
chief Mountbatten, who knew Malta (and Mintoff) well enough. 
The Minister of Defence, Mr Peter Thorneycroft, had become 
convinced that his defence chiefs were absolutely right. He, in turn, 
convinced his Prime Minister, that this was indeed so. The Malta 
independence project had better be stopped. Other influential 
personalities who had Douglas-Horne's ear might well have 
contributed their share as well. The Minister of Defence and the 
Prime Minister of Great Britain made a formidable tandem, backed 
as they were by the defence forces. For Britain to go ahead with 
granting Malta independence was just not on - when Cyprus was 
blowing itself apart in a bellicose Aegean, Libya sliding proudly into 
the oil-rich sand, and Mintoff allegedly planning a 'Nasserite' coup. 
But what could now be done to rectify matters? 
52 Min., Lansdowne, 13 Mar.; Min., Sandys, 14 Mar. 1964, ibid. See above, I. 8. 
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There was yet another consideration. NATO in general, and Italy in 
particular, were worried about Europe's southern flank. They were 
especially keen to know what was going on in Malta, when would 
Independence be given and how. Holland-Martin's successor as 
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was Admiral Sir John 
Hamilton. In a secret, personal and "for U.K.eyes only" report written 
at sea on board H.M.S. Surprise and addressed in hand to Mountbatten, 
Hamilton in March 1964 reported about important calls he had just 
made in Naples and in Rome. The C-in-C had met Italy's top brass 
including, among others, Mr Andreotti, the Minister of Defence; 
General Rossi, Chief of the Defence Staff; Admiral Giuriati, Chief of 
Staff, Italian Navy; GeneralAloja, ChiefofStaff, ItalianArmy; General 
Remondino, Chief of Staff, Italian Air Force; and Admiral Pugliese 
from COMEDCENT together with his senior Staff Officers. 
After complimenting the Italians for the utmost friendship and 
goodwill shown to him, which made him feel the respect with which 
they still regarded the Royal Navy - "surely a nice tribute to Deric 
Holland-Martin" - he quickly came to the point. He was ':so struck" 
with the general theme of every conversation which took place on 
each of his calls, that he felt he should let the Admiral of the Fleet 
know about it: 
It was very clear to me that all the senior Italian Service 
officers are anxious about their and N .A.T.O.'s southern 
flank. They see in the unsettled conditions along the whole 
North African coast a potential source of trouble and of 
possible enemy exploitation in the future. They see us facing 
the distinct possibility of losing our position in Cyprus and 
Libya. Inevitably they want to know and did not hesitate 
to ask - "What will happen in Malta?" 
Hamilton told them that he could not predict the outcome of a 
political issue but was very ready to agree with them on the military 
importance of Malta. He was "most struck" with the importance 
which they attached to this: 
It was clear to me that, for lack of the customary strong British 
Naval presence in the Mediterranean, they feel their southern flank 
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NATO'S flag at HAFMED flies over 
the Grand Harbour. Other British 
companies were Redifussion, and 
Cable and Wireless. 
to be insecure and, in the context of the growing uncertainties in 
North Africa, they do not like it. 
Hamilton sensed the same attitude, though not so strongly 
expressed, in his discussions with Admiral Russell, CINCSOUTH, 
and Rear Admiral Masterton, DEPCOMSTRIKEFORSOUTH, at 
Naples. They both wanted to know what was to happen in Malta. 
Their interest was much more than curiosity: 
In their case, however, I got the feeling, though they never 
put it into words, that their main concern was to ensure, for 
obvious military reasons, that the island never got into 
unfriendly hands. I sensed a kind of polite impatience with 
us for being so weak disappointment, perhaps, would be 
a better word. 
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Knowing how hardstretched Britain was elsewhere, Hamilton was 
obviously not in a position to reassure "any of these good friends of 
ours" about our military position in the Mediterranean, though he 
would very much have liked to have done do. He copied his letter 
to the First Sea Lord and to the British ambassador in Rome.53 On 
receiving it, Mountbatten shared its contents with the Minister of 
Defence as well as circulated it to the Chiefs of Staff. The Minister 
of Defence forwarded it to Downing Street for the Prime Minister's 
information. 54 
The Foreign Office was also interesting itself keenly in the Malta 
question. They wanted to know how changes in Libya and Cyprus 
could impact on Malta. It was partly in response to this that the 
chiefs of staff asked the Defence Planning Staff to prepare a more 
specific paper for a meeting on 24th March 1964.55 On that day, the 
whole matter was raised and discussed in the British Cabinet. There 
was general agreement with these views, hypothetical though they 
were. Cabinet concluded that there was increasing evidence that the 
Egyptian Government was intensifying its pressure 
to compel us to evacuate our bases in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East; and, if they succeeded in securing our 
eviction from the Libyan base ofEIAdem, our position would 
be seriously weakened ... Meanwhile we should avoid any 
action which might endanger our strategic facilities in Malta. 
In these circumstances they decided not to acquiesce in any unilateral 
denunciation of the Treaty by the Libyan Government, nor agree to 
take part in negotiations directed to its termination. Britain would 
confine herself to implementing their earlier undertaking to review 
the Treaty, since on that basis they could, if necessary, withdraw from 
53 Hamilton/Mountbatten, 16 Mar. 1964,926/1873/48489. 
54 Hockadat/Wright, 1 Apr. 1964, sec., 926/1873/48489. 
55 Extract, Pt. I, COS 24th Mtg/64, Item 5, enc. 926!l873/48489. 
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Libya without prejudicing their legal entitlement to continue to 
overfly Libyan territory and, possibly, even to use the facilities at EI 
Adem.56 The way in which this Cabinet decision was minuted implies 
that by March 1964 Anglo-Libyan relations were already rather more 
strained than was being publicly admitted. The implication in fact is 
that Libya wanted not only to restrict but possibly to abrogate the 1953 
Anglo-LibyanTreaty altogether, nearly a decade before it was due to 
expire. While the conservative King Idris and his entourage would 
have used some restraint in their diplomatic dealings, the writing was 
clearly on the walL 
In April 1964 the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, wrote 
formally to the Prime Minister asking that the issue of Malta's 
independence be "shelved". He hoped that plans for Malta to 
become independent on 31 st May would be "frustrated". 
Thorneycroft, who had left the army where he was an artillery 
officer to become a barrister before he entered parliament, had been 
Minister of Aviation before becoming Minister of Defence in 1962 
and Secretary of State for Defence in 1964. In his two page letter, 
Thorneycroft pointed to the forthcoming Malta referendum as a 
possible deus ex machina: 
I understand that on present plans Malta would achieve her 
independence on 31't May. It is my hope that these plans 
will be frustrated. The outcome of the referendum on the 
Independence Constitution which is to be held early next 
month may demonstrate that a postponement is desirable 
for political reasons but we cannot be sure of this. 
Not trusting to such chance, the Minister made the military and 
security argument as strongly and as succinctly as he could: because 
of developments in Cyprus and Libya Malta's importance as a 
staging post for long-range aircraft would be enhanced and forward 
operating facilities for the Royal Navy would assume greater 
56 Extract, Cabinet Meeting CM (64) 20,h, 24 Mar. 1964, enc. 926/1873/48489. 
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importance; she would be the only practicable alternative for a 
stockpile in the Mediterranean and would thus become the main UK 
base for the mounting of operations in the Mediterranean whether 
these were purely national ones or in support of an American 
intervention. Officials, he noted, had made considerable progress 
with the negotiation of a defence agreement with Malta. This was 
satisfactory so far as it went but it could at best provide" only a limited 
guarantee of our continued presence in Malta after independence." 
It seemed probable that 
we could count on the continued co-operation of the 
Nationalist Party should they remain in power. There is a 
distinct possibility that the Malta Labour Party would 
abrogate the agreement ifthey were to secure office after 
independence. 
He believed therefore that they should consider carefully in the 
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee whether there were not 
strong grounds for "delaying the grant of independence to Malta", 
or, it that was not possible, whether there were "any measures open 
to us which would improve our chances of retaining the island as a 
base." He concluded thus: 
On the assumption that we can shelve the issue of 
independence, we must, I believe, be reasonably generous 
with our assistance to the island and show ourselves 
reasonably willing to make use of its military resources in 
order to re-establish a better relationship there for our 
defence requirements.57 
Sir Alec readily obliged. In a type-written minute in reply from 
Downing Street only three days later, he agreed. "I hope the 
referendum will be completely indecisive", the Prime Minister wrote 
back, adding: "but if not, we will have to try and delay independence 
57 ThorneycroftiDouglas-Home, 17 Apr. 1964, sec., 926/1872/48489. Thorneycroft 
sent copies of his "minute", as he caned it, to the members of the D.O.P.C. and to 
Sir Burke Trend. 
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10, DOWNINO STREET. 
WHITEHALL. 
Aprl1 , W. '19&4. 
COpy OF MINUTE BY THE PlUMB MINISTER. 
Douglas-Home agreed with his Defence Minister, pinning his hopes on a 
"completely indecisive" referendum result; otherwise they would have to 
try and delay Independence "again". 
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again." Douglas-Home copied his minute to the Foreign Secretary, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the 
Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Burke Trend (who was Secretary 
to Cabinet).58 
Duncan Sandys saw both Thorneycroft's and Douglas-Horne's 
minutes. But, very significantly, he made no comment. "He has 
made no comment", a senior assistant commented in his own right. 
Meanwhile, the Cabinet Office were expressing interest in the 
possibility of a discussion on these issues in the Defence and Oversea 
Policy Committee. Mr M.M. Minogue, a Sandys aide, told Sir Burke 
Trend's private secretary that there was probably little point in a 
Ministerial discussion before the referendum which was being held 
from the 2nd to the 4th May; "and we were not yet in a position to 
express views on the delaying of independence." Should it be 
thought desirable to discuss this in D.O.P.C. "before the 
referendum", a possible date could be 29th April if the colonial 
secretary agreed. In Mr Minogue's words to Sir John Martin, 
however: "As the Secretary of State has not commented on this 
correspondence I propose, if you agree, not to pursue the matter 
further unless there is a positive approach by the Cabinet Office."59 
Martin did not think there would be any advantage in expediting 
discussion of the position in the D.O.P.C., but felt some discussion 
(before the referendum) could be useful so that Sandys would have 
the background of his colleagues' views when considering its results. 
He added: 
It is pretty clear that H.M.G. will not have much difficulty 
in declaring that the vote in the referendum has not given 
sufficiently clear support for proceeding with independence 
now.60 
58 Min., Douglas-Home!Thorneycroft, 20 Apr. 1964, sec., 926/1872/48489. 
59 Min., Minogue/Martin, 21 Apr. 1964,926/1872/48489. 
60 Min., Martin/Fairclough, 22 Apr. 1964,926/1872/48489. 
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Cabinet Office however decided to defer any further consideration 
until after the referendum.61 
While Dr Borg Olivier was being criticised for asking electors about 
the Constitution not about Independence, it was in fact Malta's 
Independence, rather than her Constitution, which was hanging in 
the balance, in that all-important referendum vote. And Borg Olivier 
must surely have sensed it. This turn of events further underlines 
what could have been behind that fateful meeting between Sir 
Edward Wakefield and Archbishop Michael Gonzi - when, after the 
former had explained to him the implications of an inconclusive 
referendum result, the latter had given him a guarantee that he 
would definitely not be advising the faithful to vote 'yes'. Wakefield 
had promptly and triumphantly cabled London about it.62 Might 
that not have been a Phyrric victory?63 
Another question that now suggests itself is whether Borg Olivier felt 
or knew that in certain corridors of power a momentum against 
Independence was building up, not so much in Malta as in Britain. 
By the time that he decided to hold the referendum, it was clear that 
Britain was facing difficulties in Cyprus and Libya; it did not take a 
wizard to guess that Malta's military importance could be seen to 
61 Min., Kisch/Martin, 22 Apr. 1964; Martin/Eastwood, 29 Apr. 1964; Eastwood/ 
Kisch, 5 May 1964; 926/1872/48489. The meeting of 29th April did not in fact discuss 
Malta at all. 
62 On the Wakefield-Conzi meeting and the referendum campaign, see above, I, 9. 
63 The logical sequence need not necessarily have been one of post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc, i.e.: no advice to vote "yes" so that the result would be inconclusive, as desired. 
There were other variables, as already discussed above; but the Wakefield posture 
may now be seen in the light of the positions being taken by the likes of Holland-
Martin, Mountbatten, Thorneycroft and Douglas-Home. It is not unlikely that Conzi 
would have known of such undercurrents as well and he was no great fan either 
of independence or of Borg Olivier; but he had other considerations, ecclesiastical 
and political, which would have swayed him not to be obtrusive on this occasion. See 
above, I, 9. 
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grow. Although neither would have known then what exactly was 
going on behind closed doors, Mintoff mentioned setbacks for Britain 
in Mediterranean politics publicly; he paraded these as bargaining 
chips. Others saw such developments as approaching dark clouds, 
more danger looming ahead for an independent Malta in the 
neighbourhood much closer to home now than Ghana or Cuba, 
British Guiana or Zanzibar. Had there been a straight 'yes' or 'no' 
question on Independence, with the MLP and the 'church' parties in 
a strategic anti-Nationalist alliance, they would have played into the 
hands of those who were increasingly reluctant to let go of Malta, those 
who were waiting and wishing for a demonstrably inconclusive result. 
Malta would not have become independent in 1964. 
Admiral Holland-Martin for one believed and argued that the 
Maltese anti-independence lobby was hardening. Unknown to him, 
that was probably a combination of three factors: wishful thinking; 
undue reliance on The Times of Malta; and the clever political twist in 
Borg Olivier's referendum question, made to measure up to Malta's 
agitated multi-party context. As it happened, the MLP voted "no" to 
the Constitution, not to Independence. A direct vote on 
"independence now or not", as suggested by the 'church' parties, and 
at one point by Sandys, could well have had Borg Olivier hoist by his 
own petard. That was a suicidal urge Borg Olivier did not have. 
As late as the last week of May 1964, the premise that independence 
for Malta could, or would, be delayed, or postponed, recurs. "The 
3pt May is no longer a feasible target date", minuted Jenkins to 
Cummings-Bruce on 19th May. 'The choice now is between granting 
independence as soon as the necessary steps ... can be completed 
probably not before July or deferring independence indefinitely." 
The necessary steps referred to were local endorsement of any 
changes on which the British government might insist in the 
Constitution, the passing by parliament of an Independence Bill, etc. 
His understanding was that 
both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence now 
accept that it would not be politic to withdraw the offer of 
independence and that, provided the Malta Government 
550 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
This Jenkins/Cumming-Bruce minute of 19 th May 1964, after the 
referendum, still wondered if the offer ofIndependence might be deferred 
indefinitely or withdrawn, but the Defence Oversea Policy Committee had 
decided otherwise just a few days earlier, at their high level meeting of 14th 
May. Prodded by Sandys, among others, Douglas-Home and Thorneycroft 
had come round to the view that Independence could be given to Malta 
provided that there would be a Defence Agreement tied to a Financial 
Agreement by way of a surety - and provided further that nuclear weapons 
would not be barred, however secretive their use. See below, III, 16. 
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agree to certain changes in their draft Constitution and 
satisfactory arrangements can be made to safeguard our 
defence interests after independence, this should be 
granted. Greater military use of Malta is something we 
should like to see whether or not independence comes soon, 
and would be an important factor in reaching satisfactory 
arrangements with the Government of a newly independent 
Malta.64 
In another exchange at this time, in preparation for a meeting of 
the Chiefs of Staff on the following day, three paragraphs were re-
drafted "to make the study apply to the future without regard to 
whether independence is delayed - the earlier version only 
considered an increase in military presence as a sweetener if 
independence were denied to Malta for an indefinite time to suit our 
defence requirements."65 
This line of reasoning was overtaken by a decision reached during 
a meeting of the top level Defence and Oversea Policy Committee 
held on 14th May 1964, during which Douglas-Home and 
Thorneycroft rather came round to the view advocated by Sandys 
that at this juncture it would be impolitic to withdraw the offer of 
Independence but that, in the circumstances, British defence 
interests should be as well secured as possible.66 
However, on 26th May, Moutbatten was still addressing his Chiefs of 
Staff on "the extent to which greater use could be made of the 
defence facilities in Malta should independence be delayed." 
However, he continued by saying that the Defence and Oversea 
64 Min., Jenkins/Cumming Bruce, 19 May 1964,926/1873/48489. At least two 
substantive documents in this discussion, probably relating to defence considerations 
or negotiations, are indicated as 'Destroyed'. 
65 Min., Cumming Bruce/Higham, Kisch, 25 May 1964, 92611873/48489. 
66 See the margin minute by Kisch on (b) in Jenkins/Cumming Bruce, 19 May 1964, 
ibid. This was confirmed by Cabinet. See below, III, 16. 
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Policy Committee had also recently considered Malta and had 
agreed that further consideration should be given to the possibility 
oflinking a future defence agreement with financial aid to Malta. At 
this D.O.P.C. meeting, Mountbatten had stated that, in his opinion, 
Dr Borg Olivier could only remain in power with the 
support of the Church, and it was inevitable that Mr Mintoff 
would eventually come to power. Mintoff was likely to 
abrogate any defence agreement which had been negotiated 
by H. M. Government with Dr Borg Olivier. 
The discussion continued on familiar lines, with the retention and 
upgrading of Hal Far airfield in support of Luqa now being 
considered to replace the airfields of EI Adem in Libya and/or of 
Akrotiri in Cyprus if and when Britain lost them. Hal Far could also 
serve as a training airfield to replace the facilities then used at Idris 
airfield which, it had been agreed, could be given up as part of the 
forthcoming negotiations with the Libyans. Sir Richard Hull foresaw 
a further possible increase in Malta as being not just that of an 
infantry battalion but an armoured reconnai~sance regiment: he 
objected to the words "one infantry battalion" as too restrictive. It 
would be practicable for a number of contingencies to have a unit 
in Malta as the Strategic Reserve spearhead unit. The garrison of 
Malta had been reduced by one major unit, it had subsequently risen 
again to two major units and there was now the possibility of a third 
major unit being stationed in the island. 
For the Colonial Office, Mr A. P. Cumming-Bruce said that he had 
"heard" that there was a possibility that the Maltese Defence 
Agreement might not be linked to financial assistance for the island. 
Both Dr Borg Olivier and the Treasury were opposed to the linkage. 
Whatever the exact terms of the Defence Agreement being worked 
out would be finally, there can be no doubt at all that by now Britain 
was truly anxious lest Malta would be lost. This state of mind was 
expressed brazenly enough by Sir David Luce who, partly echoing 
Mountbatten, wanted a new paragraph inserted into the report by 
the Chiefs of Staff to the Minister of Defence. In fact, his suggestion 
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featured as one of the main recommendations of the meeting. This 
new paragraph would draw attention to the fact that 
Mintoff, if he came to power, was likely to abrogate any 
defence agreement between the present Maltese 
Government and Her Majesty's Government and that there 
was, therefore, a risk to our whole defence position unless 
by some means we could ensure that Mintoff could neither 
seize power, nor, if elected constitutionally, abrogate any 
defence agreement. 
Such a view was pretty ominous. What it presumed and desired, 
really, was that Malta should not be granted independence at all. Not, 
at least, so long as the likes of Mint off were lurking around. In military 
circles, the terminology "by some means" was a loaded one. Would a 
secret agent be detailed to do ajob on Mintoff? Love him or hate him, 
untill 964 not a single Maltese politician had exercised Mintoff's voter 
pull over so long a span, since the introduction of universal suffrage 
in Malta in 1 947. What Luce was saying in fact was more directed at 
preventing Mintoff from seIzmg power, presumably 
unconstitutionally, although that he did not dwell on. If so, he was 
simply reaffirming the need for vigilance and preparedness to 
prevent a coup d'etat, which was being well taken care of already. While 
seeking to deter a coup by the Mintoff diehards, were other elements 
bent on a pre-emptive strike of their own? As has already been argued, 
an attempted coup before independence and a successful coup after 
it, were quite different phenomena. Luce's next presumption, which 
probably expressed what many others in his train and station then 
felt, was also open to question. How would Britain prevent a 
constitutionally elected government, be it led by Mintoff or someone 
else, from abrogating an agreement if such a government thought it 
fit to do so? There were ways of doing that, for example by Britain 
retaining sovereign rights over her Malta base, thereby being entitled 
to wage war against all comers in the defence of it even an Anglo-
Maltese War! That was military not civilian thinking - Malta knew a 
thing or two about it. Furthermore, would a Maltese government 
accept such a sovereign base area, in return for 'independence' in the 
rest of the Island? 
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0vinion, Dr Borg OliVier could only remain in power with the 
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Notes: 
could ensure that Nintotf could nei thor B~iZ€l power, 
elected constitutionally, abrogElte any defence agre~ment. 
1. Do/M(64),3. 
2. 00(64) 23rd Meoting. Ite:n 3. 
Security in Malta and the Mediterranean, especially if Mintoff were to be 
returned to power, continued to preoccupy the Defence Chiefs of Staff, 
including Mountbatten, right until Independence Day, 
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Once Malta became independent, there was no way of stopping Mintoff 
from coming to power. How could one insure against that? The 
understanding in Whitehall was that with a Borg Olivier administration a 
pact would be reliable, hopefully for the duration of it (until 1974). Mintoff, 
it was felt, would abrogate it. 
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The Commonwealth Relations Office found this passage in the 
C.O.S. minutes perturbing.67 They wrote from Downing Street to 
find out what exactly it did mean and entail: 
We should be extremely grateful for the Colonial Office 
views on this and similar thoughts. It is common form that 
once a territory is independent we have no further means 
of compelling them to keep agreements, or preventing them 
from changing their government...68 
67 Min. 2, para. 7, Annex B, COS 38th/1964. 




Clinching a Deal 
DEFENCE, FINANCE AND 
DELIVERANCE 
On 19th May 1964, two weeks after the referendum result was 
announced, the Maltese Prime Minister left for London. He 
encamped at the Savoy Hotel in The Strand in London's West End, 
determined not to return home before the Malta independence 
question would have been settled. In fact, he stayed put there, at the 
'Malta headquarters' in London - for nearly ten weeks. Only after 
the British House of Commons had finally approved the Malta 
Independence Bill in its last session before dissolution, and with a 
new date for Independence tucked away in his pocket, did Borg 
Olivier return to Malta on 26th July. It was not a holiday. Although, 
for various reasons, not much was heard in Malta about 
developments in the Anglo-Maltese talks in London, some vitally 
important questions were being lobbied and decided during those 
exasperating two months between the referendum result and Borg 
Olivier's return. The referendum was the last main hope of those 
opposed to Independence for Malta; until mid-May independence 
was still in the balance. Mter that, until mid-July, the main questions 
concerned defence, finance - and a spiritual deliverance from the 
stalemate over the religious clauses which had been inserted into the 
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draft Constitution a year earlier and which were as inadmissable to 
the British side as they were to the Malta Labour Party - and indeed 
the Holy See. 1 There was no way in which the British government 
would submit, or the British parliament approve, exemptions which 
placed the Roman Catholic Church above the human rights 
provisions of an independence constitution, more so when her 
'spiritual' sanction was still permissable under the long-standing 
electoral law of Malta; yet there was a little more to it than that. 
Getting that Malta Independence Bill through parliament seemed 
like the last major hurdle. Apart from one or two surprises yet to 
come, there was still some tough bargaining over unresolved 
disputes in matters of defence and finance. Some delicate and crucial 
stances had to be thrashed out and then worded precisely. All told, 
Borg Olivier's prolonged stay in London was less capricious than it 
may have seemed, the more so as pressures from different directions 
were making themselves felt on the defence front, while the 
Treasury were dragging their feet over money, as usual. The British 
parliament's impending dissolution before the end of July for a 
general election in October hung like the sword of Damocles over 
the heads of both administrations. 
In Malta, Borg Olivier could count on ministers Felice and Caruana 
to hold the fort, and on de Gray in case of any trouble, as well as on 
the absolute loyalty of his other ministers. In any case, nothing was 
or had ever been more important for Borg Olivier now than to clinch 
a deal with the British and get Independence for his country after 
centuries of subjection to one dominator or another. As he saw and 
presented it, and as noted in the House of Commons, he had a 
majority of the votes cast in the referendum in favour of the proposed 
constitution (54.5%); he also had a majority (50.7%) of all the valid 
and invalid votes cast.2 It was most unlikely that Borg Olivier would 
1 On this, see above, H, 12, and below, p. 563 et sq. 
2 Nearly 60% had either not voted at all, voted against or else cast blank or spoiled 
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risk jeopardizing Independence because of two religious clauses 
which, as he had already confided to Sandys, he had only accepted 
to put in as a counter-weight to Mintoff's points (and that, it seems, 
at the prompting of two ecclesiastics who had gone to London with 
episcopal beneplacitu in July 1963 to advise the' loyal' politicians.)3 
Much spade work had already been done over the past year, for 
instance over land sites to be transferred. Basic understandings had 
already been reached, not least that there would be agreements on 
defence and finance determined upon before Independence. In 
Malta, the stands and styles of the respective parties were by now 
nauseatingly familiar to London and everybody, or so they seemed. 
No sooner had the referendum result been published that Mintoff 
cabled Sandys to say that if the MLP did not hear from him they 
would take it to mean that he did not want to consult (further) with 
them, and so they would discuss Malta's future with other countries 
who were interested. Mintoff knew that he had Moscow on his travel 
agenda but tried to batter Sandys with that for the favour of another 
meeting, or to make it seem as if the blame for overtures to Russia 
lay with the British government. With characteristic ire, Mintoff 
concluded his telegram by stressing that if the MLP's demands were 
not met the party would in no way recognize a constitution framed 
by Sandys on his own and that if such an imposed constitution gave 
power to a government "dominated by priests", the MLP would 
strive by every means to demolish it.4 The small parties cabled to 
say that they were still ready to go up to London for further 
discussions, and Pellegrini actually did go, alone and uninvited, for 
a few days which changed nothing.5 By now, time was short. It was 
obviously intended that, in the nature of things, the concluding 
3 On this see above, I, ?10; n, 12. 
4 " ... il-Partit Laburista jhabrek u jistinka biex juza l-mezzi kollha halli jfarrak il-
kostituzzjoni." MintofflSandys tel., 6 May 1964, reproduced in Il-Helsien, 20 May 1964; 
the MLP were still insisting on immediate constitutional changes by Order-in-
Council and fresh elections under UN supervision. 
5 See e.g. the report in It-Torca, 31 May 1964. 
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decisions should be inter-governmental or - in the last resort if inter-
governmental disagreement prevailed - legislative and by fiat. 
On the constitutional front, one lingering bone of contention had to 
do with any laws inconsistent with the independence constitution. 
Section 6 of this constitution, which was not being in any way 
entrenched, laid down the general rule that the constitution prevailed 
over any other law that was inconsistent with it, and that the other law 
should, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. This provision, 
which held the constitution to be the supreme law but which was not 
itself entrenched, was subject to two provisions in section 48 
concerning time frames of inconsistency for certain categories oflaws 
in so far as fundamental rights were concerned. When a colony 
became independent it was not unreasonable that there should be 
some degree of immunity from existing laws. In the case of Trinidad 
and Jamaica, all existing laws had been made immune from challenge. 
In the case of Malta, the exemption finally agreed upon was less wide. 
The five laws in the First Schedule (to the Constitution) were 
exempted altogether but the remainder only for three years.6 
As a country with a very long history, Malta had had a large body of 
legislation, so it was felt that a short period of immunity was required 
during which this legislation could be properly examined and any 
amendments made to it, which were found necessary to bring it into 
conformity with the human rights provisions. After three years it 
6 The five laws in the First Schedule, to which section 48(7) referred, were the Criminal 
Code, the Code of Police Laws, the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, the 
Commercial Code, and the Civil Code. Section 48(8) precluded the award of 
compensation in respect of anything done under a provision of an existing law before 
the provision was held to be inconsistent with the Constitution. Enc., 'Laws inconsistent 
with Constitution', 926/1916/48583. Borg Olivier's delegation would have preferred one 
year instead of three years to avoid litigiousness. As for section 6 of the Constitution, in 
an interview with this writer, its drafter, Prof. J. J. Cremona, regarded constitutional 
supremacy as a 'super-norm' which did not require entrenchment because, he said, you 
could not insure against all risks. H. Frendo, Malta's Quest for Independence: Reflections 
on the Course of Maltese History (1989), p. 255. Others were less sure, suspecting that this 
may have been a loophole or an act of inter-party connivance. 
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would be fully open to challenge. The five laws exempted from 
challenge were basic to the whole legal system, all passed during the 
period of British sovereignty, two of the codes having been 
promulgated by Order-in- Council. There was no reason to suppose 
that there was anything in them which contravened the human rights 
code in any material way but it seemed reasonable to give them 
exemption as a precaution. The people of Malta were well known for 
their love of country and they had "many ingenious lawyers in Malta", 
some of whom might well devote their ingenuity to finding "technical 
points of inconsistency." The Malta Government naturally was 
anxious that there should be no uncertainty about so basic a part of 
the law under which the people of Malta had been living for so many 
years.7 Until the end of August 1964, Sandys and Borg Olivier were 
still exchanging correspondence on legalistic constitutional matters 
relating to the validation of laws. 8 
Of much greater import was the still unresolved church question. The 
'offending' clauses were the two subsections (10) and (11) bearing on 
the chapter on human rights. These stated that nothing done by the 
7 See the draft reply prepared in answer to a question as to why nothing in the laws 
set out in the First Schedule was to be held to be inconsistent with the chapter on 
fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as the minuted exchanges during June 
and July, esp. Gordon-Smith/Eastwood, 26 June 1964; Jenkins/Kisch, 1 July 1964; 
926/1923. 
8 "I greatly regret your unwillingness to accept the inclusion in the Independence 
Constitution of the substance of Section 13(2) of the 1961 Constitution. But, as I said 
to you in my letter of 19th August, I do not propose to press this matter further ... I 
would have preferred that no reference should be made to the validation of laws 
which were inconsistent with the 1961 Constitution. But, after consultation with my 
legal advisers, I feel obliged to accept your argument that the absence of some 
provision on this point might be deemed to stultify the object of Section 48(7) and 
(8) of the Independence Constitution. I have, therefore, for this reason, decided to 
incorporate the provision set out...with two small drafting amendments ... " Sandys/ 
Borg Olivier in tel., Sandys/Wakefield, 28 Aug. 1964, conf., replying to Borg Olivier/ 
Sandys, 24Aug. 1964; 926/1923. Much of this detailed and sometimes hair-splitting 
argumentation is outside the scope of this book; it would lend itself to a strict study 
of Maltese legal and constitutional history. See J. J. Cremona, The Maltese Constitution 
and Constitutional History since 1813 (PEG, Malta, 1994; 2nd ed., 1997). 
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church "in the exercise of its spiritual powers" would be held to be in 
contravention of any of this chapter's provisions; and that "nothing 
contained in or done under the authority of any law for the protection 
of the Religion of Malta" should be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of any of this chapter's provisions. When pressed, and 
realising that Vatican diplomacy was under-cutting his position 
(which had been pledged to respect the wishes of the Maltese 
episcopacy), Borg Olivier conceded to have the two 'offending' clauses 
be removed. Instead, he agreed to a sub-clause in article 2 of the draft 
constitution, which was laboriously chisselled out, largely ensuring 
the status quo. The State thereby guaranteed to the Roman Catholic 
Apostolic Church "the right freely to exercise her proper spiritual and 
ecclesiastical functions and duties and to manage her own affairs." 
This was felt to be "a more appropriate provision than that proposed 
in Section 48 (10) and (11) of the Malta Government's draft." And it 
did not entrench the Canon Law. 
There was a presumed, if vague, qualification written into the clause 
by the use of the adjective "proper" before "spiritual", suggesting 
subtly that there should be no resort to "improper" spiritual or 
ecclesiastical functions. If so, that was more of a sop, in the light of 
the interdicts and mortal sins, bell ringing during political meetings 
and such other sanctions or obstructive behaviour as had been so 
bitterly complained of by the MLP. In fact, the use of the 
qualification "proper" could just as well be read the other way 
round, depending on what definition and interpretation was 
attributed to it by which side. 
In addition, however, a general non-discrimination clause was 
inserted as Section 46. This was a standard form and followed 
precedents of many other constitutions for independence. 
According to this new section, no law would make "any provision" 
that was" discriminatory either of itself or in its effect". Moreover, 
no person would be treated in a discriminatory manner "by any 
person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of 
the functions of any public office or any public authority." 
Discriminatory behaviour was itself defined to mean "affording 
different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly 
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to their respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political 
opinions, colour or creed" on arbitrary grounds. Sub-sections (10) 
and (11) of section 48 were deleted. 
Although the Apostolic Nuncio in London, Mgr Cardinale, prided 
himself on having convinced Borg Olivier the point that "exceptions 
in human rights clauses could, if inserted in the Constitution, easily 
be used by the next Labour Government against their political 
opponents,"9 a not less compelling reason surely was a blockage of 
the Malta Independence Bill which, in the absence of any 
compromise or face-saving solution, was quite possible. 
Borg Olivier however held firm against British insistence that, 
through the Independence constitution, Malta's long-standing 
electoral law be changed. In an introduction to the draft White 
Paper prepared by the Colonial Office, it was further proposed that 
the draft Order to be submitted to Her Majesty in Council should 
include provision: 
(a) amending the provision in the Maltese Electoral 
(Polling) Ordinance relating to undue influence, to 
make it an offence to inflict or threaten to inflict any 
injury, damage, harm or loss of any kind to induce a 
person to vote or refrain from voting; and 
(b) amending that Ordinance so as to introduce a provision 
similar to that in the U.K.law whereby the election ofa 
candidate should be declared void if corrupt or illegal 
practices have so extensively prevailed that they may 
reasonably be supposed to have affected the result of the 
election. 
Borg Olivier's stand was that such a law had been on the statute book 
for decades and nobody had bothered to change it, neither the Labour 
administrations in Malta nor the British colonial administrations: why 
9 A. Koster, op.cit., p. 203; but see above, I, 10. 
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should he accept that it be changed now that Malta was becoming 
independent? On a party political level, any such change would have 
been comforting to Mintoff at Borg Olivier's expense, rendering him 
and his party unpopular with the church. It would have just about 
negatived the clause now to be entered under section 2 guaranteeing 
to the church the right "freely to exercise her proper spiritual and 
ecclesiastical functions", particularly if the church felt that occasion 
demanded that she speak out or apply moral or ecclesiastical sanctions 
(which after all was the situation in Malta right then). For Borg Olivier 
to accept these further changes, on top of the others, would have been 
tantamount to a censure of the church's rights as exercised. Politically, 
he and his party stood to gain nothing at all. On the contrary, they 
might have risked losing respect as sell-outs to British secularism and 
laicism, betraying the religious strain which had for so long been a 
moulding and distinctive feature of Maltese anti-colonial nationalism 
in a Protestant-ruled colony. It is therefore no wonder that Borg 
Olivier held firm in spite of the repeated and insistent advances by 
Sandys, who had different interests to attend to and was little prone 
to "hellfire and brimstone". Some of the futile attempts made by 
Sandys in this regard have been recalled by a witness to the last phase 
of the talks, then the Commissioner of Land in Malta: 
Borg Olivier was a hard nut to crack; and Sandys was 
showing signs of impatience. On another occasion he rose 
from the negotiating table and, addressing Borg Olivier, 
said: "Prime Minister, I'll give you time to consider the 
matter and give me an answer"; and went to sit at his desk. 
The rest of the delegations remained at the table. Mter about 
half an hour Sandys returned to the negotiating table and 
asked Borg Olivier: "Prime Minister, may I now have an 
answer?" All he got from Borg Olivier, however, was a grunt 
followed by dead silence; and the meeting broke up.IO 
10 E. Mizzi, Malta in the Making 1962-1987; An Eyewitness Account (Valletta, 1995), 
p. 36. On earlier discussions of Malta's electoral law, see esp. above I, 7-8. 
DEFENCE, FINANCE AND DELIVERANCE 567 
Sandys did not give up and called further meetings, including one 
when Borg Olivier had a bad cold, which contrary to what Sandys 
imagined, was not a 'diplomatic' cold. The Gondoliers Suite was 
booked by the British Government at the Savoy Hotel, where Borg 
Olivier and his delegation were staying, for this meeting. Mter drinks 
which lasted a good half-hour, they took their place at the table: 
Sandys put a simple and direct question to Borg Olivier. 
"Prime Minister", he said, "are you now in a position to state 
whether you will accept the changes in the draft 
Constitution which I have proposed to you?" Borg Olivier's 
reply came very quickly, and was even more to the point. 
"Yes, Secretary of State", he said, "my answer is no." Sandys 
stood up and left the room, followed by his delegation. The 
meeting had lasted less than a minute. I! 
That was not the end of the story. The heavens opened - first in the 
House of Lords, then in the House of Commons. After eulogising 
Pope John XXIII, the assassinated President Kennedy and Malta's 
role in the Second World War - "a bastion of freedom and a symbol 
of what the Free World was fighting for" - the Lord Bishop of 
Chester complained that the religious provisions in the Malta 
Independence Bill before parliament were illiberal and 
unacceptable. It was essential that the Constitution of Malta should 
safeguard the rights of the many non-Catholics who lived there or 
visited the place. His Lordship was speaking up not only for the 
Church of England but for the British Council of Churches. He 
recalled the long and protracted negotiations between British 
ecclesiastical leaders and the Colonial Office as soon as the draft 
constitution had been published in 1961, in order to ensure that the 
rights of minority, non-Catholic groups should be adequately 
II Ibid., p. 37. Similar recollections have been recounted to this writer by Dr Victor 
Ragonesi, who at the time was Borg Olivier's right-hand man, during a number of 
encounters. Guze' Cassar Pullicino, who was Acting Director of Information in Paul 
J. Naudi's absence overseas in 1962, recalled to this writer (during an informal 
encounter at Targa Gap on 9 June 1999) that Borg Olivier had once told him: "Do 
what Ragonesi tells you to." (Int aghmel dak li jghidlek Ragonis, qisni qed nghidlek jien.) 
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protected, and particularly in mixed marriages and their validity. 
Those expressions of anxiety were somewhat reluctantly withdrawn, 
because it was pointed out that Section 13 of that Constitution 
provided that 
All persons in Malta shall have full liberty of conscience and 
enjoy the free exercise of their respective modes of religious 
worship. 
No person shall be subject to any disability or be excluded 
from holding any office by reason of his religious profession. 
It was argued at the time, the Bishop of Chester added, that if there 
should appear to be any discrimination in the administration of the 
marriage law this would be a "disability" within the meaning of the 
Constitution and that therefore there was sufficient safeguard. 
Referring next to the Constitution for Independence, Chester noted 
that clause 41 repeated the two subsections of Section 13 of the 1961 
Constitution, but added a third subsection which stated: 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law 
shall be held to be inconsistent or in contravention of 
subsection (1), to the extent that the law in question makes 
provision that is reasonably required in the interests of public 
safety, public order, public morality or decency, public health, 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and 
except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing 
done under the authority thereof, is shown not to be 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
Although one might feel that all this threw open the doors very wide 
and minimize the safeguards provided by the 1961 draft, at least in 
that Malta document the disability clause (had) remained: 
But the document before us today goes considerably further 
even than this, and in the opinion of many virtually removes 
the safeguards which had been sought and which it was 
understood had been assured. Section 41 (1) repeats the first 
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subsection of the 1961 draft and the Malta versions. 
Subsection (2) repeats the questionable subsection of the 
Malta version. But the really vital section of both previous 
documents giving the assurance that "no person shall be 
subject to any disability" now disappears. This is a very 
serious modification ... 
569 
No doubt, Chester continued, attention would be directed to Section 
46 of the Constitution, which provided against discriminatory 
legislation of any kind. But paragraph (4)( c) specifically provided that 
this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes 
provision with respect to adoption, marriage, dissolution of 
marriage, burial, devolution of property on death or any 
matters of personal law not herein before specified. 
In other words, the Constitution then before them specifically 
excluded from the ban on discriminatory legislation that province 
of the law which dealt with marriage, which was the very area in 
which they had for a long time asked for reassurance and 
guarantee. If, therefore, the religious rights of those who were not 
Roman Catholics were to be preserved, it was essential that Section 
13 of the original draft, which provided that no person should be 
subject to any disability for conscience sake, should be restored, so 
that there might be no doubt whatever on that score. Chester also 
wanted to ensure that protection from deprivation of property 
without compensation would apply to buildings owned by 
Communions other than the Roman Catholics in the Island, 
including buildings then situated on land held by one of the 
Services. He concluded: 
Non-Roman Catholics will recognise with gratitude the 
statesmanship which has resulted in the removal of 
subsections 10 and 11 of Section 48 of the Malta 
Constitution which appeared to set the Church above the 
law. But it is of concern to many of us that in this day, when 
so many human rights are threatened and when, the world 
over, freedom is in jeopardy, we should appear to approve 
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My dear Sandys, 
] am sure you will not mind my writing about one 
point in the new Constitution for Malta which is likely 
to give particular concern to all the non-Roman Catholic 
Churches in this country. It is in SUb-Sections 10 and 
11 of the new Section 4~ which provide that "nothing 
done by the Roman Catholic Church in the exercise of 
its spiritual powers and duties shall be held to be in 
contravention of any of the provisions of this chapter": 
and the same is to apply in the case of anything "contained 
in or done under" the authority of any law for the pro-
tection of the Religion of Malta. 
These phrases seem to open a wide and undefined 
door for the position of the Roman Catholic Church on 
lines which, I am sure, the other Churches which I have 
mentioned would never desire to claim for themselves. 
I feel no doubt whatever that these clauses will 
arouse reactions if they were to be endorsed by Parlia-
ment. 
Yours sincerely, / 
. 0 ('~./-'<.. • .,_ jMr.r.........x 
The Right Honble. Duncan Sandys M.P. 
Colonial Office, 
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The Archbishop of Canterbury's official letter to the Colonial Secretary 
opposing the proposed exemption clauses for the Roman Catholic Church 
in an independent Malta. 
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of legislation which in the slightest degree condones the 
continuance of restrictions and disabilities on religious 
grounds. This new Constitution is, in the opinion of many, 
a backward step from the 1961 draft. We ask that the 
protection from disability should be restored; and that the 
church property should be protected without question. With 
these provisions in the Constitution we should be able to 
support the measure before us .. .l2 
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To go back on this bill now would have been to open a hornet's nest, 
surely involving the Catholic Church in Malta in all-out resistance 
and imperilling Dr Borg Olivier's hold on office. Some of the 
implications in Chester's misgivings, translated into a Maltese 
mentality, would have been seen to entail such niceties as having 
non-Catholics teach religion in Maltese schools, or not having 
obligatory religious lessons in class, Maltese marrying non-Catholics 
in Malta outside of the Catholic Church, or non-believers possibly 
buried on consecrated ground at the Addolorata cemetery; no 
disability with regard to the dissolution of marriage would have been 
seen or interpreted as a possible licence for divorce, and so on. All 
that might have suited the looser Protestant denominational groups 
or individuals living or sojourning in Malta but still offended against 
the family-based, historically preserved and conservatively led 
Maltese church as a bulwark of the island community, always wary 
of the proselyte, the infiltrator and the foreign master. Politically, it 
would have soothed Mintoffwho was the church's bete noir. 
Was it not a fact, charged Barbara Castle fiercely, that the point 
raised in another place yesterday about the effect of clauses 41 and 
46 on the rights of religious minorities with regard to marriage and 
other matters was specifically raised in this House on Second 
Reading by her honourable friend the Member for Barking (Tom 
Driberg) and other honourable Members, and that the right 
honourable Gentleman (Duncan Sandys) "at that time pooh-poohed 
the idea that there was anything to worry about and suggested that 
12 Hansard, Lords, 28 July 1964, cols. 1015-1017. 
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we were making a mountain out of a molehill?" Was it not clear that 
Sandys had been "so busy trying to railroad his independence Bill 
through this House" that he had not taken time to understand his 
own Constitution? 
Has he not grossly misled the House? Will he now apologise 
to the House, or will he take steps to see that the Royal 
Assent is not given to the Bill until the actual changes have 
been made in the Constitution to meet the legitimate fears 
of the Churches in this country? 
Sandys told her he had nothing to apologise about. What had 
happened was that during the course of parliamentary discussion a 
weakness, or alleged weakness, had been revealed and the 
Government had undertaken at once to look into it ... There was no 
technical problem of any kind. It was very important to get the Bill 
through before the House rose. Otherwise, there would be many 
months of delay in the granting of independence to Malta. The 
Constitution was introduced by an Order in Council which had not 
yet been made, and there was "no immediate hurry for making it." 
The House would not have a further chance of discussing this matter 
"unless it wishes to sit on into August." 
Mr Bottomley, also from the Labour benches, returned to the charge 
that the Bill and the writing of the Constitution had been "rushed 
unnecessarily." He referred to a statement by Mr Sandys on 23rd July 
when he had said: "We are making certain changes in a liberal 
direction ... " Would he now assure the House that clause 41 (3) of the 
earlier draft Constitution be restored to its full effect when the Order 
in Council was made? "That", retorted Sandys, "is precisely what I 
am discussing with the Prime Minister of Malta." 13 Dr Borg Olivier, 
the Marquess of Lansdowne informed the Bishop of Chester in the 
Lords on the same day, had agreed to look into the matter at once. 14 
13 Hansard, Commons, 29 July 1964, extract enc., 926/1916/48583. 
14 Hansard, Lords, 29 July 1964, extract enc., ibid. 
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Back at the Auberge d'Aragon, Borg Olivier and his legal advisers 
were indeed looking into this matter and a copious and even learned 
exchange of correspondence ensued, but by so readily agreeing to 
look into the matter at once Borg Olivier, who had left London three 
days earlier, knew only too well that by the time he could as much 
as reply, the bill was likely to have become law. And in any case, Borg 
Olivier would not budge. 
After speaking to him on the phone, Sandys wrote to the Maltese 
Prime Minister on 30th July on the subject of the non-discrimination 
clauses. In at least three long and documented letters signed by 
Borg Olivier and addressed respectively to Sandys, Lansdowne and 
Wakefield, between 1 st and 11 th August 1964, Chester's case was 
tested and refuted by legal argument. Malta's case was made 
seriously and in earnest, countering at least some of the anxieties 
genuinely expressed by the Anglican prelate. 15 "I can follow the 
Bishop of Chester's argument in his comparison of the old section 
41 (3) with the new section 46," Borg Olivier began, "though that 
argument can, with respect, be easily refuted." But he could not see 
how this could affect the position of mixed marriages, which was 
admittedly "the motive force behind the whole representation." 
Chester appeared to hold the view that Malta should be treated 
differently from all other Commonwealth countries in so far as 
protection against discrimination was concerned; that, in thus 
treating Malta differently, one should take an absolute attitude in 
framing the essential provision at least in so far as discrimination on 
religious grounds was concerned; and that the domestic law of Malta 
in relation to the form of marriage was bad and ought, after more 
than a century and a half, to be changed for the Maltese by a 
"parting" Order in Council from the United Kingdom. 
It was true that in the draft Constitution prepared by the 
15 In the course of the debate in the Lords, Chester recalled that he was in Malta 
when the Italian fleet surrendered in 1943, and he had served on one of the convoys 
making it to Grand Harbour. 
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Government of Malta section 41 (3) provided that "no person shall 
be subject to any disability or be excluded from holding any office, 
other than an office entailing religious teaching of the Roman 
Catholic faith, by reason of his religious profession." But that was the 
only provision against non-discrimination and was limited to 
grounds of religious profession. It was, on the face of it, crude and 
absolute and, "not without some strong opposition", was inserted 
merely because it had appeared in much the same form in other 
Malta Constitutions. It was thought at the time that its insertion in 
the draft would make it possible to preserve the 1961 Constitution 
status quo in respect of non-discrimination. The ball was then thrown 
into Sandys' court: 
Subsequently you insisted very strongly on a general non-
discrimination clause (which had been omitted by your 
predecessor in the present 1961 Constitution) and after some 
not inconsiderable discussion it was agreed to insert one, on 
the basis that it would absorb section 41(3). If section 41(3) 
were to survive alongside the new general provision against 
discrimination, a remarkable and not altogether logical 
situation would be created which the Malta Government 
would never have been able to accept. It is not correct to say, 
as is said in paragraph 6 of your message, that this was 
regarded only as a question of tidiness. 
You will recall your insistence that the non-discrimination 
clause for Malta should not depart from the standard form 
and indeed this is so ... 16 
Sandys was then referred to section 27 of Nigeria's independence 
constitution; section 23 of Sierra Leone's; section 24 of Jamaica's; 
section 29 of Uganda's; section 26 of Kenya's; and section 23 of 
Malawi's. Tanganyka had no code of human rights while Trinidad 
and Tobago only had two provisions of a general nature on the 
subject. 
16 Borg Olivier/Sandys, I Aug. 1964, para. 2-4, 926/1990/48655. 
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The "remarkable view" propounded by the Bishop of Chester 
appeared to be that in the case of Malta "a substantial departure 
should be made from the standard provision, which might 
also constitute a dangerous precedent." In particular he referred 
to section 46(4)(c), which provided that the rule against 
discrimination should not apply to any law so far as that law made 
provision with respect to marriage and other matters of personal 
law. This was "the common form" and was to be found in all the 
Constitutions referred to above. It enabled Parliament, if ever it 
were to introduce civil marriage, to provide that this would not be 
a valid form of marriage for a Maltese Catholic which, as Sandys 
knew, in Maltese circumstances was necessary. This was "a provision 
which any constitutional lawyer must regard as objectively essential." 
What Chester was complaining about was not in the Constitution but 
in the domestic law of Malta concerning the form and validity of 
marriage and this had not been changed by this or previous 
Constitutions. It was not removed by the old section 41(3) any more 
than it would be removed by the present section 46. Over all these 
years Maltese courts had continued to decide in the same way in 
respect 'of the validity and form of marriage, without the matter ever 
having been challenged in the Privy Council. In Borg Olivier's 
seven-page exposition, which bore Cremona's unmistakable stamp, 
reference was made approvingly to what Lord Douglas of Barloch 
had said in the same debate: 
Marriages can take place there only according to the rites 
and customs of some particular Church. But the fact that 
this has continued to be the position in Malta is something 
for which this country cannot excuse itself if it is wrong, 
because we had the opportunity on many occasions, when 
the government reverted completely into British hands, to 
alter it if we considered it advisable to do so. 
The response then went into the history of the vexed mixed 
marriage question in Malta over the decades, which had been the 
subject of voluminous official correspondence, 'diplomatic' 
negotiations between the British Government and the Holy See, 
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and of a special reference to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in the 19th century. Whenever action was threatened from 
London to disturb the position, the Maltese responded with angry 
public meetings and protestations ... What Chester was concerned 
about, and his concern had no doubt been shared by others at 
different times, was that under Maltese law the courts did not 
regard as valid a marriage, of which one of the parties was a Maltese 
Catholic, "not celebrated in accordance with the formalities 
established by the Council of Trent." Under this law it had indeed 
happened that a Malta-domiciled Catholic married an 
Englishwoman in London in the Registry Office and after some time 
returned to Malta and sought and obtained a declaration of 
invalidity of the "marriage". But the essential point remained that 
this by no means entailed "a disability" - no incapacity was involved 
- and, even if it did, it was not covered by the old section 41 (3). In 
fact the invalidity of such a marriage was "not based on the religious 
profession of one of the parties ... but on the non-compliance with 
the law of the land." 
Nor was that juridically outrageous. It merely represented 
"adherence to one legal doctrine in preference to another." The 
Malta government quoted in its support from Cheshire's tome on 
private international law specifically on this subject: 
This principle, that a marriage which is in accordance with 
the formalities of the lex loci celebrationis, is to be regarded 
as formally valid everywhere, even though if would have 
been void if solemnized in that manner in the country where 
one or both of the parties are domiciled, is generally but not 
universally accepted. Thus in those countries where status 
depends upon religious law, as in Yugoslavia and Greece for 
persons of the Orthodox faith, in Malta for Roman 
Catholics, and in Cyprus for Moslems and members of the 
Orthodox Church, a marriage contracted in disregard of the 
religious formalities of the domicil, no matter where 
solemnized, is not recognised as valid. For instance, a civil 
marriage contracted in London by a Roman Catholic 
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It was clear, however, that foreign views of this nature did not affect 
the principle that a marriage contracted in compliance with the local 
forms was recognised as formally valid by English law. In practice the 
parties avoided the unfortunate situation that arose from this conflict 
oflaws by the performance of two separate ceremonies, one according 
to the local forms, the other according to the religious requirements. 17 
Section 41(3) was a crude non-discrimination provision restricted to 
grounds of religion, providing against the subjection of a person to 
a disability but not against the subjection to a restriction or the 
according of a privilege or advantage. It was unqualified and, to 
quote Professor De Smith, 
although discrimination based on such criteria as colour, race, 
religion, language, sex or tribal or other social groupings is 
generally to be reprobated, a blanket prohibition of 
discrimination based on these grounds may be unwise. 18 
The standard non-discrimination clause of all Commonwealth 
constitutions since the Nigerian constitution contained a number of 
fair and reasonable qualifications reproduced in Malta's section 46. 
The Government of Malta proposed such a provision in an effort to 
preserve the 1961 Constitution status quo with regard to non-
discrimination; that had now been" disturbed" by the British Govern-
ment's insistence on a general non-discrimination clause, accepted by 
the Government of Malta on the basis that it absorbed, as indeed it 
should, section 41(3). Section 46 not only covered the same ground 
as the old section 41(3) but it afforded protection against the 
subjection to a restriction and the according of privileges or 
advantages, as well as widened the grounds of non-discrimination to 
cover also race, place of origin, political opinions and colour. It was 
thus considerably wider than section 41(3) and afforded 
17 This mini-treatise also referred Sandys (and presumably Chester) to Martin 
Wolff's tome on private international law in case he wished to learn more about the 
exact situation prevailing in Greece. 
18 De Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, 1964, p. 135. 
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"incommensurably greater protection against non-discrimination in 
general." 
After further recapitulations, Borg Olivier's communication 
concluded that the Government of Malta saw "no justification 
whatsoever" for any amendment of the agreed Constitution as a 
result of the representations that had been made: 
If this incongruous storm in a tea-cup were, in spite of what 
has been stated above, to determine the British Government 
to attempt to impose once more its own will, departing in 
this respect from the standard pattern of Commonwealth 
Constitutions, you will no doubt appreciate that that would 
seriously affect my Government's attitude not only to the 
new non-discrimination clause but also to certain parts of 
the other agreements which had proved so controversial 
before being initialled and about which I am still not happy, 
although I intend to honour them if nothing is introduced 
to disturb our general agreement. 19 
When Lansdowne came back on this in an aide memoire dated 6th 
August conveyed by Wakefield, the reply this time was rather more 
snappy and irritated. Borg Olivier told him there must be some 
misunderstanding because none of the arguments brought forward 
in his letter of 1 st August had been answered in his message: 
To put it briefly, in championing non-discrimination, you 
are really proposing to effect a double discrimination, 
external and internal. Externally, you are proposing to 
discriminate in the case of Malta vis-a-vis the non-
discrimination clauses of the other Commonwealth 
constitutions by departing substantially and unwarrantably 
from the standard clause ... Internally, within the ambit of 
the non-discrimination clause itself, you are proposing to 
discriminate in respect of grounds of religion amongst the 
various specified grounds of non-discrimination ... 
19 Borg Olivier/Sandys, 1 Aug. 1964, para. 5-12, ff. 3-7, 926/1990/48655. 
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Borg Olivier knew of "no constitution in the world" which had 
sought to join together the provisions of the new section 46 and the 
old section 41(3): 
And you propose to do this after the initialling of the 
relevant document and, allow me to repeat this, in my view 
without any valid reason whatsoever. 
The Maltese Prime Minister did not see how such an anomalous 
situation could properly be defended. Indeed he could not see why 
the British Government should wish to end up its colonial 
connection with Malta "with such an unhappy incident." When the 
reason behind the Rt Reverend Prelate's argument in the House of 
Lords was made known to the Maltese public, his misconceived 
assumption that the old section 41(3) afforded protection against the 
situation arising from the law of Malta and the judgments of Maltese 
courts on the subject of mixed marriages, 
the inevitably resultant public indignation may well lead to 
such manifestations as to mar the atmosphere we have 
striven to create. That is why nothing has as yet been made 
known to the Maltese public on the matter. 
Had he known at the time when he accepted the new section 46 and 
before the agreed Constitution was initialled that the British 
Government would after such initialling have insisted on the 
insertion of the old section 41(3), Borg Olivier told Lansdowne, he 
"would never have accepted" section 46: 
I wish to make it clear that, for the reasons already given in 
full, my Government will not agree to an amendment of the 
non-discrimination clause in the agreed Constitution and, 
in the event of an attempted imposition, reserves to itself full 
freedom of action, secure in the knowledge that it can fully 
and adequately defend its position before the world.2o 
20 Borg Olivir/Lansdowne, 11 Aug. 1964, 926/1990/48655. 
580 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
Borg Olivier also saw Wakefield about this matter, and the latter sent 
Sandys, who was in Austria, an account of their talk. It transpires 
that when Sandys had told the Commons he had called Borg Oliver, 
who had accepted to look into this matter at once, he could have 
given the impression that Borg Olivier had agreed to settle it in line 
with the demands being made on him. He asked Wakefield to 
remind Sandys that when the latter had rung him up "very 
unexpectedly" at his residence about the point at issue, he had told 
him that he would ring him up the following day after he would 
have looked properly into the matter, 
and indeed I telephoned him the following day, setting out 
the views which I have since insisted upon and by no means 
acquiescing in the re-insertion of section 41 (3), and earnestly 
begged him not to commit himself. 
Borg Olivier noted, correctly, that nowhere did the parliamentary 
records show that Sandys had committed himself to any 
amendment, nor indeed could he reasonably have done so without 
going further into the matter and ascertaining whether the point 
raised by the Bishop of Chester was, when viewed against the 
background of the whole Constitution, justified or not. Even at the 
latest sitting of the House of Commons at which the matter was 
discussed, Sandys had prudently enough spoken of "a weakness or 
alleged weakness" and of undertaking "at once to look into it." 
Borg Olivier dismissed the view taken by Sandys, as conveyed by 
Wakefield, that the matter in issue did not relate to any particular 
Malta law, such as that of marriage. The Bishop of Chester had 
related the matter specifically to the marriage law of Malta and the 
Secretary of State himself in the Commons on 29th July, had done 
the same. He had spoken of safeguards: 
But safeguards for what or safeguards against what? When 
something is proposed to be introduced in such an 
instrument as an independence constitution, especially after 
it has already been approved and initialled, one must be 
quite dear in one's mind as to its purpose and what it entails. 
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Does the Secretary of State, and I say this with the greatest 
respect, fully realise all the implications and repercussions 
of his proposed amendment? 
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With regard to the point made by Sandys that section 41(3) had been 
in the Malta Constitution for over forty years, Borg Olivier reiterated 
that that was why it was thought that by reproposing that limited 
provision, it would not have been found necessary to introduce the 
general provision of section 46. When subsequently the introduction 
of section 46 was agreed to, it was so agreed to on the basis that it would 
replace the old section 41(3) ... As it was, Borg Olivier concluded, 
I am now faced with the remarkable and not altogether fair 
proposition that the Secretary of State wants both 
provisions, irrespective of the anomaly that would be 
created, the dangers inherent in the implications and the 
uniqueness of the resultant combined provision. I am 
confident, however, that on reflection, he will agree that 
section 46 should be left as it is. My colleagues and I have 
considered the matter very carefully and we must repeat 
that, for the reasons already stated, we cannot accept the 
Secretary of State's amendment. 21 
Duncan Sandys was navigating between Scylla and Charybdis. At the 
same time that the Borg Olivier administration was firing back its 
eloquent and adamant repartees with veiled threats of mass 
demonstrations in Malta if the truth became known, he was being 
assailed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by the British Council 
of Churches in support of both the Archbishop, who was their 
President, and of the Bishop of Chester. The Evangelical Alliance 
wrote to Sandys on 10th August and Sir Cyri! Black wrote to him on 
the 12th, very much about the same thing, with "the Franco regime 
in Spain" thrown in for good measure. The Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr Michael Ramsey, wrote to Sandys on 22nd August 
and the secretary of the British Council of Churches, the Rev. 
21 Borg Olivier/Wakefield, 11 Aug. 1964,926/1990/48655. 
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Kenneth Slack, M.B.E., did the same, on behalf of the Standing 
Committee of their International Department, two days later. Both 
were insisting on the reinstatement of the sub-section of Section 13 
of the 1961 Constitution, which provided that no person should be 
subject to any disability or be excluded from holding any office by 
reason of his religious profession.22 Ramsey, a onetime Professor of 
Divinity at Durham and later at Cambridge, was the author of two 
cited books, one on The Gospel and the Catholic Church. He was 
Archbishop of Canterbury from 1961 to 1974; by 1964 he was a 
highly respected figure in Britain and in the Anglican Communion 
generally. An advocate of Christian unity, Ramsey's meeting with 
Pope Paul VI two years later, in March 1966, would be the first 
encounter between the leaders of the Roman Catholic and Anglican 
churches since their separation in 1534. His correspondence with 
Sandys on the Malta question went back at least to July 1963, but in 
May 1964 he had written to him from Lambeth Palace specifically 
about subsections 10 and 11 of Section 48 (exempting the church in 
Malta in the exercise of her responsibilities from the new 
Constitution's human rights provisions). These he wanted removed. 
These phrases seemed to open "a wide and undefined door for the 
position of the Catholic Church" on lines which, Ramsey was sure, 
"the other Churches which I have mentioned would never desire to 
claim for themselves." He felt no doubt whatever that "these clauses 
will arouse reactions if they were to be endorsed by Parliament. "23 
In what must rank as a masterpiece oflegal drafting, and of English 
understatement, Sandys finally replied to his dear Archbishop on 
28th August, as the days ticked away, seeking fully to reassure him 
without binding himself actually to reinstate the specific 1961 
subsection now desired. 
Except with regard to marriage and certain other matters, which were 
excluded in accordance with the precedents established in other 
22 Slack/Sandys, 24 Aug. 1964, 926/1990/48655. 
23 Ramsey/Sandys, 15 May 1964, 926/1990/48655. See above, n, 12. 
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British territories, Sandys began, there could be "no doubt" that 
sections 41 and 46 of the Malta Independence Constitution, taken 
together, provided "more specific safeguards against discrimination 
of all kinds" than did the existing (1961) Constitution. The Bishop 
of Chester, however, in his speech of 28th July, expressed anxiety 
about the effect of "the exclusion of marriage from the application of 
Section 46" and the absence ofa provision similar to section 13(2) of 
the 1961 Constitution, which prescribed that nobody should be 
penalised by reason of his religion. No laws of a discriminatory 
character relating to marriage had been passed in Malta "in this 
century", Sandys continued; and there was not "the slightest reason 
to suppose" that, in these times, any future Government of Malta 
would think of introducing "further religious discrimination." The 
problem arose, he noted, from the "peculiar nature" of Malta's 
exisiting marriage law. This still remained the Canon Law of the 
Roman Catholic Church, "originating in the MiddleAges." However, 
since the introduction of the 1961 Constitution, it had been qualified 
(by Section 120(1». This had the effect of "nullifying it to any extent 
that it is inconsistent with the provisions of that Constitution, including 
Section 13(2)." He recognised that it was most important that the 
application of this ancient marriage law should continue "as at 
present" to be open to challenge in the Courts by virtue of Section 13(2) 
of the 1961 Constitution; and he could assure him that the Order in 
Council introducing the new Independence Constitution would be 
"framed in such a way as to secure that result." On the one hand, 
Sandys did not wish to minimise the importance of legal safeguards 
but, on the other hand, it had to be recognised that in the end these 
had their limitations.24 Presumably Sandys meant to say that under 
the independence constitution outright discrimination, on more 
grounds than one, could be actionable at law, but there were normative 
as well as political constraints to what could be enunciated con-
stitutionally, the more so where age-old domestic laws were concerned. 
With tactful perseverance in excruciating difficulty and at the last 
moment, Borg Olivier and Cremona had had the better of the 
24 Sandys/Archbishop of Canterbury, 28 Aug. 1964, 926/1990/48655. 
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argument. This reply to the Archbishop of Canterbury was a palliative, 
not surrender. Sandys knew however that he had just satisfied Ramsey 
and his followers on the other two 'supremacy' subsections complained 
of, having had them duly removed as requested. 
In that deliverance, if not in this one, the Apostolic Delegate, Mgr 
Cardinale, had a determining say on the Vatican's behalf. When he 
phoned up Christopher Eastwood on 21 st July to find out about the 
form of the Secretary of State's draft statement to the Commons 
about the Malta Independence Bill, Eastwood obliged accordingly, 
whereupon Cardinale asked him to pass on his congratulations to 
Sandys "I said we were much indebted to him" Eastwood recorded 
by hand; "his help had really been a turning point in the whole 
negotiations. "25 
Another hurdle in this final but still delicate stage of the Anglo-
Maltese independence negotiations was defence, and other matters 
related to it. On this, Borg Olivier nailed his colours firmly to the 
mast. He was pro-West and anti-Communist. His government 
wanted to have an independent and sovereign state but as a 
constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth, with Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to continue, under a different 
arrangement, as the Queen of Malta. He also wanted a British 
military presence to be retained by treaty - for economic no less than 
for security purposes. The British were more interested in the latter 
than in the former, but they realised that one underpinned the 
other. No ambivalence there, and so far so good: the recipe for a 
smooth transfer of power and for a steady transition from 
colonialism to statehood. A resoluteness without hysterics. On that 
score, the British were titillated and indeed thrilled. In return, 
however, Borg Olivier and his colleagues expected from Britain and 
also from NATO some proper acknowledgement, and some 
dividends to accrue as well. Would these respond in kind? 
25 Min., C. Eastwood, 21 July 1964, 926/1916/48583. In an exchange of 
correspondence which probably constituted some kind of precedent, the Colonial 
Secretary and the Apostolic Nuncio heartily thanked and congratulated each other. 
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In their ongoing hypotheses about using Malta to make up for losses 
in Libya and Cyprus - there is not as much reference to Aden - the 
chiefs of staff had now reached the stage of adding up the officers 
and other ranks who might be transferred to Malta, possibly 
including an armoured reconnaissance regiment, the infantry 
battalion from Libya and a stockpile. Briefly, according to the latest 
calculations there would be 107 officers transferred to Malta, 76 
from Libya and 31 from Cyprus; and 1,239 and 467 other ranks 
from Libya and Cyprus respectively, a total to Malta of 1,706. Costs 
for preparing and upgrading accomodation in Malta, together with 
all the other possible transfers of weaponry and equipment, were 
also listed in these breakdowns, totalling in all nearly £5,000,000.26 
It was also being assumed that, in addition to Luqa airfield, Ta' Qali 
airfield would continue to be put to some use, while Hal Far airfield 
would be retained as operationally active. 
Hal Far and environs were a concern for the Borg Olivier 
administration because they wanted them themselves. The 
government had earmarked this zone for a Freeport project. In the 
negotiations over which lands would be retained or handed over 
under the Defence Agreement, Hal Far and the adjoining bays were 
thus on the agenda of both sides. Packing and mixing through the 
transhipment business, which major ports such as Hamburg, Trieste, 
Genova, Marseilles, Barcelona and Alexandria had already 
experimented with successfully, seemed to be one worthwhile 
investment project for Malta to pursue in restructuring and 
diversifying her economy.27 The harbour and bays stretching from 
Marsaxlokk and Delimara to Birzebbuga and Kalafrana in the south, 
just off Hal Far, appeared to be the best suited for it. In July 1963 a 
UN trade policy adviser, Dr F. K. Liebich, had presented the Malta 
26 'Administrative Facilities in Malta', enc. Lapsley/Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 June 
1964, sec., 926/1873/48489. As it turned out, within less than three years, Britain 
would decide to hasten the rundown in Malta considerably, causing a major upset 
in relations. 
27 On economic diversification, see above, n, 13. 
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govenment with a report on how such a project could be undertaken, 
and the Minister for Industrial Development, Dr Felice, had 
expressed interest in it. A team from Hamburg came over to Malta 
to further study the Freeport project and reported late in 1964.28 
When however the chiefs of staff, imbued with the idea of possibly 
extending the military use of Hal Far, asked the Colonial Office 
whether they would contribute to the upgrading costs, the latter 
held out no hopes in that direction.29 Moreover, in the context of 
the Defence Agreement, the Maltese were quering the retention of 
Hal Far on the grounds that its use was necessary for "a freeport 
project of their own" which would also require "port facilities at 
Kalafrana." The Maltese were asked to say just what their 
requirements were and when they would arise "so that we can 
consider how far we can go to meet them", for example by 
surrendering Kalafrana and agreeing to joint use of Hal Far. 
Meanwhile the Ministry of Defence was asked to consider what the 
minimum British defence requirements were, so that "we will be in 
a position to demonstrate our willingness as far as possible to tailor 
our needs to fit in with Malta's economic needs."3o 
The Malta Government's plan to establish a Free Port in the area of 
Hal Far'and Kalafrana was discussed in London during the 
negotiations on the proposed Agreement on Mutual Defence and 
Assistance. British defence requirements in that area were re-
examined in this light. As a result, it proved possible to plan future 
arrangements in a way that should meet the requirements of both 
Governments. The offers made by the British side in this connection 
were discussed orally and summarised in a note between officials on 
2pt June, but Dr Borg Olivier wished to have them formally on 
record. Briefly, the understanding reached on this question was that 
28 H. Ganado, op.cit., vol. 4, pp. 444-446. 
29 Min., Cumming Bruce, 27 May 1964, 926/1873/48489. 
30 Min., Jenkins/Cumming Bruce, 3 June 1964, 926/1873/48489. 
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the British Government would offer so to arrange matters that 
Kalafrana could, if necessary, be surrendered to the Malta 
authorities by the end of 1964, The proviso was that the British 
authorities could continue to use the Naval Armaments Depot at 
Kalafrana South and to convey torpedos between the Depot and the 
berthing facilities where they would be embarked or disembarked. 
The British Government also declared their readiness to allow the 
use of Ha I Far by civil aircraft entering or leaving the Free Port area 
under arrangements to be worked out, subject to the retention of 
the right to revert to exclusive military use should circumstances 
make this necessary. Detailed arrangements would be discussed as 
soon as the Maltese would be ready to make use of these facilities for 
the Free Port project.31 
The money-losing 'naval-turned-commercial' dockyard was an 
enormous headache, and it was still seen to be in some ways related 
to defence considerations. Strictly speaking this was not a 
responsibility of the Maltese government at all, but as it employed 
Maltese labour and was after all in Malta, its future was of great 
concern to any Maltese administration, especially of one battling to 
replace jobs that were being lost. The latest phase in the dockyard 
saga went back to 1958 when owing to changes in British naval 
deployment it had been decided that what until then was the 
'Admiralty Dockyard' would be converted and operated as a 
commercial ship-repair yard. A long lease was granted to a new 
company, Bailey (Malta) Ltd., formed for this purpose by C.H. 
Bailey Ltd. of Newport, Monmouthshire. Under agreements with 
the company, Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to make 
loans up to a total of £7 1/4 million to help meet the cost of the 
conversion and equipment of the Yard and to provide working 
capital. In 1960, certain financial transactions of the company had 
caused concern and an investigation had been carried out by the 
AccountantAdviser to the Board of Trade, Sir Richard Yeabsley. The 
then colonial secretary had required the company to appoint two 
31 'Draft Letter - The Hon. Dr. G. Borg Olivier', marked E/8, n.d., 926/1879. 
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independent directors nominated by him, one of whom was Yeabsley 
himself. A third director, nominated by the company, was also 
appointed, but these three directors all resigned in April 1962. The 
colonial secretary then appointed J. R. Muirie, from the leading 
chartered accountancy firm of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell, to inspect 
the company's accounts. According to Muirie's report, which was 
submitted in August 1962, the company had in a number of respects 
not been conducting its business in a proper manner, but no sooner 
had the colonial secretary insisted that matters be remedied and 
sought to replace certain directors than the company issued a writ, 
questioning his right to do so.32 Moreover, according to the Muirie 
report, under the control of the outgoing directors "at no time ... did 
that company make a profit on commercial ship repair work." The 
profits shown resulted "entirely from a considerable volume of 
Admiralty work at favourable cost plus terms", but such work was 
no longer available as it used to be. The suggestion that C.H. Bailey 
had been responsible for sending many ships to Malta since the new 
managing agents Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson had been 
appointed, was "completely unreal." Of290 ships repaired at Malta 
during Swan Hunter's first year, only 20 had come through C.H. 
Bailey.33 By the beginning of 1964 the British government were 
involved with Bailey in litigation for the return of £3, 000,000.34 
Furthermore, it was not clear, in transfers of shares that had taken 
place, whether "the letters of Trust fully safeguard Bailey (Malta)'s 
investment in this company." It was alleged that any transfers of 
money or shares between C.H.Bailey Ltd. and Bailey (Malta) Ltd. 
had been made without the required knowledge or consent of some 
of those who had an interest in such transactions.35 
32 Huijsman/Watt, 14 Feb. 1963, conf., 926/3015. 
33 'Dispute over Bailey (Malta) Dividend', and 'Admiralty Work', The Financial Times, 
290ct. 1964, enc. 926/3915. 
34 Min., E. C. Burr, 8 Jan. 1964,926/3015. 
35 Min., Mayle/Grattan-Bellew, 10 Apr. 1963, 926/3015. 
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It certainly looked as if the Government of an independent Malta 
would not only be inheriting the problems caused by a sudden 
Services rundown but, partly as a result of that, also a web of 
complications and intrigue arising from the situation at Malta 
Dockyard. "The great advantage in transferring our rights (to Malta) 
is that we should be relieved of all responsibility for the yard after 
independence", noted one savant, well in tune with others in the same 
office.36 As it had been agreed by the Service Departments that all 
Service lands in Malta should be handed over free to the Malta 
Government on independence, that would include the dockyard but 
it would be subject to the lease of Bailey. 37 In such a transfer, there 
was a British financial interest, that is what the British government 
held to be their right to the repayment of the loans made to Baileys 
and the Council of Administration which now amounted to some 
£4,000,000. There was a risk that the British government would be 
saddled with a further and continuing financial liability for the yard. 
The prospects of the British Government getting any substantial 
repayment of the loans in the forseeable future was regarded as 
"remote". By transferring the dockyard before the litigation was 
terminated, Britain would be transferring to the Government of 
Malta the right to determine the lease in the event of Bailey (Malta) 
Ltd. becoming bankrupt or being wound up. If Britain won the 
litigation, Britain presumably could rely on the Maltese government 
to take the necessary action "to get rid of Baileys."38 Whatever the 
decision taken, it was supposed that some mention of it had to be 
made in the DefenceAgreement.39 The best way out would be, it was 
concluded, if the ownership would be simply transferred to the Malta 
Government by the Admiralty, subject to the lease to Bailey (Malta) 
Ltd., with British rights to loan repayments made over to the Malta 
36 Min., N.L. Mayle, 12 Sept. 1963, 926/2045. 
37 Min., C. Eastwood, 3 Oct., 1963,926/2045. 
38 Min., Grattan-Bellew, 15 July 1963,926/3015. 
39 Min., N. L. Mayle, 25 June 1963,926/2045. 
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Government, as part of the general financial settlement, depending 
on what became of the litigation.4o 
A revised brief excluded the Yard from the other defence property 
to be transferred to the Malta Government under the Defence 
Agreement because of various complications, subject to further 
discussions; and the Malta Government could not have been too 
keen to get saddled with this problem which was not one of its 
making. For the time being, administratively speaking, it was 
regulated by the Malta Dockyard (Temporary Provisions) Act passed 
by the Malta Legislative Assembly in February 1963. There was a 
top gear and well-connected Council of Administration chaired, on 
the recommendation of Duncan Sandys, by Sir Eric Milbourne; and 
there were Swan Hunter as managing agents; but the property as 
such was still entrusted to Baileys who carried on with their 
marathon litigation.41 The crunch really came later, in 1967, when 
British funds for the dockyard stopped and all contact with the 
Baileys had to be terminated. Given that it had practically no 
bearing on naval shipping and repairs, Independence per se would 
in no way resolve the festering dockyard problem, but for the time 
being Borg Olivier had at least managed to keep the dockyard gates 
open while avoiding being lumped with its financial liabilities lock, 
stock and barrel. In article 5 of the Defence Agreement, the 
dockyard, like the harbour and airfield, still could not, except by 
mutual agreement between the two governments, be used by forces 
40 Memo, C. Eastwood, 7 Oct. 1963,926/2045. 
41 Milbourne had great experience in shipping matters and port administration. The 
other members, also recommended by Sandys, were Sir Nicholas Cayzer, Chairman 
of the British and Commonwealth Shipping Company; Mr Charles Densem, a 
partner in Deloitte, Plender & Griffiths, the chartered accountants; and Lord 
Melchett of the merchant bankers M. Samuel & Co. The decision to send outH.M.S. 
Troubridge for major repairs was taken at the same time in the hope of kick-starting 
a new phase. Sandys aide memoire, arising partly from discussions he had held with 
Borg Olivier in December 1962, conf., Feb. 1963, shortly before the passage of the 
Malta Dockyard (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1963, enc. 926/3015. 
DEFENCE, FINANCE AND DELIVERANCE 591 
other than Maltese and British, or NATO forces under certain 
conditions.42 
Much more insidious, from a strict defence point of view in the early 
1960s, was an issue which was very hush-hush at the time, and one 
which has never been comprehensively treated since. This was a 
difference of opinion between the Maltese and the British side which 
- to the latter - was of the utmost importance. Either as a negotiating 
tactic or because he had had second thoughts about his earlier 
readiness to consider granting Polaris base facilities to the V.S. Navy, 
now Borg Olivier wished that the Defence Agreement should 
preclude nuclear propelled vessels and other vessels carrying 
nuclear weapons, explosives, or ammunition from using or passing 
through Maltese territory, territorial waters, or airspace. 
Mr Sandys therefore asked the Ministry of Defence to consider 
whether a concession might be made in this field in a different form. 
Could not the Maltese be given an assurance, of the kind given by 
the Americans to the British, that Malta "would not be used as a base 
for nuclear operations without their concurrence?" 
Mr Thorneycroft, the Secretary of State for Defence, understood the 
difficulty that this point was making in the negotiations. However, 
he did not see "any room whatever for a concession upon it."43 
Nuclear weapons were the military craze of the sixties for those that 
had them or sought to acquire them. Malta certainly had no interest, 
means or aspiration to enter that domain pro-actively. V nless this 
was one of his bargaining chips from under the counter - he had 
42 In terms oflegislation, the problem was largely regulated by the Malta Dockyard 
Act 1968 when a Malta Dockyard Corporation was set up. On this see E. Mizzi, op.cit., 
esp. p. 67. However, the dockyard was and generally has continued to be the single 
most serious liability inherited by the Malta Government from the British period, 
financially, economically and politically. 
43 Hockady/Huijsman, 1 July 1964, sec., 926/1873/48489. 
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shown himself receptive a year earlier to the possibility of having 
nuclear-powered submarines based in Malta - Borg Olivier, a little 
islander, was more likely suspicious of and hostile to these 'new' 
inventions by the big powers for mass destruction - weapons 
deriving their destructive force from the energy released during 
nuclear fission or fusion. As nuclear weapons were not limited to a 
tactical short-range, for use on the battlefield (in which case he might 
have cared less) but included theatre medium-range and strategic 
long-range varieties, Borg Olivier may have reckoned that it would 
be in Malta's best interest if, come Independence, she could steer 
away from any direct association with these things. In storage, transit 
or otherwise, nuclear weapons could be dangerous in themselves, as 
well as a magnet for reprisals in the event of an outbreak of hostilities 
in the Mediterranean region. Nuclear weapons were spreading fast 
by 1964. Furthermore, before 1968 there was no treaty to stem or 
regulate nuclear proliferation. For Britain, as for the U.S.A. and the 
U.S.S.R., however, nuclear power for bombs, missles and other uses, 
including submarines, was becoming increasingly important to their 
respective defence systems, causing them to recast defence planning 
and budgeting. Yet these were hardly 'defensive' weapons. As Malta 
herself for obvious reasons had never attacked anyone or harboured 
any expansionist ambitions, in her national psyche she was 
accustomed to think mainly in terms of how best to defend herself 
against enemies - from the marauding Muslim corsairs of old to the 
dive-bombing German stukas of more recent memory. Who knew 
what the future might hold? On the other hand, however, she also 
needed to be defended, especially once she would become 
independent, without an army, a navy or an air force or any defence 
set-up of her own worth mentioning. Borg Olivier had to face this 
paradox. The British knew it. 
There had been heated exchanges between the Soviets and the 
Americans in 1963 when the Polaris programme was being extended 
to the Mediterranean. The U.S.S.R. suggested that the 
Mediterranean be declared a nuclear-free zone and in a note to the 
Unuited States in May, 1963, specifically mentioned Malta in the 
context of plans 
B 
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to place in the Mediterranean American atomic submarines 
equipped with the "Polaris" nuclear missile. Spanish ports 
and British military strongholds on Cyprus and Malta have 
been designated as possible bases for these submarines. 
There have been reports that the "Polaris" submarines will 
also use Turkish, Greek, and Italian ports. Two such atomic 
submarines have already entered the Mediterranean and are 
getting "the feel" of the coastal waters of Greece and Turkey. 
The U .S.A. and some ot its allies are thus demonstrating once 
again that the concern to prevent thermonuclear war or even 
reduce the danger of its occurrence is alien to their policy ... 44 
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The American response to this "propagandistic attack" was that the 
U.S. Government was 
compelled to strengthen the security of its Allies in the 
Mediterranean only after their security had been directly 
threatened by the Soviet Union's deployment of an extensive 
array of missiles aimed at countries in the area. Consequently 
the United States and the threatened Mediterranean 
countries were forced in their own defense to counteract the 
striking power of these Soviet nuclear missiles and Soviet 
nuclear-equipped aircraft which were poised for attack on 
the region. Ifithad done otherwise, the United States would 
have failed in its duty to help its Allies to defend themselves 
against a form of nuclear blackmail under which the Soviet 
Union could have attempted to force the Mediterranean 
countries to succumb to Soviet dictation or Soviet 
domination.45 
44 The Defense of the Mediterranean (16) Polaris Submarines in the Mediterranean: 
Soviet Note to the United States, May 20, 1963', Documents on American Foreign 
Relations (ed. R.P.Stebbins and E.P.Adam, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 
1964), p.l0S. 
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Borg Olivier must have realised how big and delicate an issue this 
was and tried to steer clear of it, or to tempt fate. 
In discussions on article 4 of the Defence Agreement, M.O.D. 
officials noted, Maltese pressure, which would have in effect 
confined Britain to using Malta only for operations in fulfilment of 
"obligations", had been successfully resisted.46 Article 4 now left the 
British free to use the base for any purpose which, in the view of Her 
Majesty's Government, would be proper. In response to the 
suggestion made by the colonial secretary, it was further noted that: 
To accept the American arrangement for Malta would, once 
again, be to limit the freedom of Her Majesty's Government 
to judge for what purposes they should use Malta as a base. 
We certainly cannot rule out the possibility that at some time 
in the future we might wish to use Malta as a base for nuclear 
operations, or as a staging post for nuclear operations. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Ministry of Defence was afraid that 
if they were to concede the point to Malta, they could well be 
expected to be pressed to concede it to Singapore, Aden and 
elsewhere. It would then be difficult to find arguments for resisting. 
The American position might also be seriously jeopardised: 
Nuclear weapons are a fact of the present age, and indeed 
the defence of the free world as a whole rests upon them. 
We cannot make exceptions for particular countries, by 
excluding them from any part in nuclear support, without 
endangering the defence as a whole. 
This was not to say that Malta either would or would not be used as "a 
base for nuclear operations" or even as "a place for keeping nuclear 
weapons". The basic Anglo-American policy was neither to confirm 
nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons in any particular place.47 
46 See above, H, 15. 
47 Ibid., f. 2, para. l. 
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Nuclear policy was not a subject likely to be profusely documented; 
much of the sensitive discussion involved was security-bound and 
top secret. From such revealing shreds of evidence as have survived, 
together with the memories of one or two of the handful of 
counsellors accompanying Borg Olivier at the Savoy to whom he 
confided what was going on, it is crystal clear that the anti-nuclear 
position taken by Malta was, for the British, a grave stumbling block. 
The Ministry of Defence, surely with the backing of the Foreign 
Office, and certainly that of the Office of the Prime Minister, would 
not let go on this question. In his maiden speech as Prime Minister 
in the House of Commons in November 1963, Douglas-Home had 
posited as the main issue in the forthcoming general election, an 
independent nuclear deterrent for Britain.48 
Tentatively, a letter was formulated to be sent by Borg Olivier, which 
the British Government would acknowledge without ado. In this, 
certain assurances and explanations which the latter was giving 
verbally, would be spelt out. In a draft letter to the colonial secretary 
which remained in draft form and was never sent - and which 
reserved the right of the Maltese government to be free to raise any 
objections it might have in this matter - verbal explanations given 
by the British Government to Dr Borg Olivier in 1964 were 
recorded, as follows: 
(a) that apart from the temporary storage of nuclear 
weapons in transit the British Government then had no 
plans to establish and use Malta as a nuclear base or for 
the storage therein of nuclear weapons and that it was 
most unlikely that Malta would be so used; 
(b) that Malta was really unsuitable for such use; 
(c) that exclusion of nuclear matters from the Agreement 
would create an undesirable precedent in relation to 
48 "'L-Elezzjoni tkun fuq id-Deterrent Nukleari Indipendenti" - Sir Alexander 
Douglas-Home', Il-Helsien, 13 Nov. 1963, p.l. 
DEFENCE, FINANCE AND DELIVERANCE 
other countries and that for obvious reasons the British 
and American Governments have never been willing 
either to confirm or to deny that nuclear weapons are or 
are not in any particular place; 
(d) that it is most unlikely that a situation would arise in which 
nuclear operations might take place without Common-
wealth Prime Ministers being aware of it beforehand.49 
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While there were really no hard and fast undertakings in the gist of 
these assurances or explanations, they nevertheless constituted an 
understanding that to the extent that Malta would be used for 
nuclear purposes such use was likely to be rather minimal. The third 
paragraph of the unsent draft letter confirmed the M.O.D. 
argument being made to the C.O. - that it was because of the praxis 
elsewhere, as in Aden and Singapore, that Malta could in no way be 
exempted. That 'give away' letter by Arthur Hockady sent from 
Thorneycroft's office to Nick Huijsman at the Commonwealth 
Relations Office on pt July 1964,50 was as would be expected rather 
more frank, less guarded and punctilious, leaving the whole matter 
somewhat open ended. And that essentially was where it rested. 
On Saturday 1l th July Borg Olivier was invited to lunch, alone, by 
Douglas-Home at Chequers, which was the prime minister's official 
country residence on a large estate in the more leafy surroundings 
of Buckinghamshire, north-west of London. They would not have 
noticed that, ironically, that building dates back to 1565, the year of 
Malta's Great Siege, when it was cannon balls and scalding oil, rather 
than nuclear fission and fusion, that had tempered the East's 
westward advance. Chequers had since 1921, when David Lloyd 
George first resided there, become a seductive weekend retreat 
where British prime ministers customarily entertained important 
guests in what were known as 'ministerial weekends'. The nuclear 
49 E. Mizzi, op.cit., p. 3S. 
50 See above, pp. 591-592. 
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question was sufficiently serious to the British Government for Borg 
Olivier to be treated and feted in this way. Sandys was there too. 
After the lunch of the two prime ministers, with the colonial 
secretary in attendance most of the time, Borg Olivier confided to 
his assistants that he had been prevailed upon not to make the 
nuclear issue public. It was agreed that a formula would be found 
which satisfied Borg Olivier but which would be worded in such a 
way as to be understandable only to those who were already aware 
of the problem - a lovers' code. 
Article 7 of the Defence Agreement, as agreed to and then published 
officially, would thus read as follows: 
Arrangements shall be made for consultation between the 
Government of Malta and the Government of the United 
Kingdom and their respective authorities on the operation 
of this Agreement, and each Government shall have the 
right to raise with the other at any time any question on the 
application of this Agreement where that is materially 
affected by any change of circumstances.51 
What this language of the Sybil was supposed to mean exactly is 
obscure, particularly in view of the stated policy of refusal by the 
British authorities, as by the American ones, to neither accept nor 
deny whether nuclear weapons were in use or in storage or 
anywhere. Was it a game of blind man's bluff, a Nelson's eye? It 
rather meant something in relation to and confronted with what the 
text of the article had read like before: when it had simply stated that 
arrangements for consultation on the operation of this Agreement 
should be such as might be agreed between the two Governments. 
What it did mean for Malta is that within a matter of days Sandys 
would be in a position to announce to Borg Olivier an OK - not only 
on the defence agreement, but also on a financial package. 
51 According to Ragonesi, Douglas-Home gave Borg Olivier his word of honour that 
no "nuclear" use would be made of Malta without prior consultation; but see E. 
Mizzi, op.cit., esp. p. 38. 
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Here too there had been some lingering disagreement. Borg Olivier 
had long said that he did not wish to have any direct link between 
the Defence Agreement and the Financial Agreement. When this 
matter had been raised, more than once, during the meetings of the 
chiefs of staff, who had advocated an intimate linkage, Mr Cumming 
Bruce for the C.O. had informed them that neither Borg Olivier nor 
the Treasury were in favour of it. 52 Given, however, the defence-
motivated preoccupations with developments in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East, resulting in a greater need of Malta for defence 
purposes, and the fear of an abrogation of any Defence Agreement 
or worse by a Mintoff regime, this linkage argument impressed itself 
all the more upon Mr Thorneycroft. 
For Thorneycroft, as for Mountbatten, Independence for Malta was 
afestina lente. Like Douglas-Home, they were wary of it, and would 
have delayed it if they could; at one point it seemed indeed possible 
that they would succeed. Douglas-Home was very cautious and in 
two minds about it; he had heartily hoped that the independence 
referendum in May would be "inconclusive", so that Malta's 
independence would be, to use Thorneycroft's verb, "shelved". And 
so was R. A. Butler, the Foreign Secretary, judging for example by 
his office's formal request that they be kept informed of any code-
named military operations for the Malta contingencies.53 It is thus 
not surprising to see that during the last rounds of the Anglo-
Maltese negotiations, the Ministry of Defence was insisting on a 
direct linkage between the two agreements: defence and finance. Put 
bluntly, this meant: no base, no cash. 
This matter had been again considered at the highest levels, in the 
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, and decided upon there, 
and by Cabinet. Thorneycroft therefore felt that if there were any 
question of "reopening this matter" because of Borg Olivier's 
request, Sandys would have to raise it in the D.O.P.C. The direct 
52 See above, II, 15. 
53 Ibid. 
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linkage was "a point to which Mr Thorneycroft has attached 
considerable importance."54. Thorneycroft must have felt 
reasonably sure that if Sandys were to re-open the matter in 
support ofBorg Olivier's or the Treasury's preferences, he would still 
be unable to change the decision taken. Having quickly conceded 
Independence, they would lastingly ensure defence. The 'base for 
cash' posture was seen as a sinecure. As a quid pro quo written into the 
agreement, it might even deter a Mintoff, they reckoned. 
In the summer of 1964 the British military presence in Malta 
consisted of four ships of one escort squadron, one submarine division 
(H.M.S. Ausonia plus two submaries), one minesweeping squadron 
consisting of six units, and the Royal Naval Observer School at Hal 
Far; in addition there were normally one escort and a number of 
minor vessels in reserve and refitting plus some fleet auxiliaries and 
boom defence vessels. The army had two infantry battalions plus 
support and administrative units, and the R.A.F. had one Shackelton 
Squadron for maritime reconnaissance, and a Canberra Squadron for 
photographic reconnaissance, together with support, administrative 
and movement elements. Apart from the other possible contingencies 
already mentioned, there was a U .K.-N.A.T.O. project to supplement 
and improve the existing communications facilities at Rinella Radio 
Station by a new station at Burmarrad, but it had not been possible 
to get approval for constructing this station because of "the 
uncertainty of our security of tenure in Malta after independence and 
of the uncertainty about the future of CINCAFMED Headquarters 
in Malta." If it was decided to retain HAFMED in Malta, this project 
would be allowed to proceed together with the modernisation of the 
existing facilities at Rinella.55 
This was after the policy of running down the Service establishments 
over a four-year period from 1963 to 1966 had started being 
implemented especially for the army and air force, with the savings 
54 Hockady/Huijsman, 1 July 1964, sec., f. 2, para. 2, 926/1873/48489. 
55 COS 167/64, enc. J. H. Lapsley, 27 May 1964, sec., f. 4, 926/1873/48489. 
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envisaged to Britain from this being of about £7,000,000 in annual 
costs; and by 1965/66, of some 286 officers, 1,833 ratings, 239 U .K.-
based civilians, plus some 4,700 Maltese, from the Royal Navy; 
together with 10 officers, 170 other ranks, plus some 2,000 Maltese, 
from the Army; and 30 officers, 170 other ranks, and 550 Maltese 
from the R.A.F.56 
An Allied Staff of 89 officers and 124 ratings were based at 
HAFMED, Malta, in addition to which HAFMED received frequent 
visits from NATO naval and air forces, but SACEUR had recently 
submitted "new proposals for command in the Mediterranean 
whereby CINCAFMED would be disestablished and replaced by an 
Italian COMNAVSOUTH at Naples."57 The British, supported in 
this by the Americans, were resisting uncertainty in that domain, 
mainly through the North Atlantic Counci1.58 
Negotiations under way for the mutual defence and financial 
agreements obviously had to keep all these variables in mind, 
quantifying and costing them. Somehow they had to compensate for 
the losses in personnel, expenditure and employment to Malta, the 
benefits arising from the retention of a military presence, and a 
golden handshake by way of a financial kick-start into the new era 
of Independence. 
There is no doubt that the British preferred to strike a deal with 
Borg Olivier than with Mintoff. On the whole, they had come round 
to the view that they were on surer ground dealing with Borg Olivier 
than with Mintoff. In spite of some more liberal and secularist 
concepts vaunted by Mintoff with which the British generally 
sympathised, he came to be seen increasingly as politically erratic 
56 Ibid., f. 3. 
57 'NATO Considerations - Location of Headquarters COMNAVSOUTH', ibid., f. 12. 
58 On Malta-NATO relations, including discussions about Malta in the North Atlantic 
Council, see below, pp. 609-619. 
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and ideologically dangerous. In the mid-fifties, when Mintoff was 
campaigning for Malta's Integration with Britain, they would have 
much preferred Mintoff to Borg Olivier;59 but by the mid-sixties, 
that had changed markedly. In 1964 the British Government, 
having finalised a Defence Agreement to their satisfaction, wanted 
to support Malta, and Borg Olivier's administration, as well as they 
could afford to, cocking a snook at Mintoff. That was partly out of a 
moral obligation to Malta but, no less, it was to help Borg Olivier 
consolidate and to keep Mintoff at bay. Of course they had in interest 
in doing this; so, to a lesser extent, had Western Europe. But it 
turned out in the end to be largely a mutual Anglo-Maltese interest. 
After all, an independent Malta left to her own devices would have 
been as defenceless as it then was economically dependent - more 
so with the sudden British withdrawal after so long an association 
with the Island. That was a fact of life. There is nothing theoretical 
about it. On the strength of the documentation now available, it is 
impossible to sustain a claim made in 1989 that: 
when it came to deciding which particular leader of the 
major Maltese parties they preferred to deal with, British 
officials came to the conclusion that there was precious little 
difference between them. They all stuck determinedly to 
their guns in their effort to achieve the best possible deal for 
Malta within the political ideology that they professed. This 
conclusion also emerges in an unmistakable manner from 
the British official documents available.6o 
While some main issues remained largely the same, to suggest at 
least with regard to the early 1960s that British officials saw precious 
59 On the Integration question, see esp. D. Austin, Malta and the End of Empire (Cass, 
Lond., 1971 and, J. M. Pirotta, Fortress Colony, op.cit., vo!. 2, on 1955-1958. 
60 J. M. Pirotta, 'Contemporary Maltese History', The Sunday Times, Valletta, 2 Apr. 
1989, p. 25. Pirotta was rebutting an article by Dennis Sammut entitled: "March, 
1979: when things really changed" (The Sunday Times, Valletta, 26 Mar. 1989). 
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little difference between the leaders of the main Maltese parties, 
would be wide off the mark. How far those leaders were themselves 
being patriots in equal measure, is something else; but so far as 
British officials were concerned in the 1960s, they had a decided 
preference for Borg Olivier's variety of doing politics over Mintoff's, 
and they showed it. 
The point was made unequivocally enough by probably the most 
knowledgeable officer covering the Malta and Mediterranean desk 
at the Colonial Office, Mr J. M. Kisch, in reply to a pregnant query 
from Mr J. C. Morgan of the Commonwealth Relations Office, as to 
how it was proposed to secure "that Mintoff could neither seize 
power nor, if elected constitutionally, abrogate such a defence 
agreement." The object in asking being of course, as stated, "that we 
do not want to become inheritors in Malta of a Zanzibarian 
situation!"6! 
Zanzibar, an island in the Indian Ocean off what was then called 
Tanganyika, about five times the size of Malta with a smaller 
population, had just become independent and soon afterwards, in 
January 1964, all hell broke lose in a violent revolution. Under the 
dictatorial direction of the Mro-Shirazi Party, led by Abeid Karume, 
a onetime sailor, and other army men, the Sultan of Zanzibar was 
deposed in a coup d'etat; a Revolutionary Council was set up; and the 
nationalisation of all land formerly owned by the Arab ruling class 
was accompanied by countless killings.62 Briefly, Westerners were 
made unwelcome as financial, technical and military help flowed 
into Zanzibar from the Chinese and the East Germans. Soon 
61 In a letter headed 'Top Secret", J.C.Morgan from the C.R.O.'s Mediterranean 
Department, was writing to J. Kisch at the C.O., with regard to a decision taken by 
the chiefs of the defence staff, 4 June 1964, 926/1873/48489. On this see above, 
II, 15. 
62 For a long time Zanzibar's primary export had been slaves, but in the twentieth 
century coconuts and especially cloves became the more important cash crops and 
exports. The coup's anchor man was a peasant, 'Field-Marshal' John Okello. 
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afterwards, on the Zanzibari revolutionary example, there was an 
attempted coup d'etat in neighbouring Tanganyika, another newly-
independent state, causing her president Julius Nyerere to go into 
hiding.63 That was the kind of thing British officials, and politicians, 
did not wish to see happen in an independent Malta (unlike 
Zanzibar, not a multi-racial society). 
"Your letter of 4th June referring to COS 38 th Meeting raises a large 
question", Kisch told Morgan on the following day: 
To begin with, I think one can say briefly that the Secretary 
of State has no intention of allowing a Zanzibari situation in 
Malta. Borg Olivier is discussing with Lord Lansdowne 
today the question of U.K. support to Malta's internal 
security. It would indeed be absurd if we were to allow 
Mintoff to seize power by force; it would imply that we 
would be making no attempt to retain what has now become 
a more important defence interest in Malta. 
As far as the Colonial Secretary was concerned, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office could rest assured that "the Forces would be 
instructed to quash such a coup" assuming that the Maltese Police, 
ete. were inadequate to the task. He supposed it was difficult to make 
assumptions about what might be the Government's attitude if the 
General Election there brought in a new administration, but he did 
not really see that they could take a very different view. Kisch would 
however expect that if a Labour Government were returned to 
power in Britain, Mintoffwould reopen talks with them, and indeed 
a Labour Government might seek to influence Mintoff to take a 
more reasonable line. What follows is borne out by evidence from 
various sources, to which ample reference has already been made, 
as well as by an analysis of the plain facts: 
63 In October 1964 N yerere negotiated the union of the two countries to form 
Tanzania, making the troublesome Karume his Vice-President. Karume was 
assassinated in 1972. See R. Sadlevi, Tanzania: Journey to Republic (Lond., 1999), esp. 
ch. 23, 'Revolution in Zanzibar and Army Mutiny, 1963-1964'. 
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The Colonial Secretary has very much in mind the necessity 
of putting Borg Olivier in as favourable a position as possible 
to retain power. On current form I would not expect 
Mintoff to have good chances of being successful at the next 
Malta general elections, which have to be held some time 
before March, 1966. 
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If one day Mintoff were returned to power (although Lord 
Strickland had never recovered his position after his quarrel with 
the Church even although he had reconciled himself to them) it 
was interesting to speculate what might happen. The point was 
that Malta depended "so entirely" on Services expenditure which, 
even at the end of the rundown, was not likely to fall below 
£12,000,000: 
How could the Maltese be employed, and how could they 
buy their food if the place was completely neutralised? 
Mintoffhas absurd ideas about changing over the economy 
in a matter of a few years, but he would soon find out that 
this was impossible. 
Kisch, who had been on the independence negotiations from the 
start, imagined that two thoughts were uppermost in Mintoff's mind. 
The first was that the Malta Independence Constitution could be so 
framed as to give him little chance of ever returning to power. As 
the Colonial Secretary did not intend to accept Borg Olivier's 
Constitution as it stood, Mintoff might find that his fears were 
exaggerated. Secondly, Mintoff could not accept that "the proposed 
Defence Agreement is binding on him because that is his main 
bargaining weapon for money, ete." Personally, he found it hard 
to envisage the Maltese, who are most concerned about 
money and jobs, following Mintoff into a situation where 
they had neither, and it is exceedingly difficult to see any 
other power being able to fill the vacuum that would be left 
by the withdrawal of the British Forces, and also of course 
the withdrawal of British civil aid which we may assume 
would not be continued if we were driven from the island. 
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Such considerations, Kisch thought, were by no means absent from 
Maltese minds, and that was one reason why the standing and 
success of the Malta Labour Party at the moment were not 
encouraging to Mintoff. Furthermore, when Malta became 
independent, the people would be forced to take a more responsible 
attitude. "They realize, I think, that it will not be like the good old 
days when the British could always suspend the Constitution and 
restore order." 
Some of the points and impressions made in Kisch's letter are 
evidently his own but, on the strength of his inside knowledge and 
reading of the situation, the general drift of things bears him out. 
The weakness about these somewhat optimistic arguments, Kisch 
felt, was "the poverty of Borg Olivier as a politician, or rather as an 
administrator. " 
I can only hope that on independence the better Maltese 
who at the moment keep clear of politics, will find 
themselves forced to take a hand. I also derive some comfort 
from the improbability of Egypt or Russia being able or 
prepared to put in vast quantities of money. 
The fact is that Mintoff's neutrality policy is such nonsense 
that I find it difficult to write a sensible letter about him.64 
The C.R.O. found this explanation about possible future actions by 
Mintoff "extremely useful": 
We appreciate to the full the difficulties you have outlined 
and hope that the Maltese themselves will see which side 
their bread is buttered. We have noted the proposals which 
you have advised the Secretary of State to make in respect 
of financial aid to Malta as one way of "putting Borg Olivier 
in as favourable a position as possible to retain power" by 
64 Kisch/Morgan, 5 June 1964, sec., 926/1873/48489. 
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assisting him to keep down unemployment, and thus 
maintain a quiet and stable background, not only for our 
future relations but also against which to enjoy defence 
facilities on the island.65 
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Briefly, the purpose of the Defence Agreement, as drafted by the 
last week of June, and as defined by the British Government, was 
to provide that British Forces would be enabled to remain in 
Malta and to carry out their roles effectively but with proper 
regard for the well-being of the people of Malta. It was 
recognized that, although Malta had been a base for British 
Forces, for many years and played an important part in two world 
wars, changes in the size and disposition of British Forces in 
Malta had diminished and a considerable run-down of the Forces 
stationed there had been taking place. Nevertheless, important 
requirements remained, including the need for forward 
operating facilities for the Royal Navy and for airfield facilities for 
the Royal Air Force. Although no one could foresee what further 
changes the future might bring it was expected that these 
requirements ·would continue. It was further stated that the 
British Forces had always made an important contribution to the 
economy of the island and expected that in spite of the run-down 
this would still be very substantial. Britain and Malta therefore 
had strong reasons of self-interest for making proper provision 
for the continued presence of British Forces in the island. This 
was the line to be taken in legitimizing the agreement politically 
in Britain, one that was not far removed from that of the Borg 
Olivier administration itself, although this would emphasise 
rather more Malta's needs and the benefits to Malta from it. It was 
noted that the links which had been forged between Malta and 
the Forces through the years oftheir presence on the Island went 
far beyond the economic and purely defence links and for this 
reason too "both sides in these discussions have tried very hard 
to make mutually satisfactory arrangements". The Maltese as well 
65 Morgan/Kisch, 12June 1964, sec., 926/1873/48489. 
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as the British government representatives were "satisfied that we 
have succeeded."66 
The Agreement itself only contained ten articles, but was 
supplemented by detailed and specific annexes. It provided for 
"mutual defence" and consultations on measures to be taken jointly 
or separately to ensure the fullest co-operation, and that the closest 
co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries would 
be fostered. If so requested by the Government of Malta, the 
Government of the United Kingdom, would so far as it could 
provide assistance or advice as would be agreed in the training of 
and advice to the armed forces of Malta in various ways, including 
logistical support. Under article 4, Malta would grant Britain "in 
peace and war" the right to station armed forces and associated 
British personnel and to use facilities for the purposes of "mutual 
defence", the fulfilment of international or Commonwealth 
obligations, the asistance of "other nations in maintaining their 
independence and stability", or the protection of citizens of the U.K. 
and colonies or of Malta. The modalities and other details governing 
these rights and facilities were spelt out in an annex. According to 
article 5, no forces "other than the forces of Malta and the United 
Kingdom" would be stationed in Malta or be "permitted to use" 
harbour, dockyard, airfield, staging or communications facilities in 
Malta, unless that use was rendered necessary by "distress in the 
course of sea or air navigation", or to establish such facilities in 
Malta. There was however an introductory saving clause to all this: 
"Except under arrangements made between the two Governments". 
Moreover, this article would not apply to "the forces of any Party to 
the North Atlantic Treaty", to which the Government of Malta might 
accord such rights or facilities which did not "impede" the exercise 
of the rights or the use of the facilities granted to the U.K. Article 6 
as it stood in draft form would be re-written and enlarged to take 
account of the British concern regarding nuclear weapons. Provision 
66 This edited typed draft, on 926/1916/48583, was originally intended for the 
colonial secretary's speech on the passage on the Defence Agreement in his speech 
on the Malta Independence Bill, the substance of which was in fact retained. 
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was made for consultations on the operation of the Agreement, and 
that nothing would prejudice the rights and obligations devolving 
on either Government under the UN Charter. The Annex to the 
Agreement would be an integral part of it, and the Agreement would 
come into force on the date of signature and would remain in force 
for a period of 10 years thereafter (that is, until 1974).67 
One of the last re-drafting exercises (apart from the nuclear weapons 
question) related to some kind of linkage between defence and 
finance, with the assistance of the Treasury Solicitor's office. For this 
they were using a combination of the Libya68 and Cyprus69 models 
of 1953 and 1960 respectively. A third recital - in the preamble to 
the Agreement - was therefore drafted, with a separate article 
intended for inclusion in the Agreement itself. The wording in the 
Libya Treaty which said specifically "in return for facilities" was 
thought best avoided as this savoured rather too much of a price; 70 
but there would be further discussion and some modification of this 
formula before the texts of the two Agreements would be initialled. 
The other technical but necessary consideration with regard to the 
Defence Agreement being now determined more or less in final, was 
the means for bringing it into operation, mainly through the Visiting 
Forces Act, 1952. An order to be made under it would be ready for 
signature on Independence Day.71 
In defence policy - again not unrelated to economic and financial 
considerations - one of Borg Olivier's stratagems was to interest 
NATO more in Malta: for reasons of stability and, as he saw it, profit. 
67 'Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Malta', ff. 1-4, enc. 926/2078. 
68 Cmd. 9043, art. 3. 
69 The Exchange of Notes on Cyprus, Cmd. 1093, Appendix R. 
70 Hall!Galsworthy, 15 June 1964, conf., 926/2078. 
71 Dromgoole/Kisch, 24June 1964,926/1916/48583. 
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The British were rather keen on this initially and they tried to lobby 
for it, but without much success. The Maltese government proposed 
that NATO establish in Malta an International Institute of Science 
and Technology.72 This was strategy tinged with academia: it would 
have meant promoting Malta as a world centre of excellence in 
strategic studies and technological research in military-related fields, 
drawing expertise, resident scholars, support staff and technical 
facilities from Western Europe and North America to Maltese shores. 
A decorous softener from the harsh realities of the war-torn past, a 
novel genre of academic realpolitik, this proposal was clearly consonant 
with Malta's long-standing frontline position and tradition on 
Europe's southern flank, for centuries a defender and a sentinel of 
European Christendom in the Ottoman advance westwards. It was 
an attempt to maximize on Malta's 'George Cross' credentials from 
the Second World War, which in 1964 were still within the living 
memory of most people. Borg Olivier made his administration's 
proposal for this Malta-based international institute on 18 th 
December 1963. The idea itself went back to 1960 and had 
subsequently been the subject of a great deal of consideration and 
discussion in the UK. Like the rebuilding of the Royal Opera House 
demolished in a Nazi raid in 1942, for which Borg Olivier insisted 
valiantly but in vain, this institute was one of his unlucky pet 
proposals. In Britain, the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy 
examined the proposal in detail and submitted recommendations to 
the Minister of Science but, in the light of these recommendations, 
the British government reached the conclusion that "a single unitary 
International Institute of the kind envisaged was undesirable, and 
that any such International Institute should be more broadly based 
than on the NATO Alliance." This conclusion was announced in the 
British Parliament and had been made known to other governments. 
In these circumstances, the British government was hardly in a 
position to follow up the Maltese government's suggestion.73 
72 Wakefield/Kisch, 25 Mar. 1964, 926/2064. 
73 Wakefield/Borg Olivier, 23 Mar. 1964,926/2064. 
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Contrary to the popular impression that, until Mr Mintoff gave 
Admiral Birindelli marching orders in June 1971, NATO had 
longed to retain or to increase its presence in Malta, assessments as 
to Malta's continuing value for NATO as a Mediterranean 
headquarters in the 1960s, were mixed within the NATO command 
itself. Malta was seen to possess mostly a negative value: it was a 
prize which another power bloc should be deterred by every possible 
means from plucking. Borg Olivier could not have been too pleased 
with the lukewarm responses he was getting from NATO in spite of 
his professed loyalty to Western principles, although all was not yet 
lost. As has been hinted at earlier, there was a current of opinion, 
not least an Italian one, which would have preferred to see the 
Southern command centralized in Naples, but others accepted the 
importance of retaining part of it in Malta. The British lobbied 
successfully for HAFMED to be retained in Malta, arguing that in 
addition to providing stability this also provided jobs and attracted 
spin-offs from naval visits. HAFMED in Malta could also be an arm 
support if not a fallback position for Britain's own continued 
presence in the Island after independence. Britain tried sounding 
out NATO on the possibility of Malta's membership of the 
organization. This move probably had the green light from Borg 
Olivier's administration in principle; and it would have been music 
to the ears of the Strickland, Ganado and Pellegrini parties, who 
were terrified of a Communist takeover spearheaded by Mintoff. 
Towards the end of July 1964 the Head of the UK's Permanent 
Delegation to NATO, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, had an important 
"private meeting" on Malta with his colleagues on the North Atlantic 
Council in Brussles. Shuckburgh gave them an outline of the contents 
of the Defence and FinanceAgreements (which hadjust been initialled 
by Sandys and Borg Olivier in London). A "lengthy and involved 
discussion" followed, he reported back to the Foreign Office, during 
which a number of questions were raised. The main items raised 
concerned Malta's status after independence; possibilities of Malta's 
membership of or association with NATO; and military questions. 
At the outset there was some confusion as to Malta's future 
relationship with the UK, Shuckburgh wrote: 
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I was able to clear this up by reference to Mr Sandys' 
statement of July 21 and by emphasising that, irrespective 
of the legal forms of association with the United Kingdom, 
Malta will become completely independent on September 
25 and hence presumably a member ofthe United Nations. 
Many permanent representatives of the NATO member states asked 
whether Malta would remain within the NATO area after 
independence: 
Most of those who spoke tended to assume that it would not. 
On this point Shuckburgh gave the Foreign Office's views as these 
had been outlined to him in a telegram dated loth July (before any 
initialling of any Anglo-Maltese agreement had taken place). 
As for Malta's membership of NATO, it was clear that most 
governments were unwilling to make up their minds at present. The 
most decided - and in fact the only - overt opposition to Malta's 
membership came from Denmark. The Danish representative had 
obviously already been in contact with his government because he said 
that "his Government would be reluctant to agree to Maltese 
membership." His Scandinavian neighbour, the Norwegian 
representative, said that "his Government would only take such a 
decision in the light of circumstances obtaining at the time when an 
application was received from an independent Maltese Government." 
On the other hand, the Belgian, Turkish and Greek representatives 
indicated that their governments would be "in favour of Maltese 
membership if so desired by an independent Maltese Government and 
the population of the Island." The country most supportive of Malta's 
membership seems to have been, understandably enough, Italy, since 
the Italian representative'S interventions were described in an aside 
in Shuckburgh's account as "helpful throughout". 
No government of a NATO member state was prepared at this stage 
to agree to what Britain was in fact suggesting - that contact be 
established between a representative of the International Staff and 
the Maltese Government, on grounds that not enough information 
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was yet available about "the possible future intentions of the Maltese 
Government" and "the likely conditions in the Island after 
independence", and "the military factors" involved. Most of the 
representatives who spoke asked for further indications of the views 
of the military authorities on the strategic importance of the Island 
to the NATO defence effort, and the desirability of maintaining a 
NATO Headquarters there. 
The German representative, whose instructions had been received 
before the details oftheAnglo-Maltese agreements were known, said 
that "even if the Headquarters did not remain, the most important 
thing was to prevent the use of the Island by a hostile power." He was 
not sure if this could be achieved exclusively by a bilateral agreement 
or even by arrangements to ensure the retention of the Headquarters. 
Bases "in neutral countries" could not be maintained in the long run 
and "did not prevent a government from being infiltrated." Malta, 
in the German view, "should be politically committed to the Alliance 
and membership would express this in the clearest form." Germany 
however recognized that there were many difficulties in this. The 
German government would not take a definite decision "before 
knowing the views of its Allies." Nevertheless, Germany suggested 
that consideration should be given to "an alternative arrangement 
whereby a treaty of friendship and assistance might be concluded 
between Malta and the members of the Alliance." 
The German proposal for a Malta-NATO Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance after independence, as expounded during this well attended 
special meeting convened at the behest of the UK's permanent 
representative to NATO, could be entered into "collectively or 
individually", and it would provide for three main undertakings, as 
follows: 
(a) for Malta to remain within the N.A.T.O. area for the 
purposes of Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty; 74 
74 Article 5 of the NATO treaty signed in 1.949 elaborates its primary purpose: "The 
Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe shall 
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(b) for Malta to guarantee that the N.A.T.O. Headquarters 
could continue to operate in the Island in peace or war; 
and 
(c) for detailed forms of political co-operation between 
Malta and the N.A.T.O. countries which could be 
elaborated later. 
Such a treaty would be supplementary to the presentAnglo-Maltese 
agreements.75 
For the British side, Shuckburgh said that the nature of Malta's 
relationship with NATO was not a purely legal question; it would 
depend on what kind of future relationship the Council wanted, 
adding: 
In the negotiations for Maltese independence, we had done 
our best to ensure that she remained within the Western 
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked ... 
to secure and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." In terms of 
geographical area, the treaty covered Europe and North America, the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and the Mediterranean. In the mid-sixties NATO 
was re-establishing the balance of power in Europe and reorganizing military 
strength on the basis of nuclear power. The member states then were Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany (1955), Greece (1952), Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey (1952), the UK and the 
U.S.A. Spain only joined in 1982, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 
Gust before the most recent Balkan war, over Kosovo). 
75 On this see if. 2-3 in Shuckburgh's five page report, 26 July 1964, sec., telegraphed 
to the Foreign Office and Whitehall, repeated for information to Washington, Rome, 
Malta and the Holy See. Members present at a meeting of the NATO Council held 
in Paris on 24 July 1964, under the chairmanship of Mr D. U. Stikker, were MM. 
A. de Staercke (Belgium), G. Ignatieif (Canada), Per Groot (Denmark), Franc;ois 
Seydoux (France), W. G. Grewe (Germany), C. X. Palamas (Greece), T.A. T6masson 
(Iceland), A. Alessandrini (Italy), P. Reuter (Luxembourg), H. N. Boon 
(Netherlands), G. Kristiansen (Norway), d'Oliveira Neves (Portugal), Nuri Birgi 
(Turkey) and T. K. Finletter (U.S.A.), in addition to four 'International Staff' 
members and one other. NATO Arch. 
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camp. We should have forces stationed there, which would 
be something. But the problem was not one which in our 
view could be solved by a bilateral treaty alone. We could not 
say that we felt happy about the future of the Island simply 
on the basis of our treaty with the Maltese, which, in our 
view, needed additional support. When Malta became 
independent there might be a break with the Alliance; the 
Headquarters might be removed and the NATO 
commitment cease; this would be very discouraging to the 
friends of the West in the Island ... 
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There was dearly a range of solutions whereby this could be 
avoided, the British representative held. The "most extreme was 
membership", as he put it, but the discussion "tended rather to 
confirm our view that this would present difficulties for some 
countries." Less extreme solutions ought to be considered and in 
this context Dr Grewe's proposals were "of great interest" and would 
be studied. At all events it was important to avoid a break at the 
moment of independence. Shuckburgh did not agree with those 
who had suggested that the formulation of a NATO view on the 
problem could be left until later. For this reason the British were 
anxious that 
a representative of the International Staff should go to Malta. 
He would be able to disabuse Dr Olivier of any exaggerated 
views he might have of the attitude of the Council either on 
the question of membership or the retention of the 
Headquarters, and would also be able to gain some 
impression of the thinking of the future Maltese Government. 
This would only be a first step, after which further 
consultation would have to take place in the Council. 76 
After further discussion and a summing up by Mr Stikker, who 
emphasised the urgency of reaching decisions, the meeting agreed 
on three courses of action. First, the NATO military authorities 
76 Shukburgh rep., 26july 1964, sec., op.cit., ff. 3-4. 
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would be asked urgently for an assessment of the military factors. 
Second, studies should be undertaken by the International Staff, 
with the assistance of the UK and Mr de Staercke in his capacity of 
Doyen, of the implications of Maltese membership, or of any form 
of association, with NATO. Third, no decision should yet be taken 
about the member of the International Staff visiting Malta. 
In a final intervention the British representative urged that the 
Council should not hide behind the idea that there were important 
military questions to be answered. The military requirement in 
respect of Malta could be stated simply: it was "to deny the Island 
to a hostile power." This was "primarily a political question." 
At the end of the meeting the Dutch representative suggested that 
it might be helpful if Her Majesty's Representative in Malta could 
be authorised to tell the Maltese Government that the problems of 
their future association with NATO were being carefully studied by 
the Council and that further discussions would be held with them 
in due course. Dr Boon said that it was important to take account 
of the susceptibilities of an emerging country and to prevent them 
from feeling "overlooked or unwanted". Curiously, the U .S. 
representative took no part whatsoever in the discussion. It was 
suspected that this was because while the U.S. Government was 
opposed to Maltese membership of NATO, they did not wish to take 
the lead in saying so. "It may well be", Shuckburgh surmised, "that 
the hesitations of other delegations are based on the same reasoning 
and that a lead from us might produce more positive results."77 
The British and the Americans were at odds - over having Malta in 
NATO. The subject of Malta's relations with NATO was however 
pursued in subsequent meetings of the North Atlantic Council, of 
which the Maltese side was not to be informed 78 
77 Ibid., f. 5. 
78 The UK Commisioner made a fuss because a NATO communique' was addressed from 
Paris, by mistake, to Dorman (who was in England) instead of to Wakefield. Worse 
and worse, it had been opened by Dorman's secretary, a Maltese, who remembered 
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In fact Malta was discussed in the North Atlantic Council a number 
of times between July and September 1964 until it was finally 
decided during private sessions of the Council held on the 4th, 7th 
and 10th September 1964, not to have her either as a member or 
even as an associate member of the organization, while still retaining 
her, however, as the Headquarters for Allied Forces Mediterranean 
(HAFMED) for the time being. The main opponent of any statutory 
association of Malta with NATO was France, closely followed by 
Denmark, although the Americans themselves never favoured 
membership while other member states had misgivings given Malta's 
size, and uncertainty about her political orientation and reliability 
in future. France's objection to any addition to the 15 member states 
of NATO was leaked and syndicated by Reuter's news agency three 
days before Malta's Independence. France believed that if Malta 
were to somehow join NATO, that would have strengthened 
Britain's hand in the organization.79 
opening this envelope and taking out "a savingram from Paris about NATO and 
Malta." Telegrams repeated to Malta "should be sent to the UK Commission not to 
the Governor, unless there are specific reasons otherwise ... The fact remains that 
savingram 21 has been seen by a Maltese secretary to the Governor, and this amounts 
to a very bad breach of security." Watt!Kisch, 13 Aug. 1964, sec., 926/2064. In a 
memorandum MED. 601/176/02, 21 Aug. 1964, it was explained to E.J .W. Barnes 
at the F.O. that "the Governor of Malta holds a unique position in that he is not a 
representative of the British Government and that the equivalent of the normal 
Colonial Governor is in Malta the U.K. Commissioner to whom all correspondence 
should be sent." The F.O. cabled the UK Delegation to NATO, Paris, 25 Aug. 1964, 
repeated for information to Washington, Ottawa, Lisbon, Oslo, Rome, Ankara, 
Copenhagen, The Hague, Brussles, Luxembourg, Bonn, Athens and the Holy See: 
"In order to avoid a risk of any leak to the Maltese about the current negotiations 
in the N.A. Council on Malta's relations with NATO, it is important that all letters 
and telegrams, copies of which are to be sent to Malta, should be addressed to 
'United Kingdom Commission Malta". See Barnes/Kisch, 26 Aug. 1964,926/2064. 
The UK Commission in Floriana were obsessed by the possibility of any classified 
information on Malta being spotted by "Maltese eyes". The person in charge of their 
registry, Mr A. Curmi, who opened inward mail, was guilty of having once done that. 
"Mr Curmi has now left the office and been replaced by Mr M. J. Lonsdale from the 
Colonial Office. There is now no risk of classified material being seen by Maltese 
eyes ... " Barrett!Darby, 19 May 1964,926/2064. 
79 'Franza Ma Tridx Lil Malta Fin-NATO', l-orizzont, 19 Sept. 1964, p.l. 
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A Malta Working Group was however set up in by the North Atlantic 
Council in August, 1964, and there was every intention that some 
effective liaison could be retained with Malta, although it soon became 
clear that such a liaison would fall far short of membership or even 
associate membership, which would have constituted a precedent by 
way of asui generis statutory arrangement. In a circular enclosing the 
revised terms of reference of the Malta Working Group, Permanent 
Representatives accredited to NATO were urged by the Secretary 
General, Manlio Brosio, "to begin work as soon as possible" and "to 
accelerate the proceedings". 80 Mter various hypothetical possibilities 
and suggested drafts regarding Malta's possible inclusion in NATO, 
which were largely of a tentative or perfunctory nature, Brosio 
communicated to the Permanent Representatives a wishy-washy 
decision on the subject of Malta taken at their private meeting on 16th 
September, which left the door open to discussions about NATO's 
future relationship with Malta on Independence. It authorised 
HAFMED not to sack those members of its staff who would lose their 
British citizenship on Independence Day and, subject to confirmation 
by the U .S. Delegation, agreed that a group oflegal advisers meet to 
advise on aspects of a long-term arrangement "short of full 
membership" between NATO and Malta.8! 
Following an exchange between Tyler and Rusk on 3pt July, 1964, 
wherein it was stated that the United States agreed with the United 
Kingdom that after independence it would be undesirable for Malta 
to be either a member or an associate member of NATO, a dissenting 
opinion was expressed in the form of a "personal comment on a 
wholly informal basis". This was by Mr McG. Bundy, President 
Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, who had 
80 'Malta - Terms of Reference for Malta Working Group', Brosio/Permanent 
Representatives, 21 Aug. 1964, sec., NATO Archives, Brussles. Archives declassified 
on 19 May 1999 to coincide with NATO's 50th anniversary, do not include the record 
ofNAC private sessions, during which the Malta case was discussed. Bin/Frendo, 2 
Aug. 1999. 
81 Brosio/Permanent Representatives, 18 Sept. 1964, conf., NATO Archives. 
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been following with interest the Paris discussions on future NATO 
arrangements with an independent Malta. In a letter to the U.S. 
Under Secretary of State (Ball), Bundy wrote thus: 
Given the Cyprus experience and the fact that elements in the 
Maltese political picture could produce a Cyprus-like problem 
there, I think an effective case can be made for a NATO tie and 
the establishment of a NATO presence before the island is given 
its independence and before this matter becomes enmeshed 
in internal Maltese politics ... If, subsequently, difficulties do 
develop, NATO then will be in a position to deal with them in 
terms that make most sense to the West.82 
The Department of State's position, as officially expressed by Dean 
Rusk, continued to be that a North Atlantic Council consensus be 
reached favourable to the retention of NATO's HQ in Malta 
"through some form of association with Malta". The U .S. 
Government, Rusk cabled NATO and the European Regional 
Organizations in January 1965, was "not aware" that Borg Olivier 
was "seriously embarrassed now by the presence of Headquarters 
and lack of NATO relationship". 83 
By the third week of July 1964, an Anglo-Maltese defence and 
finance deal had been clinched. Immediately afterwards it was 
82 Bundy/Ball, Washington, 27 Aug. 1964, Dept. of State, Central Files, NATO 6 
MALTA, Sec., in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. xiii, Western 
Europe Region (eds. C.S.Sampsion and G.W.LaFantasie, Washington, 1995), p.68. 
83 Rusk tel., Washington,. 18 Jan. 1965, ibid., pp. 181-182. Rusk was uninformed. 
Borg Olivier had indeed expected better. When nothing came of Malta's expectation 
that in return for hosting HAFMED she would get something substantial in return 
and in particular have some say in NATO affairs, Borg Olivier in the third week of 
April 1971 (before the general election which returned Mintoff's party was called) 
wrote to NATO intimating that they could leave. J.A. Mizzi confided to this author 
that he had seen Borg Olivier's letter to NATO and double checked on it with 
Michael Shaw from the British High Commission and the Attorney General Edgar 
Mizzi before having a news item carried in The Daily Telegraph. 
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debated and passed - without as much as a division on the third 
reading - at Westminster. Any additional relationships in foreign and 
defence policy - bilateral, multilateral, complementary, 
supplementary or otherwise - would then be for Malta to decide and 
to negotiate, as best she might, after her Independence. 
On 6 th July there were five matters still outstanding in the 
negotiations, of varying degrees of importance. The British finally 
gave up on the first one of these - changing Malta's long-standing 
electoral law to prohibit what they called 'corrupt practices' -
following Borg Olivier's "no". The second, on the question of special 
assurances regarding nuclear weapons in Malta, had been thrashed 
out through a 'lovers' code' stratagem at Chequers on II th July. 
The second was intimately tied to the first, in fact. It was following 
Borg Olivier's waiver with regard to nuclear arms in Malta that the 
British dropped their insistence on changing the electoral law; this 
quid pro quo was very much a part of the deal, as the relevant Cabinet 
paper made clear. 84 
The third pending matter concerned the connection between the 
Financial Agreement and the Defence Agreement. Mter Chequers, 
a compromise was reached here too, by untying the agreements for 
the first three out of the ten years for which they were intended to 
last. No discourtesy was thus shown to Borg Olivier for the time that 
he was due to be in office; his trustworthiness had been tried and 
was thus rewarded. As a matter of fact, most of the monies would 
be due under the best terms earlier rather than later in the decade 
1964-1974. It was mostly against some maverick Mintoff comeback 
that the British really wanted to insure. That was not foreseen before 
1966 and probably, if ever, not before the early 1970s. 
The fourth outstanding matter had long been bandied about with 
the Treasury and it was where the penny dropped: the total amount 
84 For a discussion of the British Cabinet's final decision on granting Malta 
independence, see below, p. 635. 
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of financial aid for capital expenditure, and emigration. And the 
fifth, where Borg Olivier came up a cropper, was rebuilding the 
Royal Opera House in the entrance to Malta's capital: this, built on 
designs by Barry of Covent Garden fame, and then rehabilitated 
after a fire in the 19th century - for a few generations the pride and 
joy of upper and middle classes alike - had been razed to the ground 
by the Germans in 1942, and there it lay - and still it lies - in ruins. 
But in the middle of a Services rundown and on the eve of a tricky 
independence for a onetime 'fortress colony', which had anyway 
received war damage funds, a new opera house was seen in London, 
in the second half of the twentieth century, as a costly luxury, even 
as an absurdity. It was dismissed outright by the Treasury and never 
given due consideration.s5 Malta would have her George Cross, but 
not her Royal Opera House. However, by the end of the 
negotiations, an additional sum would be made available for the 
restoration of damaged buildings on sites held by the Services. 
These "not yet settled" main points were actually identified and 
starkly listed by Sandys himself in a draft letter intended for Borg 
Olivier, but which in fact was not issued, bearing the date of 6th July, 
1964. In that draft, the contents of which must have been conveyed 
orally and then brought up in discussion, probably on the day, 
Sandys said he would be glad to discuss these matters further with 
Borg Olivier, and suggested they should arrange one further 
meeting on that day "to see if we can reach agreement before it is 
too late to introduce the Bill this Session."s6 
By 8th July D. G. Gordon-Smith was in a position to send J. J. 
Cremona the latest print of the Malta Independence Bill. Prints of 
the draft Constitution prepared for the purposes of the White Paper 
had not yet emerged from the printers. In order to avoid 
renumbering of all sections from 47 onwards in consequence of the 
85 On Borg Olivier's Royal Opera House claim, see above, esp. I, 4. 
86 Sandys/Borg Olivier, 6 July 1964, with "Did not issue" written in hand in large 
letters across the top of the left-hand corner of the document, 92611916/48583. 
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new section about discrimination, the solicitors transferred 
Cremona's earlier section 45 to section 42, renumbering 46 as 45, 
and inserted the new section as 46.87 Even as the negotiations on 
still outstanding matters continued in earnest, the British 
administrative machine was in full gear to make it in time for the last 
parliamentary sessions before dissolution. 
They only just made it. The private secretary of Sandys, N. B. J. 
Huijsman, wrote to Sir John Martin as late as 20th July to say that 
Sandys was having "protracted discussions" with Borg Olivier, "with 
the aim of reaching agreement on Malta's Independence 
Constitution, and the defence and financial arrangements which 
would operate after independence." Mr Sandys' aim "has been", 
Huijsman added, "to reach agreement in sufficient time to enable a 
Bill providing for Malta's independence to be introduced before the 
end of this Session." Unfortunately, the pace of the negotiations had 
been "a good deal slower than customary", in part owing to "the 
reluctance of the Prime Minister of Malta to accept that undue 
prolongation of the discussions would create Parliamentary 
difficulties." The position reached "by the end oflast week" was that, 
unless the Bill was introduced "this week, and assured of unopposed 
passage in Parliament, it could not be passed this Session." It now 
looked as if that difficulty might be resolved. 
Before the legislation could be introduced, two submissions had to 
be made to the Queen. The first would advise Her Majesty that 
Malta should enter independence as a monarchy with the Queen 
as Sovereign. The second would invite the surrender by Her Majesty 
of Her prerogatives and interests in so far as these were affected by 
the Malta Independence Bill. The Secretary of State had signed the 
two submissions, "although certain points still remain to be settled 
with Dr Borg Olivier before the Bill can actually be introduced."88 
87 Gordon-Smith/Cremona, 8 July 1964,926/1916/48583. 
88 Huijsman/Martin, 20 July 1964, copied to Lt.-Col. The Hon. Sir Martin Charteris, 
926/1916/48583. 
DEFENCE, FINANCE AND DELIVERANCE 623 
One of the many civil service delegations travelling on government business 
as the Independence negotiations and Malta's economic diversification 
drive proceeded apace. From left: Mr Maurice Abe1a (left), Mr Alfred 
Salomone, who became financial secretary in 1962, heading the delegation, 
and Mr Alfred Wirth. Civil servants with a background in statistics, 
economics or finance were increasingly needed at this stage. 
On Thursday 16th July, however - in between the Chequers meeting 
and the first reading of the Malta Independence Bill - Sandys was 
telling Borg Olivier that the Constitution and the Defence 
Agreement as negotiated were acceptable to the British Government. 
He was also announcing to him that the amount of aid to be made 
available under the Financial Agreement would be no less than 
£50,000,000 over ten years, actually even a little more 
than that. On 17th July Sandys was due to speak to the Leader 
of the Opposition, and get back to Borg Olivier with Wilson's reaction. 
On Monday 20th , on his return to London after the weekend, Wilson 
confirmed to Sandys that the Opposition agreed to a parliamentary 
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time-table which would allow the Bill on Malta to go through the 
Commons, and later through the Lords, before the House rose.89 
The details of the FinancialAgreement, as of the DefenceAgreement, 
would be announced in parliament and laid on the table of the House 
on Tuesday 21 st July. Briefly, it was agreed that Britain would provide 
Malta with assistance towards her capital budget and emigration up 
to a total of £50,000,000, of which £6,800,000 would be provided 
during the current financial year. Moreover, £18,800,000 could be 
withdrawn in the first three years, the period during which the 
Financial Agreement was to be untied to the Defence Agreement, 
whereas the funds for the first five years were to be drawn as to 75% 
in the form of grants and 25% in the form of soft loans. In addition, 
Britain undertook to provide up to one million pounds for the 
restoration of historical buildings in Malta now occupied by British 
forces. This could have been a sop to make good for dismissing Borg 
Olivier's more expensive opera house project, but it was something. 
Following persistent claims by Borg Olivier and exchanges of 
correspondence with him, Britain was also undertaking to provide 
budgetary assistance of up to £600,000 in the financial year 1964-
1965. The Prime Minister of Malta had sought a firm commitment 
that budgetary aid would be provided for as long as it might be 
needed, which he foresaw would be the end of the financial year 
1970-1971. He was told that, while the British government could not 
enter into any advance commitment as regards budgetary aid for 
future years, it would be prepared to consider any requests for such 
aid which the Malta government might from time to time make. 
The terms of the Financial Agreement became well known and, on 
the whole, were considered generous - if not over-generous - in 
Britain, for a departing colony. More than one British MP made this 
point. Behind the scenes, the Colonial Office, in support of the Borg 
89 E. Mizzi, op.cit., p. 39. No sooner had it done so than George Brown, Labour's 
deputy leader, went up to the gallery of the House of Commons to congratulate and 
embrace Borg Olivier, Ragonesi recalls: "How could we stop Malta from getting her 
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What this Wright/Dodd exchange of 5th June 1964 shows is that Malta's 
resumed strategic importance due to the troubles in Cyprus and Libya 
strengthened the hand of the Ministry of Defence, the Colonial and 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office in resisting 
Treasury pressures to cut down the proposed aid package, and instead to 
have it topped up. 
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Olivier stance, had been lobbying the Treasury - and the Ministry 
of Defence for support with the Treasury - in order to increase the 
monies originally intended for Malta. The argument being pushed 
by the Sandys camp, and supported by the M.O.D., was a fairly 
simple one: now that Britain's defence need of Malta was increasing, 
you dip your hands further into the till. To extract money out of 
Treasury, as every cabinet minister knows, is a formidable task, and 
to extract more than would have been intended or recommended, 
is still more so. Using the growing defence need and other 
arguments, the Colonial Office made a strong bid for an additional 
one million pounds per year for Malta. Typically the Treasury were 
not easily swayed. They double checked with the Ministry of Defence. 
While being unable, because of uncertainties, accurately to measure 
"the future usefulness of Malta to defence" at that stage, the latter 
told Mr P. H. F. Dodd at the Treasury, "the proposed additional £lm. 
a year proposed by the Colonial Office" could, however, be regarded 
as "a reasonable reflection" of the changed position. 
Summarizing the situation as they saw it, for the benefit of Treasury 
Ministers, and in view of a request made on the morning of 5th June, 
that a paper on the possible increased use of Malta for Defence be 
laid before the D.O.P.C., the Ministry of Defence stated the position 
succinctly and firmly. 
Although the full extent to which defence facilities in Malta might be 
needed could not be accurately assessed until Britain's future position 
in Cyprus and Libya were clarified, "our thoughts have, however, 
naturally turned more towards Malta as a means of meeting our future 
commitments should either or both of these bases be denied to us." 
Quoting the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff, the M.O.D. 
recapitulated how losses in Cyprus and Libya would be offset by Malta 
in seven ways. These were additional staging facilities at Luqa; the 
retention and development of Hal Far as an operational airfield; 
storage space for a reorganized TUXEDO stockpile and accomodation 
for its maintenance personnel; communications required for strategic 
purposes and contingency plans; SIGINT facilities to the greatest 
extent possibe; increased naval forward operating facilities; and 
possibly some increase in existing Army and R.A.F. Headquarters. 
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This, following the D.O.P.C. meeting, and no doubt with Cabinet 
approval, put paid to a Treasury proposal that the Independence 
aid package to Malta be cut down to £29,500,000.90 
Where did that sum come from? £29,250,000 was the sum that 
Britain, which provided no recurrent assistance to the Malta budget, 
had promised earlier in grants and loans, including £7,250,000 for 
the conversion of the Dockyard, during the course of the current 
Development Plan which ended on 31 st March 1964. In the summer 
of 1962 the Development Plan had been "redeployed" to bring up 
expenditure from c. £4,000,000 to c. £6,000,000 a year for the last 
fifteen months of it. In 1958, £25,000,000 had been offered (and, in 
the circumstances, rejected) in capital grant, plus one million a year 
for the cost of social services, again over a five year period. Borg 
Olivier had refused to commit himself on an over-all Financial 
Agreement then, before the conclusions of the Joint Study and the 
Stolper Report would have been concluded, and the British side had 
agreed to that. A new Development Plan would also be drawn up, as 
had by now been done. Borg Olivier had also objected to "a once-
for-all separation endowment." He wanted, British officials had 
commented incisively already at the time, "assistance continuing ad 
infinitum". They, on the other hand, wanted "to be able to see the end 
of it, even if it cannot be immediate". What Borg Olivier wanted was, 
commented another official, "a pension payable indefinitely." 
In the meantime, Borg Olivier had been insisting on both extending 
the limit for his budget day and having the budget itself 
supplemented by extra British funds to make good for the deficit. 
The proposed Agreement on Financial Assistance91 contained a 
preamble and seven short articles. The presumption in the preamble 
which referred to both the financial and defence agreements was 
tied down in article 7, which began thus: 
90 Wright/Dodd, 5 June 1964, sec., 926/1857/48655. 
91 Cmnd. 2423, H.M.S.O., London,July 1964. 
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During the ten years beginning on the 1st April 1964, but 
subject at all times to the continued operation of the 
Agreement on Mutual Defence and Assistance, the 
Government ofthe United Kingdom will make available to 
the Government of Malta ... 
This last article mentioned an additional £1,000,000 towards 
expenditure on the restoration of historic buildings. Nothing in the 
Agreement was to be construed as implying any obligation on the 
part of the Malta Government in respect of the repayment of any 
part of the advances made to Bailey (Malta) Ltd by the UK 
Government, but sums issued by the UK Government between 1 st 
April 1964 and the signature of this Agreement, including sums for 
the civil dockyard conversion plan, would be regarded as drawings 
on the sum of £6,800,000 specified in article 1.92 
Sandys went to parliament armed with argumentation and answers 
to any questions that were sure to arise, particularly from the Labour 
benches. His draft briefs anticipated these and included 
recommended answers to a number of such points. On why the 
electoral observers' report about the independence referendum had 
not been published: because the referendum 
added nothing to what we already knew about the differing 
opinions in Malta. The results did not therefore influence 
our conclusions. Consequently I do not see any advantage 
in attempting to analyse the vote or in publishing the 
Obervers' Report, which was in any case confidential. 
On why more consultations with the Maltese political parties had not 
been held: because 
After months of fruitless discussion, it was clear that the 
Maltese parties were never likely to reach agreement among 
themselves. However, the new constitution with the 
92 Ibid., f.2. 
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important amendments which have been made, represents 
in my view, a fair and reasonable compromise. 
629 
On changing the electoral law to eliminate 'corrupt practices', as it 
was alleged that the present law did not provide sufficient protection 
against the exercise of undue influence at elections: 
The fact is that those who complain about the law have so 
far never put it to the test by bringing a case to court. The 
law governing corrupt electoral practices is not part of the 
constitution, and responsibility for deciding on these 
matters was conferred long ago upon the legislature of 
Malta. As far as I know there is no precedent for making 
changes of this kind in the electoral law of territories before 
Independence. 
In view of the ecclesiastical aspect of the problem, he had 
consulted the Archbishop of Malta and the Apostolic 
Delegate in London. They have informed me that the 
Catholic authorities see no objection to the amendments we 
have made. 
The date of Independence had not yet been fixed, but it would 
probably be in September.93 
Various points were prepared in reply to any suggestions that fresh 
elections should have been held, or should still be held, before 
Independence, on the ground that (as claimed by the MLP) the 
earlier elections or even the referendum had been unfair. 
All the Committee of 24 at the UN had recommended on lOth May 
1963 was that the people of Malta had a right to independence; 
93 Notes in point form edited on a typed draft preceeding the Malta debate, enc. 926/ 
1916/48583. The date for Independence would be appointed by the Queen in 
Council in due course. See below, esp. III, 17. 
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Britain was invited to hold an all-party conference to consider the 
independence question, including the question of holding general 
elections in the presence of international observers, and that the 
earliest possible date be set for independence. 
In a statement made on the case of British Guiana in October 1963 
Sandys had made the point that if it were proposed to retain the 
existing electoral system, "there would be no justification for holding 
fresh elections" before independence. However, as (there, but not 
in Malta) the system was to be changed, he had added, it was clearly 
right that "fresh elections under the new system" should be held 
before independence. 
As for allegations that the 1962 and the 1964 elections and 
referendum in Malta were unfair, such allegations rested on hearsay 
or circumstantial evidence. No direct evidence was ever produced, 
the advice continued, nor was any case brought before the courts 
"as one might well have expected." In regard to the referendum, 
the Archbishop had expressly issued a circular letter to be read 
in every Church indicating that as far as the Church was con-
cerned the referendum was an entirely political matter and that 
"all Catholics were free to vote according to their conscience." 
There had been allegations that, despite this, individual priests 
used undue influence but again no case had been brought before 
the courts. The Observers' report thought that the appeal by 
the Nationalist Party that "your Church is in danger" and the 
activities and the attitude of the Church generally amounted in 
the circumstances of Malta to "a threat of spiritual injury", and 
they alleged that they had hard evidence of one or two priests having 
misused the confessional, adding however that: "While one or two 
priests may have done this, we are very doubtful whether there was 
undue influence by the Church in general though the Nationalist 
Party certainly played effectively on the emotions of the faithful." 
With regard to the suggestion that could be made that at the next 
general election, whenever it was held, there should be supervision 
by the United Nations or someone else, the line to be taken in reply, 
as indicated, was that Malta would by then be "a sovereign country" 
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and it was "not a matter on which we could make a stipulation." It 
would be for Malta "to decide for herself'. In a further and final bit 
of advice on this question, it was tentatively suggested that Sandys 
might perhaps express "our willingness to send a team of British 
observers if so requested by the Maltese Government", but it was 
thought probably better not to say this. 94 
The timing was so tight, and the successful passage of the Malta bill 
at the very end of the Session being now important, that Sandys 
needed to be fully briefed and on the alert in the forthcoming 
debate, which could still take strange turns. He could ill afford to be 
caught on the wrong foot. 
On Tuesday 21'tJuly Sandys in the Commons and then Lansdowne 
in the Lords made much the same statement about Malta. Sandys 
announced that that morning he had completed the long 
negotiations with the Government of Malta on the question of 
independence. As a result, they had now "'settled the form" of 
Malta's future Constitution. The Government of Malta had 
expressed the desire that Malta should remain a Monarchy with Her 
Majesty as Queen; they had informed him that they intended to seek 
membership of the Commonwealth. 
That morning, too, they had initialled agreements on defence 
and financial aid which were to be signed on independence. The 
Defence Agreement would enable British forces to remain in 
Malta for 10 years. Under the Finance Agreement, Britain would, 
during the same period, provide capital aid for the development 
and the diversification of the economy and assistance for 
emigration, up to a total of about £50 million. The text of the new 
Constitution was being published on that day as a White Paper; and 
94 Brief entitled 'Malta - Elections and the V.N. Resolution', in four sections edited 
on a typed draft, enc. ibid. One reason why the Observers' report was not published 
could have been that it did not quite constitute a nihil obstat; it suggested at one point 
that "a threat of spiritual injury" may have existed, owing perhaps not so much to 
the behaviour of the Church as to that of the Nationalist Party. 
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a limited number of cyclostyled advance copies of the two 
agreements would be available in the Vote Office. Despite the small 
amount of parliamentary time that remained, he hoped that the 
House would feel disposed to pass the necessary Independence Bill 
before the Recess. He realised that this was asking a lot of hon. 
Members but, as they knew, Malta's independence had already had 
to be postponed beyond the target date of 31 st May. It was therefore 
most desirable not to delay further, any longer than was necessary. 
In reply to questions, Sandys did not think they could look beyond 
10 years although during that time they could "consider any 
arrangements beyond that date". The Constitution contained a large 
chapter on fundamental human rights. As a result of these 
negotiations, that chapter had been "further strengthened". An 
additional non-discrimination clause had been inserted and 
amendments had been made which should be found acceptable. 
Replying to Tom Driberg, whose interruptions mingled with sneers 
and jeers regarding the Catholic Church in no way edified the 
House of Commons, Sandys said that these amendments made to 
strengthen the human rights provisions had been "fully approved 
by the ecclesiastical authorities in Malta". 
On the referendum and the observers' report, Sandys repeated that 
the referendum "did not really tell us anything new that we did not 
already know about the differences which existed among the Maltese 
parties" on this question, and it had not, therefore, "influenced the 
conclusions which we have reached." Pressed by Gordon Walker, 
Sandys retained the observers' report to have been a confidential 
one but he would consider whether it ought to be published. Rising 
to congratulate the government, as Mr Wingfield Digby had already 
done before him, Mr Patrick Wall asked if the Defence Agreement 
meant a check on the rundown, and if the litigation with Baileys 
could be completed and got out of the way, Sandys did not think 
there was any prospect that the dockyard litigation would be 
completed at an early date. The Defence Agreement would not 
"affect our military plans except that if there had not been a military 
agreement we would have had to withdraw our forces altogether." 
Replying to the Liberal leader Jo Grimond again on the human 
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rights question, Sandys explained that in the main the sanction was 
that "any law or anything done under any law in contravention of 
human rights" would be "invalidated". That was the main sanction, 
and it was the normal sanction in all human rights codes. This 
followed closely the human rights provisions in other constitutions. 
As for the referendum, everybody voted more or less according to 
their party affiliations. Sir William Teeling asked Sandys ifhe would 
agree that "both we and Malta owe a great debt of gratitude to the 
Prime Minister of Malta for having waited here for nine weeks" at 
a time when he, no doubt, wanted to be at home looking after his 
own affairs, realising that "my right hon. Friend was busy on other 
matters", Sandys replied curtly and tellingly: 
I think that the Prime Minister of Malta has shown great 
patience; but so have 1. 
When Mrs Judith Hart and Mrs Barbara Castle from the Labour 
benches complained that they had not had enough time to examine 
the constitution and the two agreements, about which they wanted 
to put questions, the Speaker said these could be debated on the Bill. 
He invited the Lord Privy Seal, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, to indicate the 
order of business. In view of the announcement made by the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, the 
business of the House for Thursday 23rd July and Monday 27th July 
had been rearranged. On Thursday, there would be a second reading 
of the Malta Independence Bill after which, in view of the urgency, 
the House would be asked to take the remaining stages. Mr George 
Brown said many Members on both sides of the House would have 
a number of issues to raise so that "putting the Malta Independence 
Bill through in one day" would be a very difficult operation and "the 
day may have to be protracted". Lloyd appreciated this and they were 
asking a great deal of the House to do this, but they would not have 
asked it were it not in the interests of Britain "and perhaps more in 
the interests of Malta" that the Bill should go through as quickly as 
possible. Castle said this was "intolerable". 
During the debate on the second reading starting on 23rd July, using 
much the same arguments already made in earlier debate and 
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questions put, the Opposition moved an amendment asking that fresh 
elections be held in Malta before independence would be given. The 
Government parried these criticisms with familiar and by now almost 
stock replies: such a delay at this stage, after a general election and 
referendum, would be unnecessary and harmful. On 26th July the 
House agreed that independence be given to Malta immediately by 
141 votes to 85, approving the Bill through all its stages95 The British 
Labour party had already agreed not to obstruct the passage of the 
bill, but they wanted to show at least a token support for their 'sister' 
Labour Party of Malta, even if they may not have seen eye to eye with 
it on everything. From Malta, Agatha Barbara (and Philip Muscat) 
had gone to London and kicked up a fuss about the prevalent lack of 
consultation.96 The Opposition in Malta - like that in Britain - had 
had the final version of the constitution and of the agreements on 
defence and finance sprung upon them, although they would have 
had some idea of what was going on. 
The debates in the House of Lords, on all sides, were less party 
political and rather more instructive in nature, although it was here 
that the only attempt to stop Malta's independence altogether was 
made. The Earl of Perth, who had been much involved with the 
Integration round table conference in the mid-1950s, could not 
accept "the idea of Malta standing on its own as an independent 
island". The House should decline to give the Bill a Second Reading 
until the Maltese people had been consulted either through new 
elections or by a referendum. There was "little or no evidence", he 
said, that the people of Malta wanted "independence now". The 
referendum had not been held on this question. By contrast, 
Integration, on the basis of economic equivalence, had been voted 
upon and accepted in both Houses: 
Unhappily, integration failed five years ago, and it failed 
because the then Prime Minister, Mr Mintoff, put forward 
95 Hansard, Commons, 23 July, 26 July 1964, passim. 
96 E. Mizzi, op.cit., p. 39; but see below, pp. 668-669. 
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new demands just at the very moment of success - new 
demands for money, new demands for guaranteed 
employment - and the Government at that time felt that this 
was both unreasonable and unfair. I was myself Minister of 
State for the Colonies at the time, and I fully supported in 
every way the Government's decision. But, my Lords, I have 
often since wondered whether I was right. 97 
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In winding up the debate, the Marquess of Lansdowne referred to 
the amendment moved by the Earl of Perth, recalling how much he 
had done for Malta when he (Perth) occupied the position which he 
(Lansdowne) now held, but his speech seemed to be a "nostalgic" 
one, regretting that Integration had failed. To stop Malta's 
Independence at the eleventh hour would be to delay Malta's 
economic development foreseen under the Finance Agreement and 
to arouse grave political suspicions about Britain's intentions. The 
Prime Minister of Malta had just returned to that country, he added, 
"and received a very warm welcome indeed."98 
Concern that, were Independence delayed or postponed, Maltese 
public opinion would swing against Britain, was a main reason given 
in Cabinet to proceed with Independence after the referendum, in 
spite oflingering doubts as to what its result meant exactly. "Undue 
delay", as a synoptic Cabinet minute put it in July, "would unite the 
parties in Malta in opposition to the United Kingdom". The Cabinet 
also noted that Dr Borg Olivier had been willing to sign a defence 
agreement "containing no restrictions on our entitlement to use our 
base in the Island for the storage of nuclear weapons". They had 
therefore endeavoured to reach agreement with the Prime Minister 
of Malta on the basis that "we would abandon our earlier insistence 
on a change in Maltese electoral law provided we secured an agreement 
including the rights to store nuclear weapons in Malta if necessary". 99 
97 Hansard, Lords, 28 July 1964, cols. 987-989. 
98 Ibid., col. 1039. 
99 26(3), 134,37 and 38 (6), Cab 128-129, sec. 
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In a replica of the motion in the Commons, two Labour peers moved 
that Her Majesty's Government should continue to have 
responsibility for the government of Malta until the Maltese 
legislative assembly had been dissolved and a general election held 
there. In the course of the debate Lord Farringdon recalled his 
presence in Malta during the 1962 general election and in view of 
"the atmosphere" there at the time, he did not regard "the present 
Maltese Government as having a mandate from the Maltese people." 
However, there was consensus that the financial agreement had 
been a very generous one and that Malta deserved to be treated in 
this priveleged way. Equally there was general satisfaction at the 
defence agreement reached. The Labour amendment, by 
agreement, was negatived without a vote being taken. 
Most impressive and indeed touching were the memories and 
impressions of Malta, her history and architecture, the natural 
beauty of her harbours, the loyalty and heroism demonstrated in 
wartime, the warmth and welcoming friendliness of her people -
which one Member of the House after another gave vent to, evoking 
a shared past stretching back to the 1920s and still earlier, in an 
untypically British sentimental chain of recollections. Even the 
Bishop of Chester, who somewhat veered the whole discussion to a 
tangent by his ecclesiastical worries on "disability", could not refrain 
from bringing up such fine memories. Another peer recalled a 
special service in St John's, only a year earlier, led by the 
representatives of different Christian denominations including the 
Catholics there, in which they had all together recited The Lord's 
Prayer in English. All this, particularly for so many of the more 
elderly MPs in the upper chamber, who had known Malta often in 
different ways for so long, comes across as a genuine parting; 
feelings were truly torn. Malta had been part and parcel of their own 
lives. Among those who spoke were Lord Thurlow, who had just 
served as General Officer Commanding in Malta, and Admiral Lord 
Glasgow, having only recently been the Flag Officer at Malta. For the 
Malta debate in the House of Commons, Sir Winston Churchill, who 
was ninety years old, made a rare appearance - more eloquent and 
conspicuous than ever by his dignified and venerable silence. It 
would be his last one there. 
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(Above) Crowds at the 
airport terminal and 
(left) milling around its 
precincts, gave the 
Prime Minister a 
greater welcome than 
usual on 26th July 1964, 
when it was known that 
the Malta Inde-
pendence Bill had 
passed the House of 
Commons and a 
finance-defence 
package had finally 
been agreed upon. It was on this occasion that Borg Olivier first mentioned 
21 st September as Independence Day. The poster in the centre shows The 
Queen with the words "Viva Malta Indipendenti" and the names "Castro", 
"Kruschev" and "Nasser" crossed out. The poster on the right says that 
Mintoff's "six points" had vanished (ghosfru). 
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The Prime Minister addressing a press conference in the company of every 
member of his Cabinet. From left: Ministers Caruana, Caruana Demajo, 
Felice, Paris, Spiteri, Cachia Zammit and Paolo Borg Olivier. Below: The 
poster reads: "Welcome to you our father. Malta cradle of Mediterranean 
civilization rejoices for you and with you." 
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On the night, Sandys invited the Malta delegation to his London flat for 
dinner, where he showed Borg Olivier a cable from the smaller parties 
promising their cooperation to make a success of Independence. 100 
On 26th 1 uly, as soon as the Malta Independence Bill had gone through 
the Commons, Borg Olivier returned to Malta to a hero's welcome. 
In the words of an American historian writing at the time, he 
found the airport made festive with flags, flowers, and 
greens. He was greeted by prolonged shouts of welcome 
that even drowned the roar of the engines of his airplane. 
Along the route from the airport to Palace Square he 
headed a procession welcomed by tremendous applause, 
waving of flags and banners, showers of confetti, and 
displays of fireworks. 
In his speech from the balcony of the palace he told of the days and 
nights of prolonged negotiations to obtain the independence for 
which the people of many countries had been obliged to fight and 
even to shed blood. Steps had already been taken, he said, toward 
Malta's membership in the Commonwealth and the United Nations. 
Expressing a hope that all would work with the government to lead 
Malta to her salvation he added: "This is not a personal victory, not 
a triumph for the Nationalist Party, but a victory for Malta." 
The legislative assembly, which had been adjourned since 26th April, 
was reopened, most unusually, on 19th August, in the middle of a 
Maltese summer, and it passed the budget. 101 
100 E. Mizzi, op.cit., p. 40; H. Ganado, op.cit., volA, pp. 425-427. The cable was 
actually from Ganado, although Mable took a similar position; less so Pellegrini. 
101 E. Dobie,Malta's Road to Independence (Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 256-257. 
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Twilight to Dawn 
HOPES AND FEARS ON 
THE APPOINTED DAY 
Borg Olivier once said that he had aspired to the eighth of 
September as Malta's Independence Day, but that had not been 
possible in the circumstances. I The Otto Settembre - as it was known 
to successive generations of Maltese - commemorated perhaps the 
two most important victories ever won by Malta over her 
adversaries: the first in the sixteenth century, against the Ottoman 
Empire of Suleiman the Magnificent and an expansionist Muslim 
hegemony; the second, in the twentieth, against the Axis Powers led 
by Hitler and Mussolini. These victories were epitomised in and 
symbolised by the popolar Maltese Catholic feast of Our Lady of 
Victories, known as 'il-Vitorja', traditionally celebrated on that day. 
I "Fil-fatt li gara kien li n-negozjati mal-Gvern Ingli:i: kienu iebsa u twal u meta 
bdejna nersqu ghall-ftehim ta' l-ahhar jiena kont qed nimmira possibilment ghat-8 
ta' Settembru bhala d-data tad-dikjarazzjoni ta' l-Indipendenza, :i:da minhabba 
ostakoli u diffikultajiet ta' l-ahhar dan ma setax isir ... " Anonymous interview with Dr 
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When Malta was a British colonial possession, she had no national 
feast of her own as a separate nation. Her 'national' festivities were 
officially the British and Imperial commemorations - St George's 
Day, Empire Day, the Queen's Birthday. There were religious and 
folk related feast-days, such as L-Imnarja on 29th June marking the 
feast of St Peter and St Paul, but no national day as such. Probably 
unknown to Borg Olivier, it was his erstwhile predecessor and 
founding-father ofthe Maltese nationalist movement Dr Fortunato 
Mizzi (d. 1905) who in 1885 in a show of patriotism had first 
declared the Qtto Settembre as Malta's national day. To mark that 
departure at a time when Mizzi and his Partito Nazionale were rapidly 
consolidating their hold over national sentiment through growing 
popularity in the struggle for Representative Government, a public 
meeting was organized in Valletta's Palace Square. And it was during 
that agitated political commemoration on the Qtto Settembre, 1885, 
that one of Mizzi's more learned and less inhibited supporters 
uttered the so-called 'Garibaldian' cry, which landed him into 
trouble: "Viva Malta! Malta e' dei Maltesi non degli Inglesi! Fuori 10 
straniero!" (Long live Malta! Malta belongs to the Maltese not to the 
English! Out with the foreigner!)2 Among Maltese migrant 
communities, who had left their homeland before Independence, 
the Qtto Settembre had continued to express their nationality and 
identity more than any other day, just as it had long done in the 
Maltese Islands themselves.3 Like all those of his generation Borg 
Olivier had grown up with the Qtto Settembre - the first church erected 
in his hometown Valletta was il-knisja tal-Vitorja; so one can 
understand his preference for capitalizing on such a day, which 
already possessed a national currency and charisma, uniting it with 
a third most important victory for a long-dominated country: 
independence from foreign rule. 
2 He was Dr Zaccaria Roncali. A Maltese loyalist who was present reported the 
incident to the Governor for action possibly on grounds of sedition. See H. Frendo, 
Party Politics in a Fortress Colony; The Maltese Experience, op.cit., p. 31. 
3 See H. Frendo, 'Religion and Ethnic Identity in the Maltese Australian 
Community', A. Ata (Ed.), Religion and Ethnic Idetity; An Australian Study (Spectrum, 
Melbourne, 1988), p. 179. 
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However, according to an official in the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, early in 1964 Borg Olivier had suggested St George's Day as a 
possible date for Malta's independence. In a letter to Sir Timothy Bligh 
at 10, Downing Street, Freda Smith on behalf of Duncan Sandys asked 
if Douglas-Home's approval could be sought for a proposal that the 
Duke of Edinburgh, in view of his past connections with Malta, should 
represent the Queen at the Malta Independence Day celebrations. A 
firm date for these had not yet been finally fixed, she wrote: 
Dr. Olivier would like it to be on St George's Day, 23rd April, but 
we know the Duke has an engagement in England that day. 
Moreover, she added, some constitutional points still had to be 
resolved and it was just possible that Independence might have to 
be postponed for a short period. All present indications however 
were that Malta would remain in the Commonwealth with a 
monarchical constitution. As one of the newly-converted docks in the 
former Admiralty dockyard was due to be completed in April, the 
Secretary of State considered that it would be appropriate for The 
Queen's personal representative at the Independence Day 
celebrations to perform the opening ceremony, preferably on the 
eve of Independence.4 
If, as some have held, Borg Olivier was superstitious and disliked the 
month of May,5 then the last week of April would have been near 
enough to the mark. St George represented an age of chivalry from 
the time of the Crusades; he had become England's patron saint 
when she was still a Roman Catholic country and was passionately 
revered in more than one parish in the Maltese Islands. It is unclear 
why Ms Smith should have deemed it relevant to mention an 
obviously impossible date in an official letter although she must have 
done so approvingly, if not condescendingly. However much any 
such suggestion by Borg Olivier may have warmed her heart and 
4 Smith/Bligh, 29 Jan. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
5 See E. Mizzi, op.cit., p. 4. 
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tickled her fancy, it seems bizarre in an End of Empire context, 
unless it was simply and half-seriously meant as a compliment while 
making conversation on a social occasion. 
Why did 21 5t September become "the appointed day" for Malta's 
Independence? It seems certain that the 2pt September was 
prompted and probably decided and 'appointed' by the Duke of 
Edinburgh's diary, no more no less. In fact, Freda Smith's letter is 
more important for its ready presumption that the Duke's 
engagements mattered more than any preferred date, even - or 
rather, more so - if that date were England's own national day. 
I t was only towards the end of July 1964 that a date could finally be 
fixed for Malta's Independence. In the course of two years, various 
other dates had been suggested tentatively, the most definite of 
which had been 315t May. By April it had become obvious that it was 
going to be practically impossible for Malta to make it by 315t May, 
when a referendum on the proposed Independence Constitution 
still had to be held in early May. The required legislation would have 
had to be passed before the British Parliament rose on 15th May.6 
In early May during a meeting in the Cabinet Office it was officially 
and irrevocably decided that the 31 5t May was definitely out and 
that, moreover, there was a possibility that independence might have 
to be "delayed for some considerable time".7 
At his audience on 4th February 1964 Sir Alec discussed with Queen 
Elizabeth the possibility of Prince Philip representing her at the 
Malta Independence Celebrations, but no announcement had to be 
made until the Maltese position had clarified itself. 8 As early as 
February, too, His Royal Highness made it known that 
6 Huijsman/Bonham-Carter, 6 Apr. 1964, 926/1920/48583. 
7 Minutes ofa Meeting held in Sir BurkeTrend's Room, Room 103, Cabinet Office, 
Whitehall, S.W.l, on Tuesday, 5th May 1964, at 3 p.m., conf., 926/1920/48583. 
8 Bligh/Smith, 7 Feb. 1964, conf., 926/1920/48583. 
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fc~ 
Mr. Secretary Sandys, with his humble 
duty to The Queen, begs to submit for Your 
Majesty's approval that the attached copies 
of the Malta Independence Act, 1964 and 
the Malta (Independence) Order in Council, 
1964 be presented to the Government of 
,Malta by His Royal Highness the Duke of 
Edinburgh, on the occasion of His Royal 




2nd September, 1964. 
The Queen's approval in her own hand of the British Government's 
proposals that she be designated as Malta's monarch (right) and that on her 
behalf the Duke of Edinburgh should present the Independence 
constitutional instruments to the Government of Malta. 
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AUBERGE D'ARAGON, 
MALTA. 
Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier, Prime Minister of Malta, 
presents his humble duty to The Queen and has the 
honour to submit for Your Majesty's approval the 
proposal of Your Majesty's Ministers in Malta 
that Your Majesty may be graciousiy pleased to 
take the following tltle:-
"Elizabeth,the Second, by the Grace of 
God, Queen of Malta and of Her other 
Realms and Territories, Head of the 
Oommonweal th. " 
If Your Majesty is graciously pleased to 
aecede to this request, Dr. Borg Ollvier has the 
honour to submit further that Your Majesty may 
cause a Proclamation to be issued in the terms 
of the attached draft. 
7th October, 1964. 
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at this late stage it would only be possible for him to go on 
this, or for that matter any other date in the summer, at the 
expense of a number of engagements he has already agreed 
upon in this country, with the consequent disruption of 
many peoples' plans.9 
On 30th July, Buckingham Palace officially informed Downing Street 
that the Queen wished to be represented at the Malta Independence 
celebrations and that the Duke of Edinburgh should be her 
representative. This had already been discussed informally with His 
Royal Highness's staff, and he had said that "he will be available on 
the date in question."10 
It is certain that "the date in question" was 21't September. Sandys 
had been informed a few days earlier by Rear-Admiral Christopher 
Bonham-Carter that the Duke would be prepared to be in Malta for 
the Independence celebrations "on 2pt September". He would 
arrive on Saturday, 19th September, from Athens "in good time for 
dinner", probably about 6 p.m., and he would like to spend the day 
on Sunday quietly. He assumed that the flag-raising ceremony 
would be at midnight on Sunday night, presumably after the usual 
state banquet. The Duke hoped to leave after lunch on Monday but, 
if absolutely unavoidable, he would be prepared to stay another 
night, although the Maltese were not to be told that. 
On the same day, 25th July, Sandys informed Borg Olivier, who was 
still in London, of the cleared dates. 11 In the early afternoon he met 
with Borg Olivier and Felice in the Commonwealth Relations Office 
for this purpose. The Duke would arrive on Saturday 19th and leave 
after lunch on Monday 21 5t which would mean, Sandys explained, 
that the handing over of the Independence documents and the State 
opening of Parliament would have to take place on the Monday 
9 Bonham-Carter/Huijsman, 28 Feb. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
10 Adams/Huijsman, 30 July 1964, conf., 926/1920/48583. 
11 Min., Sandys/Poynton, 25 July 1964,926/1920/48583. 
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morning. Borg Olivier said he was sure this would be acceptable. Dr 
Felice was slightly anxious about the proclamation for the 
summoning of Parliament, as there would be little time for this to 
be issued. However, he was sure that suitable arrangements could 
be made. Felice also agreed to look into the question of when the 
Duke should arrive in Malta on Saturday. He thought 6 p.m. would 
be suitable, "provided there was sufficient daylight at that time". 12 
The Duke of Edinburgh planned to go to Athens to attend the 
wedding ofthe King of Greece and expected to leave Britain about 
the 16th September. The Duke's staff at Balmoral Castle expected 
that on this occasion they would be more than usually pressed for 
time. 13 What this meant was that His Royal Highness would be 
stopping over in Malta for the weekend on his return leg from 
Athens to London, where he would then be attending to other 
functions. 
On his triumphal return to Malta on 26 th July, Borg Oliver 
announced that he had proposed the 21 st September as 
Independence Day.14 He had known for a day, from Sandys, that 
the Duke had confirmed he would be present on the 21 st. 
Joint announcements were intended, however, both for the Duke's 
visit and for the independence date itself. IS Sandys and Borg 
Olivier had agreed that the date of independence should be 
announced after the House of Lords debate. 16 By a pertinent 
12 'The Queen's Representative at the Independence Celebrations', extract from 
Note ofa Meeting between the Sec. of State and Dr Borg Olivier at 12.30 p.m. on 
Saturday 25th July, 1964 in the C.R.O., conf., 926/1920/48583. 
13 Charteris/Huijsman, 16 Aug. 1964, 926/1920/48583. 
14 Tel., Wakefield/Kisch, 5 Aug. 1964, conf., 926/1920/48583. 
15 Sandys/Wakefield, 30 July 1964,926/1920/48583. 
16 Min., Sandys/Poynton, 25 July 1964,926/1920/48583. 
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A cable confirming that Malta should become independent on 21 st 
September 1964, sent by a coincidence on 20th August 1964 - two years to 
the day since Borg Olivier had made his demand for Independence. 
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coincidence it was exactly two years to the day after Borg Olivier had 
demanded independence for Malta, on 20th August 1964, that the 
text of the prepared British announcement was communicated to 
Malta. It said that Sandys had informed Borg Olivier that the British 
Government "accept his proposal that Malta should become 
independent on 21't September 1964." Buckingham Palace would 
announce the Duke's visit themselvesY 
When asked by this writer in 1989 why the 8th September had not 
been adhered to, the chairman of the organizing committee of the 
Malta Independence Celebrations and one of Borg Olivier's senior 
Ministers, Dr Carmelo Caruana, said that Independence was such 
an important, unique event in Maltese history that it deserved a date 
to itself, hence the 21st September. 18 Actually the 8th September 
was never specifically indicated in official correpondence prior to 
Independence, whatever Dr Borg Olivier's may have had in mind. 
Even so, there were so many variables that it was practically 
impossible to just pick and choose a preordained date, expecting 
others, including representatives of the Queen and the British 
Government, to submit and conform to your convenience. A date 
mutually convenient to those concerned, towards the end of the 
summer when the Duke's diary was rather less packed, had to be 
negotiated. The royal wedding in Athens clearly lent itself to a royal 
visit to Malta on the way back. 
Thus it was that the 215t September, which until now had seemed 
like just another date on paper, began to assume a significance and 
a dynamism of its own. It was, Borg Olivier later recalled, the date 
"closest to" the 8th September "on which agreement could be 
reached." That was also, he added, in regard to the organisation of 
17 Tel., Sandys/Wakefield, 20 Aug. 1964, conf., 926/1920/48583. 
18 H. Frendo, 'L-Indipendenza: Storja ta' Kuragg', Il-Poplu, n. 14, Sept. 1989, pp. 
31-32; Malta's Quest for Independence; Reflections on the Course of Maltese History, op.cit., 
p. 252. The other members of Caruana's organizing committee were Minister J. 
Spiteri, Major F. E. Amato-Gauci, Major V. Castillo, E. Firman, J. Pollacco, Dr V. 
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the celebrations of "that historic occasion, for which Prince Philip 
and Mr Duncan Sandys had to attend", together with other 
personalities. 19 
In the meantime, there were many preparations to be seen to in 
London as well as in Malta, mostly necessary formalities of 
procedure or protocol concerned with the transfer of power, Malta's 
membership of international organizations, guest lists and 
invitations, lunches and dinners, a ball and a banquet, speeches, 
encounters and festivities. The programme for the Independence 
celebrations was drafted and redrafted at least six times, with the 
Maltese side making demands which were sometimes more 
problematic than they seemed at first sight. 
One such was the attendance of Prince Philip, as expected by Dr 
Borg Olivier, at a Holy Mass of Thanksgiving - a Roman Catholic 
Mass, naturally. Until clearance for this could be obtained, 
consultations had taken place between the Colonial Office, Balmoral 
Castle, the Home Office, Downing Street and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. 
There had been at least one precedent, the Home Office found out, 
for the representation of The Queen at a Mass in Britain. However, 
"the presence of Prince Philip would undoubtedly be breaking new 
ground; there might be criticism from some people in this 
country ... " On the other hand, for him to decline attending had to 
be weighed "against the disadvantage of upsetting public opinion in 
Malta." After 10, Downing Street had registered in a memo the 
conclusions of a discussion held with Dr Ramsey, the Secretary of 
State's private office and Sir Martin Charteris at Balmoral Castle 
were informed that "in the circumstances" the Governor of Malta 
would be informed that the Secretary of State saw no objection. 
Dorman was then cabled accordingly.20 It is worth revealing that 
19 'Ghaxar snin Nazzjon Indipendenti' interview, op.cit. 
20 Min., Martin/Jenkins, 7 Sept. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
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~{.~ 
Sir Hilton poo:kn2.l1 
Admiral Bonham-Carter has informed me this 
morning that the Duke of Edinburgh will be prepared 
to represent The Queen at the Malta Independence 
Celebrations on 21st September. 
He will arrive on Saturday, 19th September, 
from Athens in good time for dinner, probably about 
6 p.m. He would like to spend the day on Sunday 
quietly. 
He assumes that the flag-raising ceremony 
will be at midnight on Sunday night, (r ima~ine this 
will be preceded by the usual state banquet). 
The Duke would, if possible, like to leave 
Malta after lunch on Monday, which would mean that 
the formal handing over of the independence documents 
and the State opening of Parliament would have to 
take place on Monday morning, (If absolutely unavoidable 
he would be prepared to stay another night, leaving 
early Tuesday morning. But the Maltese authorities 
should not at this stage be told of this possibility). 
I have informed Dr. Borg Olivier of the above 
(except for the last point). 
We have agreed that the date of independence 
should be announced later this week, after the House of 
Lords Debate, probably on Thursday. 
r now leave it to you to make all necessary 
administrative arrangements. 
6.S;. 
25th July, 1964. 
Copy to Lord Lansdowne. 
The final confirmations. 
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after so much critical talk about religious tolerance and disability, 
Malta on her Independence should have broken a spell against 
'royal' attendance at a Catholic Mass, which had held firm since 
Henry VIII's Reformation. What actually happened was that in the 
morning of Monday 21 st September only Low Mass was said at the 
Independence Arena; by the time the Pontifical High Mass was said 
by the Archbishop at StJohn's on the morning of Wednesday 2yd, 
the Duke had left. 
The Borg Olivier administration were busy making way for Malta's 
membership of international organizations. Britain acted as 
godmother in Malta's membership of the Commonwealth and of the 
United Nations after circulating the Maltese government's request to 
all Commonwealth capitals for information or advice. There was no 
objection in Malta to Commonwealth membership, other than that 
the MLP did not wish to have this done before Independence, 
whereas there was no objection at all to Malta's membership of the 
UN or the Council of Europe. Such undertakings normally required 
the approval of the respective colonial legislature through an 
appropriate resolution. 21 The recommended wording for the 
Commonwealth membership resolution was conveyed by 
Christopher Eastwood to Victor Ragonesi at the Savoy Hotel in July, 22 
after which a preliminary circular went out to Ottawa, Canberra, 
Wellington, Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, 
Nicosia, Freetown, Dar es Salaam, Kingston, Port of Spain, Kampala, 
Nairobi and Zomba.23 In August the Malta Legislative Assembly 
passed the appropriate resolution, as advised. Borg Olivier informed 
Sandys accordingly so that the formal concurrence of the other 
Commonwealth Governments to Malta becoming a member of the 
Commonwealth on Independence be now sought.24 
21 Min., Poynton/Garner, 17 June 1964, conf., 926/1879. 
22 Eastwood/Ragonesi, 24July 1964, 926/1879. 
23 'Malta - Membership of the Commonwealth', 2-MED 706/131/1, enc. 926/1879. 
24 Borg Olivier/Sandys, 22 Aug. 1964, 926/1879. 
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Early in September Borg Olivier asked Sandys if the UK together 
with such other country as they might consider appropriate would 
undertake to sponsor Malta's formal application for membership of 
the UN. Malta wanted to send her application to the UN Secretary-
General as soon after Independence as possible.25 
Sponsorship in the UN Security Council was needed for Malawi and 
Zambia at the same time as Malta. Strictly speaking only one sponsor 
was necessary, and moreover there was no other Commonwealth 
member of the Security Council, apart from Britain. The Chairman 
for October 1964 was Sir Patrick Dean who could sponsor all three 
applications. The other Mrican members of the Security Council 
would spontaneously sponsor Malawi and Zambia, but there was "no 
obvious spontaneous sponsor for Malta". If a second sponsor was 
necessary, Morocco or Brazil looked like appropriate choices, and 
soundings in New York were recommended in this sense. At the 
same time, all Commonwealth countries would be asked to support 
Malta's application in the UN General Assembly. 26 
Advice was also at hand on Malta's arrangements for accredited 
representation in Washington and New York. For example, she 
would be expected to join the Economic Commission for Europe, 
while membership of UN specialized agencies would be most easily 
arranged as soon as Malta would have joined the UN. In the case 
of Gambia, the question of the cost of maintaining a mission at the 
UN had arisen. This depended on Malta of course, but many small 
countries accredited their Ambassador in Washington to the UN as 
well. The cost depended very much on that sort of consideration.27 
Later in 1964 Malta adopted such a practice when Borg Olivier 
nominated a distinguished and very cosmopolitan gentleman of 
Maltese descent to represent the new state both in Washington and 
25 Borg Olivier/Sandys, 4 Sept. 1964,926/1880. 
26 Axworthy/Barder, 16 Sept. 1964,926/1880. 
27 Min., Axworthy/Jenkins, 23 July 1964,926/1880. 
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New York.28 Borg Olivier addressed the General Assembly later in 
1964. 
Malta also joined the Council of Europe, citing her three-
dimensional credentials as a Commonwealth member and a 
European country in the Mediterranean region. Borg Olivier's 
Cabinet decided to apply in August 1964 and Malta's admission was 
then jointly sponsored by Britain and Italy. This application was 
unanimously upheld by the Committee of Ministers in December 
1964, endorsed by the Consultative Assembly in January 1965 and 
implemented in April 1965, thus making Malta the eighteenth 
member state of the Council of Europe (which by 1999 had 41 
member states).29 
Borg Olivier would deliver one of the most insightful and far-sighted 
speeches of his career in addressing the Council on 4th May 1965, 
when he spoke of Malta's joining as a "home coming" after a long 
absence, warned against new forms of nationalism which would keep 
Europe divided, and held out the aspiration for East-West 
reconciliation in a more closely united European continent, from 
which no European state would feel excluded by a privileged 
nucleus.3o 
Another challenge facing Malta as a new small state was the setting 
up of a Ministry for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, as it was 
28 Dr Arvid Pardo (d.1999) became well-known in successfully championing Malta's 
initiative through the UN for protection from exploitation of the world's sea-bed and 
ocean-floor - as "a common heritage of mankind". 
29 See 'Malta's Admission to the Council of Europe' in H. Frendo, Maltese Political 
Development, 1798-1964; A Documentary History, op.cit., p. 915. 
30 Ibid., esp. 'Dr Borg Olivier's Speech to the Council of Europe's Consultative 
Assembly in Strasbourg on 4 May, 1965', pp. 918-921; but see also G. Saliba (Ed.), 
A Council for All Seasons; 50th Anniversary of the Council of Europe (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Valletta, 1999), pp. 32-35; H. Frendo, 'The Council of Europe's Role in 
Malta's Democratization Process', ibid., pp. 79-86; and passim. 
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Malta's first High Commissioner to the UK, Mr John Axisa, presents his 
credentials to the British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home at 10, 
Downing Street, in 1964. As Malta was a monarchy he could not present 
his credentials to "our Queen". Axisa was the Commissioner General for 
Malta in London from 1961 to 1964. Below: Mr F. E.Amato Gauci (centre), 
who was asked to set up a Foreign Service, is seen here with four of Malta's 
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called. The first Maltese overseas representatives had to be earmarked 
for accreditation, while the first fully-fledged Ambassadors would 
soon take up residence in a newly-sovereign country. Borg Olivier 
kept this Ministry under his wing, thus adding Minister of Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs to his title of Prime Minister. 
The first serious decision facing Malta's foreign affairs ministry 
concerned Malta's would-be relations and dealings with China. 
Which China? Following the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalists at the hands of Mao Tse-tung's Communists in 1949, the 
latter had moved their seat to the island of Formosa, better known 
today as Taiwan, hoping initially to regain the mainland. To the UN 
in 1964, China still meant Taiwan, which was a member of the 
Security Council. Chiang Kai-shek had supported the Americans 
against the Japanese during the Second World War, and the 
Americans, who opposed Communism, now supported him in turn. 
The British, however, had broken a lance in favour of the 
Communists, which were assuming much greater clout and 
represented a formidable market. 
As Malta's independence approached, a decision had to be taken as 
to which China to prefer. The Americans tried to influence Malta in 
favour of the Chinese Nationalists, the British in favour of the 
Chinese Communists. Suddenly, Malta was faced by an international 
relations problem, when it had not even become independent yet. 
These Chinese did not recognize one another, and to invite one or 
even both could be regarded as siding against the other. In the end, 
Malta disregarded British nudging and preferred Taiwan, which was 
pro-American, anti-Communist and seemed willing to help out. 
Communist China would not join the UN until 1971 when Richard 
Nixon was the U.S. President - Nixon actually visited this China in 
1972. 
The 'which China' question posits itself as a paradigm in the sudden 
options and approaches facing - and open to - a nascent small state 
in international diplomacy, and in the cultivation or alienation of 
relations with other more powerful states. The Cold War was alive 
and well in the 1960s; power brokers had different agendae. The 
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'which China' question bore to some extent on a not unheard of 
disagreement between two friendly powers, the U.S.A. and the U.K., 
and on how a new small state, in this case Borg Olivier's Malta, might 
navigate in such waters: asserting sovereignty while treading softly. 
Foreign affairs had always been reserved matters for the Crown in 
Malta, even under Malta's internal self-government constitutions of 
1921, 1947 and 1961. It was only in the early 1960s that Malta could 
start to be somewhat exposed to bilateral and multilateral relations, 
but still grudgingly and under watchful British eyes. 
Until the early 1960s, the main bone of contention and party divide 
in Maltese colonial politics had been whether as an orientation Malta 
should aspire to protect, cultivate and promote her long-standing 
Latin Mediterranean roots, or to benefit from adapting herself to 
day-to-day life as a strategic naval outpost of the British Empire. 
That was an invidious tussle between identity and right, on one 
hand, survival and necessity, on the other. A nationalist would have 
also argued for survivance in a Quebecois sense, but for ordinary 
working people jobs and opportunities as these presented 
themselves would have been hardly less important. In the colonial 
cocoon there was plenty of time in which to argue about such 
matters; in an independent state life was faster and necessarily more 
pragmatic. Problems had to be faced head-on and decisons taken by 
the newly-independent people themselves in what they perceived to 
be their own best interests. 
In its own way, the 'which China' question pointed to an emerging 
situation that was in fact quite new for a place like Malta, although 
Borg Olivier liked assuming in his speeches that Malta had been a 
sovereign state before it had become a colony. He told Strasbourg 
in 1965 for instance that "with the recent attainment of 
Independence, Malta regained her sovereignty of old; and one of 
the most ancient nations of Europe returned to take its place among 
the free countries ofthis Continent." But this smacked of a familiar 
old-time typology of nationalist myth: it was not quite true, because 
even under the Order since the 16th century Malta was a fiefdom in 
international law, and such emissaries as the Order had accredited 
or were accredited to it came and went in relation to the Order as 
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an institution not to Malta as a nation-state. Before that, feudalism 
reigned supreme, haltingly and inter-changeably; nor as a rule were 
the dominant feudal masters themselves Maltese. Unwittingly, Borg 
Olivier did himself and Malta a disservice by suggesting that Maltese 
sovereignty had been interrupted at some point, and Malta was now 
reclaiming it. Malta had indeed enjoyed internal autonomy: a 
dominant class at Notabile and two or three other communes may 
have done much as they pleased in various respects at certain times, 
but she had usually belonged to someone or other, and she certainly 
had not exercised sovereignty as an independent state in any 
modern sense at all - possibly and arguably with the exception of a 
few weeks or months in 1798. Decisions on foreign policy, such as 
which state to recognize or accredit to Malta or not, were to all 
intents and purposes being taken by Borg Olivier and his ministry 
in 1964 for the first time in Malta's national history, hence the 
uniqueness of 1964. 
It was precisely because other powers knew this that they were now 
lobbying the soon-to-be independent Maltese government with 
regard to choosing one China rather than the other. The American 
Consul General, Mr Harrison Lewis, tried to see Borg Olivier about 
this already in April 1964. His object was, as he explained, "to 
exclude communist Chinese recognition in countries newly 
achieving Independence". The UK Commissioner kept him at bay 
however. Sir Edward Wakefield referred the American Consul 
General to section 83 of the Malta Constitution of 1961. Her 
Majesty's Government, he told him, controlled Malta's external 
affairs apart from such matters as were referred to in that section. 
The Malta Government, he further told Harrison Lewis, could not, 
without the prior approval of Her Majesty's Government, discuss 
with a representative of the United States Government "such matters 
as post-Independence recognition of either or both of the two 
Chinese governments". 
Lewis had to go back to the State Department to inform them of the 
constitutional position in Malta and to suggest to them "that they 
should obtain the assent" of Her Majesty's Government, through the 
Foreign Office, to the adoption to one of two courses. These were, 
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according to Wakefield, either that, "with our approval", the U.S. 
Consul General should take the matter up with the Malta 
Government; or that the UK Commissioner (himself) should 
approach the Malta Government in the manner desired. 31 
The Foreign Office was both more open and more practical. They 
saw no objection to the U.S. Consul General speaking "direct" to the 
Maltese about this matter: "we must accept that sooner or later they 
will do so." The question was not whether they allowed the 
Americans to speak to the Maltese or not, but "what steps we should 
take to speak to the Maltese ourselves". While realising that neither 
the C.O. nor the C.R.O. would wish "to lay down the law to the 
Malta Government", there was no obvious reason why they should 
not make sure that the Malta Government realised that, "as a newly 
independent state, they will become involved in the China 
controversy" and that they might shortly expect to receive feelers 
from both the Chinese Nationalist authorities in Formosa and the 
Chinese Government in Peking: 
So far as we are concerned, our interest lies in their having 
nothing to do with the Nationalists, but at the same time in 
their having no illusions about the Communists. We could 
therefore reasonably point out that so far as we can judge, 
neither Formosa nor China has anything to contribute to 
Malta's problems, which are basically economic, and that the 
Maltese should therefore beware of their blandishments. 
It was entirely for the Malta Government to decide their own foreign 
policy, but they should realise that there was absolutely no prospect 
of the Nationalists recovering the mainland, and that therefore, "if 
the Malta Government enter into diplomatic relations with them, the 
Maltese may find themselves eventually in the position of King 
Canute."32 
31 Wakefield/Kisch, 29 Apr. 1964, 926/2077. 
32 FlacklKisch, 20 May 1964, conf., 926/2077. 
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This King Canute metaphor was meant to imply that greater power 
lay increasingly with the Communists rather than with the 
Nationalists of China, so the Maltese had better watch it because they 
could be swept aside by the waves. A pagan Danish king who had 
converted to Christianity as King of England before the Norman 
conquest, in a legendary tale Cnut had demonstrated to time-serving 
flatterers the limitations of his powers by failing to make the waves 
recede.33 
Having thus loaded the dice, the Foreign Office then sounded a note 
of caution. They would, on the other hand, 
fully sympathise with any disinclination on the part of the 
Malta Government to have a Communist mission in Malta, 
and if they eventually decide to recognise the Peking 
regime, they would be entitled to make it quite clear that 
they saw no need to exchange representatives.34 
In instructions to the British ambassador in Athens, the Foreign 
Office, after consultation with the Colonial Office, held that they 
would much prefer it if the Nationalist Chinese ambassador there, 
Dr Wen, should "not, repeat not, visit Malta before the Colony 
becomes independent", for the purpose about which he was "so very 
frank". If however an application were made before that time, it 
would have to be referred in the normal way to the Maltese 
Government of course, with whom the final decision lay: 
33 The story was told by a 12th century chronicler, the archdeacon Henry of 
Huntingdon in his Historia Anglorum. In the words of Barton's seven stanza poem: 
Louder the stormy blast swept by,/In scorn of his idle word;/The briny deep its waves 
tossed high,lBy his mandate undeterred,lAs threatening, in their angry play,/To 
sweep both king and court away! See Cardinal F. A. Gasquet's Early English History 
to the Norman Conquest (London, 1926), p. 120. On King Canute see the Maltese 
colonial school textbook, by D.Fallon, ch. VI, The Danish Kings', Outlines of English 
History (G. Muscat, Valletta), pp. 16-17. 
34 FlacklKisch, 20 May, 1964, conf., 926/2077. 
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You should therefore avoid encouraging Dr Wen in any way 
and, should he approach you informally again, point out 
that in view of the absence of relations between the Chinese 
Nationalists and ourselves, it might be better ifhe made his 
approach to the Malta Government after independence, the 
provisional date of which is September 21. 
At the same time, Wakefield was asked to "pass on our views to the 
Malta Government" when the opportunity arose. Reference was also 
made to additional material about this subject enclosed with another 
letter sent to the UK Commission.35 
When on 11 th August The Times of London carried a report saying 
that Dr Borg Olivier had invited representatives of about 60 
governments, including those who were members of the Security 
Council, to send representatives to Independence celebrations from 
16th to 2yd September, the Chinese ambassador approached the 
UK Mission in New York. His Excellency Liu Chieh on 17th August 
asked for further information from his British counter-part, Mr 
Jackling, and hoped that China as a Security Council member would 
be included in the invitations. Although Malta's Independence date 
had been well and truly set if not sealed by 17th August, J ackling told 
Chieh that the Malta Independence Bill had received the Royal 
Assent but had not yet been brought into effect and "no official date 
had been fixed for Malta's independence". J ackling kindly promised 
to pass on Chieh's enquiry to London and that he would tell him if 
he heard anything definite about the Malta invitations.36 If this was 
a Chinese way of testing the British on their stand with Malta on this 
question, the latter had failed the test miserably. From now on, the 
Nationalists of China would deal with the Nationalists of Malta. 
Britain was being of no help to them whatsoever. 
35 F.O. tel., 30 July 1964, to Athens, conf.; Kisch/Watt, 28 May 1964, 926/2077. The 
F.O. communique' was distributed to the Far Eastern Dept., the Central Dept., and 
the Passport Control Dept. 
36 A copy of the UK Mission tel., 18 Aug. 1964, to the F.O., was sent by the C.O. to 
Malta, 20 Aug. 1964,926/2077. 
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Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, with 
a Maltese delegation led by Minister Caruana after Independence. Major 
Castillo, Mr Wirth and Dr Ragonesi formed part of the delegation. 
The Maltese Government thought of inviting the member states in 
the UN Security Council, of which China was one, of NATO, and of 
the Commonwealth. In addition, all the countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean littoral- North, South East and West - were asked. 
Invitations were also issued to other states such as Switzerland, the 
Holy See, the Sovereign Order of Malta, and the chairpersons or 
chief executives of several international organizations including 
LC.E.M., W.H.O., the LL.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., F.A.O., and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The UK 
were entitled to six delegates and up to another six in parliamentary 
delegations from both the Houses of Parliament, with a personal 
invitation addressed to Mr Harold Wilson. Six past governors of 
Malta were pleased to be invited: Dobbie, Douglas, Schreiber, 
Creasy, Laycock and Grantham. Mr B. Lindsay Fynn, who chaired 
the Friends of Malta G.C., was on the list, as was a very special guest, 
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Dr Constantine Colombus, the famous Malta-born jurist, a Greek-
Maltese who had been legal counsel to and a personal friend of the 
former Nationalist leader and twice prime minister Sir Ugo Mifsud 
(d. 1942). Other associations with whom Malta had worked or 
intended joining, such as the Inter-University Council, the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe, were also asked. Each invitation was for 
two delegates or for one delegate and a spouse.37 
Governor Dorman informed Sir John Martin at the C.O. that Dr 
Borg Olivier had told him that the Maltese would like in particular 
to invite Libya and IsraeP8 
By loth August, some sixty invitees had expressed their intention to 
attend, as announced in a press conference by Caruana at the 
Auberge d' Aragon, and reported in the press, including the London 
Times, on the following day.39 
The Maltese Government also wished to invite all member 
governments of NATO to send units of their fleets to participate in 
the Independence celebrations on 21 st September. If this was 
impracticable, they wished at least to ask the five or six nations 
participating in the NATO Mediterranean Naval Command to send 
ships. The C-in-C at HAFMED saw no objection to this, although 
one of those states, France, had withdrawn her ships. The capitals 
of NATO member states - Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Lisbon, Oslo, 
Rome, Washington, Bonn, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Paris and the 
Hague - were informed by Britain about this. In their circular, the 
37 'Invitations to Independence Celebrations', enc. 926/1921. 
38 Min., J. Martin, 30 July 1964, para. 5, 926/1921. 
39 For more details on this press conference, see R. Spiteri and A. Massa, Twelid ta' 
Stat Indipendenti; Malta 1964 (Guga House, Valletta, 1989), p. 148, and all sections 
of the Maltese press. 
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Foreign Office asked their respective Ambassadors and High 
Commissioners to invite the states to which they were accredited, on 
behalf of the Maltese Government, to be represented by units of 
their Navy at the Independence celebrations. In the case of Italy, 
Greece and Turkey the respective ambassadors had to explain that 
the Maltese were "particularly anxious for them to be represented". 
The F.O. added that they doubted whether NATO countries beyond 
those concerned in the Mediterranean area could organise naval 
representation, but they agreed that "it would be a welcome gesture 
if the four members, in addition to the United Kingdom, who 
participate in the Mediterranean area, could be represented". 40 
So far, so good. That, however, was to reckon without any political 
problems. Of these Malta had her fair share, and more so than was 
generally realised. 
Mintoff's Labour Party felt let down and left out. Even on 
Independence Day, they broke ranks. None of their more liberal, 
laicist or secularist points had found a place in the Independence 
Constitution: the restrictions relating to Catholic burial, Catholic 
education, marriage law, ecclesiastical preference or privilege, an 
electoral law less open to spiritual sanction, Western morality 
principles regulating whatever was decent or socially admissable. 
Not one of the sitt punti as such was in it. The great welcome given 
to Borg Olivier on his own return home after a long absence, on 26th 
July - "when the cheers drowned the noise from the engines of his 
own airplane" - was in return for the advent of Independence, 
accompanied by a reassuring defence and financial package; but it 
was also no doubt a vindication of the church-supported stand 
against Mintoff's so-called "six points", which were nowhere "in the 
bag" after all. 
A general anti-discrimination clause had been introduced and the 
two offensive clauses discriminating in favour of the Catholic Church 
40 F.O./Ankara specimen, 26 Aug. 1964, conf., 926/1921. 
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in human rights provisions had been removed, but any specific 
infringement would have to be te5ted in time (as soon enough it was, 
when the Labour Party won its case against the prohibition to a 
patient of access to an MLP newspaper in St Luke's Hospital, a public 
general hospital). 
Mintoff could have swallowed hard and given a conditional welcome 
to Independence, for which his party had fought so hard. He could 
have promised to liberalize, republicanize and change whatever he 
thought should be improved once he and his party would be 
returned to office by the Maltese electorate. Such a stance was taken 
subtly by the GWU, whose Union Press, like all other press stables 
except the MLP one, published a special supplement on 21 st 
September to commemorate Malta's Independence - although they 
had their own reservations about it. However, as Attard Kingswell 
confided to this writer in 1989 and again in 1999, they never saw 
the Independence Constitution as "static and unchangeable"; nor 
were they in favour of a resort to violence to try and wrest a different 
Independence.41 
Of the four Opposition parties, the MLP alone determined on a 
stridently antagonistic course of action during Independence week, 
when scores of distinguished representatives would be visiting Malta 
to greet her as a new member of the international community. This 
programme of activities was described as non-violent, but it was 
defiant, noisy and potentially troublesome. All party clubs were 
instructed to fly the flag at half-mast, accompanied by a black sash, 
as a sign of national mourning.42 
41 Time would prove the GWU right in this, because that Constitution was in fact 
changed. Malta was turned into a Republic in 1974 when the MLP were in office 
through a two-thirds majority in parliament. There was no referendum this time; 
in a free vote Borg Olivier himself and some other Nationalist MPs cast their votes 
against. 
42 "Tellghu l-Bandiera Maltija Mezz'asta bil-Vistu Maghha", and see "Id-Direttivi 
Ta' L-Ezekuttiv Nazzjonali tal-Malta Labour Party", Il-ltelsien, 17 Sept. 1964, p.!. 
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As a precaution, public meetings and demonstrations in any public 
place, other than official Independence celebrations, from the 16th 
to the 24th September inclusive, were banned by a proclamation 
published in the Government Gazette on 15th September. This initiative 
came from Police Commissioner de Gray who persuaded Ministers, 
"some of whom were at first reluctant", that such a ban was sensible. 
De Gray considered that although MLP extremists would wish to 
disobey the ban, the rank and file would be discouraged from 
supporting them. The GWU President, Danny Cremona, 
immediately attacked the ban, saying it violated human rights, 
aimed to stifle a large section of the population who disapproved of 
the Independence settlement, and displayed the Government's fears 
lest the "workers' movement" would make an impact on foreign 
delegates coming for the celebrations.43 
It is not clear to what extent Mintoff's popularity was surging at this 
turn of events. Although the official posture adopted by the party 
was typically defiant but wisely not a violent one, most people 
seemed reassured by the fact that Independence was accompanied 
by security and finance safety valves, without clauses deemed to be 
offensive or undesirable to the majority; and now that it had come, 
there was perhaps little point in opposing it by shouting in the street 
during the celebrations. Others however felt they had to make their 
voices heard and their resentment known at what in MLP circles was 
portrayed as a sell-out to the Catholic Church and the British 
Government. 
If official estimates of the numbers of people attending public 
gatherings in the summer of 1964 can serve as a reading of the nation's 
pulse, it would seem that Mintoff's standing had suffered, or that Borg 
Olivier's had risen. The biggest of three MLP public meetings in July 
was ajoint MLP-GWU demonstration on 12th July, which attracted a 
crowd of 2,500.44 When however Sandys made his independence 
43 Wakefield/Sandys, 16 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/2076. 
44 Int. rep., 4 July-6 Aug. 1964, sec., para. 1, f.l, 926/1822/48655. 
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announcement in the Commons on 21't July, the "shock" was 
conveyed in the monthly British intelligence report as follows: 
The Nationalist Party went wild with excitement and 
delight. They praised Borg Olivier extravagantly, and 
interpreted his success principally as a Nationalist Party 
triumph and as a blow to Mintoff. The Nationalist Party 
organised a triumphant homecoming for Borg Olivier. At 
the Airport he was given an enthusiastic reception by a large 
crowd of his own supporters; and in Valletta, where he 
spoke from the balcony of the Palace, he was welcomed by 
a crowd of some 12,000.45 
That was more than four times the size of the estimated crowd at the 
earlier MLP-GWU demonstration. Moreover, according to another 
estimate, an MLP public meeting (held at Birzebbugia, a Labour 
stronghold, on 26th July, the day when the Prime Minister's aircraft 
was due to land on his return from London) was "only moderately 
attended", and Mintoffspoke "with comparative moderation".46 On 
the whole, regard for Borg Olivier's abilities, and support for his 
Government by the end of July were considered to be "greater than 
at any time since he took office in 1962".47 While GWU strike 
threats for pay rises especially by its Dockyard Section were partly 
settled or shelved, and a call to boycott the Eighth Malta Trade Fair 
went largely unheeded, the MLP announced its opposition 
programme for Independence week. As a build-up to this, Mintoff 
inveighed against the Independence Constitution and the Defence 
Treaty. He also attacked the British Labour Party, which in spite of 
the pleas of two Maltese Labour MPs -Agatha Barbara and Dr Philip 
Muscat despatched to London to lobby Labour MPs in their favour 
when the Malta Independence Bill was before the House of 
Commons - had still not really opposed the Bill. 
45 Ibid., para. 2, f. 2. 
46 Ibid., para. 4, f. 3. 
47 Ibid., para. 5, f. 4. 
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Speaking in private after the announcement about the agreements 
reached, Mintoff said that the Defence Treaty made the British 
virtual rulers of Malta, giving them the power to move troops 
wherever they liked in the Islands. It also gave them the right to 
take any action, without even consulting the Government of 
Malta, whenever they felt that the security of the Islands was 
threatened. He criticised that part of the Defence Treaty which did 
not allow the Government of Malta to bring in foreign troops 
without the approval of the British Government. He said that his 
party should fight to get the Defence Treaty abrogated irrespective 
of the fact that the Financial Agreement was bound to it. On the 
Financial Agreement, Mintoff said that for what the British 
Government was taking in terms of defence, it was giving very little. 
He also criticised those clauses affecting the Dockyard and its 
development. 
The MLP, Mintoff said, had been caught between two power blocks 
and was suffering the consequences. No one should expect him in 
the present circumstances to throw the people into a fight against 
the imperial forces, as this would only be a "waste of blood" . There 
were strong forces ranged against them that would smash the 
Labour Movement. The only practicable solution was to watch 
carefully for any breach between the two power blocks, which could 
be exploited to the party's advantage. A frontal attack would be 
suicidal. They should use "harrassing tactics" which would not 
involve" grave loss of life". 48 
Mintoff criticised the British Labour Party for their indifference to 
the MLP's cause in supporting the passing of the Independence Bill 
through Parliament, and he described their action as a betrayal of 
the principles they had bound themselves to defend. He said that 
he would "bring shame" to the faces of the British Labour Party 
delegates at the Socialist International conference, by denouncing 
them to other Socialist delegates. 
48 Annex, into rep., 4 July-6 Aug. 1964, sec., para. 5-7, f.2, 926/1823/48655. 
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To boycott the Independence celebrations, an MLP Action 
Committee was formed and decided on a nine-point plan, as follows: 
1. Corner meetings and conferences to start all over the 
island; directives to be given to district officials and 
representatives of the Women's Section, Labour League 
of Youth and Labour Brigade on action to be taken; 
2. Posters and slogans to be displayed attacking the 
Defence treaty and the Independence Constitution; 
3. M.L.P. Clubs to fly flags at half-mast on Independence 
Day; 
4. Leaflets to be distributed to foreign visitors about the 
political situation and the events which led up to it; 
5. M.L.P. officials to try and make direct personal contact 
with official foreign representatives to give them their 
views; 
6. The M.L.P. to ask the Broadcasting Authority to allow 
it to give a talk on the Defence Treaty and the 
Independence Constitution, and to arrrange a debate 
on these issues between the M.L.P. and Government 
teams; 
7. On Saturday, 19th September, a mass meeting to be 
held, and on Sunday, 20th September, a demonstration 
to be held; 
8. On Monday, 21st September, to hold a mock ceremony 
at the Freedom Press for the lowering of the British flag; 
and 
9. The Parliamentary Group to walk out when the Duke of 
Edinburgh starts to deliver his speech at the Opening of 
Parliament. Mter the walk-out the Parliamentary Group 
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to make their way along Kingsway to the M.L.P. club in 
Kingsway. Mintoffto address the crowd from the balcony. 
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On the ninth point, the Action Committee was said to realise that 
the Parliamentary Group would have to make their way through a 
big crowd and were prepared to let events take their course. One 
Action Committee member had allegedly suggested that 700 "tough 
members" should be found to start trouble or defend Mintoff in the 
event of trouble. Others however were of the view that MLP 
members should stay away from the opening of Parliament.49 
There was concern particularly at the threatened walkout by the 
16 Labour MPs during the Speech from the Throne. Such a walk-
out would not be the first one by the MLP - they had already done 
it in 1962 to Governor Grantham - but this time it was H.R.H. 
delivering the speech and the occasion was obviously far more 
important. Such a walkout during the Duke's speech risked 
denigrating and disrupting the State opening of Parliament 
ceremony at its very highlight. Even though this might be intended 
as a demonstration against the British and Maltese governments, 
it could not fail to be regarded as "extremely rude" to H.R.H. It 
was not thought that the C.O. could get anywhere by "a personal 
appeal to Mr Mintoff's better nature". 50 Less charitably, Sir Hilton 
Poynton saw no point in an appeal to Mr Mintoff's better nature 
"because he hasn't got one". They would impress upon Dorman 
and Wakefield the need to ensure that the Malta police controlled 
demonstrations and any distrubances effectively. 51 
Much more ominous was the report that "a secret plot to murder 
the Prime Minister, probably during the Independence 
celebrations" was afoot. 
49 Annex, into rep., 7 Aug.-3 Sept. 1964, sec., para. 4-5, if. 1-3,926/1823/48655. 
50 Min., Eastwood/Poynton, 11 Sept. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
51 Min., Poynton/Sandys, 11 Sept. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
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Current frustrations had impelled a few MLP leaders who advocated 
violence to consider that some more desperate measures must be 
taken, to arouse the people to take up arms, stated the report: 
There is talk of a secret plot to murder the Prime Minister, 
probably during the Independence celebrations. To this 
end, those concerned are collecting funds and seeking a 
man willing to carry out this murder. It is realised by the 
M.L.P. extremists that an assassination although against the 
Prime Minister might endanger the Duke of Edinburgh. 
One extremist has said that this would be all to the good, as 
bound to cause a bigger sensation. 
Mintoff, however, was not being told of this plot. The reason for this 
given by the informer was "because he (Mintofl) would he afraid of 
retaliation".52 
Borg Olivier was so far unaware of this, as was Mintoff. London took 
the matter very seriously indeed, also because the life of the Duke of 
Edinburgh could be imperiled in an attempt on Dr Borg Olivier's life. 
The C.O. immediately wanted to know what the risks of the plot 
materialising were, if Dr Borg Olivier had been informed of it, and 
what special security arrangements were being made, and were these 
adequate?53 
The UK Commissioner replied that it was three weeks since the 
information about the murder plot had been received and there had 
been no subsequent confirmation of it. He thought the risk of the 
plot "materialising" was remote but de Gray had taken the 
precaution of asking the Commander of Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch for assistance, and Chief Superintendent Suttling was 
arriving in Malta on the following day, Wednesday, 17th September. 
52 Annex, into rep., 7 Aug.-3 Sept. 1964, sec., para. 6, f. 3, 926/1823/48655. 
53 Cypher tel., Sandys/Wakefield, 15 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/1823/48655. This reaction, 
marked Top Secret', was copied, among others, to Ml 4B in the Army Department 
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This report in early September of a plot by MLP extremists to assassinate 
Dr Borg Olivier, probably during the Independence celebrations, led to a 
full-scale Scotland Yard investigation, and the stepping up of security 
precautions. 
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The Prime Minister had not been informed. Special security 
arangements were being made but Suttling would advise whether 
these were adequate. 54 
On Tuesday 16th September a top level meeting was held with Mr 
Sandys in the Commonwealth Relations Office This was also attended 
by Commander E. Jones from the Metropolitan Police (who was the 
Commander of Special Branch at Scotland Yard) and Mr P.L.Taylor 
from the Home Office. The meeting was called specifically to discuss 
the report of "talk in the Malta Labour Party of a plot to murder the 
Prime Minister of Malta, probably during the Independence 
Celebrations, with consequent risk to the Duke of Edinburgh". 
In discussion it was agreed that whatever view was taken of the 
seriousness of this report, "we could not afford to take any risks". It 
had to be followed up immediately and fully. Mr Sandys therefore 
gave the following instructions. First, Chief Superintendent Suttling, 
a Senior Officer in the Special Branch, who had left for Malta that 
day, should prepare an assessment as to the extent of the danger. 
Second, if there was a serious risk, it would be necessary to take at 
once such exceptional measures as might be required; but even if 
the risk was slight, all reasonable precautions, short of extreme 
measures, should be taken to ensure the safety of the Duke of 
Edinburgh. Third, detailed information was required of the 
precautions being taken by the Malta Commissioner of Police to 
judge their adequacy. The Inspector General of Colonial Police, Sir 
Ivo Stourton, should go to Malta at once to obtain this information 
and discuss the position with the Commissioner of Police there. 
Fourth, enquiries should be made to find out why this information 
had been withheld from Dr Borg Olivier, so that a decision would 
be taken as to whether he should not be told. 55 
54 Tel., Wakefield/Sandys, 16 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/1823/48655. 
55 Record of a Meeting with the Colonial Secretary at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 16th 
September, 1964, in the C.R.O., top sec., 926/1823/48655. Together with Mr Sandys 
at the meeting there was also Lord Lansdowne, and five other C.O. officials, 
including Sir Hilton Poynton, Mr C. Eastwood and Mr J. Kisch. 
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On the same day Poynton cabled Wakefield to insist on a full report 
covering his assessment of the degree of risk and of the measures 
being taken. Mr Sandys considered that Dr Borg Olivier "ought also 
to be fully informed of these reports and of the security measures 
being taken". It was presumed that this could be done "without 
compromising source". Possibly it would be desirable also to let 
Mintoff know. "Perhaps you could suggest this to the Prime 
Minister." 
Mr Sandys wished his own Police Advisor, Sir Ivo Stourton, to fly out 
urgently to discuss plans with Chief Superintendent Suttling and 
Commissioner de Gray. Although it was felt that de Gray would be 
averse from such a visit, it was important that Stourton had full 
cooperation. Wakefield was instructed to put this proposal to Borg 
Olivier and to report back urgently before 18.00 hours that same day 
as to whether Stourton's visit would be acceptable. Stourton could 
fly out that night catching a place from London at 21.20 hours. 56 
Wakfield phoned up in the late afternoon to say he had been unable 
to see Borg Olivier but he was sure it would be O.K. for Stourton 
to fly out that night. He would meet him and put him up. He was 
confident that he would be able "to fix this" with the Prime Minister 
in the morning. 57 
That night, de Gray informed Borg Olivier of the reports. He also 
briefed him on the security measures being taken. Borg Olivier 
realised that the fullest possible precautions were necessary but was 
not himself "at all alarmed". Nor did he think it desirable to inform 
Mintoff about the reports. 
On the morning of the following day, 17th September, Stourton met 
with the D.S.O.,58 Suttling and others, including de Gray, and 
56 Cypher tel., Poynton/Wakefield, 16 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/1823/48655. 
57 Min., H. Poynton, 16 Sept. 1964, top sec., 926/1823/48655. 
58 D.S.O. stands for Defence Security Officer (Mr John Venn). 
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TOP SECRET 
INWARD TELEGRAM 
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES 
FROM If.ALTA (Sir E. Wakerield) 
Cypher 
~ m: ~!~RET 
D. 17th September, 1964. 
R. 17th 11 11 
(It'}? '{our telegram No. 631. 
Following for Poynton. 
Begins. 
16.10 hrs. 
a"···;7.,.,,,; . .. ~~:: ~'- : ',:6.\'" I 
44 
Stourton arrived this morning and has already had 
consultations with D.S.O .. and 8uttllng. He has use seen 
Prime IUniBter who fully understands reason for visit and 
welcomes it as doeo De Grey .. 
2. Prime 1l1nlster was informed last night by De Grey 
o£ reporta and of seourity measures being taken. He realises 
that t'ulleot possible precaut10ns are necessary but la not 
himself at a11 alarmed .. 
3. I suggested to Prime JUnister that )Untott ahoul.d 
be in1'ormed about reports but he thought this undesirable. 
4. Stourton will. telegraph assessment to reach you 
tomorrow af"ternoon. 
Distribution: -
Secretary ot State 
Minister of State 
Ends. 
Parliamentary Under-Seoretary of State 
:;; ~~\,:~;in ):,j.r.- \-\. e" '-t" ~ 
Mr. Eaatwood 
llr. K1ach 
}fr .. H1gham 
Kr .. Dowo..1e 
Hr .. T .. Jenkina 
J.I.C. External D1atribut1on 
Box 500 
IUniatry of Defence (Army Dept.) 
Commonweal tb Relations Ot'f'ioe 
Commander E. Jones, 
Spe01al Branch, Sootland Yard. 
Home Ot"t"ioe (lioraet'erry House) 
Sir E. Ford, 
Buckingham Pal.nce. 
- M.I.4B 
- lIr .. C.8. Pickard 
- Kr. P.L. Tayl.ol' 
Sir Ivo Stourton was the Inspector General of Colonial Police. Chief 
Superintendent Suttling, who had arrived in Malta on the previous day, was 
a Senior Officer in the Special Branch, reporting to Commander E. J ones 
at Scotland Yard. It was at the behest ofSandys that de Gray informed Borg 
Olivier about the reported murder plot. 
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planned to telegraph back his assessment on the 18th , as he duly 
did. 59 
Nothing had been volunteered of the murder plot by the 
"original source since he first mentioned it at the end of August". 
An attempt was made to approach him within the last 24 hours 
on specific aspects of the alleged plot: place, time, and method. It 
was not yet known "what if any information he will be able to 
produce". 
Accurate advance information had however been obtained of the 
intended MLP directives on the behaviour of members during the 
celebrations. These directives had since been published, and showed 
that the MLP leadership had ordered non-violent activities. 
However, the plans showed that demonstrations, "while technically 
non-violent, may certainly be noisy, and could lead to broken 
heads". 
Stourton referred in particular to three instances, which could cause 
problems. During the MLP meeting at their Headquarters on the 
afternoon of 19th September, loudspeakers would relay speeches to 
the crowd in the road at about the same time when His Royal 
Highness was expected to pass, at one point on his route, from the 
airport to Sant'Anton. On 20th September, party supporters would 
assemble in Valletta to make noisy demonstrations at appropriate 
periods during the official celebrations. MLP members should stay 
away from the Opening of Parliament ceremony, but MLP 
supporters should be present in streets outside the Palace to voice 
protests. 
De Gray was confident that all this could be contained including, if 
necessary, a last-minute decision to change the Duke of Edinburgh's 
route. Additional unconfirmed information had just been received 
that some MLP district officials were 
59 Cypher tel., Wakefield/Poynton, 17 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/1823/48655. 
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talking wildly of blowing up main power station, "rushing 
the platform" on some occasion, and throwing fireworks 
among crowd to cause confusion during flag-lowering 
ceremony on night of 20th September. 
This appeared to be contrary to the MLP directives but Stourton was 
consulting urgently with de Gray, Suttling and the D.S.O. as to what 
action might be necessary.60 
Judging by Mintoff's discourse at this delicate stage, it would seem 
that having sown the wind he now risked reaping the whirlwind. He 
must certainly have had inkling that some of those he liked to call 
"hot-heads" were taking matters into their own hands, and to 
extremes. In warning against a "frontal attack" being "suicidal" 
because the "strong forces" ranged against them would "smash 
them", Mintoff was trying to stop a blood bath; his timely 
intervention could well have prevented the civil strife to which his 
rousing speech may have incited. In August, when the murder plot 
was reported, twelve bren guns destined for the British Army in 
Libya had been stolen in Malta. For a fortnight Special Investigation 
Branch carried out interrogations to recover them; these included 
questioning Maltese civilians employed at the Army Ordnance Depot 
in Attard.61 
Mintoff's public discourse also changed, especially after his Naxxar 
meeting in June, when he had warned that blood would be shed. 
Speaking in Birkirkara in July he said that the party should win 
"through the use of reason not by the shedding of blood". He told 
those present to continue working "quietly" (bil-kwiet) for the good 
of their brother workers.62 A relative of one who was a leading MLP 
60 Cypher tel., Stourton/Poynton, 18 Sept. 1964, sec., 926/1823/48655. 
61 "Bren-Guns Missing", Malta News, 2 Sept. 1964, p.lo 
62 "Nirbhu Bir-Raguni U Mhux Bit-Tixrid Ta' Demm", l-orizzont, 6 July 1964, p,3; 
"Nirbhu Bir-Raguni ... lmma ... ", Il-Helsien, 6 July 1964, p.lo 
HOPES AND FEARS ON THE APPOINTED DAY 679 
activist in the early Sixties63 vividly recalls how worried his father had 
been just at this time, because of what was about to happen in Malta. 
The assassination was planned to take place shortly after 
Independence, when the Duke would have left. In the family, he 
remembers hearing the names ofDr Anton Buttigieg and ofMr Leli 
Tabone mentioned as the ones who were thought to have found out, 
and who intervened to dissuade those intent on perpetuating the 
crime;54 it was probably they who alerted Mintoffto the very grave 
danger involved. 55 If so, this was a parallel situation to that 
experienced at about the same time in the GWU, when due to the 
moderating stance taken by Indri Cilia and others, the Union did 
not go along with the MLP executive's request to join the party in 
violent action if necessary. 55 
De Gray was confident that any eventualities arising from the 
rumoured disturbances could be contained and he had already 
taken steps. He was ready to switch the Duke's route should 
conditions make it advisable. For security reasons, the decision to 
switch route would be taken at the latest possible moment. 
Arrangements had been made to put extra police on guard at the 
power station and to bring the Services' generator into use in the 
event of a disruption of the main electricity supply. To deal with any 
troubles duing the Independence ceremonies, special groups of 
63 His mother was the sister of the militant dockyard employee Karmnu Zammit 
(nicknamed 'Barbettu'), a regular correspondent of Il-ffelsien in the early Sixties. 
54 A dockyard fitter from Cospicua who was President of the MLP (1947-1959) as 
well as President of the GWU (1953-55), Leli Tabone (1911-1980) became general 
secretary of the Malta Technical and Clerical Association (1961-62) and Vice-
President of the CMTU (1963-65). He served as Minister of Labour in the first 
Mintoff administration (1955-58). 
65 Joseph Montfort was married to Karmnu Zammit's sister. The recollections and 
impressions referred to here are those recounted by Mr Montfort's son, Robert, and 
his grandson, Eric, as confided to this author in interviews, 12 Aug., 14 Aug. 1999. 
See also above, II, 14, esp. pp. 490-491. 
66 See above, II, 14, pp. 463-465. 
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The Speaker Mr Paolo Pace together with the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
members listen to Prince Philip reading the speech from the throne while 
the police clear the streets around the palace of rowdy MLP demonstrators. 
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police had been "closely examined by us". De Gray's precautions 
were considered "sound". A copy of this report was intended for 
Commander J ones. 67 
Between the 19th and the 22nd September MLP supporters caused 
some trouble, but not too much. Other than booing and some 
slogans like "Sandys Go Home", there were a few instances of stone-
throwing and damage to cars reported on the day that the Duke 
arrived - his route was in fact changed. Dr Messina's car was hit near 
the Freedom Press, and when he stopped the Italian flag was torn 
from its bonnet. There were whistles and cat-calls in Valletta on the 
morning of Sunday 20th as the police, using cavalry, controlled the 
demonstrators while a difile of floats depicting historical episodes and 
international organizations paraded down the streets. Hundreds of 
Labour supporters were in Valletta that morning. Superintendent 
Frank Tonna was stabbed in the abdomen in Kingsway in front of 
the Savoy cinema and rushed to hospital, while a man from Kalkara 
was caught red-handed throwing a grenade near the Cafe' Premier, 
close to the Governor's Palace. In the rush the culprit had failed to 
remove the grenade's 'safety pin' so it failed to explode. The hand 
grenade was confiscated by the police. In the melie several 
demonstrators were slightly injured; one, Alfred Frendo, was hit by 
a cavalry horse in Kingsway. Flip-flops and sandles littered the streets 
before their owners returned later to pick them up. Five men were 
charged with carrying arms illegally; another man, from Qrendi, was 
held for wounding a police constable. Other disturbances took place 
in Valletta on Monday 21't, when according to Il-Helsien "the 
Labourites dominated Valletta", and again on Tuesday 22nd , when 
at one point Bishop Galea's car was surrounded and pelted with 
pennies. There was a commotion during the State Opening of 
Parliament on Tuesday morning when Mintoff and other MPs 
looked out of the palace balcony angrily as Prince Philip was 
addressing the House to boos and chants while the police on foot and 
on horseback crushed onto the MLP supporters to clear the squares 
















































































































































684 THE ORIGINS OF MALTESE STATEHOOD 
and streets around the palace. Labour MPs did not stay in the Hall 
of St Michael and St George to listen to the Duke's address; they only 
participated in the parliamentary sitting in the Tapestry Chamber.68 
A number of demonstrators were detained. 
The main attraction, and the one most well attended, was on the 
night of Sunday 20th, starting at 10.30 p.m., when the flag-lowering 
and flag-raising ceremonies took place amidst appropriate 
spectacles, including music, song and dance. In one corner of the 
Floriana parade ground near the Phoenicia Hotel, since called the 
Independence Arena, a chorus of boos could be heard but this soon 
receded, as did the booers when the police moved them further 
away. There was some more booing, mixed with cheers, for the 
Duke, the Prime Minister, the Archbishop et al, at the opening of 
Parliament ceremony and on other occasions; but that was it. 
On the morning of the 21 st it was again at the Independence Arena 
that the more important and popular ceremonies took place, 
including the handing of the Independence documents by Prince 
Philip to Dr Borg Olivier, marking the transfer of power: 
sovereignty, at last. 
During this unusually long weekend, with two public holidays added 
on, various other Independence events took place on land and sea, 
from band marches in towns and villages to skiing and yachting 
races. Schoolchildren rallied at the Independence Arena where they 
performed acrobatic feats, lit a flame, and warmly greeted the Prime 
Minister who toured around in an open jeep, hands raised 
acknowledging the cheers. Honoris causa degrees were conferred by 
the Royal University of Malta on Prince Philip, Dorman and Borg 
Olivier on Monday, while Sandys on Tuesday lay the foundation 
stone of the new university campus in Msida, which decorously 
enough was blessed by Cardinale. 
68 See the illustrated reports of these events and of the disturbances esp. in the~Times 
and the Sunday Times, Il-l1addiem, l-orizzont, Malta News and Il-l1elsien, 20-24 Sept. 
1964, passim. 
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When on the stroke of midnight the red and white colours swiftly ran up 
the flagpole being vacated by the union jack, to the pealing of church bells, 
salutes and cries of "Viva Malta!", there followed the most splendid display 
of fireworks over the surrounding bastions and harbours. 
Emotions ran high mostly on the Sunday night, as midnight 
approached. Bands played as distinguished personalities arrived; 
strains from Auld Lang Syne drifted and floated around. 69 The 
Grand Harbour was lit up with naval units, the bastions flood-lit; an 
aura of anticipation seemed to envelop the place, under a September 
69 Even Ganado felt this, Rajt Malta Tinbidel, vol. 4, op.cit., p. 429. 
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The Duke of Edinburgh, on behalf of The Queen, formally transfers 
sovereignty to the Prime Minister of Malta in the Independence Arena, 
Floriana, on the morning of Sunday 21" September 1964. Below: a battery 
of TV crews and photographers record the scene as the Prime Minister 
waves the empowering constitutional instruments which the Duke had just 
handed him. 
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The prime minister being presented with the official heraldic emblem of 
the independent State of Malta, with a dolphin on either side of the 
crowned national colours retaining the George Cross. 
moon. The event was highlighted by the presence of His Royal 
Highness and many dignitaries from so many different places. 
Prayers were said and thoughts raised to the Almighty for guidance, 
perseverance and unity. Malta's motto, inspired by a document 
dating back to earlier times was: Virtute et Constantia. 7o 
70 Cremona says he found this reference and Borg Olivier liked it. CremonalFrendo 
interviews, June 1999. 
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The thronging crowds were moved, in some cases to tears, as the 
Maltese national colours were raised to loud cheers and the playing 
of the Maltese national anthem: Lil din l-Art helwa, l-omm li tatna 
isimha ... (To this fair land, the mother whose name we bear ... ) Shouts 
of "Viva Malta!" came from many directions in the massed crowds, 
without any fear of thus falling foul of the law. Readings and 
speeches were partly lost in the commotion. It was, as Borg Olivier 
called it, an unforgettable day, when appealing at the same time for 
national unity, as did the Archbishop in his prayers. 
Nobody was killed. There was no coup d'itat. Borg Olivier may have 
been right after all not to be unduly perturbed by either the coup 
d'itat or the assassination plot reports, although prevention was 
better than cure. Perhaps he knew the Maltese, including Mintoff 
and his party (who were after all Maltese like the rest) better than 
any British secret agent did. Still, some incidents and skirmishes 
could have had a worse outcome. 
After midnight and before daybreak, there was the most spectacular 
display of fireworks from the bastions around the harbours. As the 
twenty-first of September dawned on Malta, it became a very special 
day indeed. It was a solemn beginning, in style, full of promise. As 
Borg Olivier put it in his speech on the morning of 21 st September, 
Independence did not mean "we did not need anyone any more, or 
that we could now work less ... "71 
The Duke came and went safely, not having to bother even with any 
disruptive walk-out. Labour MPs just did not stay for The Queen's 
Speech. So much effort had gone into making that Day happen 
though - two very full years of negotiations, touch and go, with no 
breakthrough until the very end. 
The twilight too, it turned out, had been taken care of. At the 
meeting of 25 th July in London, when Sandys had confirmed to 
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A fly-past of planes, a flight of doves. The church dominating the 
background is that dedicated to St Publius, venerated as Malta's first 
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Borg Olivier the Duke's arrival on the 19th September at 6 p.m., 
Giovanni Felice had remarked that 6 p.m. would be alright so long 
as it was stilllight.72 Perhaps he was preoccupied about security too. 
Whatever it was, that remark led to an investigation about the 
sunset, the twilight and the dusk on a September day in Malta. 
The twilight find-out went like this. Almost certainly as a result of 
Felice's remark about the state of light at 6 p.m. just before the 
appointed day - and just as that day was itself being appointed - the 
Commonwealth Relations Office contacted R.A.F. Headquarters at 
Luqa. The Secretary of State's private secretary, N. B. J. Huijsman, 
communicated his discoveries to Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter at 
Buckingham Palace. "I understand that there have been enquiries 
as to whether it would still be light in Malta at 6 p.m. on 19th 
September, if His Royal Highness were to arrive there at that time", 
Huijsman began before supplying the details: 
... sunset on the 19th September will be at 1801 hours. From 
then until 1826 hours there will be the period of daylight 
which is, I believe, technically known as evening twilight, 
after which it gets dark. During evening twilight the stars 
start coming out and there is still a glow from the sun.73 
IfMr Huijsman expected gratitude for these enquiries, he was wrong. 
"I simply cannot imagine", retorted Admiral Bonham-Carter, "how 
you came to be bothered with such a footling enquiry which you have 
had to answer ... Ifit came from my office, I apologise humbly, we are 
quite capable of finding such things out for ourselves."74 
The night of 20th September was still and humid, but the sky seemed 
somehow larger that night, perhaps because the Floriana parade 
72 See above, p. 647. 
73 Huijsman/Bonham-Carter, 7 Aug. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
74 Bonham-Carter/Huijsman, 13 Aug. 1964,926/1920/48583. 
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ground, where countless troops had marched and massed bands 
played, was the largest open space in a Maltese urban environment. 
It was a very Maltese night, but an exceptionally memorable one too. 
The glow in the hearts of those present was from the sense of 
occasion. The stars indeed came out, as promised by the organizers. 
It had been a long twilight. At the break of dawn, a quite different 
day beckoned. 
At the Colonial Office, a solitary official minuted a concluding 
minute, saying that this file was not concerned with anything that 
happened in Malta after midnight on 20th September - "and it may 
now be closed - at once". 75 
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